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Rwandese Patriotic Front Demands

US Embassy Rwanda

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GRW
D60V-RPF

RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT DEMANDS.

A. Long term (see our political programme)

B. Short term:

1. CEASEFIRE

- The ceasefire is not an end in itself. It should be part of a package of definitive solutions to the problemes in the country.
- The government of Rwanda should make specific commitments to agree on the principles of power sharing arrangements as well as the integration of the two armies to form a national army as preconditions for the ceasefire.
- To ensure that the ceasefire holds, and apart from the conditions stipulated in the N'sele agreement:
 - a. There should be a neutral zone separating the two armies.
 - b. There should be a neutral monitoring force whose size, status and terms of reference are agreed upon by the two parties. This includes when the said monitoring force should be commissioned and when it should be decommissioned.
 - c. There should be a definitive time frame within which the ceasefire should be implemented.
 - d. There should be a sequence of events leading from the cessation of hostilities to the complete implementation of the peace accord.
 - e. There should be clear arrangements to provide resources necessary for the monitoring force to play its role independently and effectively.
 - f. Although the amended N'sele agreement of 16th September 1991 does not include both the RPF and the Rwanda government as members of the monitoring force, there should be a mechanism by which the two parties can participate in the working of the monitoring team. This would not only be a confidence building measure but also of practical significance.

2. TRANSITIONAL POWER SHARING ARRANGEMENTS.

- Rationale:

- a. It is a logical outcome of any negotiated settlement.
- b. It is both a political and administrative safeguard.

- Nature:

There should be a national council which is broadbased and which has full executive and legislative powers. This national council should preside over the interim period.

- Interim programme:

There should be a clear interim programme. This should include:

- a. The completion of the integration of the two armies and the formation of a national army.
- b. Return, resettlement and integration of refugees and other displaced persons.
- c. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of war ravaged areas.
- d. Administrative and Political reforms necessary to ensure a genuine democratization process and foster national unity.
- e. Constitutional arrangements.
- f. Organizing a national debate on the future of the country.
- g. Preparing and carrying out elections.
- h. Any other programme agreed upon by the governing national council.

- Interim period:

There should be adequate time to implement the above programme.

3. INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES AND FORMATION OF A NATIONAL ARMY.

- Rationale:

- a. The present army in Rwanda is a factional army which cannot be relied upon to guarantee the security of the Rwandese people and their property. The same army is responsible for many crimes against the Rwandese people and cannot therefore be trusted to safeguard the democratization process.
- b. It is a right of every eligible Rwandese citizen to be part of the national army if he/she so wishes.

- Nature:

- a. Determination of the size of the national army.
- b. Determination of numbers that each side will contribute to the national army.
- c. Criteria to determine eligibility to join the national army.
- d. Training and equipping the national army.
- e. The demobilization process will involve rehabilitation, resettlement and integration of those not absorbed in the national army into other activities.
- f. Reform of the other security institutions.