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Bonding alone: Familism, religion, and secular civic participation[☆]

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the influence of familism, religion, and their interaction on participation in secular voluntary associations. We develop an insularity theory to explain how familism and religion encourage Americans to avoid secular civic participation. Using data from the first wave of the National Survey of Families and Households, this study finds that familism reduces participation in secular organizations. Moreover, religion moderates the effect of familism: specifically, religious involvement tends to increase the negative effect of familism on secular civic participation. Although religious involvement in and of itself fosters secular civic participation, strong familism tends to dampen positive impacts of religious involvement. For familistic individuals, religious congregations appear to reinforce their insularity within their immediate social circle and family.

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1. Introduction

The empirical literature on civic engagement suggests that strong bonds within a civic group do not always generate solidarity across different groups (e.g., Lichterman, 2005). Scholars often employ bonding and bridging metaphors to describe such civic relationships (Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006; Blanchard, 2007; Chaves et al., 2002; Putnam, 2000; Scheitle and Adamczyk, 2009; Schwadel, 2005; Wood and Warren, 2002; Wuthnow, 2002, 2004). In a nutshell, bonding relationships primarily strengthen unity within a group, whereas bridging facilitates cohesion between different groups. Although these metaphors have been used to illustrate *structural* connections among individuals, they also imply two different kinds of *cultural* orientations: insularity versus inclusivity.

These internal and external orientations, in many cases, coexist in tension (Putnam, 2007, pp. 143–144) within institutions that generate social capital, especially religion and family. Some religious institutions often promote bridging ties that cut across a wide range of civic groups (Warren, 2001; Wood, 2002), but others discourage members from mingling with outsiders, inducing them to withdraw into their immediate social circles (Uslaner, 2002). Similarly, families often foster civic virtues such as cooperation, respect, and tolerance for future citizens (Glendon, 1993), yet some forms of familistic ideology that emphasize the normative importance of marriage and childbearing (Wilcox, 2004) can inhibit extrafamilial engagement by encouraging family members to focus on the interests and needs of family members, at the expense of groups outside the family (Ginsborg, 2005; Kumar, 1997).

Although both religion and family maintain longstanding, reinforcing institutional ties with one another (Christiano, 2000; Thornton, 1985), and religion has lately played an increasingly central role in legitimating a familistic orientation

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among Americans (Wilcox, 2004), previous studies on religion and civic engagement have paid little attention to the role that familism may play in moderating the religion–civic engagement link. Moreover, surprisingly few family scholars have examined the links between family and civic engagement, even though familial factors (e.g., family structure) appear to be linked to patterns of civic engagement (Wilson, 2000; Wolfinger and Wolfinger, 2008). Indeed, only recently have family scholars turned their attention to domestic life in an effort to determine how volunteering is transmitted from parents to children (Mustillo et al., 2004) and how spouses influence each other's volunteer work (Rotolo and Wilson, 2006). Another study has shed new light on dynamics in couples' division of household labor by incorporating community volunteering and informal support into the gender stratification literature (Hook, 2004). But no family studies have considered the ways in which religion may moderate the family–civic engagement link. To date, the civic engagement literature lacks a comprehensive study of how *both* familism *and* religion affect secular forms of civic participation.

This study aims to fill that gap by examining whether familism is linked to patterns of secular civic participation, and whether familism and religious factors interact to influence participation in secular voluntary organizations. The main research questions for the current study are as follows: (a) Does familism discourage participation in nonreligious voluntary organizations? (b) Does the relationship between familism and secular civic participation vary by religious tradition? (c) Is the relationship between familism and secular civic participation moderated by levels of religious involvement? Using data from the first wave of the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), this study explores these research questions by focusing on participation in a wide range of nonreligious voluntary associations.

2. Theory and hypotheses

2.1. Familism and secular civic participation

2.1.1. Conceptualizing familism

Researchers conceptualize familism in different ways, largely according to their subdisciplinary orientation. One strand—mostly from the sociology of the family—employs the term when measuring a normative dimension of intergenerational solidarity (e.g., Bengtson and Roberts, 1991). Following the work of earlier family scholars (e.g., Blair, 1972), this literature defines familism as “attitudes about the centrality or primacy of family life” (Gans and Silverstein, 2006, p. 961). Using this conceptualization, research has explored the role of familism in, for instance, fostering social support between aging parents and adult children in the population at large (Parrott and Bengtson, 1999), and among Mexican Americans (John et al., 1997).

Another conceptualization of familism is found in the sociology of religion literature, which identifies *religion* as a driving force that sustains family functions in modern society. The literature in the sociology of religion focuses on the processes by which the institutions of religion and family *become allies* under the threat of secularization. Secularization theorists such as Berger (1967) and Luckmann (1967) observe a notable affinity between religion and family, as these institutions reinforce each other in sustaining their symbolic significance after having become segregated from the major economic and political institutions. In short, from this perspective, familism is a concept that captures the interplay of family and religion in the private sphere, and is heavily influenced by religious conceptions of family life (Pankhurst and Houseknecht, 2000). Accordingly, research on the topic has focused on the familism embedded in religious institutions and its influence on family-related behaviors. For example, Wilcox (2004) has taken this approach in linking conservative Protestantism to the ideology of a kind of *traditional familism*. In particular, Wilcox contends that the traditional familism espoused by conservative Protestantism emphasizes lifelong marriage, premarital sexual restraint and a vigorous parenting ethic that combines strong parental authority, strict discipline, and a warm, expressive style of parenting.

While these different conceptualizations agree that familism focuses on the primacy of family life, the latter approach found in the sociology of religion literature emphasizes the role of religious institutions in shaping and legitimating a particular form of family ideology. In this paper, we focus on a kind of familism that generally advanced by traditional Protestant, Catholic and Jewish religious traditions in response to dramatic family changes occurred in the United States (Manning, 1999).

2.1.2. Privatization of religion and family

Despite a multidimensional process of secularization, most versions of secularization theory concur that modernity brings structural differentiation of religion from other primary secular institutions such as the market and the state (Casanova, 1994; Gorski, 2000). The one notable exception to this general pattern of differentiation is that the ties between religion and family tend to remain strong in the contemporary world. For instance, Berger (1967, p. 373) observed that “religion has found itself in a state of social ‘proximity’ to the family in the private sphere,” providing a “buffer zone” against market forces and state control where individuals continue to pursue questions of meaning, identity, and intimacy (Pankhurst and Houseknecht, 2000, p. 24).

Since religion and family are so closely tied to each other, familism facilitates religious involvement and vice versa. Indeed, research suggests that people with a familistic orientation are more likely to attend church as well as participate in congregational activities, and that religious attendance fosters higher levels of traditional familism (Becker and Hofmeister, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 1995; Wilcox, 2004). However, the importance placed on domestic life may limit involvement in secular civic organizations outside the home. For example, people who are closely focused on their own families may not

have time to participate in secular civic organizations. In contrast to this general pattern of secular disengagement, participation in the institution of religion may be a priority for people with traditional family attitudes. Thus, in this study, we posit that religion and traditional familism encourage people to invest in their families and churches, because they reinforce one another, and to disengage from secular institutions that may compete with families and churches—either for adults' time, or for their normative allegiance.

This insularity perspective of traditional familism is somewhat similar to “privatism” appeared in Italy and South Korea. In a classic study of a southern Italian village, Banfield (1958, p. 10) describes the ethos of “amoral familism,” whereby people pursue the material and short-run interests of their immediate families rather than cooperate with neighbors for their common good. Several decades later, Putnam (1993) found a similar ethos elsewhere in southern Italy, arguing in Granovetter's (1973) terms that “‘strong’ interpersonal ties (like kinship) . . . are less important than ‘weak ties’ . . . in sustaining community cohesion and collective action” (p. 175). Similarly, in an analysis of Korean familism, Kim (1990) asserts that some Korean civic organizations foster strong kinship ties for the benefits of one's own family rather than the wider community. Because these cases are drawn from “strong-family” areas (Dalla Zuanna, 2001; Suzuki, 2008), one may argue that this insularity perspective is limited to such regions (i.e., Southern Europe and East Asia). However, as Banfield (1958, p. 11) and Ginsborg (2005, p. 106) point out, this kind of insular ethos may be found even among a relatively “weak-family” region such as the United States.

2.1.3. *Changes in American family life*

There have been dramatic demographic and ideational changes in family life over the past three decades: delays in marriage and fertility, increases in cohabitation and nonmarital childbearing, widespread divorce, and cultural shifts that largely ratify these demographic changes (see, e.g., Spain and Bianchi, 1996; Thornton and Young-DeMarco, 2001). Some Americans, especially religious conservatives, have responded to these changes by underlining their commitment to familism, emphasizing, for instance, “a commitment to a lifelong marital covenant, and a high level of expressive interaction between all members of the family” in an effort to hold these family changes at bay (Wilcox, 2004, p. 36). At the behavioral level, research suggests that familistic parents are more likely than other parents to hug and praise their children, to spend time with their children, and to resort to corporal punishment—partly in an effort to protect their children from secular influences that are seen as threatening to the welfare of the family (Wilcox, 1998, 2004). At the institutional level, family-oriented parachurch organizations such as Focus on the Family, Concerned Women for America, and the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute have responded to these cultural shifts by “articulating a largely antimodern family ideology that [has] mixed religious, Americanist, and familist themes” (Wilcox, 2004, p. 105). Thus, we expect that familistic concern about the quality and stability of family life may lead family-minded people to be more inward-looking, focusing their attention on domestic life and on religious institutions that support their familistic worldview; such people should be less likely to engage secular organizations outside of their family and religious circles. Thus, the insularity perspective suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. Higher levels of familistic attitudes are associated with lower levels of secular civic participation.

2.2. *Examining interaction effects*

2.2.1. *Familism and religious tradition*

The literature on religion and civic engagement generally suggests large denominational differences in secular volunteering (e.g., Becker and Dhingra, 2001; Park and Smith, 2000). Most studies show that conservative Protestants are less likely to participate in secular volunteer organizations than are members of other Christian traditions, such as mainline Protestants and Catholics (Wuthnow, 1999). Given this variation in secular engagement between religious traditions, there may be factors unique to the specific religious traditions that affect the extent to which familism is related to secular civic engagement. Our literature review pays special attention to conservative Protestantism because of the salience of family beliefs and practices in that tradition.

In the 1950s, the Catholic and mainline Protestant churches were influential promoters of familism (Bendroth, 2002). But since the 1970s these religious traditions, especially mainline Protestantism, have moved away from explicitly endorsing a familistic outlook, and more toward championing family diversity, egalitarian gender roles, and a progressive view of human sexuality (Wilcox, 2004). Accordingly, they were increasingly less likely to provide an institutional setting where familism is underlined and reinforced in their congregants. By contrast, conservative Protestantism—at least since the 1970s—has devoted significant pastoral attention to family life, and has endorsed a familistic outlook in much of its preaching, teaching, and media offerings (Bartkowski, 2001). For example, Wilcox (2004) found that married evangelical men with children are often more engaged with their children than mainline Protestant fathers. Further, Brooks (2002) showed that the high levels of concern with family decline are concentrated among conservative Protestants. Because conservative Protestants stress family life more than social issues, among evangelicals, church attendance is not significantly associated with membership in secular civic groups (Wilson and Janoski, 1995). Accordingly, among its most familistic members, the conservative Protestant tradition may strengthen bonding ties instead of bridging ties (Blanchard, 2007; Schwadel, 2005). In other words, conservative Protestant congregations may be effective at mobilizing familistic members for a Bible study group and other family-oriented gatherings, but not for the broader society beyond their families and congregations (Ruiter and De Graaf, 2006). This expectation leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. There is a negative interactive effect of familism and conservative Protestantism upon secular civic participation.

2.2.2. Familism and religious involvement

Moreover, because of the strong affinity between family and religion, these two institutions may work together to dampen secular civic engagement. To date, research on civic engagement has not focused specifically on the interactive effects of familism and religious involvement on secular civic engagement. However, the literature on religion and family mentioned above suggests that, at the cultural level, religious institutions may make a familistic outlook especially salient by endowing it with transcendent significance, and by drawing sharp cultural boundaries against a secular world that is seen as hostile to the family (Wilcox, 2004). People may be particularly likely to focus on their families and churches, to the exclusion of secular civic organizations, because they see the family as a divinely-ordained institution and because they wish to protect their families from secular influences. Accordingly, religious people who are family-minded may wish to steer clear of institutions that challenge, or even those that do not fully support, their religiously-supported familistic outlook.

A similar dynamic may be in play at the organizational level. Specifically, we draw on the “organizational closure” perspective to develop a hypothesis about the interactive effects of familism and religious involvement (Schwadel, 2005, p. 161). In the sociology of religion literature, this perspective has been used to explain that conservative Protestants are less active in secular organizations than members of other religious tradition because of their dedication to their own congregations (Iannaccone, 1994). For instance, one study found that churchgoing evangelicals are less likely to volunteer for groups outside their churches because they focus so much of their time and energy on their own congregations (Wuthnow, 1999). In this case, the organizational closure perspective suggests that religiously active persons who are also devoted to their families have little time or ability to participate in secular organizations, partly because they devote the lion’s share of their free time and attention to these two institutions (Lam, 2002; McPherson and Rotolo, 1996). Hence, we predict that holding familistic attitudes is more likely to reduce secular association participation when people are also active in groups in religious communities. Accordingly, we offer the following pair of hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3a. The negative effect of familism on secular civic participation is larger for people who frequently attend religious services.

Hypothesis 3b. The negative effect of familism on secular civic participation is larger for people who frequently participate in religious group activities.

3. Data and measurement

3.1. Data

We test these hypotheses using data from the first wave of the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). The NSFH is a national survey of probability sample of 13,008 adults aged 19 and older interviewed between March 1987 and May 1988 (Sweet et al., 1988). The key variables used in this study are part of the self-administered questionnaire modules completed by 12,243 respondents (765 cases were terminated before completion). Most variables had small amounts of missing data (less than 5%), thus missing data were deleted listwise except family income (24%). Missing values on family income were imputed using regression-equation imputation, with an equation including covariates for race, education, and marital status. After imputation, we were left with our final sample of 10,328, who have data on all the variables in the analysis. Sample weights are used to achieve the proper representation of respondents in the US population.

3.2. Dependent variable

Researchers have employed different categorization schemes to distinguish between various types of voluntary associations (for a recent review, see Bonikowski and McPherson, 2007). For the purposes of this study, we use Uslaner’s (2002) typology, which classifies voluntary associations as religious or secular. This measure is useful because familism may be differently related to each type of civic participation. As noted earlier, traditional family values are positively related to religious participation; however, in the current study we expect this kind of familism to be inversely associated with secular participation.

The dependent variable in this study is a dichotomous measure that taps whether respondents belong to *any* types of secular voluntary associations. The NSFH respondents were originally asked how often they participated in the following organizations ranging from (1) never to (5) several times a week: (a) fraternal groups, (b) service clubs, (c) veterans’ groups, (d) political groups, (e) labor unions, (f) sports groups, (g) youth groups, (h) school-related groups, (i) hobby or garden clubs, (j) school fraternities or sororities, (k) nationality groups, (l) farm organizations, (m) literary, art, study or discussion groups, (n) professional or academic societies, and (o) church-affiliated groups. Since we are interested in how likely familistic individuals are to be a member of any nonreligious voluntary association, we employ a dichotomous measure following several

other studies (e.g., Curtis et al., 1992; Ruiter and De Graaf, 2006; Wuthnow, 1999). Specifically, to measure *secular civic participation*, we assigned a value of 1 to respondents who participated in political groups, labor unions, sports groups, school related groups, hobby or garden clubs, cultural groups, and professional societies at least several times a year. We assigned a value of 0 to respondents who did not participate in the aforementioned groups.

It is possible that different categorization schemes might affect the results. Following Uslaner (2002), we therefore tested different categorization schemes by first including voluntary associations that can be either secular or religious (e.g., fraternal groups). We then examined the sensitivity of our results by adding voluntary associations that appear too homogeneous to incorporate into a measure of secular civic participation (e.g., nationality groups). Ancillary analyses (shown in Appendix tables) indicate that the results are not sensitive to the choice of secular voluntary associations.

3.3. Key independent variable and control variables

3.3.1. Familism

Our *familism* index consists of five questions that have been used in previous analyses (Wilcox, 2004). The questions together tap the normative importance of marriage, childbearing, and children's well-being.¹ The first three questions ask respondents to indicate their agreement with the following statements using a 5-point scale, ranging from (1) strongly agree to (5) strongly disagree: (a) "Marriage is a lifetime relationship and should never be ended except under extreme circumstances;" (b) "It's better for a person to get married than to go through life being single;" (c) "It's better for a person to have a child than to go through life childless." These items were reverse-coded so that high scores on these questions indicated a high level of familism. For the last two questions, respondents were asked to indicate their approval of the following statements: (d) "Women who have a child without getting married;" (e) "A couple with an unhappy marriage getting a divorce if their youngest child is under 5." Respondents answered using a 7-point scale, ranging from (1) strongly approve to (7) strongly disapprove. Because of the different response format, all items were standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 before being summed to create the index (Cronbach's alpha = .60).

3.3.2. Religious traditions

We controlled for religious traditions because there is variation in traditional family attitudes (e.g., Gay et al., 1996) and secular civic participation (e.g., Wuthnow, 1999) among religious traditions. Employing a religious classification scheme devised by Steensland and colleagues (2000), we constructed dummy variables for *conservative Protestant*, *mainline Protestant*, *black Protestant*, *Catholic*, and *unaffiliated*. More specifically, respondents who identified with Baptist, Assemblies of God, Pentecostal, Missionary Alliance, Christian Reformed, and many fundamentalist and evangelical churches were coded as conservative Protestant.² Respondents who indicated Episcopal, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Methodist, or Congregational affiliations were coded as mainline Protestant, which serves as the reference category in the analyses. African American respondents who identified with Baptist, Methodist, and several conservative churches were coded as black Protestant. Jewish and other religion were excluded from the analyses because of the small number of respondents in both of these categories.

3.3.3. Theological conservatism

Theological conservatism is an important control variable because it was found to be positively associated with traditional familism (Wilcox, 2004) and negatively associated with secular civic participation (Schwadel, 2005). Further, it may be used as a proxy for "general conservative orientation," which may confound the relationship between traditional familism and secular civic participation.

Following previous research (Ellison and Bartkowski, 2002; Wilcox, 1998), we used the following two items to construct a measure of *theological conservatism*: (a) "The Bible is God's word and everything happened or will happen exactly as it says" and (b) "The Bible is the answer to all important human problems."³ Respondents answered using a 5-point scale, ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. We reverse-coded these items and constructed an additive index, ranging from 2 to 10 with higher scores indicating a high level of theological conservatism (Cronbach's alpha = .85).

3.3.4. Religious service attendance

We controlled for religious service attendance because it is positively associated with a familistic orientation (e.g., Becker and Hofmeister, 2001) and secular civic participation (e.g., Wuthnow, 2004). *Religious service attendance* was measured using the question: "How often do you attend religious services?" Following General Social Survey's scheme, religious service attendance was coded from (0) never to (8) several times a week.

¹ Unlike Wilcox (2004), we excluded items on caring for aging parents because our theory does not posit that elderly parents care is associated with secular civic participation. In response to a reviewer's request, we examined whether adding these items to the current familism index improve reliability. We did not find any improvement, which supports our theoretical reasoning. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.

² Due to the lack of detailed coding scheme for Baptist, Lutheran, and Presbyterian in NSFH, we cannot rule out the possibilities of some measurement error in our results as we may include Northern Baptists and exclude some evangelical Lutheran and Presbyterians.

³ It should be noted that we use the term theological conservatism to refer to biblical inerrancy. Although data limitations do not allow us to explore other aspects of theological conservatism, recent studies showed that theological conservatism is a much richer construct that includes distinctive beliefs in "sin" and "salvation" as well as "scripture" (see, Bartkowski and Hempel, 2009; Hempel and Bartkowski, 2008).

3.3.5. Religious group participation

We also included a measure of religious group participation partly because some studies found evidence that participation in congregational activities eliminates the net effect of religious service attendance on bridging civic engagement (Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006) and nonvoting political behavior (Brown and Brown, 2003). These studies emphasized the role of congregational activities because most civic skills used in secular organizations (e.g., writing letters, organizing meetings, and speaking in public) are acquired and cultivated primarily through that type of religious involvement. Respondents were asked how often they participated in church-affiliated groups. This question measures *religious group participation* that range from (1) never to (5) several times a week.

3.3.6. Sociodemographic controls

Finally, a number of demographic control variables were included in the following analyses: *gender* (female/male [omitted]) of the respondent, *race/ethnicity* of the respondent (black/Hispanic/non-Hispanic white [omitted])⁴, the *region* of the respondent (Northeast/North Central/West/South [omitted]), respondent's *years of education*, respondent's *family income* (in thousands of dollars), respondent's *age* (in years), respondent's *marital status* (divorced; widowed; unmarried; married [omitted]), and the *number of children in the household*.

3.3.7. Interaction terms

We also added a series of interaction terms. For our analyses, continuous variables like familism, religious service attendance, and religious group participation were mean centered to avoid multicollinearity problems in the models with our interaction terms.

4. Analytic strategy

The dependent variable in our analyses is a dichotomous measure of whether or not a respondent reports at least one membership in each of seven different types of secular voluntary associations (i.e., political groups, labor unions, sports groups, school related groups, hobby or garden clubs, cultural groups, and professional societies). Analyses were conducted in two steps. First, we used two-sample *t* tests to determine whether proportions of associational membership are significantly different between low and high levels of familism.⁵ Second, we used logistic regression to estimate the effects of familism and other covariates on the likelihood of membership in secular voluntary associations. The model is constructed in a hierarchical fashion. The first model tests whether familism reduces the likelihood of secular civic participation controlling for two types of religious involvement and demographic controls. To this baseline model, in Models 2 and 3, we introduce religious tradition and theological conservatism, respectively, to determine whether religion controls confound the relationship between familism and secular civic participation. Following that, Models 4–6 test the interactions of our three measures of religion: Model 4 tests whether religious tradition moderates the relationship between familism and secular civic participation; Models 5 and 6 test whether the negative effect of familism on secular civic participation is larger for respondents who have greater attendance at religious services (Model 5) and religious group participation (Model 6).

5. Results

Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study are provided in Table 1.

5.1. Bivariate analyses

5.1.1. Familism

Are familistic individuals less involved in secular voluntary associations than nonfamilistic individuals? Table 2 presents the proportion of respondents reporting membership in each type of voluntary associations separately for low and high levels of familism determined by mean split. Following Uslaner (2002), we categorized secular voluntary groups into three distinct types: “primarily secular,” “either secular or religious,” “clearly secular but seems too homogeneous” (p. 243). Table 2 provides some support for our first hypothesis. We see that people with high levels of familism report lower membership than those with low levels of familism in all types of primarily secular voluntary groups. But this pattern does not hold for groups that could be either secular or religious and for groups that are clearly secular but too homogenous in their demographic and occupational compositions. For the group that can be either secular or religious, differences are only significant for fraternal groups. People with high levels of familism report higher levels of membership in fraternal groups. In the group that is clearly secular but too homogeneous, people with high levels of familism report higher levels of membership though only at significant levels for farm organizations. In sum, Table 2 suggests distinct patterns of involvement in voluntary

⁴ Other racial categories were dropped from the analysis because the numbers of Native Americans, Asian Americans, and persons from other racial backgrounds were too small for multivariate analysis.

⁵ We report results from two-sample *t*-tests instead of two-sample test of proportions because when sample size is large, *t*-tests and *z*-tests produce almost same values (Park, 2009).

Table 1

Descriptive statistics, NSFH1 (N = 10,328).

	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
<i>Dependent variable</i>				
Membership in secular voluntary groups	.55	.50	0	1
<i>Demographic controls</i>				
Female	.60	.49	0	1
Male (ref.)	.40	.49	0	1
Black	.19	.39	0	1
Hispanic	.07	.26	0	1
White (ref.)	.73	.44	0	1
Northeast	.19	.39	0	1
North Central	.28	.45	0	1
West	.16	.36	0	1
South (ref.)	.37	.48	0	1
Education	12.38	3.11	0	20
Family income (in thousands; imputed)	27.919	35.200	−24.626	988.7
Age	42.17	17.15	16	95
Divorced	.19	.39	0	1
Widowed	.10	.30	0	1
Unmarried	.19	.39	0	1
Married (ref.)	.52	.50	0	1
Number of children	.85	1.18	0	11
<i>Religion controls</i>				
Religious service attendance	3.90	2.93	0	8
Religious group participation	1.85	1.22	1	5
Conservative Protestant	.20	.40	0	1
Black Protestant	.14	.34	0	1
Catholic	.27	.44	0	1
Unaffiliated	.09	.28	0	1
Mainline Protestant (ref.)	.31	.46	0	1
Theological conservatism	7.05	2.22	2	10
<i>Key independent variable</i>				
Familism index (standardized)	−.05	3.04	−10.43	6.67

Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.

Table 2

Proportion of group membership and the significance of the difference by familism, NSFH1 (N = 10,018).

Voluntary association type	Total	Low familism ^a (n = 5095)	High familism ^a (n = 4923)	Sig. diff. ^b
<i>Primarily secular</i>				
Political groups	0.063 (0.242)	0.071 (0.256)	0.055 (0.227)	t = 3.26**
Labor unions	0.066 (0.247)	0.071 (0.258)	0.059 (0.236)	t = 2.45*
Sports groups	0.315 (0.464)	0.354 (0.478)	0.274 (0.446)	t = 8.67***
School related groups	0.270 (0.444)	0.302 (0.459)	0.238 (0.426)	t = 7.23***
Hobby or garden clubs	0.150 (0.357)	0.159 (0.366)	0.141 (0.348)	t = 2.58**
Literary, art, study or discussion groups	0.131 (0.337)	0.145 (0.352)	0.116 (0.320)	t = 4.25***
Professional or academic societies	0.163 (0.370)	0.191 (0.393)	0.135 (0.342)	t = 7.58***
<i>Either secular or religious</i>				
Fraternal groups	0.079 (0.270)	0.072 (0.258)	0.086 (0.281)	t = −2.65**
Service clubs	0.115 (0.319)	0.119 (0.324)	0.110 (0.313)	t = 1.35
Youth groups	0.176 (0.381)	0.181 (0.385)	0.172 (0.377)	t = 1.24
School fraternities or sororities	0.049 (0.216)	0.049 (0.215)	0.049 (0.217)	t = −0.15
<i>Clearly secular but too homogeneous</i>				
Veterans' groups	0.040 (0.197)	0.037 (0.189)	0.044 (0.205)	t = −1.82
Nationality groups	0.041 (0.197)	0.040 (0.197)	0.041 (0.198)	t = −0.10
Farm organizations	0.030 (0.170)	0.025 (0.155)	0.035 (0.185)	t = −3.11**

Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.

Standard deviations are in parentheses.

^a High and low levels of familism are determined by a mean split.^b Significant tests are from two-sample t-tests with equal variance. Degrees of freedom for each t-test are (N − 2) = 10,016.

* p < .05 (two-tailed tests).

** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

*** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

groups according to the levels of familism. People with high levels of familism are less likely to report membership in primarily secular groups.

5.1.2. Religious tradition and religious involvement

As we noted earlier, religious tradition and religious involvement may moderate the familism–civic participation link. For this reason, in Table 3 we compare individuals with low and high levels of familism on these covariates. Beginning with religious tradition, we see that individuals with high levels of familism are significantly more likely to be affiliated with conservative Protestantism, whereas individuals with low levels of familism are more likely to belong to mainline Protestantism. Although individuals with low levels of familism are more likely to be affiliated with Black Protestant and Catholic traditions, the difference is not statistically significant. Turning to religious involvement, as expected, individuals with high levels of familism report greater attendance at religious services and religious group activities.

5.2. Multivariate analyses

The bivariate statistics presented above suggest that familism is negatively associated with participation in primarily secular organizations. However, we can be confident of our findings only after controlling for a range of potentially confounding predictors of secular civic participation. We present a series of logistic regression models, estimating the net effects of familism on the likelihood of belonging to secular voluntary association. Table 4 presents the results from logistic regression estimating the effects of familism on secular civic participation. Model 1 indicates that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, familism is associated with lower levels of participation in secular voluntary associations. In other words, the more people hold a strong normative commitment to marriage and childbearing, the less they participate in secular organizations. Also, we see that greater involvement in religious institutions is significantly associated with secular civic participation. Specifically, both religious service attendance and religious group participation are positively associated with the likelihood of belonging to secular civic participation. However, inconsistent with some previous studies (e.g., Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006) adding religious group participation does not eliminate the net effect of religious service attendance on secular civic participation.

In Model 2, we include religious traditions to determine whether the main effect of familism on secular civic participation remains robust. As expected, conservative Protestants are significantly less involved in secular associations than mainline Protestants. Even after controlling for religious traditions, the net effects of familism remain substantial. Model 3 examines whether a measure of theological conservatism explains the relationship between familism and secular civic participation. Theologically conservative people are less likely to be involved in secular voluntary associations, and adding this variable somewhat reduces the effect of familism, but the relationship between familism and secular civic participation remains robust. This suggests that a particular view on marriage and childbearing has significant and negative effects on secular civic participation net of “conventional” effects (Stolzenberg et al., 1995).

The remainder of Table 4 shows mixed results about interaction effects. First, Model 4 shows no support for Hypothesis 2. Given the greater emphasis on family-oriented beliefs and practices in conservative Protestantism, we expected that familism among conservative Protestantism would be especially likely to lower the likelihood of secular involvement; but did not find a significant difference. It appears that religion is linked to secular civic participation in a more generic fashion rather than a culturally-specific way; measures of religious involvement are stronger predictors for secular civic participation than religious traditions. Models 5 and 6, however, provide support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b, indicating that religious service attendance and religious group participation moderate the effect of familism on secular civic participation. Specifically,

Table 3

Proportion (mean) of religious tradition/religious involvement and the significance of the difference by familism, NSFH1 (N = 10,018).

Variables	Total	Low familism ^a (n = 5095)	High familism ^a (n = 4923)	Sig. diff. ^b
<i>Religious tradition</i>				
Conservative Protestant	0.203 (0.402)	0.157 (0.364)	0.251 (0.433)	$t = -11.75^{***}$
Mainline Protestant	0.305 (0.460)	0.314 (0.464)	0.296 (0.456)	$t = 2.00^*$
Black Protestant	0.136 (0.343)	0.141 (0.348)	0.131 (0.337)	$t = 1.50$
Catholic	0.268 (0.443)	0.268 (0.443)	0.267 (0.442)	$t = 0.22$
Unaffiliated	0.089 (0.284)	0.120 (0.324)	0.057 (0.231)	$t = 11.17^{***}$
<i>Religious involvement</i>				
Religious service attendance	3.848 (2.931)	3.255 (2.831)	4.462 (2.906)	$F_{1,10016} = 443.60^{***}$
Religious group participation	1.824 (1.211)	1.639 (1.076)	2.016 (1.309)	$F_{1,10016} = 247.80^{***}$

Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.

Standard deviations are in parentheses.

^a High and low levels of familism are determined by a mean split.

^b Significant tests are from two-sample *t*-tests with equal variance and *F*-tests (ANOVA). Degrees of freedom for each *t*-test are (N – 2) = 10,016.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 4

Unstandardized coefficients from the logistic regression predicting participation in secular voluntary associations, NSFH1 (N = 10,328).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Demographic controls^a</i>						
Female	-.417*** (.059)	-.422*** (.059)	-.403*** (.059)	-.403*** (.059)	-.403*** (.059)	-.401*** (.059)
Black	-.355*** (.075)	-.432*** (.131)	-.374*** (.132)	-.373*** (.132)	-.382*** (.132)	-.376*** (.132)
Hispanic	-.482*** (.115)	-.554*** (.119)	-.546*** (.119)	-.557*** (.119)	-.550*** (.119)	-.553*** (.119)
Northeast	.057 (.078)	-.018 (.083)	-.036 (.083)	-.039 (.083)	-.035 (.083)	-.034 (.083)
North Central	.219** (.068)	.169* (.071)	.157* (.071)	.156* (.071)	.157* (.071)	.160* (.071)
West	.344*** (.089)	.301*** (.091)	.283*** (.091)	.279*** (.091)	.290*** (.091)	.289*** (.091)
Education	.217*** (.014)	.213*** (.014)	.204*** (.014)	.205*** (.014)	.203*** (.014)	.204*** (.014)
Family income (in thousands; imputed)	.009*** (.003)	.009*** (.003)	.008*** (.003)	.008*** (.003)	.008*** (.003)	.008*** (.003)
Age	-.018*** (.002)	-.019*** (.002)	-.019*** (.002)	-.019*** (.002)	-.019*** (.002)	-.019*** (.002)
Divorced	.118 (.091)	.118 (.091)	.124 (.091)	.124 (.091)	.130 (.091)	.129 (.091)
Widowed	-.134 (.122)	-.144 (.122)	-.140 (.122)	-.141 (.122)	-.139 (.123)	-.142 (.122)
Unmarried	.073 (.107)	.058 (.107)	.049 (.107)	.051 (.107)	.051 (.107)	.052 (.107)
Number of children	.235*** (.028)	.233*** (.028)	.234*** (.028)	.234*** (.028)	.233*** (.028)	.233*** (.028)
<i>Types of religious involvement</i>						
Religious service attendance	.037*** (.013)	.031* (.013)	.040*** (.014)	.039*** (.014)	.043*** (.014)	.038*** (.014)
Religious group participation	.277*** (.032)	.295*** (.032)	.307*** (.032)	.309*** (.033)	.317*** (.033)	.338*** (.035)
<i>Suppressing factors^b</i>						
Familism ^{c,d,e}	-.050*** (.011)	-.048*** (.011)	-.037*** (.011)	-.042* (.018)	-.041*** (.011)	-.041*** (.011)
Conservative Protestant		-.228*** (.083)	-.175* (.084)	-.168* (.084)	-.168* (.084)	-.166* (.084)
Black Protestant		.030 (.151)	.016 (.151)	.013 (.151)	.012 (.151)	.008 (.151)
Catholic		.044 (.079)	.016 (.079)	.013 (.079)	.017 (.079)	.015 (.079)
Unaffiliated		-.158 (.111)	-.228* (.113)	-.263* (.124)	-.189 (.114)	-.213 (.113)
Theological conservatism			-.063*** (.016)	-.062*** (.016)	-.065*** (.017)	-.064*** (.017)
<i>Interactions</i>						
Familism by religious tradition						
Familism × conservative Protestant				-.005 (.027)		
Familism × black Protestant				.003 (.030)		
Familism × Catholic				.025 (.025)		
Familism × unaffiliated				-.023 (.038)		
Familism by religious involvement						
Familism × religious service attendance					-.009** (.003)	
Familism × religious group participation						-.023** (.009)
Constant	-2.437*** (.208)	-2.256*** (.220)	-1.752*** (.258)	-1.760*** (.258)	-1.746*** (.259)	-1.778*** (.259)
Log pseudo-likelihood	-5711.449	-5702.313	-5691.118	-5689.321	-5684.923	-5685.583
Degrees of freedom	16	20	21	25	22	22

Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

^a Reference categories are male, white, south, and married.^b Reference category is mainline Protestant.^c The main effect of familism represents the effect for mainline Protestant.^d The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious service attendance.^e The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious group participation.* $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

the negative influence of familism on secular civic participation tends to become larger as the levels of religious service attendance and religious group participation increase. Figs. 1 and 2 display these interaction effects graphically.

Fig. 1 shows a relationship between familism and predicted probability of secular civic participation separately for the “low” and “high” levels of religious service attendance. Specifically, we defined high levels of religious service attendance as those where the mean attendance is greater than 6.83 (i.e., more than one standard deviation above the mean of 3.90), and low levels as those where the mean attendance is less than 0.97 (i.e., more than one standard deviation below the mean of 3.90). The predicted probabilities show that familism has larger effect among individuals with higher religious service attendance. On the contrary, among those with lower levels of religious service attendance, the relationship between familism and secular organization participation is smaller, while still negative. Fig. 2 shows results for religious group participation. Similarly, we found familism to have a stronger negative impact on secular organization participation among individuals with greater participation in religious group activity than those with less participation. In sum, religious




Fig. 1. Relationship between familism and secular civic participation by levels of religious service attendance.




Fig. 2. Relationship between familism and secular civic participation by levels of religious group participation.

involvement, whether service attendance or group participation, was found to increase the negative influence of familism on secular civic engagement.

6. Discussion and conclusion

The objective of this study was to examine whether and how traditional familism is linked to secular civic participation. Through the lens of a longstanding but often-neglected theoretical perspective in civic engagement literature, this article found a negative relationship between traditional family ideology and secular civic participation among American adults. Although the family is often depicted as a seedbed of civic virtue, this article presents an alternative conclusion: Families—particularly when they seek to protect their members against secular influences—*can* cultivate insularity. The insularity perspective suggests that a strong normative commitment to the institution of marriage may discourage involvement in the larger society. Our findings support this argument, showing that a strong orientation toward marriage and the family tends to reduce the likelihood of participation in secular voluntary associations.

This result, however, does not necessarily imply that familistic individuals are asocial or even “amoral” (Banfield, 1958); rather, it can be said that the *scope* of associational life among familistic individuals is somewhat more limited than among nonfamilistic individuals (Alexander et al., 2012). As Fischer (2005) points out, “parochial sociality is quite different from than no sociality at all; it is still sociality” (p. 160). As our bivariate statistics (Table 3) show, people who hold traditional family ideology tend to form in-bound social networks revolving around religious congregations. This finding is particularly interesting in light of other studies indicating that familistic orientation promotes religious involvement (e.g., Becker and

Hofmeister, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 1995). Thus, our study, combined with this earlier body of research, suggests that family-oriented culture has a *divergent* impact on religious institutions and secular organizations, fueling religious participation and dampening secular civic engagement.

Indeed, our interaction models suggest that the familism–religious involvement interaction term is negative for secular engagement: that is, when familism is combined with greater involvement in religious congregations, its negative influence on secular engagement tends to be strengthened by the religious involvement. This aggravating effect is interesting because of the main effect of religious involvement on secular engagement was found to be positive. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006), religious involvement, particularly religious activities outside of religious services (e.g., a Bible study group, a church committee) may not only provide a training ground for the cultivation of civic skills that are transferable to nonreligious organizations, but also serve as a recruitment channel to secular voluntary associations. However, the effect of congregational participation tends to be smaller among familistic than nonfamilistic individuals.

While these findings shed some light on the relationships between familism, religious involvement, and secular civic participation, this study has several limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, although this article finds an inverse relationship between familism and secular civic engagement, it is not clear why traditional familism reduces secular civic participation. Do people who have traditional family ideology “feel insecure” in an environment where they should negotiate the modern secular ideas and practices, by which they reduce their engagement in the secular sphere (Ermiş and Gambetta, 2010, p. 366)? Does “social uncertainty” promote insularity (Yamagishi et al., 1998)? Or might secular disengagement among familistic individuals be an unintended consequence of “altruistic fear” of crime to protect their family members (Warr and Ellison, 2000)? These questions will be useful for future work to specify mechanisms underlying familism’s insular effects. Further, a more elaborate approach to “organizational closure” is needed; do individuals devoted to their family and congregations simply have little time or energy left for secular engagement, or do they culturally avoid engagement in secular organizations? Although data limitations do not allow us to conduct a more rigorous examination of time spent in both religious and nonreligious organizations, future studies should seek to determine if time constraints instead of cultural avoidance come into play in the mechanisms behind familism’s inverse relationship to secular civic participation.

Second, this study assumes that the direction of causality runs from familism and religion to secular civic engagement. Our theoretical reasoning gives us some confidence that our models are tracking this pattern. But it is possible that the direction of causality may run in the opposition direction, or that some unmeasured factor is driving the empirical patterns our study illustrates. For example, individuals who have a “joiner” orientation (Regnerus and Smith, 2005, p.26) or “gregarious personality” (Wuthnow, 2004, pp. 84–88) may tend more to be active in nonreligious organizations as well as religious congregations. This sociality factor is important because it may confound the relationship we described in this article. Future research can improve this study by exploring whether religious social networks (e.g., number of close friends or acquaintances in congregations) account for the relationship between familism and secular civic participation.

Third, although this article shows an inverse relationship between an attitudinal dimension of familism and secular engagement, we are not certain whether the negative effect of familism described here hold for a *structural* dimension of familism. Two recent economic studies that measure the degree of family ties find a negative association between strong family ties and trust in strangers (Ermiş and Gambetta, 2010) and political participation (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011, but see Tossutti et al., 2008). However, little empirical evidence has been provided as to which dimension of familism is consequential. Future research should seek to extend familism measures and determine whether differences exist between structural and cultural dimensions of familism.

Fourth, in the future, research should consider whether the negative effect of a family orientation described here is generalizable across different time and contexts. For example, is this type of familism consequential for other regions like Western Europe? Future research using cross-national data could address this issue by examining how familism effects differ in regions that have different levels of family orientations. Further, given the ideology of familism is historically specific (Edgell, 2005), it is possible that the empirical evidence provided here is limited to a certain period of time when concern for family decline is high (Brooks, 2002). By replicating this study in another time period, researchers will be able to assess whether or not the inverse association between traditional familism and secular civic engagement is generic.

Finally, there is a limitation on the measure of secular association participation. Given the often-blurred boundary between “religious” and “civic” spheres in the US context (Lichter et al., 2005), sorting out secular organizations from a wide array of voluntary organizations can be challenging. Most public datasets simply list voluntary associations, making it almost impossible to determine whether an organization is *truly* secular. Several secular organizations have religious origins, or certain civic activities that appear to be secular but may be sponsored by religious organizations. For instance, as Loveland and colleagues (2008, p. 11) recently noted, fraternal organizations such as the Catholic Knights of Columbus have religious backgrounds, but they can be regarded as “secular.” Hence, future research should develop a more sophisticated scheme for distinguishing religious organizations from nonreligious organizations. In the same vein, it should also seek to examine civic engagement through religious as well as secular organizations for a complete understanding of dynamics in the relationship between familism and civic engagement.

Despite these limitations, our study has made an original contribution to the research literature by examining how traditional familism and religion, and their *interplay*, influence secular forms of civic engagement. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study of its kind to provide evidence of the negative influence of traditional familism on civic engagement in the United States. This study finds that a strong family orientation is significantly and negatively associated with secular civic

engagement or—more generally—a bridging orientation towards the secular social world. This effect of familism is particularly strong among individuals who are deeply involved in their religious communities. Thus, this study provides support for an insularity perspective that sees strong familism, particularly when coupled with religious involvement, as a source of social disengagement in American life. This study also provides support for the organizational closure perspective, which suggests that religious Americans who are devoted to their families and their churches probably have little time and energy left to devote to secular organizations. Religious Americans who focus on their families seem unable to extend their civic engagement beyond their church communities. In other words, rather than engaging with Americans of a more secular stripe in a wide range of civic organizations, these Americans would rather bond alone with family and friends who share their commitment to faith and family.

Appendix A

See Tables A1 and A2.

Table A1

Unstandardized coefficients from the logistic regression predicting participation in both secular and secular/religious groups, NSFH1 ($N = 10,328$).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Demographic controls^a</i>						
Female	-.438*** (.060)	-.445*** (.060)	-.427*** (.060)	-.428*** (.060)	-.427*** (.060)	-.426*** (.060)
Black	-.327*** (.074)	-.328* (.130)	-.275* (.131)	-.273* (.132)	-.282* (.132)	-.276* (.132)
Hispanic	-.557*** (.117)	-.636*** (.121)	-.628*** (.121)	-.643*** (.121)	-.632*** (.121)	-.637*** (.121)
Northeast	.051 (.079)	-.036 (.083)	-.052 (.084)	-.056 (.084)	-.051 (.084)	-.050 (.084)
North Central	.199** (.069)	.139 (.072)	.129 (.072)	.127 (.072)	.128 (.072)	.131 (.072)
West	.455*** (.092)	.405*** (.093)	.388*** (.094)	.383*** (.093)	.395*** (.094)	.395*** (.093)
Education	.223*** (.014)	.218*** (.014)	.210*** (.014)	.211*** (.014)	.209*** (.014)	.210*** (.014)
Family income (in thousands; imputed)	.009** (.003)	.009** (.003)	.008** (.003)	.008** (.003)	.008** (.003)	.008** (.003)
Age	-.013*** (.002)	-.013*** (.002)	-.014*** (.002)	-.014*** (.002)	-.013*** (.002)	-.014*** (.002)
Divorced	.063 (.094)	.064 (.094)	.070 (.094)	.070 (.094)	.074 (.094)	.074 (.094)
Widowed	-.175 (.123)	-.183 (.123)	-.179 (.123)	-.179 (.123)	-.177 (.123)	-.181 (.123)
Unmarried	.063 (.112)	.049 (.113)	.041 (.112)	.043 (.112)	.042 (.112)	.044 (.112)
Number of children	.201*** (.029)	.200*** (.029)	.201*** (.029)	.202*** (.029)	.200*** (.029)	.200*** (.029)
<i>Types of religious involvement</i>						
Religious service attendance	.046*** (.013)	.038** (.014)	.047*** (.014)	.045*** (.014)	.050*** (.014)	.044** (.014)
Religious group participation	.320*** (.033)	.339*** (.034)	.350*** (.034)	.352*** (.034)	.358*** (.034)	.390*** (.038)
<i>Suppressing factors^b</i>						
Familism ^{c,d,e}	-.043*** (.011)	-.041*** (.011)	-.031** (.011)	-.035 (.018)	-.035** (.011)	-.037*** (.011)
Conservative Protestant		-.262** (.084)	-.214* (.085)	-.206* (.085)	-.207* (.084)	-.204* (.084)
Black Protestant		-.094 (.150)	-.106 (.150)	-.112 (.150)	-.110 (.150)	-.117 (.151)
Catholic		.035 (.080)	.009 (.080)	.005 (.080)	.010 (.080)	.008 (.080)
Unaffiliated		-.227* (.112)	-.292* (.114)	-.339** (.125)	-.258* (.115)	-.277* (.114)
Theological conservatism			-.059*** (.017)	-.058*** (.017)	-.060*** (.017)	-.060*** (.017)
<i>Interactions</i>						
Familism by religious tradition						
Familism × conservative Protestant				-.007 (.027)		
Familism × black Protestant				-.005 (.029)		
Familism × Catholic				.029 (.025)		
Familism × unaffiliated				-.032 (.038)		
Familism by religious involvement						
Familism × religious service attendance					-.008* (.003)	
Familism × religious group participation						-.028** (.009)
Constant	-2.615*** (.213)	-2.388*** (.226)	-1.922*** (.266)	-1.929*** (.265)	-1.916*** (.266)	-1.955*** (.266)
Log pseudo-likelihood	-5567.331	-5555.746	-5546.413	-5543.597	-5541.675	-5539.328
Degrees of freedom	16	20	21	25	22	22

Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

^a Reference categories are male, white, south, and married.

^b Reference category is mainline Protestant.

^c The main effect of familism represents the effect for mainline Protestant.

^d The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious service attendance.

^e The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious group participation.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

Table A2

Unstandardized coefficients from the logistic regression predicting participation in all types of voluntary associations except church-affiliated groups, NSFH1 (N = 10,328).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Demographic controls^a</i>						
Female	-.485*** (.060)	-.492*** (.060)	-.473*** (.061)	-.473*** (.061)	-.472*** (.061)	-.471*** (.061)
Black	-.371*** (.074)	-.388*** (.129)	-.329* (.130)	-.327* (.130)	-.338*** (.130)	-.331* (.130)
Hispanic	-.491*** (.118)	-.590*** (.122)	-.581*** (.122)	-.595*** (.122)	-.585*** (.122)	-.589*** (.122)
Northeast	.074 (.079)	-.030 (.084)	-.048 (.084)	-.053 (.084)	-.047 (.084)	-.046 (.084)
North Central	.242*** (.070)	.172* (.072)	.161* (.072)	.159* (.073)	.161* (.073)	.163* (.072)
West	.427*** (.091)	.368*** (.093)	.349*** (.093)	.343*** (.093)	.357*** (.093)	.355*** (.093)
Education	.208*** (.014)	.203*** (.014)	.194*** (.014)	.195*** (.014)	.193*** (.014)	.194*** (.014)
Family income (in thousands; imputed)	.009** (.003)	.009** (.003)	.009** (.003)	.009** (.003)	.009** (.003)	.009** (.003)
Age	-.011*** (.002)	-.012*** (.002)	-.012*** (.002)	-.012*** (.002)	-.012*** (.002)	-.012*** (.002)
Divorced	.052 (.095)	.052 (.095)	.058 (.095)	.059 (.095)	.063 (.094)	.063 (.094)
Widowed	-.194 (.122)	-.204 (.122)	-.201 (.122)	-.200 (.122)	-.199 (.122)	-.202 (.122)
Unmarried	.070 (.114)	.052 (.114)	.043 (.114)	.045 (.114)	.044 (.114)	.047 (.114)
Number of children	.179*** (.029)	.177*** (.029)	.178*** (.029)	.178*** (.029)	.177*** (.029)	.177*** (.029)
<i>Types of religious involvement</i>						
Religious service attendance	.047*** (.013)	.038** (.014)	.047*** (.014)	.046*** (.014)	.051*** (.014)	.045** (.014)
Religious group participation	.314*** (.034)	.337*** (.034)	.349*** (.034)	.352*** (.034)	.358*** (.035)	.389*** (.038)
<i>Suppressing factors^b</i>						
Familism ^{c,d,e}	-.040*** (.011)	-.038*** (.011)	-.027* (.011)	-.028 (.018)	-.032** (.011)	-.033** (.011)
Conservative Protestant		-.296*** (.084)	-.243** (.085)	-.231** (.085)	-.236** (.085)	-.234** (.084)
Black Protestant		-.081 (.148)	-.094 (.149)	-.098 (.149)	-.098 (.149)	-.104 (.149)
Catholic		.058 (.081)	.030 (.081)	.026 (.081)	.031 (.081)	.029 (.081)
Unaffiliated		-.224* (.112)	-.296** (.115)	-.335** (.124)	-.257* (.115)	-.281* (.115)
Theological conservatism			-.065*** (.017)	-.064*** (.017)	-.067*** (.017)	-.067*** (.017)
<i>Interactions</i>						
Familism by religious tradition						
Familism × conservative Protestant				-.014 (.026)		
Familism × black Protestant				-.009 (.029)		
Familism × Catholic				.026 (.025)		
Familism × unaffiliated				-.030 (.038)		
Familism by religious involvement						
Familism × religious service attendance					-.009** (.003)	
Familism × religious group participation						-.027** (.009)
Constant	-2.378*** (.212)	-2.131*** (.226)	-1.615*** (.266)	-1.620*** (.266)	-1.609*** (.266)	-1.647*** (.266)
Log pseudo-likelihood	-5549.807	-5534.924	-5523.481	-5520.773	-5517.549	-5516.755
Degrees of freedom	16	20	21	25	22	22

Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

^a Reference categories are male, white, south, and married.

^b Reference category is mainline Protestant.

^c The main effect of familism represents the effect for mainline Protestant.

^d The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious service attendance.

^e The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious group participation.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

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