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ABSTRACT

Although there is evidence that divorce and volunteering are related, little is known about the process by which divorce affects volunteering. Using four-wave panel data spanning 16 years, this study examines the causal mechanisms underlying changes in volunteering following divorce. Results from estimating structural equation models indicated that divorce affects volunteering through different mechanisms for women and men. For women, increased financial strain explained a decline in volunteering after divorce. For men, decreased social integration measured by formal group participation accounted for a decline in volunteering after divorce. Domain-specific analyses further showed that decreased religious attendance following divorce explained a decline in religious volunteering and, at the same time, an increase in secular volunteering among men but not women. Men appear to switch their volunteering domains from religious to secular organizations after divorce.

KEYWORDS

Divorce; financial strain; social integration; volunteering

Beginning with Wilson and Musick's (1997) treatment of volunteering as productive work, volunteering has been examined through the lens of resources theory (for a recent example, see Forbes and Zampelli 2014). At its core, resources theory sees volunteering as productive work that demands resources. Like paid labor, the performance of volunteer work requires both individual and social resources. Not surprisingly, studies of volunteering have consistently found that those with greater resources (e.g., more education, larger income, and more extensive social networks) tend to volunteer more frequently than those with less (Wilson 2000, 2012). If individual and social resources are necessary for volunteering, changes in the levels of such resources, for instance, due to stressful life events, may affect volunteering behavior. This study examines the mechanisms of such a change relative to the event of divorce.

Divorce affects almost all aspects of life: physical (Dupre et al. 2015), psychological (Johnson and Wu 2002), economic (Tamborini, Couch, and Reznik 2015), social (Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005), and geographic (Geist and McManus 2008). Civic life is another important aspect of life, which we expect, will also be affected by divorce. Indeed, previous studies have shown that divorce inhibits participation in political activism (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006) and voting (Kern 2010).

This study examined whether getting divorced affects volunteering—here defined as unpaid productive work performed through or for an organization (U.S. Bureau of Labor

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Statistics 2015)—and, if so, how. We were particularly interested in examining gender differences in the effects of divorce on volunteering and its causal mechanisms, given the already-existing evidence of such differences. Recent studies based on panel data from Switzerland and the United States have shown differential effects of divorce on volunteering, showing that it reduces volunteering among women in Switzerland (Voorpostel and Coffé 2012), while it increases volunteering for men working with secular organizations in the United States (Nesbit 2012).

These studies have offered speculation on possible explanations for changes in levels of volunteering after a divorce, but neither study tested a causal mechanism that could explain why one's volunteering behavior would change as one exits one's marriage. We addressed this gap in research. Using four-wave panel data gathered by the Americans' Changing Lives study, which followed a national sample of U.S. adults for 16 years, from 1986 to 2002, this study makes the following contributions to the literature. First, our use of four-wave panel data allowed us to establish causal order among divorce, postdivorce socioeconomic hardships, and volunteering. Previous studies, which were based on two-wave panel data, were limited in their ability to assess their causal relationships, as in those cases, socioeconomic hardships were measured concurrently with divorce or volunteering. Second, our panel data enable us to control for levels of socioeconomic hardship that preceded divorce. If previous socioeconomic hardships are not controlled for, it is impossible to attribute any difference between pre- and post-divorce levels of volunteering to divorce-generated hardships, because hardships may exist and accumulate even before a divorce (Booth, Edwards, and Johnson 1991; Conger et al. 1990).

Lastly, previous studies have not been able to assess long-term influences of divorce on volunteering because they have relied on data that show relatively short time lags between waves, specifically, 2 to 7 years apart (Nesbit 2012; Voorpostel and Coffé 2012). Research on the relationship of divorce to mental health (Lorenz et al. 2006) and life satisfaction (Clark et al. 2008) has generally found only short-term adverse effects, and the same may be true for volunteering. It remains an empirical question whether and "how the length of time after [divorce] is related to volunteering (Nesbit 2012:1171)." Assessing divorced people at two time points, we examined whether the length of time following a divorce affects volunteering. In what follows, we briefly review resources theory, on which this study is based.

Theoretical Background

Resources Theory

Resources theory treats volunteering as a form of work that produces value (Musick and Wilson 2008:111). The conceptualization of volunteering as a productive activity brings to light resources that can be consumed to provide goods and services for the benefit of others. If volunteering is considered relative to production, it is immediately recognizable that resources are scarce and unevenly distributed in society. Musick and Wilson (2008:113) describe this state of affairs as follows:

> Volunteering is more attractive to the resource-rich than to the resource-poor. If volunteer work demands money, the rich will find it easier to do; if it demands knowledge and "civic skills," the well educated will be less challenged by it; if it requires heavy lifting, the physically

healthy will find it more tolerable; if it is very time consuming, those with "time on their hands" will find it easier to beat the burden. In other words, the resource-rich are more likely to "profit" from doing volunteer work.

Among the many resources that can be utilized in volunteering, economic and social ones are identified as critical facilitators of it (Musick and Wilson 2008). Our literature review focuses on these forms of resources.

Volunteers freely give their time, not necessarily their money, but extensive research has confirmed a positive relationship between economic resources such as family income and volunteering (e.g., Rotolo and Wilson 2012). Why do people with greater economic resources volunteer more frequently than those without? A sociological explanation of this phenomenon is that volunteering brings social status and recognition. This "dominant status" theory suggests that the availability of greater economic resources increases volunteering because those with greater resources are more likely to be asked in the first place (Smith 1994; Wilson and Musick 1997).

Thus, it may be that people with greater economic resources volunteer more frequently because their economic status provides them with more social resources. Social resources theory proposes that access to social resources that are embedded in social networks leads to status (Lin 2001:43). Social resources are especially crucial in recruitment of volunteers, and people who are more closely integrated into social networks tend to be asked more to volunteer (Musick and Wilson 2008). Evidence suggests that social resources interact with economic resources in boosting volunteering (Wilson and Musick 1998). In a later study, Musick and Wilson (2008:129) found that people with greater economic resources volunteer more partly because they belong to a greater number of voluntary associations.

Religious congregations are among the most important voluntary organizations recruiting volunteers (Putnam 2000). The volunteering literature has consistently documented that attendance of religious services is one of the strongest predictors for volunteer work (Kim and Jang 2017). Because of the role that religious congregations play in the volunteering sector, it is expected that a change in the level of religious participation leads to changes in patterns of volunteering. Below, we review the sociological literature dealing with divorce and its social and economic consequences for volunteering.

Divorce, Financial Strain, and Volunteering

Divorce has adverse effects on economic well-being (Amato 2000), and low economic well-being, in turn, may affect volunteering negatively. Research has shown that the subjective assessment of one's economic needs better predict volunteering than objective indicators of economic well-being, such as family income. The Independent Sector reported that those with concerns relating to financial burdens were less likely to volunteer and that this pattern held for all income groups (Independent Sector 2001:7). More recently, Son and Wilson (2015) provided evidence that the effect of household income on volunteering disappeared when chronic financial strain was taken into account, suggesting that family income affected volunteering only indirectly, via financial strain. To extend this line of research, we propose that increased financial strain following divorce can account for declines in volunteering after divorce.

Further, we suggest a gender effect here. Previous research has consistently shown that women face greater financial difficulties after divorce than men do (Holden and Smock

1991; Raz-Yurovich 2013; Smock, Manning, and Gupta 1999). This gender gap in post-divorce economic well-being suggests that, if increased economic hardship drives declines in volunteering, women's volunteering will decline more than men's. Two qualitative studies have provided insight into possible gender differences in economic consequences of divorce on volunteering. In her work on the social integration of divorced women, Gerstel (1988:360) reported that many of her study participants could not join voluntary associations due to lack of money. Volunteer work is usually coordinated by a voluntary association that may require membership fees and other expenses, and economic hardship could prevent divorced women from joining such associations.

Greater economic burdens on divorced women may also result in greater time constraints. In another qualitative study, McBride et al. (2006) provided evidence for this idea. One participant of their study was asked whether she was involved in her community. She said, "Umm, I tried to be. But I have to work two jobs to make my ends meet. So I'm not very, I don't get involved as much I'd like" (p. 158). Of course, divorced men may also experience time constraints relative to volunteering, but because women retain child custody more often than men do, divorced women tend to be more pressed for time; they spend time not only on paid work but also on childcare. This reasoning leads to the hypothesis that if volunteering is found to decrease after divorce due to increased financial difficulties, this phenomenon is more likely to occur among women than among men.

Divorce, Social Integration, and Volunteering

Divorce is generally associated with changes in social networks, both in terms of participation in informal social networks and formal voluntary associations (Milardo 1987). While it may be that divorced individuals create and develop new social ties, studies have typically found declines in participation in both social networks and formal groups following divorce. This is partly because of the loss of the joint social network and joint activities (Kalmijn and Bernasco 2001; Terhell et al. 2004). Using a Dutch national sample of first-married and ever-divorced people, one study found that divorce decreased participation in social clubs and religious services among women and in outdoor recreation clubs among men (Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005).

Much evidence has been found showing that, between the two forms of social integration, formal group participation predicts volunteering better than informal social networks do. One recent study found that the social time spent with family, friends, and neighbors failed to increase the likelihood of volunteering, although spending time with friends from voluntary associations did increase (Musick and Wilson 2008:269, see also Table 78). This finding suggests that voluntary associations form a crucial conduit for the dissemination of volunteer opportunities and the recruitment of potential volunteers are recruited. One is more likely to be asked to volunteer when one's social networks are embedded in voluntary associations. Because volunteer recruitment typically occurs in an organizational setting, changes in patterns of formal group participation are more likely to be responsible for changes in volunteering after divorce than changes in social contacts are. Therefore, we predict that divorce decreases volunteering by reducing participation in formal groups.

In addition to this general hypothesis, we propose specific hypotheses on the types of volunteer organizations, as divorced individuals may volunteer more or less than they used to, depending on where they volunteer. It may be that divorced individuals decrease

their involvement in certain types of volunteer organizations more than they do in others. If a couple once volunteered at an organization in which divorce is stigmatizing, the couple—at least the partner who is blamed for the divorce—is less likely to continue to volunteer at that organization. This is what Kalmijn and Uunk (2007) called the *stigmatization hypothesis*. Using combined data from the European Community Household Panel and the European Value Survey, they found that divorced individuals living in regions with greater intolerance of divorce reported greater declines in social contacts than those living in regions with greater tolerance.

If this finding applies to volunteer organizations, we can expect divorce to result in decreased volunteering at religious organizations due to a corresponding decrease in attendance at religious services. Because the married are more likely to attend religious services than the unmarried (Gallup 2010), and because religious institutions have long endorsed a pro-marriage ethos (Christiano 2000), the institutionalization of marriage norms produce less acceptance of divorce. In such an environment, divorced individuals may consider themselves to be "strangers," who may be inside the church yet feel themselves outside of it (Simmel [1908]1950:402). If religious volunteering decreases after divorce, it may be because divorced individuals attend religious services less frequently than married people do.

If this is true, are men or women more likely to become isolated from their religious communities after divorce? A study of marriage in men's lives may provide an answer. This work found that religion is of particular importance to married men (Nock 1998). Using data from two waves of the National Survey of Families and Households, Nock found that, following marriage, men became more involved in organized religion, as measured by attendance frequency at religious services, participation in social events at church, and membership in church-related groups (pp. 94–95). If being married encourages men to increase involvement in organized religion, then it would logically follow that the dissolution of marriage may bring an opposite effect, namely, disengagement from it. Indeed, this is exactly what Nock found: that is, attendance at religious services decreased among men after divorce (p. 146). Can the same be expected for women?

Although a Dutch study did find women decreased attendance at religious services after divorce (Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005), a U.S. national study found the opposite, an increase in women's religious participation after divorce (Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995). More specifically, the U.S. study found marked gender differences in religious participation after divorce: "Divorce increases the probabilities of religious participation for 32-year-old women, while decreasing it for 32-year-old men" (p. 100). This result was consistent with the finding of Hetherington and Kelly (2002), who demonstrated the role of congregations in providing a female study participant with "a sense of rootedness, security, and belonging" (p. 76). These findings lead to the expectation that men, after divorce, will attend religious services less frequently than they used to, and this will in turn reduce their volunteering for religious organizations.

If divorce has an indirect negative effect on religious volunteering through declines in attendance at religious services, it is quite conceivable that divorce may have a different effect on secular volunteering, namely, an indirect *positive* effect, through the decline in religious service attendance. This idea aligns with the *liberation hypothesis*, which predicts that, relative to their married counterparts, the divorced are more broadly integrated into social networks (Gerstel 1988; Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005). For men in

particular, divorce may bring new opportunities for social relationships that they encounter in the search for new partners. This is plausible because, unlike women, who cope with divorce using existing support networks, men tend to seek new social ties and participate in voluntary associations (Gerstel 1988:344; Terhell et al. 2004:735). If this supposition is accurate, it could explain Nesbit's (2012) finding that divorce increases men's but not women's secular volunteering.

The Current Study

This study examines gender differences in the causal mechanisms of postdivorce changes in volunteering. Two previous studies have examined the direct relationship between divorce and volunteering, showing decreases in volunteering following divorce among women (Voorpostel and Coffé 2012) and increases in secular volunteering following divorce among men (Nesbit 2012). Using structural equation modeling, we extended these studies, investigating gender differences in the indirect effects of divorce on volunteering via two mechanisms: increased economic hardship and decreased social integration. The literature on gender gaps in postdivorce economic hardship leads to the hypothesis that divorce is more likely to decrease volunteering among women than among men through the mechanism of increasing financial strain (*Hypothesis 1*). Second, the literature on the effects of divorce on social integration supports the hypothesis that divorce decreases volunteering by decreasing social integration, as measured by attendance at religious services and participation in voluntary associations, among both men and women (*Hypothesis 2*). Finally, drawing on the stigmatization and liberation thesis, we examine the mechanism of social (dis)integration mechanism by testing whether decreased attendance at religious services contributes to decreases in religious volunteering (*Hypothesis 3*) and increases in secular volunteering among men (*Hypothesis 4*).

Method

Data and Sample

We used four waves of panel data spanning 16 years (1986–2002) from the Americans' Changing Lives (ACL) Study (House 2002). In 1986, a nationally representative sample of adults aged 25 years and older was selected through a multistage stratified area probability sampling with an oversampling of African Americans and those aged 60 and older (N = 3,617). The second wave of data (N = 2,867) was collected in 1989. Five years later, in 1994, the third wave of data (N = 2,562) was collected. Finally, the fourth wave of data (N = 1,787) was collected from 2001 to 2002. Our analytic sample consists of the 1,787 respondents who completed Waves 1 and 4 surveys, regardless of whether they completed Wave 2 or 3.[1]

Our sample is representative of the surviving adults of the U.S. population in 1986, as our analyses were weighted by the wave-specific sample weights (V12962) provided by ACL (House, Lantz, and Herd 2005). Variables with missing data were few (<0.1%), but to handle missing data, we used the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) procedure, which is one of two "state-of-the-art" methods along with multiple imputation (Schafer and Graham 2002:147). The full information approach utilizes all available information by

including partially complete cases to provide a maximum likelihood estimation. That is, probable values for missing data points are implied by observed variables, and the inclusion of the partially complete cases increases the precision and accuracy of parameter estimates (Enders and Bandalos 2001).

Measures

Volunteering

Our measures of volunteering include the range of volunteering (i.e., the number of organization types in which the respondent volunteered) and volunteer hours. These two measures complement each other: volunteering range captures the breadth of volunteer activities, while volunteer hours focuses more on the depth. To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we included two domain-specific measures: secular volunteering and religious volunteering.

Volunteering Range. In each interview, respondents were asked whether they did volunteer work during the past year for different types of organization: (a) a church, synagogue, or other religious organization; (b) a school or educational organization; (c) a political group or labor union; (d) a senior citizens group or related organization; and (e) any other national or local organization, including United Fund, hospitals, and the like. Responses to each category were coded 1 = "yes," 0 = "no." Following Wilson and Musick (1997), we summed the types of volunteering organizations, which ranged from 0 to 5.

Volunteer Hours. Respondents' hours of volunteering in the previous year of the survey were also assessed at four time points. They were asked: "About how many hours did you spend on volunteer work of (this kind/these kinds) during the last 12 months?" Response choices were 1 = "less than 20 hours," 2 = "20–39 hours," 3 = "40–79 hours," 4 = "80–159 hours," 5 = "160 hours or more." Following Thoits and Hewitt (2001), we converted this ordinal measure into a continuous variable by assigning midpoints, 10, 30, 60, 120 except the last category, which was coded as 200 hours, with 0 hours being assigned to those who did not volunteer. We then took the natural log to reduce skewness (we added .01 to avoid taking the log of zero).

Secular Volunteering. Respondents who answered "yes" to volunteering for any type of nonreligious organizations were coded 1; those answering "no" were coded 0.

Religious Volunteering. Respondents who reported "yes" to volunteering for a church, synagogue, or other religious organization were coded 1; those responding "no" were coded 0.

Transitions to Divorce

To measure changes in the respondent's marital status (1 = "married," 2 = "divorced," 3 = "widowed," 4 = "never married") between Times 1 and 3, we constructed four dummy variables, three of which capture all transitions to divorce: (a) married at Time 1 but divorced at Time 2 and remained divorced through Time 3 (n = 28); (b) married through Time 2 but divorced at Time 3 (n = 49); and (c) married at Time 1 and divorced at Time 2

but remarried at Time 3 (n = 18).[2] A fourth dummy variable of "other" includes 740 respondents who did not fall in one of the three categories of transition to divorce (e.g., never married at Time 1 and married at Time 2 and divorced at Time 3, divorced at Time 1 and married at Time 2 and widowed at Time 3, etc.).[3] The reference category was those who married through Time 3 (n = 952).

Mediators

Financial Strain. Financial strain is a standardized index of two items. Respondents were asked: "Now a few questions about (your/your family's) financial situation. (a) How satisfied are you with (your/your family's) present financial situation?" Original responses ranged from 1 ("completely satisfied") to 5 ("not at all satisfied"). And then asked: "How difficult is it for (you/your family) to meet the monthly payments on your (family's) bills?" Original responses ranged from 1 ("extremely difficult") to 5 ("not difficult at all"). These two items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicated greater difficulty. Two items were then summed and standardized to create an index of financial strain (Cronbach's alpha = .80).

Religious Service Attendance. At each of four waves, respondents were asked how often they usually attended religious services. The response categories were 1 ("never") to 6 ("more than once a week").

Group Participation. Respondents were asked: "How often do you attend meetings or programs of groups, clubs or organizations that you belong to?" The response categories were same as religious service attendance.

Background Variables

Following previous research on volunteering, we included several covariates of volunteering, including sociodemographic variables. Race and ethnicity was measured using a dummy variable, *non-Hispanic Black*, with non-Hispanic White being a reference category. *Age* was coded in years. *Education* (years of schooling) ranged from 0 to 17, whereas *family income* was measured based on a 10-point ordinal scale ranging from 1 ("Less than $5,000") to 10 ("$80,000 or more"). *Work hours* were measured by an item asking, "On average, how many hours a week do you work on this job, including paid and unpaid overtime?" *Housework hours* were measured based on an item asking, "Altogether, about how many hours do you spend doing these things [prepare food for meals or wash dishes, do grocery shopping, cleaning, doing laundry, sew and mend] in an average week?" For *employment status*, a dummy variable was constructed (employed = 1), and *depression* was a standardized index using the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression (CES-D) scale (Radloff 1977) (Cronbach's alpha = .83). We also computed *the number of children aged 0–17 in the household* using information about children at home.

Analytic Strategy

We used structural equation modeling to test our hypotheses. To estimate our structural equation models, we used Mplus 8 (Muthén and Muthén 2017); this incorporates Muthén's (1983) "general structural equation model," which allows not only continuous but also dichotomous and ordered polytomous variables to be included in a model.

Because our measures of endogenous constructs are ordered categorical (financial strain, religious attendance, group involvement) and count (number of volunteering organization types) as well as continuous variable (volunteer hours), we employed the estimator of MLR: "maximum likelihood parameter estimates with standard errors … that are robust to non-normality and non-independence of observations" (Muthén and Muthén 2017:668). Finally, for model fit assessment, we focus on joint criteria using three types of fit index (Hu and Bentler 1999): incremental (Comparative Fit Index, CFI), absolute (Standardized Root Mean Square Residual, SRMR), and parsimonious (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, RMSEA). Specifically, a model was determined to have a good fit to data if one of two joint criteria, (CFI ≥ .96 and SRMR ≤ .09) or (SRMR ≤ .09 and RMSEA ≤ .06), was met.

Figure 1 visualizes the relationships predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2 about volunteer range and hours (Model 1), whereas those predicted in Hypotheses 3 and 4 about religious and secular volunteering are shown in Figure 2 (Model 2). In both Models 1 and 2, causal paths from the dummy variables of getting divorced (i.e., Married T1–Divorced T2–Divorced T3, Married T1–Divorced T2–Remarried T3, and Married T1–Married T2–Divorced T3) to endogenous constructs at Time 2 were constrained to be zero because paths from the former to the latter would violate the necessary condition of time sequence for causality. For example, in the case of Model 1, a total of 15 paths were not estimated given that Model 1 has three transition-to-divorce dummy variables and five measures of



Figure 1. Conceptual Model 1: Mediating effects of economic and social hardships on changes in volunteering after divorce.

Note: Model fit statistics: χ^2 (30) = 37.127, p = .173; CFI = 1.000; RMSEA = .016 (90% C.I.: .000, .032); SRMR = .005. T1 = 1986. T2 = 1989. T3 = 1994. T4 = 2002. Only hypothesized paths with standardized coefficients are shown to reduce clutter. On each path, the first coefficient represents men and the second represents women. Model controls for autoregressive endogenous variables, race, age$_1$, education$_1$, family income$_1$, work hours$_1$, housework hours$_1$, depression$_1$, and number of children under 18 in household$_1$ (see Appendix Tables A2 and A3 for the coefficients of control variables).* p < .05 (two-tailed).



Figure 2. Conceptual Model 2: Mediating effects of religious attendance on changes in religious and secular volunteering after divorce.

Note: Model fit statistics: χ^2 (30) = 49.945, p = .012; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .027 (90% C.I.: .013, .040); SRMR = .008. T1 = 1986. T2 = 1989. T3 = 1994. T4 = 2002. Only hypothesized paths with standardized coefficients are shown to reduce clutter. On each path, the first coefficient represents men and the second represents women. Model controls for autoregressive endogenous variables, race, age$_1$, education$_1$, family income$_1$, work hours$_1$, housework hours$_1$, depression$_1$, and number of children under 18 in household$_1$.* $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

endogenous constructs (i.e., financial strain, religious attendance, group involvement, volunteering range, and volunteer hours) at Time 2. Because the models were simultaneously estimated separately for men and women, its overall degrees of freedom is 30 (15 × 2 gender groups). Thus, we would need the test of model fit to be interpreted for hypothesis testing.

Results

Appendix Table A1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables included in analysis, presented separately for male (n = 652) and female (n = 1,135) as well as total sample (n = 1,787).

Model 1

Tables 1 and 2 present results from estimating Model 1 that specifies the mediation of financial strain and social integration, measured by religious attendance and group involvement, between a transition to divorce and volunteering for men and women, respectively. The unstandardized (B) and standardized coefficients (β) are shown for each endogenous variable, controlling for race, age, education, family income, work hours, housework hours, number of children under 18 in household, and depression (see Appendix Tables A2 and A3 for the coefficients of control variables). Model fit was

Table 1. Model 1: Testing mediating effects of increased financial strain and decreased social integration on the relationship between transitions to divorce (Time 1 – Time 2, Time 2 – Time 3) and changes in volunteering (Time 1 – Time 4) for men interviewed at Waves 1 and 4, whether interviewed at Waves 2 and 3 (n = 652).

	Financial strain$_2$		Financial strain$_3$		Financial strain$_4$		Relig. attendance$_2$		Relig. attendance$_3$		Relig. attendance$_4$		Group involvement$_2$		Group involvement$_3$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Div$_3$[a]	—	—	.288	.039	−.338	−.047	—	—	−.823	−.057*	.658	.044	—	—	.176	.012
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Remar$_3$[a]	—	—	−.483	−.065*	−1.024	−.141*	—	—	−.055	.004	−.401	−.027	—	—	−.665	−.046
Mar$_1$Mar$_2$Div$_3$[a]	—	—	.327	.072	−.112	−.025	—	—	−.520	−.059*	−.169	−.018	—	—	−.936	−.106*
Other[a]	—	—	.078	.037	−.111	−.054	—	—	−.382	−.092*	−.017	−.004	—	—	−.120	−.029
Financial strain$_1$	.464	.478*	.217	.215*	.133	.135*	−.035	−.017	.072	.036	.002	.001	−.096	−.050	.161	.083
Financial strain$_2$	—	—	.413	.398*	.182	.180*	—	—	.070	.034	.057	.027	—	—	−.085	−.042
Financial strain$_3$	—	—	—	—	.295	.302*	—	—	—	—	−.007	−.003	—	—	—	—
Religious attendance$_1$	−.011	−.023	−.022	−.043	−.017	−.035	.798	.793*	.236	.238*	.073	.071	.132	.136*	.159	.162*
Religious attendance$_2$	—	—	.044	.088	.030	.062	—	—	.526	.533*	.212	.207*	—	—	.038	.039
Religious attendance$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.019	−.039	—	—	—	—	.599	.577*	—	—	—	—
Group involvement$_1$	−.014	−.028	.007	.013	−.007	−.013	−.002	−.002	−.056	−.056	.004	.004	.350	.357*	.140	.141*
Group invovlement$_2$	—	—	.031	.059	.005	.009	—	—	.137	.133*	−.092	−.087*	—	—	.262	.258*
Group involvement$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.043	−.086	—	—	—	—	−.009	−.008	—	—	—	—
Volunteering range$_1$	−.061	−.073	−.126	−.147	.121	.145	.201	.119*	.138	.083	.021	.012	.286	.175*	−.041	−.025
Volunteering range$_2$	—	—	−.016	−.019	−.146	−.170*	—	—	−.014	−.008	.101	.057	—	—	.261	.152*
Volunteering range$_3$	—	—	—	—	.024	.028	—	—	—	—	−.169	−.094	—	—	—	—
Volunteer hours$_1$	.017	.085	.021	.100	−.023	−.114	−.044	−.105*	−.019	−.047	.001	.003	.010	.025	.024	.059
Volunteer hours$_2$	—	—	.012	.056	.022	.103	—	—	.008	.019	.001	.002	—	—	−.007	−.017
Volunteer hours$_3$	—	—	—	—	.005	.023	—	—	—	—	.050	.114*	—	—	—	—

	Group involvement$_4$		Volunteering range$_2$		Volunteering range$_3$		Volunteering range$_4$		Volunteer hours$_2$		Volunteer hours$_3$		Volunteer hours$_4$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Div$_3$[a]	−.111	−.008	—	—	−.240	−.029	−.204	−.022	—	—	−.670	−.020	−1.432	−.042
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Remar$_3$[a]	−.757	−.051*	—	—	−.437	−.052*	−.572	−.062*	—	—	−1.922	−.056	−3.185	−.092*
Mar$_1$Mar$_2$Div$_3$[a]	.430	.048	—	—	−.463	−.090*	−.108	−.019	—	—	−1.839	−.088*	−.683	−.032
Other[a]	.143	.034	—	—	−.224	−094*	−.129	−.050	—	—	−.944	−.097*	−.370	−.038
Financial strain$_1$	−.028	−.014	−.004	−.004	.014	.013	.074	.060	−.008	−.0012	.128	.028	.255	.055
Financial strain$_2$	.019	.009	—	—	−.124	−.106*	−.017	−.013	—	—	−.576	−.121*	−.130	−.027
Financial strain$_3$	−.047	−.024	—	—	—		−.004	−.003	—	—	—	—	−.088	−.019
Religious attendance$_1$	.009	.009	.033	.058	.052	.092	−.063	−.100	.277	.117*	.121	.052	−.278	−.118
Religious attendance$_2$	.071	.071	—	—	−.027	−.047	.073	.117	—	—	.177	.076	.506	.217*
Religious attendance$_3$	.216	.214*	—	—	—	—	.063	.100	—	—	—	—	.273	.115
Group involvement$_1$	.058	.057	.059	.100*	−.007	−.013	.032	.051	.228	.095*	−.016	−.007	.071	.030
Group invovlement$_2$	.177	.171*	—	—	.029	.049	.025	.038	—	—	.144	.059	−.040	−.016
Group involvement$_3$	.192	.189*	—	—	—	—	.069	.109*	—	—	—	—	.352	.147*

Volunteering range$_1$	.099	.059	.609	.628*	.164	.170*	.087	.082	.949	.238*	.327	.083	.273	.069
Volunteering range$_2$	−.032	−.019	—	—	.329	.331*	.187	.171*	—	—	.444	.109	−.317	−.078
Volunteering range$_3$	−.039	−.022	—	—	—	—	.335	.306*	—	—	—	—	.428	.104*
Volunteer hours$_1$	−.019	−.045	−.028	−.119	.020	.082	−.016	−.062	.180	.183*	.160	.164*	−.017	−.018
Volunteer hours$_2$	.025	.059	—	—	−.009	−.036	.001	.003	—	—	.156	.158*	.199	.200*
Volunteer hours$_3$	.045	.105	—	—	—	—	−.018	−.067	—	—	—	—	.101	.100

Note. Model fit statistics: χ^2 (40) = 61.720, p = .015; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .025 (90% C.I.: .011, .036); SRMR = .008. B = Unstandardized coefficients. β = Standardized coefficients. Standard errors are not shown because of space limitations. Gray shade denotes significant relationships. The subscripts denote the time of assessment. $Mar_1Div_2Div_3$ = being divorced at Time 2 and remained divorced until Time 3. $Mar_1Div_2Remar_3$ = being divorced at Time 2 but remarried at Time 3. $Mar_1Mar_2Div_3$ = being married until Time 2 but divorced at Time 3. Model controls for race, age$_1$, education$_1$, family income$_1$, work hours$_1$, housework hours$_1$, depression$_1$, and number of children under 18 in household$_1$ (For estimated effects of control variables, see Table A2).

[a]Reference category = Married$_{1-3}$ (i.e., continuously married until Time 3).

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

Table 2. Model 1: Testing mediating effects of increased financial strain and decreased social integration on the relationship between transitions to divorce (Time 1 – Time 2, Time 2 – Time 3) and changes in volunteering Time 1 – Time 4) for women interviewed at Waves 1 and 4, whether interviewed at Waves 2 and 3 (n = 1,135).

	Financial strain$_2$		Financial strain$_3$		Financial strain$_4$		Religious attendance$_2$		Religious attendance$_3$		Religious attendance$_4$		Group involvement$_2$		Group involvement$_3$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*B*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Div$_3$[a]	—	—	.639	.087*	−.308	−.043	—	—	−.521	−.039	.052	.004	—	—	−.619	−.045
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Remar$_3$[a]	—	—	−.573	−.079*	−.400	−.056*	—	—	.606	.045	.088	.006	—	—	.610	.045
Mar$_1$Mar$_2$Div$_3$[a]	—	—	.619	.115*	−.193	−.036	—	—	−.108	−.011	−.508	−.049*	—	—	.421	.042
Other[a]	—	—	−.017	−.009	−.045	−.023	—	—	−.225	−.062	−.144	−.038	—	—	.056	.015
Financial strain$_1$	.349	.376*	.218	.235*	.124	.135*	−.009	−.005	.063	.037	.074	.041	−.031	−.018	−.077	−.044
Financial strain$_2$	—	—	.388	.389*	.109	.110*	—	—	.039	.021	−.038	−.020	—	—	.033	.018
Financial strain$_3$	—	—	—	—	.342	.345*	—	—	—	—	−.137	−.071*	—	—	—	—
Religious attendance$_1$	.023	.043	−.009	−.017	−.057	−.107	.732	.712*	.201	.203*	.180	.175*	.148	.146*	−.068	−.068
Religious attendance$_2$	—	—	−.017	−.032	.066	.128	—	—	.499	.517*	.077	.077	—	—	.177	.182*
Religious attendance$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.016	−.030	—	—	—	—	.485	.465*	—	—	—	—
Group involvement$_1$	−.019	−.035	−.012	−.023	.014	.026	.035	.034	.048	.049	.014	.014	.310	.311*	.259	.263*
Group invovlement$_2$	—	—	−.012	−.023	−.004	−.008	—	—	.024	.025	−.017	−.017	—	—	.220	.222*
Group involvement$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.017	−.033	—	—	—	—	.015	.015	—	—	—	—
Volunteering range$_1$	−.048	−.055	−.082	−.094	−.084	−.098	.051	.030	−.061	−.038	.095	.057	.119	.073	.064	.039
Volunteering range$_2$	—	—	.046	.054	.037	.044	—	—	.081	.052	−.054	−.033	—	—	.115	.074
Volunteering range$_3$	—	—	—	—	.067	.078	—	—	—	—	.030	.018	—	—	—	—
Volunteer hours$_1$	.009	.041	.016	.069	.006	.027	.009	.021	.001	.002	.011	.025	.026	.059	−.018	−.041
Volunteer hours$_2$	—	—	.012	.055	.013	.060	—	—	−.026	−.063	.004	.009	—	—	−.005	−.012
Volunteer hours$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.017	−.073	—	—	—	—	.005	.011	—	—	—	—

	Group involvement$_4$		Volunteering range$_2$		Volunteering range$_3$		Volunteering range$_4$		Volunteer hours$_2$		Volunteer hours$_3$		Volunteer hours$_4$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Div$_3$[a]	.057	.004	—	—	.281	.034	.111	.013	—	—	−.256	−.008	1.275	.040
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Remar$_3$[a]	.561	.039	—	—	−.106	−.013	−.238	−.028	—	—	−.611	−.019	−1.176	−.037
Mar$_1$Mar$_2$Div$_3$[a]	−.318	−.030	—	—	−.232	−.038	−.220	−.035	—	—	−.575	−.024	−1.071	−.045
Other[a]	−.053	−.014	—	—	−.122	−.054	−.043	−.019	—	—	−.019	−.002	−.147	−.017
Financial strain$_1$	.056	.030	−.026	−.023	.036	.034	.054	.049	−.047	−.011	−.028	−.007	.380	.093*
Financial strain$_2$	−.071	−.036	—	—	−.017	−.015	−.034	−.029	—	—	.117	.027	−.269	−.061
Financial strain$_3$	−.169	−.085*	—	—	—	—	−.107	−.092*	—	—	—	—	−.393	−.090*
Religious attendance$_1$	.112	.106*	.062	.097*	−.007	−.012	−.009	−.014	.205	.086*	.142	.061	−.189	−.080
Religious attendance$_2$	−.031	−.030	—	—	.058	.098	.012	.019	—	—	.098	.043	.232	.101
Religious attendance$_3$	.083	.077	—	—	—	—	.047	.074	—	—	—	—	.084	.035
Group involvement$_1$	.075	.072	.027	.042	.053	.087*	−.012	−.019	.227	.097*	.310	.135*	−.004	−.002
Group invovlement$_2$	.124	.118*	—	—	−.018	−.029	.012	.020	—	—	−.169	−.073	.012	.005

Group involvement$_3$	.277	.261*	—	—	—	—	.053	.085*	—	—	—	—	.314	.134*
Volunteering range$_1$	−.187	−.109	.567	.545*	.109	.110	.153	.150*	.751	.194*	−.127	−.034	−.007	−.002
Volunteering range$_2$	.134	.081	—	—	.404	.422*	.247	.252	—	—	.621	.170*	.368	.100
Volunteering range$_3$	.032	.019	—	—	—	—	.390	.380*	—	—	—	—	.421	.110*
Volunteer hours$_1$	.065	.142*	−.005	−.020	−.005	−.020	−.008	−.031	.272	.265*	.073	.072	.038	.038
Volunteer hours$_2$	−.059	−.132*	—	—	−.013	−.052	−.048	−.182*	—	—	.179	.183*	−.021	−.021
Volunteer hours$_3$	.060	.132*	—	—	—	—	.009	.034	—	—	—	—	.286	.284*

Note. Model fit statistics: χ^2 (40) = 61.720, p = .015; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .025 (90% C.I.: .011, .036); SRMR = .008. B = Unstandardized coefficients. β = Standardized coefficients. Standard errors are not shown because of space limitations. Gray shade denotes significant relationships. The subscripts denote the time of assessment. $Mar_1Div_2Div_3$ = being divorced at Time 2 and remained divorced until Time 3. $Mar_1Div_2Remar_3$ = being divorced at Time 2 but remarried at Time 3. $Mar_1Mar_2Div_3$ = being married until Time 2 but divorced at Time 3. Model controls for race, age$_1$, education$_1$, family income$_1$, work hours$_1$, housework hours$_1$, depression$_1$, and number of children under 18 in household$_1$ (For estimated effects of control variables, see Table A3).

[a]Reference category = Married$_{1-3}$ (i.e., continuously married until Time 3).

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

good (CFI = .998, RMSEA = .025, and SRMR = .008), meeting both joint criteria, (CFI ≥ .96 and SRMR ≤ .09) and (SRMR ≤ .09 and RMSEA ≤ .06). We also present standardized coefficients in Figure 1 for visualization of our results to test the first two hypotheses. On each path, the first coefficient represents men, whereas the second coefficient after slash represents women.

Increased Financial Strain

To begin with, the second column of Table 1 shows that, for men, the effect of a transition to divorce on volunteering at Time 4 was not found to be mediated by subsequent financial strain, as the transitions—either $Mar_1Div_2Div_3$ or $Mar_1Mar_2Div_3$—had no significant effect on financial strain at Time 3, regardless of whether divorce occurred between Times 1 and 2 ($B = .288$, $\beta = .039$; $p > .05$), or between Times 2 and 3 ($B = .327$, $\beta = .072$; $p > .05$).

On the contrary, the second column in the top panel of Table 2 shows that both women who divorced at Time 2 and remained divorced until Time 3 ($Mar_1Div_2Div_3$) and those who remained married until Time 2 but divorced at Time 3 ($Mar_1Mar_2Div_3$) reported more financial strain between Times 2 and 3 than those who remained married through Time 3 ($B = .639$, $\beta = .087$ and $B = .619$, $\beta = .115$, respectively), which in turn is associated with a decline in both the range of volunteering and volunteer hours at Time 4 ($B = -.107$, $\beta = -.092$ and $B = -.393$, $\beta = -.090$; the fourth and seventh columns in the bottom panel of Table 2).

Results from testing statistical significance of the indirect effects presented in Table 3 indicated that three the four indirect effects were significant (see Table 3, first three rows) except the effect of $Mar_1Div_2Div_3$ on volunteer hours ($B = -.251$, $\beta = -.008$; $p > .05$; not shown in the table). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported. While not hypothesized, interestingly, the second column of the top panel of Table 2 shows that those women who remarried at Time 3 after getting divorced between Times 1 and 2 reported less financial strain ($B = -.573$, $\beta = -.079$) than those who remained married through Time 3.

Table 3. Summary of indirect effects.

Model	Group	Indirect Effect	*B*	*β*	Sig.	Support
Model 1	Women	Married (T1)-Divorced (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Financial strain (T3) → Volunteer range (T4)	−.069	−.007	*	H1
		Married (T1)-Married (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Financial strain (T3) → Volunteering hours (T4)	−.244	−.010	*	H1
		Married (T1)-Married (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Financial strain (T3) → Volunteer range (T4)	−.066	−.011	*	H1
	Men	Married (T1)-Married (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Group involvement (T3) → Volunteer range (T4)	−.065	−.012	*	H2
		Married (T1)-Married (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Group involvement (T3) → Volunteering hours (T4)	−.329	−.016	*	H2
Model 2	Women	None				
	Men	Married (T1)-Divorced (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Religious attendance (T3) → Religious volunteering (T4)	−.057	−.015	*	H3
		Married (T1)-Divorced (T2)-Divorced (T3) → Religious attendance (T3) → Secular volunteering (T4)	.035	.010	*	H4

Note. Model fit statistics for Model 1: χ^2 (30) = 50.766, p = .010; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .028 (90% C.I.: .014, .041); SRMR = .007. Model fit statistics for Model 2: χ^2 (30) = 49.945, p = .012; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .027 (90% C.I.: .013, .040); SRMR = .008. *B* = Unstandardized coefficients. *β* = Standardized coefficients. T1 = Time 1 (1986). T2 = Time 2 (1989). T3 = Time 3 (1994). T4 = Time 4 (2002). Only hypothesized and significant paths are shown.

* $p < .05$ (one-tailed).

Decreased Social Integration

Turning to the results for two measures of social integration (religious attendance and group involvement), we found significant indirect effects for men as summarized in Table 3 (also see Figure 1). We see that men who divorced between Times 2 and 3 reduced both volunteer range and volunteering hours at Time 4 as a result of decreased group involvement at Time 3 (see the fourth and fifth rows in Table 3), while no significant mediation by religious attendance was found among those who got divorced between Times 1 and 2 and remained so at Time 3. We also see that there was no significant difference in reports of religious attendance between men who remarried at Time 3 and those who remained married through Time 3 (B = .606, β = .045; p > .05). Taken together, these findings partially support Hypothesis 2.

Model 2

Decreased Social Integration in Religious Communities

Tables 4 and 5 present the results of Model 2 for men and women, respectively. Here we intend to investigate whether decreased attendance at religious services accounts for the decrease in religious volunteering (Hypothesis 3) and the increase in secular volunteering (Hypothesis 4). While this model was estimated with control variables included in Model 1, their coefficients are not shown for space constraints (available on request). While this model's chi-square was significant (χ^2 = 59.859, df = 30, p = .022 < .050), all other fit indices indicated good fit to data as the model met both joint criteria (CFI = .998, RMSEA = .024, and SRMR = .008). For consistency, Model 2 included other mediators used in Model 1 (i.e., financial strain and group involvement), but given our interest in religious attendance, we only discuss results hypothesized in Model 2.

Table 4 shows that, for men, a transition to divorce reduced religious volunteering at Time 4 as a result of decreased religious attendance at Time 3 (fifth column), specifically, divorce occurred between Times 1 and 2 (B = –.809, β = –.056), though not getting divorced between Times 2 and 3 (B = –.500, β = –.056; p > .05; see the fifth column in the top panel of Table 3). Religious attendance at Time 3 was in turn positively related to religious volunteering at Time 4 (B = .071, β = .263) and inversely to secular volunteer at Time 4 (B = –.043, β = –.182). Indirect effects of a transition to divorce between Times 1 and 2 on religious (B = –.057, β = –.015) and secular volunteering (B = .035, β = .010) were both found significant in the expected direction (see the bottom two rows in Table 3). On the other hand, the fifth column of the top panel of Table 5 shows no significant difference among women in attendance at religious services, whether they remained married across waves, got divorced between Times 1 and 2 (B = –.526, β = –.039; p > .05), or divorced between Times 2 and 3 (B = –.141, β = –.014; p > .05). As a result, indirect effect of a transition to divorce on either volunteering was found to be significant. These findings support Hypotheses 3 and 4.

Discussion

Gender differences in the social and economic consequences of divorce have been of interest to sociologists for many years. Little attention, however, has been paid to the

Table 4. Model 2: Testing Mediating effects of decreased religious attendance on the relationship between transitions to divorce (Time 1 – Time 2, Time 2 – Time 3) and changes in religious and secular volunteering (Time 1 – Time 4) for men interviewed at Waves 1 and 4, whether interviewed at Waves 2 and 3 (n = 652).

	Financial strain$_2$		Financial strain$_3$		Financial strain$_4$		Relig. attendance$_2$		Relig. attendance$_3$		Relig. attendance$_4$		Group involvement$_2$		Group involvement$_3$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*B*
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Div$_3$[a]	—	—	.274	.037	−.327	−.045	—	—	−.809	−.056*	.666	.044	—	—	.165	.011
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Remar$_3$[a]	—	—	−.483	−.065*	−.966	−.133*	—	—	−.044	−.003	−.380	−.025	—	—	−.646	−.045
Mar$_1$Mar$_2$Div$_3$[a]	—	—	.315	.069	−.117	−.026	—	—	−.500	−.056	−.127	−.014	—	—	−.897	−.102*
Other[a]	—	—	.066	.031	−.116	−.057	—	—	−.367	−.089*	−.002	−.000	—	—	−.067	−.016
Financial strain$_1$	.460	.473*	.208	.207*	.142	.145*	−.036	−.018	.078	.039	.013	.006	−.083	−.043	.162	.083
Financial strain$_2$	—	—	.417	.402*	.170	.169*	—	—	.065	.032	.065	.031	—	—	−.081	−.040
Financial strain$_3$	—	—	—	—	.289	.297*	—	—	—	—	−.015	−.007	—	—	—	—
Relig. attendance$_1$	−.020	−.041	−.024	−.047	−.024	−.048	.740	.736*	.235	.237*	.071	.069	.131	.135*	.141	.143*
Relig. attendance$_2$	—	—	.041	.080	.039	.080	—	—	.530	.538*	.240	.234*	—	—	.035	.036
Relig. attendance$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.006	−.012	—	—	—	—	.582	.560*	—	—	—	—
Group involvement$_1$	−.016	−.033	.003	.006	−.010	−.020	.000	.000	−.056	−.056	.003	.003	.373	.379*	.142	.143*
Group invovlement$_2$	—	—	.027	.052	.006	.012	—	—	.145	.142*	−.084	−.079*	—	—	.288	.284*
Group involvement$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.051	−.101	—	—	—	—	−.003	−.003	—	—	—	—
Relig. volunteering$_1$	.097	.047	.000	.000	.152	.073	.342	.081*	.058	.014	.080	.018	.574	.140*	.463	.112*
Relig. volunteering$_2$	—	—	.053	.026	−.186	−.093	—	—	.043	.011	.069	.016	—	—	.104	.026
Relig. volunteering$_3$	—	—	—	—	.034	.018	—	—	—	—	.173	.043	—	—	—	—
Secular volunteering$_1$	.029	.015	.020	.010	−.056	−.027	−.241	−.058	.012	.003	.044	.010	.372	.093*	.113	.028
Secular volunteering$_2$	—	—	.048	.023	.030	.015	—	—	.078	.020	.200	.048	—	—	.287	.072*
Secular volunteering$_3$	—	—	—	—	.104	.050	—	—	—	—	.143	.033	—	—	—	—

	Group involvement$_4$		Relig. volunteering$_2$		Relig. volunteering$_3$		Relig. volunteering$_4$		Secular volunteering$_2$		Secular volunteering$_3$		Secular volunteering$_4$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*B*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*B*	*B*	*β*
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Div$_3$[a]	−.111	−.008	—	—	−.044	−.012	.017	.004	—	—	−.023	−.007	−.206	−.060
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Remar$_3$[a]	−.669	−.045	—	—	−.280	−.074*	−.238	−.061*	—	—	.039	.011	−.109	−.032
Mar$_1$Mar$_2$Div$_3$[a]	.458	.051	—	—	−.180	−.078*	.024	.010	—	—	−.015	−.007	−.112	−.053*
Other[a]	.158	.038	—	—	−.091	−.085*	.011	.010	—	—	−.004	−.004	−.044	−.045
Financial strain$_1$	−.018	−.009	.011	.022	.005	.009	.033	.061*	−.017	−.034	.012	.026	.005	.011
Financial strain$_2$	.014	.007	—	—	−.044	−.084	−.066	−.121*	—	—	−.030	−.061	.046	.095
Financial strain$_3$	−.053	−.026	—	—	—	—	.012	.023	—	—	—	—	−.021	−.046
Relig. attendance$_1$	−.005	−.005	.063	.257*	.032	.124*	−.018	−.067	−.035	−.142*	−.025	−.105	−.027	−.116
Relig. attendance$_2$	.064	.065	—	—	.026	.101	.045	.168*	—	—	−.005	−.023	.025	.109
Relig. attendance$_3$	.199	.197*	—	—	—	—	.071	.263*	—	—	—	—	−.043	−.182*
Group involvement$_1$	.057	.056	.006	.026	−.002	−.008	−.004	−.014	.032	.126*	.005	.020	.008	.033
Group invovlement$_2$	.186	.180*	—	—	.009	.035	−.014	−.050	—	—	.010	.040	.017	.071
Group involvement$_3$	.199	.195*	—	—	—	—	−.000	−.001	—	—	—	—	.041	.173*

Relig. volunteering$_1$	.076	.018	.464	.448*	.336	.310*	.155	.137*	−.100	−.095*	−.113	−.113*	−.073	−.073
Relig. volunteering$_2$	.134	.033	—	—	.188	.180*	.135	.124*	—	—	.103	.107	−.085	−.088
Relig. volunteering$_3$	.425	.109	—	—	—	—	.233	.224*	—	—	—	—	−.018	−.020
Secular volunteering$_1$	−.092	−.022	−.010	−.010	.020	.019	.030	.028	.279	.274*	.212	.218*	−.040	−.041
Secular volunteering$_2$	.209	.052	—	—	.042	.040	.147	.137*	—	—	.143	.150*	.046	.049
Secular volunteering$_3$	.159	.038	—	—	—	—	−.054	−.048	—	—	—	—	.219	.221*

Note. Model fit statistics: χ^2 (40) = 59.859, p = .022; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .024 (90% C.I.: .009, .035); SRMR = .008. B = Unstandardized coefficients. β = Standardized coefficients. Standard errors are not shown because of space limitations. Gray shade denotes significant relationships. The subscripts denote the time of assessment. $Mar_1Div_2Div_3$ = being divorced at Time 2 and remained divorced until Time 3. $Mar_1Div_2Remar_3$ = being divorced at Time 2 but remarried at Time 3. $Mar_1Mar_2Div_3$ = being married until Time 2 but divorced at Time 3. Control variables in Model 1 were included in Model 2. [a]Reference category = Married$_{1-3}$ (i.e., continuously married until Time 3). Rel. = Religious.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

Table 5. Model 2: Testing mediating effects of decreased religious attendance on the relationship between transitions to divorce (Time 1 – Time 2, Time 2 – Time 3) and changes in religious and secular volunteering (Time 1 – Time 4) for women interviewed at Waves 1 and 4, whether interviewed at Waves 2 and 3 (n = 1,135).

	Financial strain$_2$		Financial strain$_3$		Financial strain$_4$		Relig. attendance$_2$		Relig. attendance$_3$		Relig. attendance$_4$		Group involvement$_2$		Group involvement$_3$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Div$_3$[a]	—	—	.634	.087*	−.290	−.040	—	—	−.526	−.039	.050	.004	—	—	−.633	−.046
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Remar$_3$[a]	—	—	−.581	−.080*	−.408	−.057*	—	—	.621	.047	.118	.008	—	—	.638	.047
Mar$_1$Mar$_2$Div$_3$[a]	—	—	.660	.122*	−.194	−.036	—	—	−.141	−.014	−.455	−.044	—	—	.425	.042
Other[a]	—	—	−.013	−.006	−.053	−.027	—	—	−.233	−.064	−.132	−.035	—	—	.075	.020
Financial strain$_1$	.352	.378*	.216	.233*	.125	.136*	−.021	−.012	.067	.039	.070	.039	−.047	−.027	−.082	−.047*
Financial strain$_2$	—	—	.388	.389*	.107	.108*	—	—	.038	.020*	−.037	−.019	—	—	.034	.018
Financial strain$_3$	—	—	—	—	.343	.347*	—	—	—	—	−.143	−.074*	—	—	—	—
Relig. attendance$_1$	.031	.057	−.002	−.003	−.063	−.118*	.696	.678*	.197	.199*	.190	.184*	.114	.113*	−.074	−.074
Relig. attendance$_2$	—	—	−.007	−.013	.070	.135*	—	—	.486	.504*	.091	.090	—	—	.178	.183*
Relig. attendance$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.014	−.026	—	—	—	—	.456	.437*	—	—	—	—
Group involvement$_1$	−.019	−.037	−.011	−.020	.010	.018	.035	.034	.038	.039	.019	.018	.320	.321*	.258	.262*
Group invovlement$_2$	—	—	−.005	−.010	.001	.001	—	—	.023	.023	−.010	−.010	—	—	.227	.227*
Group involvement$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.018	−.035	—	—	—	—	.015	.014	—	—	—	—
Relig. volunteering$_1$	−.052	−.024	−.052	−.025	−.052	−.025	.385	.095*	−.081	−.021	.283	.070	.576	.145*	.068	.017
Relig. volunteering$_2$	—	—	.105	.050	.135	.065	—	—	.033	.009	−.272	−.068	—	—	.152	.039
Relig. volunteering$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.009	−.005	—	—	—	—	.293	.074	—	—	—	—
Secular volunteering$_1$	.055	.025	.031	.014	−.051	−.024	−.032	−.008	−.041	−.010	.199	.047	.100	.024	−.060	−.015
Secular volunteering$_2$	—	—	.236	.101*	.135	.058	—	—	−.199	−.046	.113	.025	—	—	.143	.033
Secular volunteering$_3$	—	—	—	—	−.021	−.010	—	—	—	—	−.061	−.014	—	—	—	—

	Group involvement$_4$		Relig. volunteering$_2$		Relig. volunteering$_3$		Relig. volunteering$_4$		Secular volunteering$_2$		Secular volunteering$_3$		Secular volunteering$_4$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Div$_3$[a]	.037	.003	—	—	.018	.005	.050	.014	—	—	−.063	−.019	.094	.030
Mar$_1$Div$_2$Remar$_3$[a]	.577	.040	—	—	−.053	−.015	−.015	−.004	—	—	−.052	−.016	−.133	−.043
Mar$_1$Mar$_2$Div$_3$[a]	−.391	−.037	—	—	−.083	−.032	−.181	−.067*	—	—	.029	.012	.036	.016
Other[a]	−.063	−.016	—	—	−.032	−.034	−.029	−.029	—	—	.039	.044	.004	.004
Financial strain$_1$	.057	.031	−.018	−.041	.007	.016	−.002	−.005	.011	.028	−.019	−.045	.056	.140*
Financial strain$_2$	−.081	.041	—	—	−.003	−.007	.003	.006	—	—	.026	.057	−.048	−.112*
Financial strain$_3$	−.150	−.076*	—	—	—	—	−.017	−.034	—	—	—	—	−.023	−.055
Relig. attendance$_1$	.107	.101*	.047	.184*	−.007	−.027	−.002	−.007	−.031	−.133*	.021	.084	−.019	−.082
Relig. attendance$_2$	−.060	−.058	—	—	.052	.206*	.023	.089	—	—	−.033	−.137	−.002	−.011
Relig. attendance$_3$	.080	.074	—	—	—	—	.035	.128*	—	—	—	—	−.025	−.109
Group involvement$_1$	.066	.063	.027	.107*	.030	.117*	−.004	−.017	.000	.002	.003	.013	−.001	−.006

Group invovlement$_2$	.126	.119*	—	—	−.011	−.042	.008	.029	—	—	−.010	−.041	−.009	−.042
Group involvement$_3$	.283	.266*	—	—	—	—	.015	.056	—	—	—	—	.027	.116*
Relig. volunteering$_1$	.134	.032	.453	.448*	.122	.119v	.145	.137*	−.015	−.017	−.031	−.032	−.067	−.075
Relig. volunteering$_2$	−.011	−.003	—	—	.310	.306*	.022	.021	—	—	−.040	−.042	.062	.069
Relig. volunteering$_3$	.574	.141*	—	—	—	—	.351	.341*	—	—	—	—	.020	.022
Secular volunteering$_1$	.285	.065	.017	.016	−.052	−.049	.067	.061	.253	.269*	.103	.103*	−.001	−.002
Secular volunteering$_2$	−.502	−.108*	—	—	.097	.086*	−.069	−.059	—	—	.167	.157*	.078	.079
Secular volunteering$_3$	.499	.114*	—	—	—	—	.122	.111*	—	—	—	—	.201	.214*

Note. Model fit statistics: χ^2 (40) = 59.859, p = .022; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .024 (90% C.I.: .009, .035); SRMR = .008. B = Unstandardized coefficients. β = Standardized coefficients. Standard errors are not shown because of space limitations. The subscripts denote the time of assessment. $Mar_1Div_2Div_3$ = being divorced at Time 2 and remained divorced until Time 3. $Mar_1Div_2Remar_3$ = being divorced at Time 2 but remarried at Time 3. $Mar_1Mar_2Div_3$ = being married until Time 2 but divorced at Time 3. Control variables in Model 1 were included in Model 2. [a]Reference category = $Married_{1-3}$ (i.e., continuously married until Time 3). Rel. = Religious.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

implications of those consequences for civic life. With a focus on one form of civic engagement, volunteering, we sought to explain gender differences in the effects of divorce on volunteering using panel data. The literature on social and economic resources theory and the observation of gender differences in the effects of divorce on economic and social well-being guided us to the hypothesis that economic and social hardships could mediate the inverse relationship between divorce and volunteering. Our structural equation analysis revealed three major findings.

First, we found that two mediators were responsible for changes in volunteering after divorce, and each was responsible for changes in a different gender: these were increased financial strain for women and decreased social integration for men. Those findings were consistent with the conception that, after divorce, women tend to suffer more from financial loss than do men, whereas men are more likely to suffer from social isolation (e.g., see Gerstel, Riessman, and Rosenfield 1985). However, previous research has left unexamined whether postdivorce financial hardship and social isolation are responsible for postdivorce declines volunteering, respectively.

Second, adverse effects of divorce on volunteering continued for men and women who had been divorced for a long time. First, women who had been divorced since Time 1 were still experiencing financial strain at Time 3, which in turn reduced volunteering at Time 4. We also found that declines in religious attendance mediated relationships between divorce and volunteering only for men who had been divorced for a long period, specifically, 5 to 8 years, However, for men who had been divorced for a relatively short period of time, this causal mechanism was not evident. The literature on divorce has documented similar effects of being divorced for long periods of time with regard to psychological distress (Johnson and Wu 2002), and the present study adds to that literature by providing evidence that women's financial hardship and men's religious disengagement after divorce linger for at least a decade and continue to hinder volunteering.

Third, domain-specific analyses showed that divorce increased men's secular volunteering through the mechanism of decreasing attendance at religious services. This supports Nesbit's (2012) finding that divorce increases secular volunteering for men. We also found that decreases in religious attendance were responsible for the increased volunteering of men at secular organizations. These findings tend to support the stigmatization hypothesis, namely, that declines in social contacts after divorce are more significant in voluntary associations that have higher levels of sanctions against divorce. These findings suggest that social norms play an important role in voluntary associations: "the more intolerant the community is about divorce … the greater the chance of losing social contacts after divorce" (Kalmijn and Uunk 2007:450).

Although religious attendance was found to mediate the relationship between divorce and secular volunteering, measures of attendance at secular voluntary associations would have enabled a direct examination of whether an increase in involvement in secular voluntary association after divorce could contribute to increases in secular volunteering. Because voluntary associations are vehicles for social integration for divorced men (Gerstel 1988), participation in such organizations could help men restore social relationships and facilitate their integration into a larger society (Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005). Future research would be well advised to examine whether increased participation in secular voluntary groups is responsible for increases in secular volunteering among men.

Although we identified mediating roles of financial strain, religious attendance, and formal group participation in the association between divorce and volunteering, it is not possible to rule out the possibility of other causal mechanisms. We conducted supplemental analyses to explore three alternative mediators that are known to be correlated with divorce and volunteering: depression, family income, and the number of children under 18 years old in the household. First, it might seem plausible that increased depression could reduce volunteering after divorce because divorce is positively associated with depression (Menaghan and Lieberman 1986), which in turn is negatively associated with volunteering (Thoits and Hewitt 2001). However, no mediation effects were found for depression. The effects of divorce on depression appear to be fully explained by decreases in social integration, as Thoits and Hewitt found such evidence in data of the first two waves of ACL (see Table 4, Panel B).

We found family income to mediate the relationship between divorce and volunteering. In particular, family income measured at Time 3 mediated the negative effects of divorce —whether between Times 1 and 2 ($Mar_1Div_2Div_{3)}$ or between Times 2 and 3 ($Mar_1Mar_2Div_3$)—on volunteer hours (B = –.420, β = –.013 and B = –.698, β = –.030, respectively) and range (B = –.126, β = –.015 and B = –.209, β = –.033, respectively) at Time 4 among women. By contrast, women who remarried between Times 1 and 2 tended to increase their volunteer hours (B = .344, β = .011) and range (B = .103, β = .012), in part due to the increase in family income. This result suggests that family income as well as financial strain mediates the association between divorce and volunteering. When financial strain was used as a primary mediator, as in Son and Wilson (2015), we found that the effect of family income is not fully mediated by financial strain. We suspect that differences in the measurement of volunteering could have contributed to this discrepancy because our results are based on the range of volunteering, while Son and Wilson used a dichotomous measure for volunteering.

Next, we tested whether the number of children in the household mediated the relationship between divorce and volunteering, as decreased numbers of children are likely to reduce volunteering among men, in particular for noncustodial fathers. The supplemental results provided some support in favor of mediation. That is, among men, the transition to divorce at Time 3 reduced volunteer range at Time 4 (B = –.108, β = –.011) because that transition decreased the number of children at Time 3 (B = –.841, β = –.144), which tended to increase the volunteering range at Time 4 (B = .129, β = .134). We found no significant mediation among women, perhaps because they were more likely to have custody and thus experience little change in the number of children. These findings confirm the well-established conclusion that "volunteering is an instance of household production undertaken outside the home," as the presence of children in the household has positive effects on the supply of volunteer labor (Brown and Zhang 2013:341). Besides formal group participation, number of children in the household appears to function as a mediator in social integration mechanism.

Finally, the methodological limitations of the present study must be noted. We utilized four waves of ACL data, and as with any study using multiwave panel data, the sample experienced attrition, from the original 3,617 subjects to 1,787 (representing 49.4% of the original sample size). To maintain national representativeness, we used panel sampling weights in all analyses. Readers should be aware, in addition, that the number of divorced

individuals in the sample was small. As with attrition, this issue was a data-related constraint. In response, we call for future research to analyze panel data from larger numbers of divorced individuals to replicate our findings.[4]

Despite these limitations, our study makes several contributions to our understanding of the process by which divorce influences volunteering. First, unlike the previous two-wave panel studies, our four-wave panel data allow us to establish causal ordering among divorce, mediators, and volunteering. This study showed that increases in financial strain and decreases in social integration are the most plausible mechanisms for the changes in volunteering following divorce. Second, our findings demonstrate that these mechanisms are gendered: economic hardship results in changes in volunteering for women, while social isolation results in changes in volunteering for men. Last, we found evidence that divorce increases secular volunteering among men due to declines in attendance at religious services. Instead of quitting volunteer work, men appear to switch their domain of volunteering from a religious to a secular one.

Notes

1. We conducted a *t*-test to compare those who left the sample before taking the Wave 4 survey (n = 1,830) with those who remained and completed the Wave 4 survey (n = 1,787). The analysis indicated that dropouts were more likely to be Black, older, less educated, and of lower socio-economic level as measured by family income ($p < .01$) (results available on request).
2. We included a dummy for those who remarried in order to control for the confounding effects of change in marital status between Times 2 and 3. Because we focus on the effects of divorce on volunteering, we did not have specific hypotheses about remarriage. But in general, there may be little difference between those who were continuously married and those who remarried, given that remarrying helps mitigate economic and social hardships (Dewilde and Uunk 2008; Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005).
3. Since the "other" category is not of the present study's interest, we do not discuss the dummy variable's coefficients, while we report them in tables.
4. To explore the extent of these limitations, we conducted sensitivity analysis by estimating the model for the full sample (n = 3,617) without using panel sampling weight and a restricted sample of those who completed all four surveys (n = 910) to see whether results varied across the different samples. First, the use of the full sample slightly increased the number of (a) those who were married at Time 1 but divorced at Time 2 and remained divorced through Time 3, from 28 to 36, (b) those who were married through Time 2 but divorced at Time 3, from 49 to 68, and (c) those who were married at Time 1 and divorced at Time 2 but remarried at Time 3, from 18 to 25. The number of those in the reference category, that is, those who married through Time 3 increased from 952 to 1,649. Since they were estimated without using weights, the validity of results from this analysis is questionable, but the results indicated support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 and no support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. Specifically, women who were married at Times 1 and 2 but got divorced between Times 2 and 3 decreased volunteer hours and volunteering range in part due to an increase in financial strain (*Hypothesis 1*), whereas their male counterparts were found to decrease volunteer hours as a decrease in group involvement *(Hypothesis 2*). Second, results from analyzing the restricted data (n = 910) remained the same as those from the present data (n = 1,787) in terms of hypotheses that received empirical support. In sum, results of sensitive analysis were largely consistent with our hypotheses (Complete results are available upon request).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Appendix

Table A1. Descriptive statistics of variables used in analysis for the total sample (n = 1,787) as well as Male (n = 652) and female samples (n = 1,135).

	Total Sample (n = 1,787)					Male Sample (n = 652)					Female Sample (n = 1,135)				
Variable	n	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	n	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	n	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
$Mar_1Div_2Div_3$	1787	.016	.124	.000	1.000	652	.017	.129	.000	1.000	1135	.015	.122	.000	1.000
$Mar_1Div_2Remar_3$	1787	.010	.100	.000	1.000	652	.011	.103	.000	1.000	1135	.010	.098	.000	1.000
$Mar_1Mar_2Div_3$	1787	.027	.163	.000	1.000	652	.035	.185	.000	1.000	1135	.023	.150	.000	1.000
$Mar_1Mar_2Mar_3$	1787	.533	.499	.000	1.000	652	.650	.477	.000	1.000	1135	.465	.499	.000	1.000
Other	1787	.414	.493	.000	1.000	652	.287	.453	.000	1.000	1135	.487	.500	.000	1.000
Financial strain$_1$	1787	.038	1.009	−1.370	2.720	652	−.041	.919	−1.370	2.720	1135	.084	1.055	−1.370	2.720
Financial strain$_2$	1650	−.064	.952	−1.370	2.720	590	−.100	.899	−1.370	2.720	1060	−.043	.981	−1.370	2.720
Financial strain$_3$	1669	−.077	.962	−1.760	2.720	614	−.094	.935	−1.760	2.720	1055	−.068	.978	−1.760	2.720
Financial strain$_4$	1692	−.240	.924	−1.760	2.720	626	−.291	.857	−1.370	2.720	1066	−.210	.961	−1.760	2.720
Religious attendance$_1$	1785	3.560	1.763	1.000	6.000	651	3.161	1.740	1.000	6.000	1134	3.788	1.736	1.000	6.000
Religious attendance$_2$	1650	3.538	1.797	1.000	6.000	590	3.129	1.777	1.000	6.000	1060	3.765	1.769	1.000	6.000
Religious attendance$_3$	1667	3.600	1.744	1.000	6.000	612	3.325	1.737	1.000	6.000	1055	3.759	1.728	1.000	6.000
Religious attendance$_4$	1692	3.590	1.821	1.000	6.000	626	3.332	1.810	1.000	6.000	1066	3.741	1.811	1.000	6.000
Group involvement$_1$	1787	2.949	1.810	1.000	6.000	652	2.857	1.744	1.000	6.000	1135	3.002	1.846	1.000	6.000
Group invovlement$_2$	1649	3.019	1.781	1.000	6.000	589	2.896	1.723	1.000	6.000	1060	3.088	1.810	1.000	6.000
Group involvement$_3$	1669	3.189	1.783	1.000	6.000	614	3.098	1.742	1.000	6.000	1055	3.242	1.805	1.000	6.000
Group involvement$_4$	1690	3.119	1.836	1.000	6.000	625	2.955	1.772	1.000	6.000	1065	3.215	1.867	1.000	6.000
Volunteering range$_1$	1783	.846	1.072	.000	5.000	650	.777	1.027	.000	5.000	1133	.885	1.095	.000	5.000
Volunteering range$_2$	1649	.872	1.105	.000	5.000	589	.800	1.005	.000	5.000	1060	.912	1.155	.000	5.000
Volunteering range$_3$	1666	.934	1.085	.000	5.000	614	.875	1.056	.000	5.000	1052	.969	1.101	.000	5.000
Volunteering range$_4$	1685	.947	1.115	.000	5.000	624	.976	1.134	.000	5.000	1061	.929	1.105	.000	5.000
Volunteer hours$_1$	1787	−.592	4.158	−4.605	5.298	652	−.728	4.196	−4.605	5.298	1135	−.515	4.136	−4.605	5.298
Volunteer hours$_2$	1650	−.491	4.201	−4.605	5.298	590	−.453	4.190	−4.605	5.298	1060	−.512	4.209	−4.605	5.298
Volunteer hours$_3$	1667	−.222	4.128	−4.605	5.298	614	−.371	4.110	−4.605	5.298	1053	−.135	4.137	−4.605	5.298
Volunteer hours$_4$	1679	−.295	4.129	−4.605	5.298	623	−.215	4.124	−4.605	5.298	1056	−.343	4.133	−4.605	5.298
Relig. volunteering$_1$	1787	.205	.404	.000	1.000	652	.179	.384	.000	1.000	1135	.220	.415	.000	1.000
Relig. volunteering$_2$	1650	.304	.460	.000	1.000	590	.271	.445	.000	1.000	1060	.322	.467	.000	1.000
Relig. volunteering$_3$	1669	.333	.471	.000	1.000	614	.306	.461	.000	1.000	1055	.349	.477	.000	1.000
Relig. Volunteering4	1685	.341	.474	.000	1.000	624	.329	.470	.000	1.000	1061	.349	.477	.000	1.000
Secular volunteering$_1$	1787	.211	.408	.000	1.000	652	.229	.420	.000	1.000	1135	.201	.401	.000	1.000
Secular volunteering$_2$	1787	.180	.384	.000	1.000	652	.212	.409	.000	1.000	1135	.162	.369	.000	1.000
Secular volunteering$_3$	1787	.193	.395	.000	1.000	652	.206	.404	.000	1.000	1135	.186	.389	.000	1.000
Secular volunteering$_4$	1787	.180	.384	.000	1.000	652	.204	.403	.000	1.000	1135	.167	.373	.000	1.000
Black	1787	.246	.431	.000	1.000	652	.213	.410	.000	1.000	1135	.264	.441	.000	1.000
Age$_1$	1787	47.051	14.932	24.000	83.000	652	43.951	13.801	25.000	80.000	1135	48.833	15.269	24.000	83.000

Education$_1$	1787	12.538	2.845	.000	17.000	652	12.954	2.979	.000	17.000	1135	12.300	2.738	.000	17.000
Family income$_1$	1787	5.212	2.576	1.000	10.000	652	5.896	2.379	1.000	10.000	1135	4.819	2.603	1.000	10.000
Work hours$_1$	1787	27.326	22.252	.000	95.000	652	38.650	20.284	.000	95.000	1135	20.821	20.678	.000	95.000
Housework hours$_1$	1780	17.194	14.656	.000	95.000	650	7.202	7.058	.000	48.000	1130	22.942	14.808	.000	95.000
Depression$_1$	1787	−.005	1.018	−1.160	4.470	652	−.163	.899	−1.110	4.250	1135	.086	1.071	−1.160	4.470
# of children < 18$_1$	1787	.740	1.100	.000	7.000	652	.748	1.065	.000	7.000	1135	.736	1.120	.000	7.000
Female	1787	.635	.482	.000	1.000										

Table A2. Estimated model 1: Effects of control variables on endogenous variables (top and middle panel) and covariances and correlations among the residuals of endogenous variables (bottom panel) for men interviewed at Waves 1 and 4, whether interviewed at Waves 2 and 3 (n = 652).

	Financial strain$_2$		Financial strain$_3$		Financial strain$_4$		Religious attendance$_2$		Religious attendance$_3$		Religious attendance$_4$		Group involvement$_2$		Group involvement$_3$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*
Black[a]	.120	.040	.247*	.079*	.092	.030	.062	.010	.137	.023	.206	.033	.159	.027	.017	.003
Age$_1$	−.011*	−.148*	−.011*	−.149*	−.009*	−.119*	.004	.026	−.001	−.007	.008	.054	−.015*	−.101*	−.003	−.017
Education$_1$	.011	.034	−.018	−.055	−.019	−.058	.008	.011	−.000	−.000	.021	.030	.056	.088	.036	.055
Family income$_1$	−.061*	−.160*	.049*	.125*	.007	.019	−.031	−.040	−.050*	−.065*	−.027	−.034	−.017	−.022	.001	.001
Work hours$_1$	−.001	−.014	−.003	−.051	.001	.012	.001	.007	−.006*	−.066*	.005	.051	−.001	−.015	−.002	−.022
Housework hours$_1$	.002	.019	.002	.013	.009	.075	−.015*	−.062*	.006	.026	−.008	−.033	−.024*	−.101*	.010	.039
Depression$_1$	.095*	.099*	.099*	.100*	.064	.066	.005	.003	−.103	−.053	.039	.019	−.139	−.073	−.077	−.040
# of children < 18$_1$	−.001	−.001	−.020	−.025	−.063	−.081	.061	.038	−.001	−.000	−.006	−.003	−.003	−.002	.081	.052

	Group involvement$_4$		Vol. range$_2$		Vol. range$_3$		Vol. range$_4$		Volunteer hours$_2$		Volunteer hours$_3$		Volunteer hours$_4$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*
Black[a]	.065	.011 −.013	−.004		.372*	.106*	.213	.055	−.486	−.033	.624	.044	.129	.009
Age$_1$	−.000	−.002	.004	.045	−.009*	−.106*	−.008*	−.088*	.002	.005	−.043*	−.124*	−.042*	−.120*
Education$_1$	.038	.058	.058*	.152*	.044*	.117*	.065*	.156*	.120	.076	.169*	.109*	.288*	.185*
Family income$_1$	.022	.029	−.045*	−.100*	−.044*	−.099*	−.031	−.064	−.106	−.058	−.096	−.053	−.071	−.039
Work hours$_1$	.005	.047	.003	.049	−.002	−.039	.004	.058	.007	.031	−.001	−.003	.015	.067
Housework hours$_1$	.004	.016	−.001	−.004	−.001	−.006	.003	.021	−.024	−.041	−.014	−.025	.006	.011
Depression$_1$	.076	.039	.003	.003	−.032	−.029	.026	.021	.228	.049	−.116	−.025	.203	.044
# of children < 18$_1$	−.061	−.038	.073*	.081*	.051	.056	−.074	−.075	.336	.090	.043	.012	−.307	−.083

	B	*β*		*B*	*β*		*B*	*β*
Fin. strain$_2$ ↔ Relig. attnd.$_2$	−.004	−.006	Fin. strain$_3$ ↔ Relig. attnd.$_3$	−.038	−.057	Fin. strain$_4$ ↔ Relig. attnd.$_4$	−.077*	−.109*
Fin. strain$_2$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_2$	−.007	−.008	Fin. strain$_3$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_3$	.003	.003	Fin. strain$_4$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_4$	−.046	−.049
Fin. strain$_2$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_2$	.025	.050	Fin. strain$_3$ ↔ Vol. range$_3$	.017	.032	Fin. strain$_4$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_4$	−.064*	−.110*
Fin. strain$_2$ ↔ Vol. range$_2$	−.030	−.013	Fin. strain$_3$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_3$	.071	.032	Fin. strain$_4$ ↔ Vol. range$_4$	−.244*	−.112*
Relig. attnd.$_2$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_2$	.233*	.168*	Relig. attnd.$_3$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_3$	.356*	.267*	Relig. attnd.$_4$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_4$	.273*	.196*
Relig. attnd.$_2$ ↔ Vol. range$_2$	.044	.056	Relig. attnd.$_3$ ↔ Vol. range$_3$	.120*	.154*	Relig. attnd.$_4$ ↔ Vol. range$_4$	.170*	.198*
Relig. attnd.$_2$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_2$	.340	.096	Relig. attnd.$_3$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_3$	.266*	.083*	Relig. attnd.$_4$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_4$	.756*	.234*
Grp. involv.$_2$ ↔ Vol. range$_2$	.322*	.310*	Grp. involv.$_3$ ↔ Vol. range$_3$	.223*	.209*	Grp. involv.$_4$ ↔ Vol. range$_4$	.208*	.182*
Grp. involv.$_2$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_2$	1.598*	.336*	Grp. involv.$_3$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_3$	1.066*	.243*	Grp. involv.$_4$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_4$	.730*	.170*
Vol. range$_2$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_2$	1.958*	.737*	Vol. range$_3$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_3$	1.925*	.750*	Vol. range$_4$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_4$	1.937*	.727*

Note: The subscripts denote the time of assessment (e.g., age$_1$ = age assessed at Time 1). Standard errors are not shown because of space limitations. Fin. = Financial. Relig. = Religious. Attnd. = Attendance. Grp. = Group. Involv. = Involvement. Vol. = Volunteering.

[a] Reference category = Nonblack. *B* = Unstandardized coefficients. *β* = Standardized coefficients.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table A3. Estimated Model 1: Effects of control variables on endogenous variables (top and middle panel) and covariances and correlations among the residuals of endogenous variables (bottom panel) for women interviewed at Waves 1 and 4, whether interviewed at Waves 2 and 3 (n = 1,135).

	Financial strain$_2$		Financial strain$_3$		Financial strain$_4$		Religious attendance$_2$		Religious attendance$_3$		Religious attendance$_4$		Group involvement$_2$		Group involvement$_3$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*
Black[a]	.229*	.074*	−.071	−.023	.194*	.064*	.030	.005	.427*	.075*	.640*	.108*	.113	.020	.283*	.049*
Age$_1$	−.002	−.035	−.005	−.074	−.010*	−.149*	.003	.019	.009*	.072*	−.007	−.054	.015*	.120*	.000	.001
Education$_1$	.013	.035	−.007	−.020	−.043*	−.117*	−.038	−.054	.067*	.099*	−.012	−.017	.093*	.134*	.051	.074
Family income$_1$	−.042*	−.112*	−.019	−.050	−.006	−.016	.015	.020	.011	.016	−.018	−.025	.064*	.090*	−.018	−.026
Work hours$_1$	.000	.002	−.001	−.025	.001	.017	−.004	−.052	−.002	−.020	.003	.032	−.001	−.010	−.001	−.007
Housework hours$_1$	.001	.011	.001	.014	.005	.084	.001	.006	.004	.033	.006	.048	.007	.063	.001	.006
Depression$_1$	.109*	.126*	.048	.055	.043	.050	−.015	−.009	−.039	−.024	−.003	−.002	.022	.013	−.036	−.022
# of children < 18$_1$	.069	.084	−.015	−.018	−.089*	−.110*	.023	.015	−.046	−.030	−.165*	−.105*	.128*	.083*	.056	.037

	Group involvement$_4$		Vol. range$_2$		Vol. range$_3$		Vol. range$_4$		Volunteer hours$_2$		Volunteer hours$_3$		Volunteer hours$_4$	
	B	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*	*B*	*β*
Black[a]	.052	.008	−.026	−.007	.149	.042	−.034	−.010	−.556	−.041	.146	.011	−.284	−.021
Age$_1$	−.013*	−.097*	.003	.041	−.001	−.016	−.021*	−.265*	.019	.065	−.011	−.036	−.080*	−.268*
Education$_1$	.068*	.093*	.041*	.094*	.087*	.205*	.007	.015	.140*	.085*	.333*	.207*	.035	.022
Family income$_1$	−.023	−.031	.006	.013	.010	.023	−.013	−.030	.053	.032	.108	.066	.008	.005
Work hours$_1$	.001	.012	−.003	−.065	−.000	−.008	.000	.006	−.012	−.061	−.008	−.040	.003	.014
Housework hours$_1$	.002	.014	.000	.003	−.000	−.002	.001	.014	.007	.027	.001	.005	.005	.018
Depression$_1$	−.014	−.008	−.067*	−.065*	−.035	−.035	−.048	−.048	−.259*	−.067*	−.074	−.020	−.240	−.063
# of children < 18$_1$	−.144*	−.089*	.114*	.117*	.021	.022	−.148*	−.154*	.585*	.161*	.118	.033	−.547*	.153*

	B	*β*		*B*	*β*		*B*	*β*
Fin. strain$_2$ ↔ Relig. attnd.$_2$	−.017	−.019	Fin. strain$_3$ ↔ Relig. attnd.$_3$	−.053	−.061	Fin. strain$_4$ ↔ Relig. attnd.$_4$	−.051	−.054
Fin. strain$_2$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_2$	−.047	−.040	Fin. strain$_3$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_3$	.040	.037	Fin. strain$_4$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_4$	−.021	−.018
Fin. strain$_2$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_2$	−.035	−.052	Fin. strain$_3$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_3$	−.032	−.051	Fin. strain$_4$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_4$	−.012	−.020
Fin. strain$_2$ ↔ Vol. range$_2$	−.198*	−.076	Fin. strain$_3$ ↔ Vol. range$_3$	−.052	−.021	Fin. strain$_4$ ↔ Vol. range$_4$	−.062	−.026
Relig. attnd.$_2$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_2$	.304*	.176*	Relig. attnd.$_3$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_3$	.441*	.250*	Relig. attnd.$_4$ ↔ Grp. involv.$_4$	.435*	.224*
Relig. attnd.$_2$ ↔ Vol. range$_2$	.143*	.144*	Relig. attnd.$_3$ ↔ Vol. range$_3$	.233*	.230*	Relig. attnd.$_4$ ↔ Vol. range$_4$	.185*	.181*
Relig. attnd.$_2$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_2$	.606*	.158*	Relig. attnd.$_3$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_3$	.819*	.203*	Relig. attnd.$_4$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_4$	.738*	.181*
Grp. involv.$_2$ ↔ Vol. range$_2$	.298*	.239*	Grp. involv.$_3$ ↔ Vol. range$_3$	.309*	.244*	Grp. involv.$_4$ ↔ Vol. range$_4$	.367*	.297*
Grp. involv.$_2$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_2$	1.110*	.230*	Grp. involv.$_3$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_3$	1.456*	.288*	Grp. involv.$_4$ ↔ Volunteer hjours$_4$	1.426*	.289*
Vol. range$_2$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_2$	2.093*	.758*	Vol. range$_3$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_3$	2.251*	.778*	Vol. range$_4$ ↔ Volunteer hours$_4$	1.936*	.746*

Note: The subscripts denote the time of assessment (e.g., age$_1$ = age assessed at Time 1). Standard errors are not shown because of space limitations. Fin. = Financial. Relig. = Religious. Attnd. = Attendance. Grp. = Group. Involv. = Involvement. Vol. = Volunteering.

[a]Reference category = Nonblack. *B* = Unstandardized coefficients. *β* = Standardized coefficients.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).