

1993

Abbreviations

Mark S. McLeod

Follow this and additional works at: <http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality>

 Part of the [Epistemology Commons](#), and the [Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

McLeod, Mark S., "Abbreviations" (1993). *Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology*. Paper 3.
<http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality/3>

This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Christian Studies at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in *Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology* by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University.

Abbreviations

- CMP Christian mystical practice
- CP Christian practice
- J_d Deontological justification
- J_{di} Involuntary deontological justification
- J_e Evaluative justification
- J_{eg} Grounds evaluative justification
- J_{eg}[★] Grounds evaluative justification (applied to epistemic practices)
- J_n Normative justification
- J_{ns} Strong normative justification
- J_{nw} Weak normative justification
- PP Perceptual practice
- PT Parity thesis. There are many versions of the parity thesis, the most general of which is this: Under appropriate conditions, (1) S's engaging in an epistemic practice *EP*, which generates theistic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (2) S's believing that *p*, where *p* is a theistic belief (of a specified kind), has the same level and (specified) kind of epistemic status as (3) S's engaging in an epistemic practice *EP*[★], which generates nontheistic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (4) S's believing that *p*[★], where *p*[★] is a non-theistic belief (of a specified kind).
- PT_A Alston's parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are J_{nw}.

- PT_{AS} Alston's strong parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are J_{cg}[★].
- PT_A[★] Alston's parity thesis[★]: Under appropriate conditions, both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are prima facie rational.
- PT_N New parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, engaging in CP and engaging in unique person practice have, for S, the same level and strength of overall rationality.
- PT_{P1} Plantinga's parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, where no overrides are present, S's belief that *p*, where *p* is a belief about God, has the same nonclassical normative proper basicity (the strongest level) as S's belief that *p*[★], where *p*[★] is a paradigm belief.
- PT_{P1}' Plantinga's parity thesis': Under appropriate conditions, where no overrides are present, S's belief that *p*, where *p* is a belief about God, has at least the same nonclassical normative proper basicity (the strongest level) as S's belief that *p*[★], where *p*[★] is a perceptual belief.
- PT_{P1}[★] Plantinga's parity thesis[★]: For person S, whose epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appropriate environment, paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs have the same level of epistemic warrant.
- PT_{P1}^{★'} Plantinga's parity thesis^{★'}: For a person S, whose epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appropriate environment, physical object beliefs and theistic beliefs have the same level of epistemic warrant.
- SP Sense perceptual (doxastic) practice
- SPP Sense perceptual (doxastic) practice

Rationality and
Theistic Belief