



---

David Rawson Collection on the Rwandan Genocide

Archives and Museum

---

2021

## David Rawson Detailed Notes on Ongoing National Assembly

David Rawson

Desired influence - purposes and possibilities  
Bruno Delage De l'armée de l'Air et de l'espace  
Delage

National Assembly majority;

Relations between observers - differences

Evolution of French policy - make military victory impossible / internal pol.  
Internal differences

UN / OAU

Statement of Min at Human Rights Conference

Genocide - possible

UN actions Book - Book

Overall

Marlau : Same music - objectives

How to get out - ~~with our troops~~ UN

Went in to stabilize

Not tied to a person - but to Amadou

Genocide - not prevent - massacres etc

Book - Book - OK

Not report not political - in front in gathering

France would not come back in;

Saw Habré very little; worked through his subordinates.

Saw Bagosso once after he had tried to stop killing;  
Did everything we could

Personal relations with De Ferranti - but delicate relations w. France

Good relations with Christopher P. Rice not on his agenda

Campaign was just to telephone his colleagues in NSC

Person in Council of Ministers taken before his return

Unconscious but with changed mandate

Marshal did not protest in writing that FO MW saw -

Book Book not up to the task - ask Cleaver <sup>his own</sup>

~~the work~~ Senate report - driven by opportunity

Belgian budget situation - Env.

Took UN from 5% to 10% asked

Nunoo German Ambassador associated with very joint Western demands. Perhaps not so active a role given lack of vital German interest in the area.

Diplomats — Diplomats were too vague & general - no "diplomatic" radio transcripts human rights abuses should have been specified.

Bely — Belgian situation goes way back - uses Tutsi - never gave power of independence to Hutu under influence of clergy.

Accompanied RPF back into town. Seen as protection of RPF.

Haby — Personal antagonism as well as caste division

Kanyamvudo Bushim - / Bandyananga  
massacres

France Harry deby didn't support a divided government. Must get together with opposition and ~~allies~~ allies

Haby — The Amahoro process Haby was adamant against but then change his mind

Belgium Belgium active in working out <sup>with</sup> ~~for~~ a peace plan so it could bring its forces home.

Did not have a President who could order troops

Many little massacres - Burundi 1993

Kenya Had French and some army. Tutsi and did not often intervene might have been ~~butchered~~ killed. La Baule really started this -

— US US initially not interested. Grateful for protection of French forces. Began to pick up after French failed to arrange a ceasefire. For a while it looked like French strategy was working. RPF pushed back

Papal Nuncio Papal Nuncio played vital role at such crises usually in getting a deeply divided church (Hutu extremist, RPF sympathizers, even Hutu and Tutsi clergy) together on one side more important in church role than as cleric of church

intelligent  
Really looking at actors in the political play too little attention  
to social cultural background.

### George Martusse.

Haby was more mysterious - said he would take Rwanda through Reconciliation and then Haby steps down - M. Herard of all the African leaders least vicious he is not bad. Madame difficult to know but did have ~~concerning~~ care of her husband. tried him to agree with Ntanganya -

RPF  
Believe RPF shot down plane. Haby way to big a block to their ambitions. Had technology and capacity. Segara was head of RPA.

Ntanganya even more mysterious. Obsessed with name sake of his own <sup>opposition - public role</sup>. Force Africaine Rwandaise had become soldiers and an embarrassment to French forces. Suggested withdrawal of assistance

France  
Not clear to him what the purpose of French policy was.  
He described it as stabilizing the regime and pushing it toward openness but that never confirmed by Paris

Murwanja was behind RPF move - had to be first to succeed. He kept sufficient distance that if it fails he was not blamed nor if it succeeded he had got rid of his refugee problem.

Amoundou  
Amoundou was permissible in the context that if certain things happened the massacres would come.

CDR was very important political element. Inclusion was key to transition

Decision to engage drawn by Belgian arguments for  
MINUSTAH in UN and to US - to be used to bad to manage  
<sup>disturbances</sup>  
Special operation in central Africa

British always spoke of MINUSTAH in most minimalist terms  
Only country which did not have parliamentary inquiry  
small size low cost minimal mandate

Both Lode (on a quick vacation in New York) and Cloet (on an  
opportunity to Romania) were out of town when the plane came down  
& troopers were killed.

Unusual negotiation where principals always spoke  
through intermediaries who saw each other yet were to be  
in same government

Bringing RPF into Kigali was a disastrous  
mistake.

Lodge Williams <sup>on</sup> ~~in~~ American mandate reinforcing forces  
six demands last specifically maritime genocide  
more likely than The Pope - Dallaire is not asking for more

Belgian participation a matter of 70% people  
regular meetings with defense - little parliamentary <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~  
fed questions to certain senators - especially good after  
Clair Feb. visit

both campaign to withdraw and <sup>call</sup> challenge to UN to  
unjust mandate and troops levels.

horrible miscalculation - bad evaluation of the nature of  
the situation

French told to Haley govt. - human rights not really their issue  
Belgian protected human rights. US not engaged - Africa dedicated  
to Mr. More - <sup>friendly</sup> relations ~~with~~ <sup>of</sup> Clair & Chast plan but Clair  
always referred Africa to G. More. <sup>Never</sup> in the White House

Clair became politically <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ forced after R. govt. Saw possibility that ~~that~~ ~~that~~  
might fall.

Boutros did not know Rwanda admin. <sup>class.</sup> Meetings with him were fruitless -  
but necessary to prove the effect. - Feb. + Apr.

Foreign ministry & Clair came out of the Senate investigation in good shape  
Had done its job. Defense prepared with account but not organized

Bernd Olaf Leibnitz In innersten Afrika: Hutu und Tutsi zwischen Vernichtung und Versöhnung, Stuttgart: Hänsler, 1998 n. 1

## 1-3 June, 2006 NATO Gathering

- I. Belgian expedition of troops, withdrawal, refusal to forward arms 1995 - Clark<sup>had</sup>  
Focus on issues raised in the report.
- II. Decision to engage in MINUACR <sup>U.N. peacekeeping</sup> <sup>Small but not armed</sup>
- III. Mandate and ROE - removed the substance - watered down <sup>Demand for</sup> <sup>strengthened by</sup>
- IV. Decision to withdraw Information gathering
- V. Decision to withdraw.

Focus on Trilateral.

Policy, forces of each. Security / Pol. / HR / Institutional.  
Level of cooperation: <sup>High</sup>

Focus on Other Issues

Peacekeeping Training WEU, NATO, EU.

Structural Change in UN.

Prevention

Human Rights - Darfur.

Dieter Hölscher

Erfurtstrasse 8

53757 St. Augustine

Germany 02241338947

Conrad, <sup>Iconoclast</sup> Youth Orient The source of initiation  
redoubts into the mysteries of life