2003

Quaker Families and Business Networks in Nineteenth-Century Darlington

Gillian Cookson

University of Durham, Gill.Cookson@durham.ac.uk

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/quakerstudies

Part of the Christian Denominations and Sects Commons, and the History of Christianity Commons

Recommended Citation

Available at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/quakerstudies/vol8/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Quaker Studies by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.
Czechoslovakia and who was imprisoned by both. In the latter case, Kleinerová was a co-defendant of the first major show trial of the Communist government and was given a life sentence of which she served ten years. This fascinating article tells the story of a courageous life. It also gives valuable insight into the story of Friends in Czechoslovakia after Quakerism was introduced there in the 1920s, as well as reflecting on how religious groups maintain or negotiate their integrity in the face of totalitarian regimes.

We are pleased to be able to include at the end of this issue a rich selection of book reviews, a clear sign that the study of Quakerism is healthy and vibrant.

'Ben' Pink Dandelion

EDITOR
railway, and its Quaker network extended beyond Peases and Backhouses to other families engaged in trade, and to contacts beyond the Tees valley who were central to the success of the railway and all which followed from it. This paper examines Darlington’s network of Quaker industrialists and their impact upon the local economy. It will also attempt to identify, from a business rather than a theological perspective, distinguishing ‘Quaker’ features of the prevailing commercial culture, and to define their contribution to the town’s development.

**Darlington and its Region**

Eighteenth-century Darlington was a prosperous market town in an undeveloped region. The inhabitants were ‘abundantly supplied with all the necessaries of life from the adjacent country at a cheap rate’ and the local economy was said to thrive on ‘foreign money’—profits from trade re-circulating in the town and its surrounds. The main manufacturing industries were linen and worsted manufacture—dominated in Darlington by Quaker masters, both before and after mechanisation—and tanning. A service sector included inns and other facilities for travellers on the Great North Road as well as professional services and retail businesses associated with the town’s position as market and focus for a large rural hinterland.

In its commercial variety, Darlington differed from other Tees towns and from much of the rest of the north-east region. Despite its own lack of natural resources, it held the key to opening up mineral deposits in the Tees valley, thanks to a financial structure which was by 1800 relatively sophisticated. Central to this were the banks which had developed, initially as sidelines of two Quaker textile businesses, the Pease bank from worsted, and Backhouse’s from linen.

The famous railway, foundation of Darlington’s nineteenth-century prosperity, opened in 1825, after more than fifty years of efforts to improve Tees valley communications. Events during the decade leading to the establishment of the Stockton and Darlington railway have been thoroughly explored by Kirby. 12 There were problems of organisation, of finance, of geography, of rival schemes based on Stockton which would have marginalised Darlington, of proposed alternatives involving combinations of canal and rail. Not least were political difficulties, including opposition by the Earl of Darlington, whose obstruction included an attempt to ruin Backhouse’s bank. After parliamentary defeat in 1819 and delay after the death of George IV, the Stockton and Darlington Railway Act finally passed in 1821, helped substantially by widespread Quaker lobbying of parliament. The legislation was modelled on canal practice with an emphasis on local, rather than coastal, trade in goods and minerals. Several changes of route during the planning were necessary, to avoid the earl’s estates and minimise costs. Darlington influence, though, diverted the railway south from its shortest and cheapest line, so that it skimmed the northern fringes of the town. The railway’s effect upon coal prices was rapid and dramatic, more than halving the cost of Auckland coal.

The uneasy collaboration between Darlington and Stockton, eleven miles from the sea, did not endure. Joseph Pease was soon arguing that Stockton, with its nautical difficulties and limited capacity, was inadequate for the booming trade. In 1829, in partnership with four other Quakers, he bought the 500-acre Middlesbrough estate for £30,000 and established ‘Port Darlington’ to bypass Stockton. The railway was extended there in 1831, a dock built, coal staithes erected, and a town rapidly developed. Joseph Pease (1799-1872) was a man of vast commercial ability and vision. Quickly identifying the potential of the south Durham coalfield as the railway opened out the area, he became a partner in the Shildon colliery in 1828, and then acquired one colliery after another until he was ‘the largest and most influential coal owner in the whole Division’. Despite the initial fall in coal prices, profits were maintained through the huge increase in volume of sales of Tees coal. After a shaky start, the Stockton and Darlington railway had become a solid enterprise by the late 1820s. Its £100 share price rose from £80 in 1823, to £315 in 1832, and an eight per cent dividend was paid in 1832 and 1833. By 1839-41 this had reached 15 per cent, the highest of any railway in the country.

Until the 1850s, aside from its effects upon the coal trade, the impact of the railway upon Darlington’s industry was limited. The Stockton and Darlington company was itself small, owning under 37 miles of track, and buying in most of its rolling stock. It employed 267 within the town in 1855, about five per cent of the total male population. A few other firms grew up on railway related business, the largest being Kitching’s engineering works, and there were various related service industries including carriers and professional advisors. But the town’s communications, and consequently its industrial prospects, were re-oriented with the opening in 1841 of the first section of the Great Northern of England Railway, between Darlington and York. This new north-south line undermined Middlesbrough’s raison d’être, the transport of coal by sea, but the discovery of Cleveland iron ore deposits in 1850 presented new possibilities for both towns. Mining the inferior and impure Cleveland ore seams was viable only because of the geological accident that Durham coal, when converted to coke, was superior to any other in Britain. Middlesbrough continued to thrive because the Stockton and Darlington railway was the means of bringing together coal, iron ore and limestone. Pease consolidated the Stockton and Darlington’s monopoly by extending branch lines into Cleveland and expanding westwards to create new markets for Durham coal and obtain supplies of haematite ore from Cumberland. Pease himself went into iron ore mining from 1852. An extra 75 miles of railway had been built by the early 1860s. In 1861, the company’s mileage was 125, with a further 75 under construction.

By the early 1860s, the region was dominant in iron production, a situation deriving as much from international demand for railway capital equipment as from natural endowments. The industrial landscape of both Middlesbrough and Darlington changed markedly as a result. Darlington, where the main north-south railway met the busy mineral line, became a natural location for heavy industry. The Stockton and Darlington directors decided in 1858 to
Darlington's population reached a level almost two and a half times that of including the Stockton and Darlington railway. Excepting the textile firm, the investments included Joseph Pease and Partners, collieries, coke-ovens and fire impact of railways on the economy's total growth before 1870 was not quantified in detail. Edward Pease; and the Owners of the Middlesbrough Estate. The bank was, according to Kirby, in reality the counting house for the various Pease enterprises, and the South Durham Iron Company, whose partners, including John Harris, Henry Pease and Alfred Kitching, were the same as those of the Albert Hill Land Company which planned and developed Darlington's new industrial quarter. Kitching had retired from active business in 1862, to be succeeded by his cousin and fellow Quaker, Charles Ianson, at the Whessoe Foundry. Ianson expanded the foundry as well as establishing the Rise Carr Rolling Mills in about 1864 with Sir Theodore Fry, another member of the Society. The Pease family, and Joseph Pease in particular, was heavily represented in much of the region's industrial activity. On his death in 1872, Joseph Pease's investments included Joseph Pease and Partners, collieries, coke-ovens and fire brick manufacturers; J.W. Pease and Co., ironstone and limestone mining in Cleveland and Weardale; the original family woollen firm, Henry Pease and Co.; Robert Stephenson and Co., locomotive builders; the private bank, J. and J.W. Pease; and the Owners of the Middlesbrough Estate. The bank was, according to Kirby, 'in reality the counting house for the various Pease enterprises', including the Stockton and Darlington railway. Excepting the textile firm, the whole of this empire owed its origins to the railway. In Kirby's view, while the impact of railways on the economy's total growth before 1870 was not quantitatively impressive, their effect upon the development of this well-defined regional economy was profound. Darlington's special situation was acknowledged in 1867 in an argument presented by the South Durham MPs pressing for parliamentary borough status for the town: situated midway between the extensive coalfields of South Durham and the ironstone deposits of North Yorkshire, and [which] participates largely in the trade of both districts; ... a centre and seat of direction of a system of Railways which bring into communication the eastern and western coasts of the northern counties; ... the seat of extensive woollen, iron and other manufactories [which] ... conducts by various branches the

Banking of every town in a wide district both in Durham and Yorkshire; and ...supplies a great part of the capital that works the coalfields of South Durham.
The Darlington Quaker banks, with their external links, were at the centre of industrial activity. Before the railway, both Pease and Backhouse families restricted their activities to textile manufacture, with banking a growing sideline. James Backhouse came to Darlington in 1746 on his marriage to the heir of a linen manufacturer, Jonathan Hedley. Backhouse started holding notes and dealing in bills during the 1750s, and was local agent for Royal Exchange Assurance from 1759. His commercial contacts, nurtured on Quaker business in London, encompassed Norwich, the Midlands and West Riding. By the early 1760s Backhouse had taken over his father-in-law's linen firm, whose customers were mainly in Yorkshire, Lancaster and London.

While the Pease bank remained a private concern without a branch network, Backhouse's grew from short-term lending in linen manufacture to a wide foundation of trade and lending based on national Quaker connections. Catering for more than regional needs, this served to consolidate the bank's wider reputation. There is little evidence that it invested in local industry. James Backhouse certainly helped the Quaker John Kendrew develop and patent a flax-spinning machine and set up a small factory during the 1780s and 1790s. But Banham found no other obvious industrial loans from the bank before 1800 and concludes that its main influence on regional industrial development came between 1815 and 1836. During its first half century, from the 1750s, the bank had refined its procedures, familiarised itself with the London money market, and developed experience of risk assessment. As a result, industrial support was selective, and the bank later proved very successful in advancing long-term capital to risky projects while avoiding bankruptcy. The Backhouse bank's success in weathering the financial storm of 1825-26, and also their experience as shareholders in the Stockton and Darlington railway, gave the family confidence to launch into joint stock banking and to invest more widely in industry later.

There was a further connection which was to prove of greater consequence still for the town's development, that with Quaker financiers of Darlington origin in the City of London. These connections arose through the Kitching and Ianson families. William Kitching, an ironmonger, married Ann Ianson of Darlington in October 1770, and had a son John (1771-1864) and daughter Mary. By a second marriage, to Hannah Goad of London in 1793, he had other children including Alfred (1808-82), who established the Railway Foundry in Darlington during the 1830s. When John Kitching was considering his future, he followed the advice of an Ianson uncle to settle in London 'at there seemed few openings for an energetic business career in the north at that time'. Kitching was established in the capital as a linen draper in Whitechapel High Street by 1796, having left Darlington in or just after 1792. He arrived in London at about the same time as two other young northerners, Thomas Richardson and John Overend. The three were warmly welcomed by 'south country Friends who were wont to exercise a very real care over the members of their flock'.

Thomas Richardson, one of the great financiers of his day, had been born in Darlington in 1771. His cousin Edward Pease paid his passage to London and introduced him to Smith, Wright and Gray, leading London bankers and Quakers. Richardson rose from errand boy to confidential manager, and in 1802 set up in partnership with Overend, from Settle, Yorkshire, who later married Richardson's sister. Their bill-broking business made their names 'household words in the Banking and Financial circles of the world', its success based on Overend's original idea to charge commission only to the borrower on bills of exchange. The firm soon moved from a small office in Finch Lane to grander premises on Lombard Street, and was joined in 1807 by John and Samuel Gurney, of the Norwich banking family which had advised and possibly financed them at the outset, becoming Overend, Gurney & Co. Ltd after Richardson's retirement in 1830. John Kitching at first declined their offer of partnership, continuing to work for another Ianson relative, William, a muslin manufacturer. In 1804, Ianson and Kitching joined Richardson and Overend in a marine insurance business, riding out the wave to 'emerge victorious', and becoming underwriters at Lloyds in about 1818. With the fortune he had made, John Kitching retired very young, apparently to pursue religious activities. The links between these families, and between the London money market and Darlington industry, were further cemented when Mary Kitching, John's sister, became Overend's second wife in 1831. By then the capital which this group invested in their home town had ensured that no other young man would have to leave Darlington in order to follow a business career. Richardson retired to Great Ayton, in Cleveland, where he died in 1853, but through his years in London had 'retained a warm interest in the affairs of the north' and was a considerable investor in the Stockton and Darlington railway and in the development of Middlesbrough. He was also a partner in George Stephenson's locomotive works in Newcastle, and invested heavily in the Great North of England Railway. John Kitching, who lived out the remainder of his long life in Stamford Hill, London, where William Ianson and Thomas Richardson had their London homes, also invested heavily in the Stockton and Darlington railway, and helped his younger half-brother weather the difficult early years of the foundry business.
Equally important to the project's success was extensive lobbying of Hoares, Hustlers and Foxes, as well as the Richardsons, Overends and Gurneys. The Darlington families counted among their relatives Frys, Barclays, Birkbecks, Backhouse, £5,000 from Thomas Richardson and £3,000 from John Backhouse were, however, cousins. Without resources supplied by this extended group, the region's development could not have proceeded so far and so fast.

Meanwhile Thomas Richardson, Samuel Gurney, Robert Barclay and eight Peases and other Quakers, including some from other Tees valley towns. Pease, married two daughters of Joseph Gurney, the Norwich banker. The Pease–Gurney connection shows a well-established network and a clear strategy, with the Earl of Darlington's attempt to ruin Backhouse confirming the bank's central role in the railway enterprise. Backhouse was saved during that episode by London and branches of his family bank in county Durham and the North Riding accepted deposits, as did Quaker banks in London. Banham argues that these arrangements show a well-established network and a clear strategy, with the Earl of Darlington's attempt to ruin Backhouse confirming the bank's central role in the railway enterprise. Backhouse was saved during that episode by London contacts willing and able to send £32,000 in gold. Problems completing the railway's subscription list in 1818 were also overcome through the Quaker network. The Pease and Backhouse families pledged £21,300, more than 17 per cent of the total share capital. Quakers had guaranteed two thirds of the sum, including £14,000 from Joseph Gurney, by then father-in-law of Jonathan Backhouse, £3,000 from Thomas Richardson and £3,000 from John Kitching. Equally important to the project's success was extensive lobbying of parliament by Quaker allies from London and elsewhere. The result was a company unique in U.K. railways, 'a public joint stock concern which was, in effect, a close family partnership'. The purchase of the Middlesbrough property using personalised capital networks provides further dramatic evidence of the strength of these links. By the mid 1840s the Pease family had built a vast business empire which had never been constrained by lack of finance, the result of 'kinship ties of unusual strength and geographical dispersion'.

After 1850, Darlington's rapid growth offered new possibilities for profit and philanthropy. The Pease family initiated several town centre developments as private enterprises, not all of which were entirely admirable. John Pease, another son of Edward, for instance, proposed low-quality housing in an already crowded and unhealthy central yard in 1857. More significant in developing the suburbs were a number of new organisations, including three building societies, a freehold land society with political aims, and the land company whose directors were the partners in the South Durham Iron Company. Most of these were Quaker-dominated and with partners in common, although the grander families, increasingly remote, assumed only nominal roles. A lower social group was drawn in, including paid managers such as Thomas MacNay, secretary of the Stockton and Darlington railway, and George Harker, a railway contractor based at Shildon. Alfred Kitching, after retiring from business in 1862, devoted much time to such enterprises and to local politics. He was involved with fellow Quakers in the establishment of the resort of Saltburn, was a member of Darlington's Board of Health until 1867, and its chairman from 1866, then an alderman in the new corporation until his death, serving as Mayor of the town in 1870. He had been a partner in the South Durham Iron Company since 1854, a proprietor of the Albert Hill Land Company from 1853, and a member of the land society which launched the development of the suburb of Eastbourne during the 1850s. John Harris, similarly nearing the end of his business career, was also a driving force in the various urban development and building society schemes of the 1850s and 1860s.

The commercial advantages of Quakers

From examples given above, it is clear that Darlington Quaker industrialists enjoyed the advantage of access to large resources at short notice, and perhaps with less formality than was conventional in business. The Backhouse bank provides a striking demonstration of the network's power in combination, having been saved from collapse at least twice by fellow Quakers. The Backhouses lost considerably in other local bank collapses between 1805 and 1816, and made no profit from their linen business in the five years to 1815. Banham argues that they were close to failure in 1815, and did not have the liquidity to meet a run on the bank, which survived only because of its high reputation and the support of prominent customers.

While Quakers had a reputation for financial integrity, and this, combined with their ability to summon such resources, made them attractive as business connections, they supposedly enjoyed other advantages in business. The principles inculcated by their faith included a modus operandi of thinking, planning and recording, and a curiosity and broad view of the world, which were arguably of advantage in forming commercial and technical judgements. Kirby translates this into economic terms: strong and clearly defined Quaker 'personalised external networks' reduced transaction costs by minimising uncertainty and deficient knowledge. Not least in this equation was the value of informed and disinterested advice. For Alfred Kitching, the judgment of his much older and more experienced half-brother John, the London financier, may have saved his
business. In about 1843 the Railway Foundry was facing ruin because of excessive competition and a loss of contracts from the railway company. Alfred consulted John for 'consideration and advice' before communicating to his brother William 'my intentions to resign and discontinue our business.' John's reply has not survived, but he apparently encouraged Alfred to continue. The following year new partnership arrangements were in place and the foundry went on to great success. There are other instances during the planning of the Stockton and Darlington railway when technical and organisational advice from fellow Quakers proved to be invaluable. Edward Pease's correspondence late in 1818 with Joseph Price of Neath Abbey made him realise some of the railway's wider possibilities. Pease was also in constant contact with Thomas Richardson throughout the railway's planning, exchanging ideas and building the confidence which convinced Richardson to chance so much of his own money.

Quakers also supposedly had the advantage of being untainted by the extravagance, dishonesty, drunkenness and other forms of debauchery to which many family businesses of the time fell victim. This offered a generalised safety net, backed up by local Quaker meetings which, anxious of their own reputation, dealt firmly with unacceptable business practices or personal transgressions, and quickly identified those in financial difficulty in order to avoid scandal. They also offered support in the form of advice or loans, or apprenticeships and credit to poorer members. In theory this brought fairness and consistency, but inevitably life was not so simple. Powerful individuals, such as employers, could exert disproportionate influence as decisions were based on consensus rather than majority vote. Not all those in difficulty were willing to share their load with fellow members; it would, for instance, be commercial folly for bankers to admit publicly to business problems. Few records survive of such interventions, which were handled informally and confidentially, and by the mid-nineteenth century were diminishing.

Nor is it true that immunity to disaster could be guaranteed, even where business contacts were members of the extended family as well as co-religionists. An early recollection of Henry Kitching, nephew of Mary Overend, was of the failure of Overend, Gurney and Co. in 1866. Kitching's father did not lose money in the bank's collapse but he was severely affected. 'The result was stupefying.' The engineer John Harris was said to have lost substantial assets in the Overend, Gurney collapse, obliging him to sell his railway engineering business quickly and for less than its true value. Later the problems of the Pease textile business were compounded when Joseph Pease's brother Henry and nephew Henry Fell Pease were brought close to personal ruin through a debt owed by the Quaker owner of the Guisborough Alum Works. At the same time the firm was hit by losses incurred by their Bradford partners, Quakers and distant relatives, John Thistlethwaite and Co., who had suffered embezzlement by a family member.

What, then, of other personal advantages supposedly enjoyed by Quaker entrepreneurs, their vision, foresight, curiosity and innovative approach? While Quakers found their way into the Smilanesian pantheon of Victorian industrial heroes, they appear not to have deserved such overblown accolades any more than the rest. Much of the foresight supposedly employed in transforming the Tees valley from backwardness turns out to be a result of hindsight, as in 1878 when Edward Pease was credited with 'discerning sixty years ago that railways were destined to revolutionise the world.' The truth of how the railway was brought to reality is much more mundane. Although considerable information was collected and projections made, for instance in an 1818 report on its economic feasibility, the vision behind the scheme was very limited. Not all local Quakers were enthusiasts for the railway. William Kitching, writing to his son John in London at the end of 1818, was sceptical, as evidently was Joseph Pease of Feethams, Edward's brother:

[He] has taken much pains and seems certain from the calculations he has made that it will not pay, while his brother Edward and a number more seem as positive it will be a good thing...I cannot say I feel so sanguine as the subscribers, well knowing that in public concerns money goes swimmingly out, but too oft is apt to sink never more to rise.

Those who were more supportive were not necessarily possessed of any greater foresight. Jonathan Backhouse made clear during discussions of a joint canal and railway proposal between 1812 and 1818, before it was decided to proceed with the railway alone, that he was considering only the economic development of the Darlington area, not a coal export trade to rival the Tyne and Wear. Pease and Backhouse thought only of the sale of coal along the line, with some coal to be shipped out as ballast. They had no idea of any more traffic than used existing turnpikes. The corporative motto on the Stockton and Darlington company seal, 'At private risk for public service', suggests a utility on the model of canal and turnpike trusts, rather than full-blown entrepreneurial opportunity. And technologically the railway was in no way innovative. The decision to use steam traction was confirmed only in 1823, and even after 1825 the company considered abandoning its inefficient locomotives altogether in favour of horses. The famous pioneering railway was in fact almost a geographical accident, the only possibility amidst poor rivers and unsuitable terrain for canals. The closest that Edward Pease came to prophecy was in December 1824: 'Does thou hold canal shares', he wrote to Richardson, 'the anticipation of railways will frighten them down'. But he retained his customary phlegm: 'I see the kingdom mad about railroads - don't be gull'd, thy experience will teach thee what danger there is.'

Local Quakers proved rather more adept at responding to the railway's possibilities once it was an established fact, in a way better described as pragmatic than visionary. Even before the line opened, in the summer of 1825, encouraged by Backhouse the Tees Coal Company was formed to exploit the coastal market for coal. Two years later, recognising Stockton's inadequacies, the railway directors decided to extend the line to Middlesbrough and achieved that...
losses continued to mount. Not until after the Pease crash of 1902 - to which profitability.128 Decisions on the worsted firm's future were apparently made losses, the bullet was never bitten and further large sums were poured into the shore up Henry Pease and Co., against the considered views of more business-cloth.126 Backhouse's support for John Kendrew's early, reasonably competent, Eastern Railway, described at the time it merged with the Stockton and fear of losing the capital invested, and, not least, sentiment, for as long as it could be subsidised by other, spectacularly successful, family interests. Closure was poor. It was sustained only through a sense of responsibility to the workforce, a long-term decline of the local textile industry, run upon the original Pease family firm, known as Henry Pease and Co., from about Ianson invested in modern plant during the 1780s, but ultimately Darlington largely by Quaker family businesses, is a case in point. In the mid eighteenth capitulated to Leeds, Barnsley and Scottish linen centres. By 1830 linen of their various concerns was similarly unimpressive. Through decades of religious and social ostracism, members had developed enormous self-confidence while representing unpopular causes – as with the Pease delegation to the Czar in an attempt to avert the Crimean War. But this, combined with the supposed Quaker attributes of being careful, educated, intelligent, and honest, and to an extent cushioned against financial disaster, did not necessarily translate into efficient management. The long-term decline of the local textile industry, run largely by Quaker family businesses, is a case in point. In the mid eighteenth century Darlington had been the leading centre for certain types of fine linen cloth.128 Backhouse's support for John Kendrew's early, reasonably competent, efforts to mechanise fляx-spinning could have maintained this success, and Ianson invested in modern plant during the 1780s, but ultimately Darlington capitulated to Leeds, Barnsley and Scottish linen centres. By 1830 linen manufacture, lacking the technology available elsewhere, was all but finished in the town.127

The worsted industry in Darlington had become completely concentrated upon the original Pease family firm, known as Henry Pease and Co., from about 1833 when Joseph Pease's younger brother took over its management. Although Henry Pease's approach was prudent and thoughtful, the business's results were poor. It was sustained only through a sense of responsibility to the workforce, a fear of losing the capital invested, and, not least, sentiment, for as long as it could be subsidised by other, spectacularly successful, family interests. Closure was discussed in 1842 and several times after that. Despite continuing sizeable losses, the bullet was never bitten and further large sums were poured into the concern. Several times the firm's appalling management was re-organised, but losses continued to mount. Not until after the Pease crash of 1902 – to which the textile concern had made a major contribution – when the family was removed from all management responsibility, did the worsted business achieve profitability.129 Decisions on the worsted firm's future were apparently made without reference to the wider Quaker network. The various resolutions to shore up Henry Pease and Co., against the considered views of more business-oriented family members, were based upon a religious notion of protecting the livelihood of the poor, but there was also concern to preserve the family's reputation for political reasons. Darlington Quakers were bound by conscience on certain issues, for instance against profiting from military contracts,130 but in general adopted a pragmatic approach to commerce and would close unprofitable businesses when necessary. With the local linen industry in terminal decline, the Backhouses shifted entirely to banking, while the Iansons turned to engineering. The Peases may have been less charitable towards their textile employees had they not had a portfolio of other investments to support that business.

The Stockton and Darlington railway, perhaps surprisingly in view of its extraordinary financial results and its impact upon regional industrialisation, also provides a sorry story of managerial incompetence. In 1845 it was accused of being 'one of the worst-managed undertakings in the Kingdom, and that is saying a great deal.'131 The railway's 'antediluvian' management practices 'remained outsized at an immature level of development', according to Kirby.132 The subcontracting of locomotive repairs and servicing, and track maintenance, in the tradition of an eighteenth-century mineral line, could have been 'a rational form of business organisation' but was used rather as 'a method of evading management'.133 The result was that Hackworth, the most significant subcontractor, became de facto general manager, employing the Kitchings to do much of the engineering work.134 Under the circumstances, this arrangement may have cut complications and enabled an otherwise impossible level of technical sophistication.135 The system persisted for as long as the line was independent, suggesting, as Kirby concedes, that it was manageable and cost effective for a small railway.136 Nor did it lack direction, for the Pease brothers were always on hand as 'managerial' directors.137 Joseph Pease in particular, dynamic, forceful and innovative, was known as an autocrat in the 'little railway republic'.138 In this the railway seems to have received more attention from its directors than was customary for a canal or turnpike undertaking.

In fact the network structure sustaining Quaker businesses through the early difficulties of industrialisation may later have proved disadvantageous to continuing success. The committees and sub-contracting which took the place of individual direction could have worked against effective management systems developing. There were further pitfalls in networks. Their interdependent elements exposed members to a danger of a domino collapse. Banks were especially at risk through the failures of others, as with Backhouses in 1815, saved from a crash only by its widespread Quaker links.139 The new industries following in the wake of the railway were particularly vulnerable to external economic forces. Networks which had sustained promising businesses through the fluctuations of an immature industrial economy could not protect them in a changed business environment. The Stockton and Darlington railway depended upon mineral business, a fluctuating market, with little else to fall back on, so relied upon the good will of bankers and of its Quaker connections.140 The interdependence of companies meant an overlap of
directorships, which in this case brought the advantage of consistent decision-making across the related activities. The disadvantage was an over-reliance on the Peases, so that, for instance, bad speculations by Joseph and Henry Pease in the 1840s threatened the railway's future. The Pease bank later became a huge drain, eventually dragging down the whole empire in 1902. Members of the Pease family were also implicated in the failures of the two Quaker ironworks, the South Durham and the Skerne, both out of business by 1882, while Kitching and the Darlington Forge, with a more flexible approach to their products, managed to survive recession, competition and changing markets.

The Quaker network's links of friendship and kinship remained strong, and were increasingly seen by non-Quakers in a negative light. The tensions began to show before the railway even opened. Jonathan Backhouse had willingly accepted a majority decision in favour of a railway in 1818, against his own preference for a canal, and afterwards 'loyally assisted in carrying out the undertaking' in close collaboration with Edward Pease. But non-Quakers were not so well disposed to accept the increasing dominance of Pease and his ideas. William Chaytor of Croft resigned as company chairman in protest against this growing influence. In 1821, Thomas Meynell of Yarm, chairman of the railway's management committee, was so infuriated by Pease's apparently unilateral changes to the scheme, involving the dismissal of Overton as engineer and appointment of George Stephenson, that he threatened to withdraw his £2,500 investment. He was dissuaded from resigning but later left the company when outvoted in 1828 on the extension of the railway to Middlesbrough. Another prominent director, Leonard Raisbeck of Stockton, left at the same time, concerned that his town's interests were being disregarded, to be followed by the Quaker Benjamin Flounders of Yarm, who objected to Edward Pease's rudeness to him.

As the wealth and power of these men grew with the industrial flowering of Darlington and Middlesbrough, there arose resentment, and especially a suspicion that preferment in employment and contracts was being shown to other Quakers. The railway solicitor Francis Mewburn, closely associated with Quakers and the Darlington Forge, with a more flexible approach to their products, managed to survive recession, competition and changing markets.

Jonathan Backhouse's view in 1800 was that 'the root of evil is, not so much the sect although they may be less deserving than others. This applied even more in Darlington's local government, with Backhouses and Peases in control and boundaries between business and politics increasingly hazy. The Improvement Commission of 1823, and its successor from 1830, the Local Board of Health, were dominated by Quakers. From a time before they were fully enfranchised, Quakers had lobbied and organised on a range of issues.
There are many examples in Darlington of social and economic developments outside the formal structure of government and mainstream industry: turnpikes, law and order, market improvements, partnerships to develop utilities. Most of these initiatives fell under Quaker control during the early nineteenth century. Before 1800, Darlington linen weavers had a friendly society, and worsted workers a co-operative to sell provisions, both independent of their employers. After 1800 such mutual contributory schemes fell under the auspices of Quaker factory owners: the Free Gift Society of the Kitchings, the Peases' Woolcombers' Sick Association and Women's and Children's Association.

Such initiatives may have been motivated by a genuine concern for workers' comforts and self-sufficiency, but inevitably the Quaker network's monopoly of industry and politics brought a backlash. Darlington's earthly success may have been a blessing for its virtue, but a growing circle of critics saw cant, hypocrisy, perhaps corruption, and a powerful oligarchy of self-seeking sectarianism. As with the rifts in the railway company, so in Darlington itself, quiet resentment of the Pease and Backhouse oligarchy turned to open hostility when in 1834 the Pease-owned Darlington Gas and Water Company was bought by the Board of Health for double its nominal value. The Peases were accused for years after of 'unbridled profiteering'. The 'anti-Quaker' party, primarily a political opposition though with economic manifestations, grew in the 1860s. The Quakers, it was said, ran everything in town apart from the Anglican Church, the Licensed Victuallers Association (founded 1859) and the trades unions. This degree of control of every aspect of the town's life rested upon an almost complete monopoly of employment and other financial patronage. In 1868, argues Nosser, there were only two 'neutral' employers, Barnham's Darlington Iron Company and the North Eastern Railway, which although described as a Liberal company had Tories on its board. There were, though, signs of change, including two attempts to establish industrial co-operatives. It is ironic that the town's mushroom growth between 1850 and 1870, so much the result of Quaker enterprise, brought about their loss of political control. Darlington's incorporation in 1867, a defeat for the Quaker operatives. It is ironic that the town's mushroom growth between 1850 and 1870, so much the result of Quaker enterprise, brought about their loss of political control. Darlington's incorporation in 1867 was a defeat for the Quaker operatives. 171

CONCLUSION

Darlington's Quaker network was able to access London and Norwich finance through a wider range of close kinship and business channels than has often been recognised. The involvement of external investors in the Stockton and Darlington railway, and in the development of the port of Middlesbrough, has generally been attributed to their shared religious faith, but it is now clear that the London investors were more than fellow Quakers; they were close relatives of Darlington promoters, and some were themselves of recent Darlington origin. Their participation was fundamental in kick-starting the region's economic growth and sustained it through early fluctuations to maturity. Combined with the skills and enterprise of Quakers and others, this enabled Darlington to gain an early economic advantage, which was afterwards compounded.

The measure of the network's achievement is the industrial and urban expansion and success of the town throughout the nineteenth century. There was happy geographical chance in Darlington's continuing prosperity, in its position on the railway network and in some exceptionally compatible and timely mineral discoveries, although Quaker lobbying and exploration had played their part in bringing this about. This and the external investment were key to the town's long-term success. The 'Quaker' business attributes of foresight, organisational skills, curiosity and innovative energy, while present in one or two outstanding individuals, were largely mythical and have been over-rated as a general phenomenon. While it would be unfair to emphasise the failed businesses, such as the iron companies, or the Pease crash of 1902, to which other problems had contributed, as representative of Darlington Quakers in business, there are many other examples of limited planning and inept management. The network's role was contingency rather than vision, which proved adequate during the early phases of industrialisation. Once the railway's future was assured, the Quaker industrialists were not noticeably adventurous, even though many then had access to capital. Some engaged in urban development and new industries after 1850, but many more retired to rural life, and the town's commerce came to rest on institutions rather than individuals and family partnerships, with a circle of paid managers and servants at the fore in business and politics. In their commercial behaviour during the second half of the nineteenth century, Darlington Quaker entrepreneurs increasingly came to resemble their non-Quaker counterparts elsewhere, with business, family and social considerations apparently assuming priority over religious ones.

NOTES

1 This article is based on research carried out for the Darlington volume of the Victoria County History of Durham, to be published as Durham V.C.H., iv, in 2005. Draft text appears online at http://www.durhamqrc.net. Thanks to John Barham, Andrew Gwy, Edward H. Milligan and Helen Roberts for additional information and ideas.
2 John W. Steel, Friendly Sketches: essays illustrative of Quakerism (London and Darlington, 1876), p. 92.
3 The local football team is still known as 'The Quakers'.
4 For the Pease and Backhouse families and their commercial interests, see Maurice W. Kirby, Men of Business and Politics: the rise and fall of the Quaker Peace Dynasty of north-east England, 1700-1943 (London: George Allan and Unwin, 1984); Maurice W. Kirby, The Origins of Railway Enterprise: the Stockton and Darlington Railway, 1821-1863 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Anne Orde, Religion, Business and Society in North-East England: the Peace family of Darlington in...

43 Barber, 'Development of Darlington', p. 36; quoting the Darlington Mercury, 30 May 1866.


40 Wh.D. Longstaffe, The History and Antiquities of the Parish of Darlington (Darlington, 1854), p. 281.

40 Wh.D. Longstaffe, The History and Antiquities of the Parish of Darlington (Darlington, 1854), p. 281.

40 Wh.D. Longstaffe, The History and Antiquities of the Parish of Darlington (Darlington, 1854), p. 281.

40 Wh.D. Longstaffe, The History and Antiquities of the Parish of Darlington (Darlington, 1854), p. 281.

40 Wh.D. Longstaffe, The History and Antiquities of the Parish of Darlington (Darlington, 1854), p. 281.

40 Wh.D. Longstaffe, The History and Antiquities of the Parish of Darlington (Darlington, 1854), p. 281.

40 Wh.D. Longstaffe, The History and Antiquities of the Parish of Darlington (Darlington, 1854), p. 281.
88 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 6.
89 Darlington Lib., ER/003937/8, ER/0039379.
91 D.R.O., D/Whes 15/14; D/Whes 14/46.
92 D.R.O., D/Ki 15A.
93 D.R.O., D/XD 10/1.A/73.
94 Darlington Lib., ER/00030517.
95 Kirby, Quakers, ch. 3, esp. pp. 52-3.
96 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 6.
97 Thanks to Helen Roberts for this idea.
98 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, ch. 3, esp. pp. 52-3.
99 D.R.O., D/Ki 353.
100 D.R.O., D/Ki 353.
101 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 102.
103 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 9.
104 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 102.
105 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 10.
107 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
110 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
111 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
112 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
113 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
114 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
115 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
116 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
117 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
118 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
119 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
120 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
121 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
122 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
123 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
124 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.

**Quaker Studies**

88 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 6.
89 Darlington Lib., ER/003937/8, ER/0039379.
91 D.R.O., D/Whes 15/14; D/Whes 14/46.
92 D.R.O., D/Ki 15A.
93 D.R.O., D/XD 10/1.A/73.
94 Darlington Lib., ER/00030517.
95 Kirby, Quakers, ch. 3, esp. pp. 52-3.
96 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 6.
97 Thanks to Helen Roberts for this idea.
98 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, ch. 3, esp. pp. 52-3.
99 D.R.O., D/Ki 353.
100 D.R.O., D/Ki 353.
101 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 102.
103 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 10.
104 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 30.
105 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
106 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 30.
107 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
109 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
110 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
111 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
112 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
113 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
114 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
115 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
116 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 7.
117 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 2; Pratt, English Quakers, pp. 87-88; discusses the long involvement of Quakers in road-, canal- and bridge-building schemes.
119 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 4.
120 D.R.O., D/Ho/C 63/6.
121 D.R.O., D/Ho/C 63/9.
122 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 4.
123 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 4.
124 Kirby, Origins of Railway Enterprise, p. 4.
163 Spencer, Men that are gone, p. 136.
164 D.R.O., D/KO 37.
165 D.R.O., D/KD/95/1; D/HP 40; D/HP 39.
166 Nossiter, Influence, Opinion and Political Idioms, p. 131.
168 Kirby, Men of Business and Politics, pp. 60-62.
169 Kirby, Men of Business and Politics, pp. 64-66.
170 Nossiter, Influence, Opinion and Political Idioms, p. 136; Kirby, Men of Business and Politics, p. 64.
171 Nossiter, Opinion and Political Idioms, pp. 140-41.
173 Barber, Development of Darlington', pp. 45-46.
174 Nossiter, Influence, Opinion and Political Idioms, pp. 141-42.

AUTHOR DETAILS

Gillian Cookson is County Editor for the Victoria County History of Durham, and is completing a history of Darlington. Her interests lie in the regional history of the north-east of England, and in industrial history, particularly the engineering industry of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Mailing address: Dr Gill Cookson, County Editor, Victoria County History of Durham, Department of History, 43 North Bailey, Durham DH1 3EX, England.
E-mail: Gill.Cookson@durham.ac.uk