2006

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Kerry Irish
George Fox University, kirish@georgefox.edu

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Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan

Kerry E. Irish

Abstract
This article takes the view that Dwight D. Eisenhower's work as a staff officer in the War Department in the early 1930s was significant not only for his own career, but also for the United States. In these years, Eisenhower wrote the first detailed industrial mobilization plan, the blueprint the nation would follow if it entered a major war. Though not formally implemented in 1941, much of Eisenhower's plan provided the basis for a more efficient transition to war production than had occurred during World War I. Moreover, his work enhanced his reputation in the Army.

In late 1929 Major Dwight D. Eisenhower went to work in the War Department for Brigadier General George van Horn Moseley, an adviser to Assistant Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley. Hurley, Moseley—and now Eisenhower—were primarily concerned with developing a plan for mobilizing American industry to supply the military with the accoutrements of war in timely fashion, something it had largely failed to do in the Great War. Eisenhower would spend two and one-half years of his life working on the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan (IMP) and related matters.

Unfortunately, Eisenhower scholars have not taken the time to investigate or understand this era of their subject's life; most have dis-


Kerry E. Irish earned a B.A. in history at George Fox University and a Ph.D. at the University of Washington. He is currently working on a study of the early life and career of Dwight Eisenhower. He is a professor of American history at George Fox University, Newberg, Oregon.
missed it as unimportant or given it little attention. It was not unimportant. Eisenhower's work in the early 1930s, especially on the Industrial Mobilization Plan, had a significant impact on his development. Indeed, it was the basis for his understanding of what he eventually called the “military-industrial complex.” Eisenhower's work in these years provided him with detailed information and deep experience regarding industrial production for war and first-hand knowledge of leading Army officers, important businessmen, and government officials. Indeed, Eisenhower contributed more to the 1930 IMP than any other Army officer. Additionally, and thus helping to demonstrate the significance of Eisenhower's work in this era, the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan constituted an important element in the military preparedness of the United States. The 1930 IMP was the basis for all of the industrial mobilization plans that followed, and the work done on these plans did indeed aid in industrial production during World War II in spite of the fact that President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not formally adopt the Army plan. Finally, it was Eisenhower's work on the Industrial Mobilization Plan that brought him to the attention of Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur.

Some background information is helpful in understanding the significance of this era in Eisenhower's life and for the nation. The legislation that mandated creation of an industrial mobilization plan was the National Defense Act of 1920. That act found its genesis in the inadequate American industrial response to the Great War. The lack of prewar planning for industrial mobilization had led to confusion, bottlenecks, and delay in supplying American troops, delay that ultimately meant unnecessary deaths. This shortage of U.S. weapons made training difficult and stretched the resources of America's allies. Congress, at least for a few months after the conclusion of the war in November 1918, was


determined that such a tragic waste of men and time should not be repeated.\(^4\)

The Assistant Secretary of War was the civilian official given responsibility for developing an IMP.\(^5\) The Army gave the following definition of such a plan:

Mobilization of industry for military purposes during a national emergency is the operation of adjusting peace time energy and industry to meet the essential requirements of national life, and the maximum requirements of military effort, with a minimum of disturbance of normal conditions.\(^6\)

Though Congress had mandated these plans, it is important to note that the plans the Assistant Secretary's office created, since they involved the bureaucratic machinery of the federal government, necessarily took the form of a recommendation to the President.\(^7\) The Army then found itself hampered in the creation of an industrial mobilization plan by the fact it could never be certain that the President or Congress would adopt the plan at the appropriate moment.\(^8\)

Throughout the 1920s the Army devoted most of its efforts to supplying its forces as opposed to planning for industrial mobilization during war. This apathy toward planning, and the determination of both Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge to cut the military budget, aroused the ire of Bernard Baruch, who had headed the War Industries Board (WIB) during the Great War. That body had guided the wartime industrial production of the nation.\(^9\) Once the war ended, the WIB passed away. Baruch was determined to create some civilian-led permanent body, along the lines of the WIB, that would prepare and organize American industrial production for rapid and efficient conversion to wartime needs.\(^10\) To this fight, which he waged throughout the twenties and thirties, Baruch brought the prestige of his war service and the fact that he was a highly successful and respected financier and stock

7. Ibid., 13, 14.
10. Ibid., 51.
speculator. Indeed, in 1929, Baruch advised many of his friends, including Will Rogers and General John J. Pershing, to get out of the stock market before the great crash. It was Baruch's pressure on the War Department that had led to the creation of the Army Industrial College in 1924, but this hardly satisfied Baruch. He even used his own money to pay for the expert advice of sociologists, political scientists, economists, and statisticians in formulating his industrial mobilization plan.

As the 1920s passed, the Army bandied about ideas for a superagency such as the Great War's War Industries Board; still, there was no detailed IMP. Indeed, many Army officers resented what they regarded as civilian interference in Army matters and did not want the War Department to develop an IMP that featured civilian control of Army procurement. Even General Charles P. Summerall (Army Chief of Staff from 1926 to 1930) opposed such work. Undaunted, Baruch and other concerned citizens, including Brigadier General Hugh S. Johnson and other Baruch associates from the WIB, kept pressure on political leaders and the War Department to formulate a detailed IMP, one that featured a civilian-dominated government agency to coordinate war production. But Baruch and his allies beat their heads against a deaf and dumb body politic. The Coolidge administration (1923–29) and an increasingly isolationist populace were determined to cut defense spending and de-emphasize the military. Army officers in the Planning Branch, forced by lack of resources to focus on immediate procurement needs, found little time in the mid-twenties to add to their admittedly sketchy IMP. However, by 1928 the Army had managed to produce its most detailed, though still rudimentary, IMP. Referred to as the Basic Procurement

Plan, it featured civilian-dominated "war service committees," which were to act as liaisons between industry and the War Department; it also raised the possibility of coercion of labor during war.19

Ironically, movement toward a more highly developed IMP gathered force when Herbert C. Hoover, one of the most peace-oriented presidents in American history, became chief executive in 1929. Hoover, though a determined advocate for peace, was not a total pacifist; he was a gifted organizer, a thorough leader, and a realist. Assistant Secretary of War Patrick Hurley—with the guidance and energy of Moseley—produced the next step in the IMP in 1929.20 Known as the "Hurley Plan," the 1929 IMP featured an example of Moseley's creativity: a new cabinet-level position to be activated when the President declared a war emergency. That day was known as M-Day, defined by the War Department as the first day of mobilization, and would most likely be synonymous with a declaration of war, but not automatically so.21 This new secretary would "act for President on all nat. def. matters," which actually included all areas in procurement and industrial mobilization since other areas of national defense came under the Secretary of War.22

The Hurley Plan was intended to be the catalyst for discussion of how best to proceed. It certainly served that purpose. The proposed new cabinet position was almost universally condemned. Bernard Baruch criticized the idea as disruptive to war production: the new secretary would replace existing authority at just the moment when established relationships and procedures were most needed to facilitate war production.23 Interestingly, Moseley's more ambitious ideas were not represented in the IMP; privately, he advocated the creation of a Department of Defense, which would unify all the services and their needs under one office. Moseley, in this regard, was ahead of his time.24

Prophetically, some critics worried that if the War Department plans were too comprehensive, or centralized too much authority in one man or group of men,

20. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilisation, 84, 85. See also Thatcher's footnotes numbered 68 and 69, crediting Hurley; Blum, "Birth and Death of the M-Day Plan," 65; Wilson, "Herbert Hoover and the Armed Forces," 140.
they might be ignored by a president zealous for his own authority, or
distrustful of businessmen or the military.\textsuperscript{25}

The Hurley IMP was to be revised every other year so as to remain
current and viable relative to the Army’s probable role in any national
emergency.\textsuperscript{26} Unfortunately, the Army’s mission was no more clearly
defined in 1930 than it had been in 1920; indeed, one could add 1940 as
well. For example, many fundamental questions had no definitive
answers: What were United States security interests? Would the country
fight for the Philippines? Who were its most likely enemies in war: Great
Britain, Mexico, Germany, or Japan? And what kind of war would be
waged against that enemy; would the Army fight for the Philippines or
would that war be a Navy show? With little guidance from the President
or the State Department, the Army adopted the wisest and most cautious
approach: prepare for the biggest war imaginable—in other words, a
repeat of the Great War.\textsuperscript{27}

Dwight Eisenhower came to the War Department convinced that
thorough planning for a future war was an absolute must in the modern
world. Eisenhower had attended the Army War College in 1927-28.
While there he had co-written a major research paper entitled “War and
its Principles, Methods, and Doctrines” and was the sole author of
another important work entitled “An Enlisted Reserve for the Regular
Army.” Both works emphasize the point that in future wars, fortune
would favor those nations that had engaged in extensive preparation in
both manpower and industrial capacity. In “War and its Principles,”
Eisenhower wrote:

It will be shown that though the actual conflict (battle) is waged
between armed forces which have been prepared for battle, the
preparation and maintenance of those forces requires the utmost in
industrial organization, and free access to sources of raw materials.\textsuperscript{28}

Eisenhower went on to assert his belief that preparation, or lack of it,
may decide the conflict:

Modern war is fought between armed forces composed of men and
materials which have been specially prepared for battle. \textit{Lacking}

\textsuperscript{25} Thatcher, \textit{Planning for Industrial Mobilization}, 89.
\textsuperscript{26} War Department, \textit{Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1931}, 26.
\textsuperscript{27} Miller, “The United States Army in the 1930s,” 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75;
Mark A. Stoler, \textit{Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance,
and U.S. Strategy in World War II} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2000), 2, 3, 6.
\textsuperscript{28} Dwight Eisenhower et al., Army War College Paper: “War and its Principles,
Methods, and Doctrines,” File: Army, A-Army, Z (misc.), Box 2, Name Series,
Principal Files, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1916–52 (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers,
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter EL), Abilene, Kansas.
such preparation, men and materials on the battlefield are useless, and preparation consumes an appreciable period of time. [Emphasis in the original]29

Eisenhower, in opposition to conventional wisdom, believed that the next war would likely feature an enemy with a highly mobile and massive offensive capability; there would be little time to organize a response to such a foe.30 Making matters worse and prewar planning even more important, the United States had little in the way of a permanent "municitions industry." Most of the corporations that would supply the American soldier would have to convert to war production.31 Finally, he believed that given the American democratic system, an agency that would coordinate the nation’s military response had to be both powerful and led by civilians.32 Eisenhower, then, was not just passing time in these years, but was attempting to put in place a program he believed was the cornerstone of national defense.

In working for Moseley, Eisenhower was reunited with fellow West Pointer Wade H. Haislip (U.S. Military Academy, 1912) and best friend Leonard T. Gerow, with whom he had studied at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1925–26. Eisenhower had graduated first in his class, Gerow eleventh. They were a great team.33 Eisenhower also had the opportunity to renew a friendship with another old comrade, George S. Patton, who had been assigned to the office of the Chief of Cavalry in 1928.34

George Moseley was an interesting combination of prejudices, opinions, charm, and talent. In the Great War, Moseley had, by all accounts, done a masterful job as G-4 of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), the officer in charge of supply. Indeed, it seems his reputation was as lofty as that of Pershing's G-3 (operations), Fox Conner. That

29. Ibid.
31. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilisation, 60.
32. Schwarz, The Speculator, 337.
33. Chief of Staff Diary, 9 November 1929, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 111; Perret, Eisenhower, 95, 106. A memo in Eisenhower's 201 File lists the class standing. Some sources have Gerow finishing number two, but this is inaccurate.
Eisenhower would spend years working for both men was indeed fortunate in terms of both his education and his career.

Eisenhower saw Moseley as a “brilliant officer” who inspired and encouraged creativity in his subordinates.35 He appreciated Moseley’s organizational genius.36 As noted above, Moseley often solved problems in unconventional ways; he was not a stickler for Army regulations. He prized common sense above traditional methods.37 This appealed to Eisenhower, who usually loved both minor rebellions and creative thinking: his career at West Point comes to mind, as do his tank doctrines and fondness for new methods of waging war. To have a superior officer actually encourage original thought was irresistibly refreshing. Moseley gave his aides important work to do and relied heavily upon that work.38 There were, of course, limits to creative freedom. The Army was not a democracy. Once Moseley had made a decision, it had to be fully and professionally executed. Eisenhower understood and appreciated the fact that Moseley expected his officers to advance the ideas and programs of the commanding officer.39

Some authors have argued that Eisenhower was unusually reluctant to share his opinions with superior officers, and that he was overly subject to the opinions of stronger men.40 Eisenhower’s willingness to learn from others has been misunderstood as mental weakness. He had a great talent for assessing character, for gauging what he could say and how he could say it to any given person. He and Fox Conner, during their time together in the Panama Canal Zone in the early 1920s, had argued at length and loudly over military tactics. With Moseley, Eisenhower enjoyed political discussions. Moseley was fully aware that the younger man was not nearly as conservative as he was. In September 1943 he wrote Eisenhower a letter that discussed the presidential election in 1944:

In his broadcast last Sunday night, Walter Winchell stated that if the Republicans ran [Douglas] MacArthur as President, Mr. Roosevelt

36. Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 108; Dwight Eisenhower to George Van Horn Moseley, 11 June 1943, File: Moseley, George Van Horn, Box 84, Principal File, Pre-Presidential Papers, Eisenhower Papers, EL.
39. Dwight Eisenhower to George Van Horn Moseley, 23 November 1934, Moseley File, EL.
40. Brendon, Ike, 10, 13, 58, 59, 109, 110; Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 72, 73.
would take you on as his running mate. I have no respect whatsoever for Mr. Winchell, but sometimes he gets the news quite accurate.  

Moseley clearly had reason to believe that Eisenhower would be acceptable to Roosevelt; certainly the idea did not surprise him. Eisenhower had appreciated much about the Democrats when he was a young man; he also admired some aspects of FDR’s New Deal. One can easily imagine that he and Moseley had interesting discussions in the early 1930s.

In late 1929, Eisenhower and Major Gilbert Wilkes, an engineer also assigned to work on the IMP, began “intriguing and frustrating” work on that plan. In response to the criticism of Baruch and others, Moseley ordered adjustments to the IMP. For example, Baruch had suggested that Moseley’s proposed separate department of munitions be eliminated. Moseley acquiesced; the munitions department was integrated into the IMP. He did not, however, give up his idea of a new cabinet-level position. In addition to these adjustments, Eisenhower and Wilkes visited various manufacturers and asked to see their old plans for conversion to war production. The two officers requested suggestions as to how such plans might be improved. But few businessmen, or politicians for that matter, were interested in talking about conversion plans. Rather than anticipating fat contracts for war production, most industrialists were concerned that cooperation with the Army might force them to reveal trade secrets, or, should war come, result in loss of control of their own businesses. Furthermore, most Americans believed there would not be another major war.

In December 1929, Hoover had promoted the energetic Hurley to the post of Secretary of War; he was the first such secretary to have carried a rifle in the Army as a private. As secretary, Hurley had even greater authority to see the IMP revised and implemented; the extremely

41. George Van Horn Moseley to Dwight Eisenhower, 29 September 1943, Moseley File, EL.
42. Chief of Staff Diary, 15 June 1933, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 229, 251, 252 (the entry on page 229 concerning Hugh Johnson is dated June 1932; however, the context of Ike’s comments makes clear that the date must be later, perhaps 1933, since Ike remarks that Hugh Johnson is head of the National Recovery Administration); Chief of Staff Diary, 20 April and 2 June 1933, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 251, 252.
44. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilisation, 90.
45. Ibid., 89, 91.
46. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilisation, 508; Chief of Staff Diary, 12 November 1930, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 145.
47. Eisenhower, At Ease, 210, 211; Miller, “The United States Army in the 1930s,” 78, 79; Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1987), 250.
competent Moseley carried on his duties without the aid of an assistant secretary of war until April 1930 when the President gave Frederick H. Payne the job. 48

Payne loved the Army, and Eisenhower soon gained his confidence. 49 In June 1930 the major wrote an article for the Assistant Secretary. Published under the latter's name in Army Ordnance, the article outlined Payne's and Eisenhower's basic IMP ideas. Many Army officers, like Chief of Staff Summerall, opposed any further civilian "meddling" in the Army. Others were suspicious of, if not hostile to, such activity and prone to credit exaggerations. The article was an attempt to ease fears and explain the reality of modern war. Eisenhower emphasized four areas of concern. First, he calmed nerves and dispelled rumors: there would be no nationalization of industry under the plan, and chief executive officers would not become colonels, ordered about like lackeys. Nor would every aspect of production be regimented. Indeed, the planners hoped to avoid unnecessary disruption of the domestic economy and culture. 50

Second, Eisenhower explained that modern war was a conflict between economies; production of the weapons and supplies of war was as important as sound strategy and tactics. 51 He no doubt recalled his Great War efforts to train tank crews with no tanks at Camp Colt, Pennsylvania (on the old Gettysburg battlefield).

Third, an organization that coordinated planning and production was an absolute must if waste and delay were to be avoided. Only government was large and powerful enough to serve that function. Therefore, Eisenhower, drawing in part on Baruch's ideas, envisioned an agency that would exercise that control. 52 He described it as follows:

Consequently, in the event of war, a great industrial organization will certainly be a part of the Federal government during the period of the emergency. This organization must be made up of leaders in all the branches of industry. Representatives of labor, of manufacturers, of financiers, of the professions, of agriculturalists, of producers of raw materials and so on must combine in an organization under the

50. Frederick H. Payne, "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization," an article prepared by Major Eisenhower for Payne, published in Army Ordnance; hereafter Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization." A copy of the article with the notation that Eisenhower had written it is in File 875, Box 84, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, Record Group (RG) 107, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland. The article can also be found in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 138–42.
51. Ibid.
52. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211.
President to guide our industrial effort along those lines that will 
sure speedy victory—and justice to every citizen. [Emphasis 
added]53

Eisenhower's industrial mobilization planning agency was to be more of 
a forum for ascertaining the most effective policies as opposed to a vehi-
cle for declaring government directives. The IMP agency Eisenhower 
evisioned emphasized cooperation, teamwork, and unity. Only as a last 
resort would it issue orders.54

Finally, Eisenhower warned his readers that such a mobilization of 
industry would need to be done quickly; a modern enemy would not 
likely allow its opponent time to mobilize and organize its industry as 
had usually been the case in the past. The failure to carefully prepare, to 
be ready, could mean defeat.55

As we shall see, some of the details of the IMP would change, but the 
basic ideas that underlay it would not. Above all, Eisenhower envisioned 
cooperation between government, industry, labor, and the military. 
Indeed, for Eisenhower the entire nation would constitute one great 
team with its collective face set resolutely toward victory.56 This philos-
ophy of teamwork, cooperation, and compromise would manifest itself 
throughout Eisenhower's Army career and into the presidency.57 Mose-
ley was impressed with Eisenhower's article and with his abilities. Mose-
ley later wrote of him: "He has a remarkable mind and an equally 
talented pen, enabling him to present a subject simply and clearly."58

One of the primary obstacles to Hurley's work was, as mentioned, 
Chief of Staff Summerall. Fortunately for the Secretary, Summerall's 
term as chief ended in late 1930. Hoover's dilemma was whom to appoint

54. Dwight Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Indus-
trial Mobilization," 2 October 1931 (a paper Eisenhower wrote while a student at the 
Industrial War College), in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and 
Selected Papers, 187, 188. Eisenhower's conception of the IMP was similar to his 
vision for the American Assembly, a think tank that he created while President of 
Columbia University from 1948 to 1952. The American Assembly was a forum for 
bringing together business leaders, academic experts, and other interested persons of 
talent or stature to analyze the nation's major problems and propose solutions. 
Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 482. For a full 
description of the American Assembly, see Travis Jacobs, Eisenhower at Columbia 
55. Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization."
56. Ibid.; Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial 
Mobilization," 184, 187, 188.
57. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 271, 
272; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
as his successor. There were numerous superb candidates. Fox Conner was General Pershing's personal choice, but Pershing was in France attending to Battle Monuments Commission business and was thus unable to personally press Conner's case. William D. Connor, the highly respected leader of the Army War College, was another possibility, as was George Moseley. But the man who had Hoover's respect, the man whom the country knew best because of his combat record in the Great War, and who had brought long-needed reforms to West Point, was Major General Douglas MacArthur. Hoover chose MacArthur. 59

It is interesting to note that Dwight Eisenhower was well known and highly respected by three of the leading candidates for chief of staff in 1930. These men had served on Pershing's staff in the Great War: Conner was G-3 (operations), and Connor was G-4 (supply), succeeded by Moseley. 60 MacArthur later wrote that Eisenhower had established a well-earned reputation for being an "outstanding soldier." 61 When Eisenhower became famous in 1942, the media wondered where he had come from; many asked if his rise to fame and power was accidental or due just to luck. But the fact is that Eisenhower was well known, his talents held in the highest regard by many of those who led the Army. There was less luck than talent involved in his rise to high command. Addressing this persistent and pernicious myth, Bernard Baruch has written: "Eisenhower's spectacular rise was no accident. General [George C.] Marshall chose him, over many of his seniors, to lead the Allied forces because he recognized his many talents and abilities." 62 Baruch, intimately acquainted with the Army and its officer corps, and a friend of George Marshall since a 1922 hunting trip, was in a position to know. 63

It is not too much to say that Eisenhower's service with MacArthur would, over the years, change his life. In the fall of 1930 the new Chief of Staff took an avid interest in the work of the Assistant Secretary of War and his aides. Hurley met with MacArthur, Moseley, and Eisenhower to discuss the details of the IMP. The men found they agreed on most of


the important aspects of the plan. Morale in the Army in general, and the Planning Branch in particular, rose dramatically.64

Those who were primarily responsible for the creation of a comprehensive industrial mobilization plan in the early 1930s were Secretary of War Hurley, his assistant Frederick Payne, Douglas MacArthur, George van Horn Moseley, Bernard Baruch, and Dwight Eisenhower. But it was Eisenhower who did much of the research, visited factories, talked to industrial leaders, took into account his superior's opinions, conceptualized what the plan should include, wrote most of it, and did much of the arguing for the IMP with both civilians and his Army superiors. The IMP thus contained many of his ideas regarding war and how it should be waged.65 Though Eisenhower was the lowest in rank of the men cited above, he was unusually persuasive with both oral and written arguments.

Eisenhower drew heavily on the wisdom of the past in the form of Bernard Baruch and, as we have seen, his own studies at the Army War College. He had probably come to his conclusions regarding the necessity of industrial planning and preparation independently of Baruch, but Baruch unquestionably imparted to Eisenhower much of the form that such planning and preparation should take. Eisenhower was far closer to Baruch in his ideas than most War Department officers.66 Though Baruch was a Democrat who advocated virtual government control of crucial industries in the event of war, Eisenhower respected his views, adopted many of them, and developed a friendship with the stock speculator that lasted until his death. Indeed, Eisenhower, more than any other Army officer, agreed with Baruch's views, attempted to persuade his Army colleagues that most of Baruch's ideas were superior to their own, and incorporated as many of them as he could into the 1930 IMP.67 It is then no surprise that Baruch thought much more highly of the 1930 IMP than the 1929 version.68 Indeed, historian and Baruch biographer John

64. Moseley, “One Soldier’s Journey,” 133.
65. Eisenhower, Memorandum for the Chief of the Planning Branch, 7 November 1930, File 44, Box 6, Memoranda to Planning Branch, 1931–1932, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, RG 107, NARA; The 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan, File 110, Box 12, Records of the Planning Branch, Procurement Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 1921–1941, RG 107, NARA; Schwarz, The Speculator, 337. Schwarz credits MacArthur, Baruch, and Eisenhower, but it seems to me that the other three were also important factors. Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 161.
66. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211; Schwarz, The Speculator, 337. Eisenhower did not meet Baruch until 1930, well after he wrote his Army War College paper. Of course, Baruch’s ideas were well publicized before that time.
67. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211.
68. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 91.
Schwarz has called Eisenhower Baruch’s “most apt pupil in the military.”

Eisenhower wrote in At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends:

High officials believed that a war should be conducted through the normal, peacetime agencies of government. They did not favor price controls. They saw no reason for special organization. Those of us who believed in Baruch’s policies argued that competition between departments of government would interfere with maximum industrial production. They would answer that co-operation between the Army and Navy would be enough to take care of the problem.

Eisenhower was too much the historian and realist to fall for that reasoning:

All our experience has shown that this was convenient reasoning and foolishness. Even during war against a common enemy, armies and navies of the same nation have often delighted in warring against each other for guns, men—and applause.

Eisenhower was the primary author of the 1930 IMP, which thus benefited from many of his talents. Two seem especially important. First was his amazing memory. His wife, Mamie, later recalled that he “knew by heart production man-hours on everything from a bomber to a mess kit.” Another of Eisenhower’s great qualities was his basic humility; he was usually willing to listen to the ideas of others, including civilians, to profit from their experience. Some writers have interpreted this trait negatively: Eisenhower was easily dominated by more forceful men and their ideas. This generalization might be valid if Eisenhower had adopted the ideas of such men wholesale, but such was not the case. He was eclectic, picking and choosing among the ideas he thought best and then adding his own. Consequently, Eisenhower’s work was almost always reflective of a greater store of knowledge than his own experiences would suggest. His work on the IMP exhibits this most positive of traits.

Eisenhower adopted some, but not all, of Baruch’s philosophy. Baruch believed that in modern war there was little room for free enter-

69. Schwarz, The Speculator, 391.
70. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211, 212; Schwarz, The Speculator, 338.
71. Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930; Eisenhower, At Ease, 211.
73. Dorothy Brandon, Mamie Doud Eisenhower: A Portrait of a First Lady (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1954), 171.
74. For Eisenhower as easily swayed, dominated, or indecisive, see Brendon, Ike, 59, 110, 114, 133, 138, 155, 156, 160, 163, 168, 175; D’Este, Patton, 486–89; Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2002), 423, 424, 596, 602.
prise: the government must control all aspects of the economy; both capital and labor must be subservient to the nation's security interest. He argued that prices of all goods be capped so as to both secure the economy against inflation and provide as much military power for the dollar as possible. In addition, labor should be organized to facilitate optimum production. Baruch, as the head of the War Industries Board in 1918, was associated in the popular mind with highly coercive policies toward both industry and labor. In 1930 he was careful to disavow any suggestion that he favored "conscription of labor," but this disavowal was a bit disingenuous. Baruch believed labor should be cajoled, coerced, and controlled as necessary: a central government agency would orchestrate the allocation of labor. He supported what was known as a "work or fight" bill. Indeed, Baruch believed that in the event of a major war all aspects of the economy, not just war production, had to come under government control in order to protect the living standards of the populace. This, in turn, would allow for the maintenance of morale. In order to achieve the foregoing, Baruch advocated the creation of a permanent superagency along the lines of the old War Industries Board. In short, Baruch would end economic freedom during war in order to preserve it for peace. Finally, his plan would enhance the role of civilian businessmen and industrialists in determining what was needed and who would produce it.

Eisenhower's Army plan featured less centralized control than Baruch's plan, but far more than the old system. Several sources indicate the leading ideas regarding the Army's industrial mobilization plan as advocated by Dwight Eisenhower: the speech he wrote for Payne to deliver to the Army War College, the article he wrote for Payne published in Army Ordnance, the 1930 IMP itself, his paper for the Army Industrial College (where he was a student in 1931), and his article for the Cavalry Journal of November 1931. The three former sources, of course, reflect more than Eisenhower's own ideas, but it would be a

78. Ibid., 326.
mistake to severely discount the degree to which Eisenhower's ideas are represented in the work he did for Payne and in the industrial mobilization plan. He was no mere typist; he was asked to write these documents because of the respect he had gained from Payne, Moseley, and others. Moreover, Moseley highly valued creativity and initiative, and Eisenhower knew it. These documents, then, do not conceal Eisenhower as much as they reveal him. Of course, in the Industrial College paper and the journal article, he was relatively free to write whatever he chose in terms of philosophy. At the end of the day, these sources differ little in regard to basic ideas; they also reflect and advance ideas that Eisenhower had written about in his work at the Army War College in 1927–28.

Eisenhower believed that modern war against a great power required an immediate and massive response. Such a war was essentially two-fold: it involved a traditional battlefield transformed by modern weapons and the industrial capabilities of an entire people. These capabilities had to be organized ahead of the actual conflict. In 1953, President Eisenhower, remembering the American propensity to dismantle its defensive capability, asserted "that we would not again become so weak militarily as to encourage aggression." But who should organize industry to meet such a sudden challenge? In the 1930s, Eisenhower was sure that only high-ranking civilian authorities in government could perform that function. Here he was in opposition to many officers in the War Department who believed that the Army could coordinate with individual businesses to supply itself. Eisenhower's plan thus featured not only government control of war production, but also the creation of a special wartime body, led by civilians, that would exercise that control along the lines of the War Industries Board of the Great War era.

82. Chief of Staff Diary, 15 June 1932, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 225–27; Eisenhower, At Ease, 210; Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 160.

83. Eisenhower et al., Army War College Paper: "War and its Principles, Methods, and Doctrines."


87. Address by Payne (Eisenhower), 6 January 1931, 149, 151, 152, 153; Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial Mobilization," 184;
MacArthur favored this approach.\(^{88}\) The difference between the Army's plan and the Baruch view was that in the former plan this coordinating agency would not come into existence until the President, facing either the threat or the reality of war, so decreed.\(^{89}\) That decree would constitute the so-called M-Day. Baruch insisted that the controlling agency be created as soon as possible and perform its duties permanently.\(^{90}\)

The 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan featured four separate "superagencies," one each for war industries, war labor, selective service, and public relations. The war industries agency was to be dominant, but all four were to be represented, along with the Army and Navy, on the Advisory Council to the President. An official Army historian remarks, "Broad decisions of wartime policy would be made by the President and his council, to be executed by the council members through their respective organizations."\(^{91}\)

There was still more disagreement between Eisenhower and Baruch over the role of civilians. The latter envisioned not only a civilian-led superagency, but also greater prewar civilian leadership in determining who would produce what items. Many Army officers were afraid that Baruch's plan deprived the Army of essential decision-making powers. It also demonstrated greater concern for civilian wartime living standards than the Army version.\(^{92}\) Eisenhower, as one would expect, was in favor of cooperation and compromise.

Another goal of the IMP was to "equalize the burdens of war," specifically to reduce the profits that industrialists had made during the last war. The most radical of ideas, to nationalize industry, was opposed by

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\(^{91}\) Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilisation, 78, 79.

\(^{92}\) Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilisation, 515.
Baruch, who preferred to cap all prices for the duration of the emergency.\textsuperscript{93} Indeed, Baruch would cap not only the prices of goods associated with war production, but virtually all prices.\textsuperscript{94} Eisenhower agreed with Baruch, but most Army officials were opposed to "radical changes in normal economic relationships between individuals and between individuals and Government." They did, however, reluctantly admit that something had to be done to control profits.\textsuperscript{95} They advocated capping profits at 6 percent.\textsuperscript{96} At the outbreak of hostilities a "systematic registration of wealth" would take place and "tax legislation framed to place an equitable burden thereon" created.\textsuperscript{97}

Eisenhower's and Baruch's argument that some form of "price stabilization" was necessary led Army leaders to envision doing away with cost-plus contracts awarded to the lowest bidder.\textsuperscript{98} They preferred pre-war agreements between the Army and manufacturers that stipulated these manufacturers would produce a given product at a given price. The advantage to this system was that the Army could plan who was to produce what, and negotiate prices in a stable economic environment. The Army planners believed that this method, along with some modest price controls, would also help control inflation.

Eisenhower was the Army's strongest advocate of Baruch-like price controls and continued to argue for them even after the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan was completed. The price control features of the 1930 IMP were merely a first step for Baruch and his pupil; there were those in and out of the Army who wanted no controls whatsoever, or thought Baruch's ideas too rigid.\textsuperscript{99} Moseley was among the latter. Eisenhower apparently urged Moseley and Baruch to continue to discuss the issue.\textsuperscript{100}

In his Industrial College paper of October 1931, Eisenhower referenced

\textsuperscript{93} Statement of Bernard Baruch to the War Policies Commission, 6 March 1931.
\textsuperscript{95} Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930, pp. 25, 26.
\textsuperscript{96} Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey," 135; Statement of General George van Horn Moseley, Deputy Chief of Staff to the War Policies Commission, File 177, Box 182, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, War Policies Commission, 1930–1932, RG 107, NARA.
\textsuperscript{98} Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930, pp. 25–29, 75. Moseley in a letter to Baruch of 22 May 1931 is clearly entertaining the idea of freezing prices. The letter can be found in File 79, Box 178, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, War Policies Commission, 1930–1932, RG 107, NARA; Thatcher, \textit{Planning for Industrial Mobilisation}, 158, 159.
\textsuperscript{100} Eisenhower, "War Policies," 196, 197; Eisenhower, \textit{At Ease}, 211.
a letter from Moseley to Baruch the previous May in which Moseley describes his now more complete understanding of Baruch’s ideas and expresses some acquiescence in them.101 In his article for the Cavalry Journal, Eisenhower provided a staunch defense of Baruch’s price-capping program that indicates the author personally preferred that method over the taxing of profits the Army plan envisioned. One of the Baruch plan’s strengths was its greater control of inflation not only in war production but also in the domestic economy as a whole. The Army plan, with its ambiguous price “stabilization” concept, risked far greater inflationary pressures as profits grew if costs escalated.102 By the time Douglas MacArthur testified before the War Policies Commission in the spring of 1931, the Army’s price stabilization program, though not as sweeping as Baruch’s concept, was far more developed and specific. As the Army’s foremost proponent of price controls and the author of MacArthur’s statement to the War Policies Commission, Eisenhower had much to do with this move toward price controls.103 Eisenhower left the Planning Branch in 1932, but he and Baruch continued to advocate a “total [price] stabilization plan” throughout the 1930s.104

Eventually many of the price control concepts in the industrial mobilization plans of the 1930s were used in the era of the Second World War.105 The 1933 Industrial Mobilization Plan featured an even greater determination to see price controls implemented in time of war. That plan included a “separate price control appendix describing the history, objectives and methods of price control, together with recommended legislation and a wartime price control organization.”106

Of all the IMPs, the 1930 version was the friendliest to labor and received by far the most labor support.107 As we have seen, Baruch was associated with the coercive labor policies the Woodrow Wilson administration had approved reluctantly in the Great War. The idea of conscripting labor in the event of a major war was so politically volatile that Congress had barred the War Policies Commission from considering it.108 Eisenhower’s 1930 Army plan specifically rejected conscription of labor,

103. Statement of General Douglas MacArthur to the War Policies Commission, 1931; Statement of Bernard Baruch to the War Policies Commission, 6 March 1931; Rosenbloom, Peace Through Strength, 188–92.
106. Ibid., 94.
arguing that it would be enormously divisive at precisely the moment the nation needed unity. Instead, with some input from labor organizations like the American Federation of Labor, it posited a "Labor Administration" that would seek to ensure that labor was fully employed and fairly treated.109

Another important element of the Army plan, one that has received little attention, was the intent to create an office of public information.110 Eisenhower may not have originally suggested this idea, but he fully supported it. He believed that maintenance of civilian morale was fundamental to achieving victory in war, and that providing information that served that purpose should be a key component of any plan.111

If the nation were to be ready for a modern war, ready to convert its economy quickly and efficiently to war production, it would need a group of experts devoted to creating and revising the plans for that eventuality. The Army IMP envisioned the enlargement of the staff of officers who were trained in that work and assigned to it on a relatively permanent basis. Eisenhower's working title for this group of officers, who would be led by a civilian, was the "War Department Economic Staff."112

Eisenhower was distraught to discover how much Army-Navy squabbling existed in the 1920s and '30s, especially in regard to procurement of supplies. He made great efforts to persuade those concerned with the nation's security that teamwork and cooperation among the various services, institutions, and offices were essential if adequate defensive capability was to be achieved.113 Trite though it may be, Eisenhower originally drew this lesson from his athletic days and saw it reinforced as he gained experience in the Army. In the Second World War he preached and exhibited the highest form of teamwork, and often used a football team as an example. Though the Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB) had been created in 1922 to coordinate munitions procurement, it had accomplished little. The board had insufficient power, and disagreements between the Army and Navy made it largely ineffective. Matters were get-


ting worse, not better; the winter of 1930 saw the nadir of Army-Navy relations in regard to procurement.114

Eisenhower decided to do something about the problem. In the article entitled "Peacetime Difficulties of Procurement Planning" he wrote for Moseley in January of that year, he asserted:

One of the difficulties encountered in agreeing upon an organization, is the lack of close cooperation and coordination (or rather lack of mutual understanding) between the Army and the Navy. It is useless to assert the fault lies wholly with either side . . . above all, lack of appreciation in the highest positions of the great importance and deadly seriousness of the problem involved, have prevented that meeting of minds between the personnel of these two departments which is a prerequisite to a successful solution.115

Eisenhower's article helped set in motion a chain of events that led to the reorganization and revitalization of the Army and Navy Munitions Board.116 Moseley used it to launch a cooperation campaign. That summer the Navy began giving the Army "lists of facilities that the Navy considered essential for some of its production" and established "joint machinery for coordinating the industrial plans of the two services."117 In 1931 Payne wrote in his annual report that he was "particularly gratified to report that the procurement activities of the War and Navy Departments are being constantly brought into close co-ordination."118 Eisenhower wanted to make the ANMB one of the key agencies in the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan.119 Moseley refused, citing time constraints and his own uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the still pending reforms.120 However, when the IMP was revised in May 1931, a reference to the ANMB was included. Eventually the reorganized ANMB became "the sponsor of the plan for industrial mobilization and successfully coordinated the ideas of the two departments [War and Navy] in developing these plans."121

119. Hasson to Carr, 5 March 1931; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilisation, 95.
120. Hasson to Carr, 5 March 1931.
121. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilisation, 50, 194, 227; Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilisation, 42.
In November 1930 the Planning Branch officers given the job of writing the IMP failed. Three years earlier, when officers assigned to the Battle Monuments Commission could not create an acceptable guidebook to the American battlefields and cemeteries of the Great War, the project was given to Eisenhower, who produced a much-appreciated document. Now Moseley asked Eisenhower to write the IMP. In spite of the fact that Eisenhower did not enjoy working on the industrialization plan, which he called a “long irksome job,” he completed the plan in a week of hard writing.\(^{122}\) His greatest challenge, he later recalled, came in the “selection and arrangement of material.”\(^{123}\)

Eisenhower’s work was impressive. Upon perusing the 1930 plan, Lieutenant Colonel McCain, who had worked on the 1928 plan, wrote, “they have made great strides back there [the Planning Branch] since our day. Among other things they have finished up a very comprehensive Industrial Mobilization Plan covering the entire field . . . it represents an exhaustive piece of work.”\(^{124}\)

Eisenhower himself acknowledged the impact of his Industrial Mobilization Plan work on his life.

In these positions [working for the Assistant Secretary of War] I had been forced to examine world-wide military matters and to study concretely such subjects as the mobilization and composition of armies, the role of air forces and navies in war, tendencies toward mechanization, and the acute dependence of all elements of military life upon the industrial capacity of the nation. This last was to me of especial importance because of my intense belief that large-scale motorization and mechanization and the development of air forces in unprecedented strength would characterize successful military forces of the future. . . . The years devoted to work of this kind opened up to me an almost new world. During that time I met and worked with many people whose opinions I respected highly, in both military and civil life. [Emphasis added]\(^{125}\)

Eisenhower’s 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan featured the creation of a civilian-led planning agency that would come into being at the beginning of an emergency. This superagency would coordinate the industrial production of the nation and advise the President regarding that production. In the meantime, an expanded staff of Army officers would work with businessmen to plan the production of war materials. Second, busi-


\(^{124}\) Thatcher, *Planning for Industrial Mobilization*, 93, 94.

ness profits would be capped at 6 percent, cost-plus contracts would not be used, and the Army would move toward price controls to check inflation. Third, there would be no conscription of labor; a labor administration would coordinate the needs of industry and labor. Finally, an office of public information would educate the public to keep morale high and the nation unified.

At the end of 1930, General Moseley left his job as Payne's assistant to become MacArthur's Deputy Chief of Staff. On 23 November Moseley invited Eisenhower to his home for a conversation. The general apologetically informed his aide of his impending departure. Eisenhower had been told much earlier that he would leave whenever his chief departed, but Payne understandably could not part with both of them at the same time. Then Moseley told Eisenhower that the Assistant Secretary had been so impressed with his work that he wanted Eisenhower to take over Moseley's job. Unfortunately, he also said he had informed Payne that Eisenhower's rank precluded that appointment; the job demanded at least a full colonel. As consolation, Moseley told Eisenhower that Payne's request would be placed in his service record. 126

Payne was not satisfied with that gesture. In a speech a few weeks later at the Army War College, Payne, for a moment, left the remarks that Eisenhower had prepared for him and inserted a call for reform of the promotion system to allow for rewarding merit and ability. Reform of the system, he knew, was one of MacArthur's priorities. The Army Chief of Staff was working with the Hoover administration to pass legislation that would allow the Army to consider merit above seniority in the promotion to colonel as it already was for general officers. But no changes were forthcoming during the Hoover administration. On his own initiative MacArthur had de-emphasized seniority to some extent at that level. But apparently Eisenhower was still too junior to meet that lower standard. 127

Unfortunately for the Army planners, the proposed creation of civilian-led agencies that were outside the framework of normal governmental machinery became a fatal flaw in the plan after the election of 1932. 128 The Army's industrial mobilization plan, as originally envisioned, was to be revised and updated every few years. This was done. Details were changed in 1933 and 1936 but the basic plan still envisaged that superagencies to control war industrialization would come into exis-

126. Chief of Staff Diary, 24 November 1930, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 145.
tence once an emergency was declared. As General Moseley observed, the superagencies were the “most important part” of the plan. But with the ascension of Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in 1933, peacetime governmental machinery took the form of the New Deal. The politicians and bureaucrats who ran the New Deal were suspicious of any rivals to their power, especially rivals who would come from the military or the business community as the IMP envisioned. Making matters worse, the Army did a poor job of explaining to the public and to government officials the rationale behind its plans. In revising the plans through the mid-1930s, it also moved away from cooperation with labor just as labor was becoming more important politically.

Though Army leaders could not be certain that the President would adopt the IMP, grassroots work continued. After the Army surveyed over 20,000 U.S. factories to discover their capacities and expertise in creating war supplies, 10,000 plants were selected for war manufacture. Moreover, there was significant, if not perfect, cooperation between the military and business leaders. The suggestions made by industrialists regarding design of munitions and standardization of components were often accepted.

In 1937 new Assistant Secretary of War Louis A. Johnson was determined to stimulate industrial mobilization planning. Signs of trouble in Europe and in Asia provided impetus to Johnson’s efforts, and Bernard Baruch continued to advocate greater preparedness. Johnson proceeded along the lines of the Army’s original IMPs: superagencies that arose at the time of the crisis would coordinate war production. Unfortunately for Johnson and the nation—at least in terms of military efficiency—President Roosevelt had no intention of relinquishing control of war industrialization to agencies outside his own direct supervision. True, the superagencies were to answer to the President, but FDR was convinced that his own authority would be compromised under the Army plan.

129. Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933, File 112, Box 13, Records of the Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 1921–1941, RG 107, NARA; Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936, File 120, Box 14, Records of the Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 1921–1941, RG 107, NARA; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilisation, 187; Blum, “Birth and Death of the M-Day Plan,” 66; Schwarz, The Speculator, 356.


133. Schwarz, The Speculator, 356.


135. Schwarz, The Speculator, 357.
The 1939 revision of the IMP, influenced by Baruch, was ostensibly designed to meld efficiently with New Deal agencies. But, as Albert Blum has shown, the President was afraid that the Army plan, by empowering business leaders and the military, would effectively end the New Deal and result in the loss of many of its accomplishments.\textsuperscript{136} In an incredible case of miscommunication between the President and Johnson, or outright bullheadedness on Johnson's part, his plan featured a new War Resources Administration (WRA) that would oversee most of the other war agencies contemplated in earlier plans. Johnson's plan gave great powers to the leader of this agency who, though still theoretically under the President's authority, would of necessity operate with a great deal of autonomy.\textsuperscript{137} There was no chance that such a plan would be acceptable to FDR.\textsuperscript{138} At one point he remarked to an adviser regarding the WRA, "these 'fellows' wanted him to 'abdicate.'"\textsuperscript{139} The President decided to ignore the administrative aspects of the Army plan and in action reminiscent of the New Deal, create his own agencies, all answerable to him.\textsuperscript{140} Roosevelt's agencies would necessarily be created from scratch, and thus they entered the fray late; worse, their responsibilities were poorly defined and often overlapped.\textsuperscript{141}

As defense appropriations rose in the years before American entry into the Second World War, the Army and Navy continued to place their own contracts with suppliers, competing for precious commodities and bidding up prices. If the IMP of 1930 had been followed, this foolishness would not have occurred. The failure to institute centralized planning from 1939 into 1943 resulted in enormous logjams of goods and serious delays in production.\textsuperscript{142} David Kennedy has described it:

> Straining to meet the ambitious goals the president had set, procurement officers loosed their imaginations, abandoned any vestige of managerial discipline, and lost all sight of the larger context within which they were operating. Military purchase orders became hunt-


\textsuperscript{138.} Schwarz, \textit{The Speculator}, 358–62; Blum, "Birth and Death of the M-Day Plan," 74–89.

\textsuperscript{139.} Blum, "Birth and Death of the M-Day Plan," 80.


\textsuperscript{141.} Kennedy, \textit{Freedom From Fear}, 620; Blum, "Birth and Death of the M-Day Plan," 79–89.

\textsuperscript{142.} Ibid., 626, 627.
ing licenses, unleashing a jostling frenzy of competition for materials and labor in the jungle of the marketplace.

Kennedy continued:

Makers of cargo vessels gobbled up steel supplies, snarling the construction of warships. Naval purchasing agents robbed aircraft assembly plants of aluminum. Locomotive foundries converted to tank production when locomotives were far more urgently needed. When construction was not stalled outright, it could end up uselessly squandered. . . . At the same time, troops in training were throwing rocks in the grenade course and using firecrackers to simulate the scarce live ammunition that had to be carefully husbanded for the battlefield.143

The United States eventually became the great “Arsenal of Democracy” but only because of two fortuitous factors: time and distance. If the continental United States had not been thousands of miles from the major battlefields, the nation would not have had the time to properly organize for war. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, it took Roosevelt over a year of war to finally coordinate industrial mobilization planning under one man who could give it most of his attention. In 1943, Roosevelt confidant and former Supreme Court Justice James F. Byrnes became head of the Office of War Mobilization. Byrnes’s office was in the White House.144

The President’s war mobilization program fell far short of the 1930 IMP in other ways as well. Indeed, there is a tremendous sense of irony in comparing the Army IMP of 1930 to what actually occurred in the war. The Army plan, created by conservative men such as Payne, MacArthur, and Eisenhower, envisioned a far more centralized, controlled, and profitless war than the great architect of the New Deal produced. Though no plan could have solved all of the difficulties the United States incurred in converting to war production, it seems reasonable to observe that the Army plan in virtually any of its manifestations of the 1930s would have coordinated war production more effectively than FDR’s haphazard program. Industrial mobilization planning was not a great president’s finest hour. Cost-plus contracts, inherently inflationary and wasteful—and forbidden in the 1930 plan—were used extensively during the war. The margin of allowable profit was 10 percent, almost double the profit left to manufacturers in the Army plan of 1930.145

Because the Army’s IMP, in terms of its organizational scheme, was not adopted by Roosevelt in the years just before United States entry

143. Ibid., 626, 627.
144. Ibid., 628, 629, 630.
145. Ibid., 623.
into World War II, historians and biographers have often dismissed Eisenhower’s work on the plan as unimportant or have given this period of his life scant attention. While it is true that Roosevelt did not adopt the administrative machinery that the Army recommended, the grassroots work that Army officers did in the 1930s as they talked with business leaders, created relationships with them, explained needs and concerns, and wrote and revised conversion and production plans, made the path to effective war industrialization smoother than it would have been otherwise.

Concerning the value of the IMP, Burnham Finney, editor of American Machinist and author of Arsenal of Democracy, judiciously wrote in 1941:

> Are we farther along today, now that we are in an emergency, than if we hadn’t had the industrial mobilization scheme in operation for many years? The unqualified answer is yes, “yes, we are farther along.” Proof? The army and navy knew what they wanted when the present emergency began. That, in the opinion of expert military men, is the outstanding difference between 1917 and today. The thousands of plants surveyed are now starting to make the products allocated to them under the plan. From the list of 20,000 plants [in the plan] have come many of the 30,000 manufacturers with direct defense contracts. Precious time has been saved; perhaps not enough of it, but some. . . . Altogether, the efforts quietly exerted by the army and navy during the years when war seemed remote have paid dividends.

In 1940, Assistant Secretary of War Johnson wrote in his annual report, “Without the benefit of plans perfected by twenty years of study the successful and timely execution of this program [industrial mobilization for war] would have been virtually impossible.” [Emphasis added]

Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, in his annual report for 1941, also noted that the IMP had helped the nation prepare for war:

> While the industrial mobilization plan, 1939 revision, was not put into full operation, it was followed very closely in the war department procurement activities. From August until the organization of the Priorities Super-Agency in the later part of December 1940 the Army and Navy Munitions Board exercised the wartime priority

146. See Brendon, Ike, 58; Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 88, 92; Davis, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 229; Perret, Eisenhower, 106–9; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 59.


149. War Department, Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1940 (Washington: GPO, 1940), 10.
function (on a purely voluntary basis by industry, but nevertheless effectively)—in our Industrial Mobilization Plan, careful attention had been devoted to this as well as to other wartime super-agency functions.\textsuperscript{150}

The same year, in testimony before the Truman Committee, the Senate committee charged with investigating war mobilization, Patterson remarked:

When the burden of the present defense program was placed on the Department, the supply services immediately started operating under the Industrial Mobilization Plan. They promptly placed orders for munitions with plants previously allocated, using informal competition wherever possible. In this way, the Ordnance Department has placed 85 percent of its orders for small arms, artillery, and ammunition components with industrial concerns already familiar with the problems.\textsuperscript{151}

The students at the Army Industrial College concurred with the above comment:

A consideration of the IMP, together with its development and the present situation, indicates that the IMP has been of great service in the present program of industrial mobilization. While the agencies are not strictly in accordance with those planned, the principles of the IMP appear to be in the process of being executed.\textsuperscript{152}

Just after Dwight Eisenhower completed his work on the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan, Douglas MacArthur testified before the War Policies Commission that progress had been made relative to 1917:

Today we have a skeletonized framework of a citizen Army capable of absorbing rapidly the military man power of the Nation [sic], whereas in 1917 we had to build up practically a complete organization. Similarly, on the material side we are in intimate touch with the industrial structure under a plan which will enable American industry to promptly absorb our war requirements.\textsuperscript{153}

Moreover, according to the Army's World War II economic mobilization historian, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, which Eisenhower had helped energize in the early thirties, and which since that time had been largely guided by Army officers from the Planning Branch,

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\item \textsuperscript{150} War Department, Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1941 (Washington: GPO, 1941), 45.
\item \textsuperscript{151} WPD 3674-66, DRB, TAG, as quoted in Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 690.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Problem No. 28, Short Course No. 1, January-April 1941, Army Industrial College, p. 11, as quoted in Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 303.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Statement of General Douglas MacArthur to the War Policies Commission, 1931.
\end{enumerate}
made substantial contributions to the rearmament program. It launched and directed the original priorities system for World War II, apportioned basic industrial capacity between the Army and Navy, cleared foreign contracts for munitions production in the United States, had an important role in breaking the machine tools bottleneck, compiled military requirements for numerous raw materials, and performed a wide array of other services.154

Finally, in regard to the efficacy of the IMP program and thus the significance of Eisenhower's work on it, the same historian has observed:

The creation of the War Production Board shortly after Pearl Harbor did reflect, in many respects, the conception of the War Resources Administration [the last form of the controlling superagency] set forth in the Industrial Mobilization Plan. Most of the plan's other features, both organizational and functional, were utilized in the course of the emergency, as well as after Pearl Harbor, but without specific attribution to or necessarily resulting from the Industrial Mobilization Plan itself.155

Dwight Eisenhower largely wrote the Army's first detailed IMP. In this effort he was an important player in stimulating and focusing the War Department's 1930–31 effort to create a comprehensive industrial mobilization plan.

In understanding this era and Eisenhower's place in it, it is imperative to remember also the larger political picture both in the Army and in the nation. The Army, particularly its planning for future wars, was unpopular in the country at large. The Army itself was divided over how that planning should proceed and how the economy should be organized in case of war. Hurley, Baruch, Payne, MacArthur, Moseley, and Eisenhower moved the nation to tolerate the idea of Army industrial planning for war, and moved the Army to accept a civilian-led centralized planning agency as the cornerstone of its industrialization plan. Army industrialization planning proceeded throughout the 1930s, and a civilian-led administrative agency was the cornerstone of that plan throughout the

155. Ibid., 81. See also Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilisation*, 691, for more argument as to the efficacy of the IMP. For a contrary view of the value of interwar planning for industrial mobilization, see Gough, "Soldiers, Businessmen and US Industrial Planning." Gough's work is valuable in pointing out some of the problems associated with interwar industrial mobilization planning. However, he ignores the accomplishments of that planning and does not compare the IMPs to the situation before World War One. Edward Coffman, who cites Gough in his recent book, still sees Army industrial planning in a positive light. Coffman, *The Regulars*, 284. Regardless, my point here is that Eisenhower's work on the IMP was significant, not that the plans were flawless or exemplified the highest cooperation between leaders of the military and industry.
decade. Roosevelt's war production program benefited from the lower-
echelon work the Army had done in the years before the war, and
eventually came back to the idea of a controlling superagency to govern
war production.156

Eisenhower's work in these years also benefited him personally. He
became acquainted with many of the nation's important business and
political leaders, and a friend to a few. The influential Baruch, a Democ-
rat, would support him for President in 1952.157 Eisenhower learned how
the federal government in Washington, D.C., worked and who worked
it.158 By the end of his service in the Assistant Secretary of War's office,
he knew as much or more about planning for industrial mobilization as
any officer in the Army.

Indeed, in the mid-1960s, Eisenhower remembered just how signifi-
cant his work in this era had been for him. He wrote in At Ease:

I now undertook work that was intriguing, and frustrating, but that
\textit{gave me an early look at the military-industrial complex} of whose
pressures I would later warn. Except at that point, the pressures
were exactly reversed. [Emphasis added]159

During his presidency (1953–61), Eisenhower endeavored to create a
defense establishment that was capable of defending the United States
indefinitely, but which did not bankrupt the nation or fundamentally
change its nature. For Eisenhower, both the old habit of dismantling the
country's defensive capability after war, and the new threat of a defense
establishment that fed on the fears of the nation and sucked away both
freedom and prosperity, had to be avoided.160 At the end of his adminis-
tration in January 1961 he warned the American people:

In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the mili-
tary-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of mis-
placed power exists and will persist.161

Finally, Eisenhower's work in the early 1930s impressed MacArthur,
who particularly appreciated Eisenhower's talent in writing. In 1931 the
Chief of Staff asked Eisenhower, who at that time was still assigned to

156. James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 1:466, 467; Thatcher, \textit{Planning for Indus-
trial Mobilisation}, 303, 304.


158. Ambrose, \textit{Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect}, 92;
Miller, \textit{Ike the Soldier}, 258; William B. Pickett, \textit{Dwight David Eisenhower and Amer-
ican Power} (Wheeling, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1995), 65.


160. Ambrose, \textit{Eisenhower: The President}, 87, 88; Eisenhower, \textit{Mandate For
Change}, 131, 132.

Payne’s office, to write his annual report. MacArthur wrote of the major’s work:

I desire to place on official record this special commendation for excellent work of a highly important nature which you have just completed under my personal direction. You not only accepted this assignment willingly—an assignment which involved much hard work—performing it in addition to your regular duties in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, but you gave me a most acceptable solution within a minimum of time.  

Mamie had the letter framed “to preserve it.” As Geoffrey Perret, an authority on both Eisenhower and MacArthur, has written, “such fulsome praise from a Chief of Staff was almost unheard of.”

MacArthur was also impressed with Eisenhower’s ability to develop relationships with business leaders, a rare talent in the Army of that day. As things turned out, Eisenhower’s relationship with the majestic, mercurial, and maddening MacArthur was just beginning.

165. Brandon, Mamie Doud Eisenhower, 171; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilisation, 34, 35.