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A Study of Two Early Theologians at Drew Theological Seminary: Randolph S. Foster and John Miley

Paul Gerhardt Hvidding

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A STUDY OF TWO EARLY THEOLOGIANS
AT DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY:
RANDOLPH S. FOSTER AND JOHN MILEY

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of
The Western School of Evangelical Religion

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Bachelor of Divinity

by
Paul Gerhardt Hvidding
May 1950
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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND PROCEDURE FOLLOWED

In all branches of learning there is a perennial need to check-up on material to determine if progress is being made and to note where a dead-end has been reached or actual retrogression has taken place. In no field is this check-up more necessary than in the field of theology and philosophy.

I. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. The problem of this study has been to determine if Arminian theology in America, as represented by two of her most influential theologians, has been true to the philosophy and theology of John Wesley and, also, to determine if they have advanced this thought in any significant manner. More generally the problem of this study has been to delineate the main current of Wesleyan-Arminian theology. Randolph S. Foster and John Miley, consecutively professors of theology at Drew Theological Seminary in the latter half of the nineteenth century, were chosen as representing the most influential school of Arminian theology in America. In this study, comparison has continually been made of the chosen American representatives with the three most influential British theologians, Wesley, Watson, and Pope.
Justification of the study. The tragic confusion of contemporary theology, which is but a reflection of the confusion of contemporary thought in general, has prompted this study. To return to bed-rock in philosophy and theology has been the urgent need of our generation. The reign of Kant and Hegel in philosophy came to an end in the last century. New leaders, such as Bergson and James, came to power with the beginning of the present century. These men were unable to occupy for long the place of authority. Bergson's two most promising students, Maritain and Gilson, turned Neo-Thomist and became its most brilliant contemporary representatives. At a time when the material logic of Hegel was all but dead in the field of pure philosophy it was very much alive in the fields of theology and the philosophy of history. Contemporary theology has been snowed under by an avalanche of authors who have been forcing theology through the forms of Hegelian dialectics. The theology of John Wesley, though it has escaped largely the dialectical plague, has suffered from severe corrosion, both of its philosophical basis and in its very vitals.

Historical background. America has not had a reputation for great originality in its thinking. Even its political thought has been largely borrowed from Europe. Until recently its philosophy and theology also came from Europe. Now one or two American philosophers have been
successful in starting the current flowing in the opposite direction. However, these currents came at too late a date to profoundly influence the thought of Europe. Theology, in the form of Calvinism, arrived first in America. Arminianism and Lutheranism came about a century and a half later. The Friends represented a Protestant group who were early residents in America, but their contribution was practice rather than theology. Philosophy, in the form of Locke's *Essay*, came to influence lonely thinkers like Jonathan Edwards, and Berkeley's personal visits were appreciated by the same lonely men. However, on the whole, the currents of philosophy flowing into America were not strong. Political thought and science, together with literature, were the chief intellectual supplies imported, aside from theology which constituted the main stream. By the time the new nation was established all three of Protestantism's great branches were facing each other and, unwilling to compromise in order to unite, were set to battle it out. Each of the three groups had an abundance of European theological thought ready at hand. The need was to bring this material into clear form and shape it for use in the close struggle that was to follow in the death grapple of theologies.

It was only after the smoke of battle had somewhat subsided, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, that the greatest of these clarifying works appeared in all camps.
At this time the Calvinists were ably represented by Charles Hodge. Foster and Miley, representing the Arminians, pointed their arguments largely against Hodge. It is a point worthy of note that, at this same time, other works also appeared on eschatology, revision of the Scriptures, and exegesis. Joseph Seiss' monumental work on the Apocalypse represented the Lutheran group. Philip Schaff's labors, in heading the committee which produced the American Standard Version of the Bible, represented a united group. Daniel Steele's original work in the Greek Testament was an important contribution to Arminian theology. His studies strengthened the doctrine of entire sanctification, giving it the weight of sharper interpretation in passages which employed meaningful Greek verb tenses.

Prior to the appearance of these great argumentative works, the work of evangelization had progressed across the continent, and the large major denominations had staked their claims, shaped their empires, and finished the rough pioneering work. It is important to note, that, just prior to the Civil War, great revivals swept the nation on a scale unprecedented before or since, so that at heart America was a profoundly Christian nation. The schools at that time were too few and too small to adequately educate America in the fine points of theology, yet the Bible was read there as well as in the homes and churches. The preachers, though largely self-
educated in the Arminian movement, read the basic works of their denomination, especially the early writers, such as Wesley and Fletcher, so that many of them had a profound grasp of the cardinal doctrines of their theology. They preached doctrine to their people and thus grounded them in the important teachings of their church. The denominational disciplines were also rigidly followed in those early days.

After the Civil War the picture changed. The tremendous increase of wealth, due to the rapid industrial expansion, brought into American life the flood of secularism which all but destroyed vital Christianity. It was upon this secular stream that liberal theology rode into power. Foster and Miley witnessed the onrush of this current and felt its power. Perhaps it was more in recapitulation than in profound influence that the works of Foster and Miley stand, in their relation to Arminian thought in America. At any rate they furnish the clearest expression of that thought in America. The originality of a towering thinker like Jonathan Edwards, who stands as a lonely peak in American philosophy, cannot be claimed for Foster and Miley. The latter were clarifiers of thought already current in theology. However, even such thinkers can turn up new problems and supply new solutions. They emerged from a triumphant movement that had won success all over America and had become embodied in the largest single Protestant denomination. The Methodists won
their success not only by the zeal of their evangelism, but also by the quality of their theology. Even sons of established Calvinist families were won to Arminianism. Daniel Steele, the direct descendant of the father of David Brainerd, the prospective son-in-law of Jonathan Edwards, was an example of such a trophy.

II. THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED

Limitations of the study. This study has been limited to a few cardinal points of theology which have been the storm centers over which Arminian and Calvinist thought have fought their rounds. These are the subjects of anthropology and soteriology. Also included in this study have been the philosophical basis of theology, the relation of reason to revelation, and the inspiration of the Scriptures.

Comparison with basic works. The procedure of this study has been to compare the contributions, on these topics, of Foster and Miley, whichever one was the stronger, with the basic works of Wesley, Watson, and Pope. The work of Foster has been used entirely on the philosophical basis of theology. Miley has been used entirely on the topics of anthropology and soteriology, with the exception of the sub-topic of entire sanctification, in the handling of which both men have been used. This study has used Locke's *Essay of the Human Understanding* to check Foster's *Prolegomena* and *Theism*. 
Miley, in developing his topics, made many references to the works of Wesley, Watson, and Pope. Thus the work of this part of the study became not a comparison but a check on Miley to determine if his conclusions were valid.
CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THEOLOGY

The service of philosophy to theology has been an important one. The most influential theologians have colored for good or for evil their systems of theology by their philosophical commitments.

I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Luther's philosophical commitments. Luther had not been trained in the philosophy of Aristotle. He had little regard for any philosophy. The most influential minds in his background were those of Augustine and the German mystics, notably John Tauler. John Calvin also adhered closely to Augustine. Thus, Augustine became a dominant force in the theologies of both the Lutherans and the Calvinists. Neither Lutheran nor Calvinistic theology gave much place to the philosophical basis of theology. Neither Luther nor Calvin committed themselves to the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle.

Wesley's acceptance of Aristotle. That Wesley


committed himself to the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle can be inferred from a reference which he made to Locke in the following quotation.

In reading over the second volume of Mr. Locke's Essay I was much disappointed: it is by no means equal to the first. The more I consider it, the more convinced I was that his grand design was, (vain design!) to drive Aristotle's logic out of the world, which he hated cordially, but never understood: I suppose, because he had an unskillful master, and read bad books upon the subject.3

It has been of interest to this writer to determine if Foster and Miley appreciated the Aristotelian background of Wesleyan theology. The early schools of America came from a Puritan background. Thus the oldest colleges were Calvinistic and did not teach Aristotelian philosophy. The study of philosophy came into American Protestant schools at a much later date.

II. FOSTER'S PROLEGOMENA AND THEISM

Foster's debt to Locke. In the Prolegomena Foster made several references to Locke's Essay. The influence of this book is evident throughout the Prolegomena. It has seemed important to review fragments of the Essay, pertinent portions which deal most directly with the problems treated in the Prolegomena.

Locke's Essay has influenced several outstanding

theologians. Wesley had a high regard for Locke, correcting him principally where he departed from the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle. Jonathan Edwards, who had access to few books, early became acquainted with Locke and prized him highly, but in his mature thinking he accepted Leibnitz' corrections on Locke. Leibnitz, as he himself confessed, stood in relation to Locke somewhat as Plato had stood in relation to Aristotle. Edwards, largely self-educated in philosophy, was never led to see the basic importance of Aristotle.

In the opinion of Wesley, Locke nowhere in his Essay showed himself more masterful than in Book One, in which he refuted arguments for the innateness of ideas and principles. This work of clearing the ground of all debris, in order that the structure of knowledge might arise upon a clean foundation, was, to Wesley, an important accomplishment. Wesley wrote:

I think that point, that we have no innate principles is abundantly proved, and cleared from all objects that have any shadow of strength, and it was highly needful to prove the point at large, as all that follows rests on this foundation; and as it was at that time an utter paradox both in the philosophical and the religious world.  

Foster leaned heavily upon Locke. He took over from Locke the notion that, to begin with, the mind is void of ideas—a mere tabula rasa. Like Locke, he differentiated

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truth: (1) truth of being, (2) truth of concept (mental truth), (3) truth of sign (verbal truth), (4) moral truth.

A notable differentiation in the thought of Foster and Locke was that of idea and concept. Idea, to Locke, was anything that comprised the content of the mind. He did not use the notion of concepts. To Foster, the ideas was primarily that which existed in the mind of God prior to man's creation and served as the archetype for his creation. When a concept corresponds with the idea completely it becomes identified with an idea.

Unlike Locke, who constructed his structure of knowledge on the foundation of simple ideas, Foster took concepts ready at hand and proceeded from there. A thoroughgoing philosophical basis to the sciences must be constructed upon the bedrock of some sort of simples. In his Prolegomena Foster posited the existence of God as the basic stone in the foundation of theology. However, in that book, he did not attempt to establish the philosophical ground upon which the proof of God's existence rests. This was preserved for his Theism. To Foster, the crux of the whole problem of demonstrating the existence of God lay in being able to show that the changes in matter clearly show an extra-material

6 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

cause. This required an ability of mind to clearly grasp what is involved in the notion of causality. Foster posited the notion that the mind could arrive at a clear conception of causality though it could not grasp what was involved in such a notion. For example, though man knows that a first cause brought the world into being he does not know the manner in which it was brought into being. This assumption by Foster was purely a metaphysical one. It was based on the necessity of the mind in thinking about reality. Hume's sequence of events, which had been posited to take the place of causation, Foster rejected as being "wretched cavil." 

The principle of causality was, for Foster, necessary to the life of reason. The mind in its thinking about reality, to avoid intellectual suicide, must recognize the validity of this principle. Once the principle of causality is recognized the mind is driven to recognize that matter cannot initiate action. The mind is able to have clear notions of the distinction between mind and matter. The mind is able to see deeper than the phenomena of nature and is able to recognize that there is a power behind nature. The

9 Ibid., p. 91.
10 Ibid., p. 90.
11 Ibid., p. 84.
mind of man does not rest until it arrives at an ultimate cause of all things.\(^\text{12}\)

To Foster, the demonstration of God's existence had metaphysical roots which were imbedded in the life of reason in such a manner that they could not be removed without destroying that life.

**Foster's presuppositions.** The basic presuppositions of Foster\(^\text{13}\) were that the mind inevitably and by necessity forms concepts both of itself and of other beings. From the process of forming these concepts emerges such postulates as that mind exists and hence there is an ego, that there is objective reality, that concepts exist, and that there is an exact correspondence between the concept and the objective reality. Foster did not attempt to give reasons for positing his presuppositions but simply took them as basic without needing validation. He assumed their necessity in beginning any sort of intellectual pursuit. He dogmatically asserted such notions as: (1) there is an external, concrete universe; (2) there are minds; (3) the external concrete does become an object of thought by or to mind or minds.\(^\text{14}\) Foster by-passed the skeptical approach and simply took for granted the presuppositions of enquiry. No attempt was made by Foster to

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\(^{13}\) Foster, *Prolegomena*, p. 54.

answer the skepticism of Hume; in fact, the Prolegomena makes no reference to Hume. With the statements of his presuppositions, Foster proceeded to build his structure of knowledge.

**Foster's epistemology.** The mind though starting with sensations quickly transcends them and rises into the realm of super-sensible ideas. Following Locke closely, Foster briefly described the acquisition of such ideas as those of space, time, and power. The Christian epistemology, according to Foster, postulates the existence of ideas before things. He wrote:

> In tracing the history of the human idea, we found that concrete reality is antecedent to the concept, and its synthesis with mind, the ground of the concept. The world of human concepts is offspring of the world of realities, and a transcript of them in thought.

> But now when we turn to the world of realities, to examine them, we find that the case is reversed: the realities are transcripts of pre-existing ideas—the idea is older than the reality. As we push investigation, we discover that the concrete universe falls within the limits of time—that once it was non-existent. But we know that had there been no reality or being of any kind, then no being could ever have existed, as that would involve the coming of all reality from the empty womb of nothing, in contradiction of the axiom intuitively perceived to be a necessary truth, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, or, more generally formulated, there can be no effect without a cause.

> But now, when continuing the investigation, we pass out beyond all objective reality—that is, all dependent

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15 Ibid., p. 60.
16 Ibid., p. 61.
being, or being originating in time, and come to that antecedent, independent, eternal reality, the then only form of being, we are compelled to conceive it as possessing the idea of the as yet non-existing universe, as it is impossible it should give concreteness to ideas which it did not possess. Thus idea in its original form is seen to be, not a concept of reality propagated by it in mind, but, on the contrary, it is found to be the eternal mold into which reality is cast. The universe of real things is made after the image or pattern of the invisible things--eternal ideas. It is that which makes the universe intelligible, or translatable into thought. The unmeaning cannot be explained. That which does not express thought cannot be put in the terms of thought. 17

This primacy of the idea is not Platonic because it has no real being but is in the mind of God.

Foster did not mean to say that the concept is propagated in the perceiving mind by the external concrete, or that the mind is a passive recipient of the image of the reality, as is a mirror, but that the object when presented to the mind in sensation becomes the occasion or ground of a mental act by which is formed a concept of the reality. The archetypal idea to Foster was that which antedated the concrete reality. He explained again the order of ideas and things.

The historic order is: first, an eternal mind, the only reality, holding in idea a universe not yet existing; second, a creative act, by which a universe of objective, concrete being was fashioned after the pattern of antecedent ideas. Subsequent to that creative act there were and are two kinds of being--one, the uncreated, independent, which anterior to the creation was the only being; the other, a created form of being, which, prior to the creative act, had no existence except as a thought, but which, by the creative act, became a reality and not

17 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
a thought; third, created mind—a real being or beings introduced into existence long posterior to the creation of things, which, by a power invested in them, is able to see the antecedent things as they are in reality—things expressing ideas. The three kinds of being are distinct and real, and separable in thought: the first, eternal, spiritual; the second, temporal, material; the third, temporal, spiritual; the second and third dependent on and caused by the first; the second in no sense dependent on or caused by the third; the third not caused by the second but served by it; the first and the third of the same nature, but different as infinite and finite; the second wholly differentiable in nature from the first and third. In the first, idea is archetype; in the second, idea is concrete; in the third, idea is derivative. 18

Knowledge distinguished from belief. Locke's definition of knowledge was brief, being the "perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas." 19 This implied certainty. According to Foster, knowledge implies three things: (1) firm belief; (2) of what is true (3) on sufficient grounds. 20 The pertinent part of the definition is the last phrase. The grounds, according to Locke, must be such as to give certainty, not just assurance or probability. Intuition gives certainty. "All knowledge is in the last resort, intuition." 21 The knowing process involves intuition. Only intuition, which immediately perceives the agreement or disagreement of ideas,

18 Ibid., p. 69.
19 Locke, op. cit., p. 424.
20 Ibid., p. 128.
21 Ibid., pp. 474–36.
yields knowledge. However, according to Locke\(^{22}\) the process
of demonstrative proof yields knowledge because in each step
intuition is used so that the valid conclusions of such a
process yield certainty though of a slightly inferior quality
to simple intuition—as if there could be degrees of certainty!

Foster's list of what is known squared with Locke's
view—with one exception.

We know objects external to self by perception when in
suitable relations to them [falling under category of
sensitive knowledge of particular existence in Locke's
wording].

We know things and events of the past by memory
[retention of what has been known].

We know things and events by testimony [this to Locke
constituted probability and not knowledge except in the
case of the testimony of a Divine personality. Very
substantial testimony brings such high probability as to
excite a high degree of assurance].

We know some necessary truths [axiomatic truths].

We know demonstrated truths.\(^{23}\)

Locke made a remarkable admission in favor of Divine
Revelation because he regarded the testimony of a Divine
Being as constituting the highest type of knowledge.

Besides those we have hitherto mentioned, there is one
sort of propositions that challenge the highest degree of
our assent, upon bare testimony, whether the thing
proposed agree or disagree with the common experience and
the ordinary course of things or no. The reason where of
is, because the testimony is of such an one that cannot
deceive nor be deceived, and that is of God himself.

\(^{22}\) Foster, op. cit., p. 69.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 182.
This carries with it assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name 'revelation,' and our assent to it, 'faith'; which as absolutely determines our minds and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our knowledge itself; and we may as well doubt of our own being as we can whether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation. Only we must be sure that it be a divine revelation, and that we understand it right: else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm and all the error of wrong principles, if we have faith and assurance in what is not divine revelation. And therefore, in those cases, our assent can be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an assurance of diffidence, arising from the more or less apparent probability of the proofs. But of faith and the precedency it ought to have before other arguments of persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter, where I treat of it as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to reason, though, in truth, it be nothing else but an assent founded on the highest reason.24

Foster, in the many pages which he devoted to the subject, said no more than what Locke thus said so concisely and so well.

How shall we determine which of our concepts are knowledge, which beliefs, and which mere unfounded fancies? This was a leading question to Foster. The problem of the relation of belief to knowledge occupied a large share of the concern of the Prolegomena. There are certain common points belonging to all of the three—knowledge, belief, and fancy. They all alike imply the presence in the mind of defined conceptions. They all imply a degree of conviction

24 Locke, op. cit., p. 566.
that the concept represents some truth, expresses an affirming act or state of the mind with respect to the concept, or the object which it represents. Here Foster follows Locke in regarding knowledge as involving certainty. Where there is certain knowledge there is no need for belief. Belief and fancy involve uncertainty. Mere feeling of certainty alone is not sufficient ground for discriminating knowledge from belief. When knowledge of a thing is affirmed there is no possibility that this knowledge should turn out to be false. A belief may not square with the truth but knowledge must or it no longer is knowledge.

Foster regarded a clear understanding of the relation of belief to knowledge to be of prime importance to theology. Belief without antecedent knowledge is blind credulity. Belief must rest upon a foundation of knowledge. In the work of theologians like Charles Hodge this distinction between belief and knowledge is not made too clearly.

Knowledge is the perception of truth. Whatever the mind perceives, whether intuitively or discursively, to be true, that it knows. We have immediate knowledge of all the facts of consciousness; and with regard to other matters, some we can demonstrate, some we can prove analogically, some we must admit or involve ourselves in contradictions and absurdities. Whatever process the mind may institute, if it arrives at a clear perception that a thing is, then that thing is an object of knowledge. It is thus that we know the objects with which heaven and earth are crowded. It is thus we know our fellow men. With regard to anything without us, when our ideas or convictions concerning it correspond to what the

25 Foster, op. cit., p. 74.
thing really is then we know it. How do we know that our dearest friend has a soul, and that that soul has intelligence, moral excellence, and power? We cannot see or feel it. We cannot form a mental image of it. It is mysterious and incomprehensible, yet we know that it is, and what it is, just as certainly as we know that we ourselves are, and what we are. In the same way we know that God is, and what he is. We know that he is a spirit, that he has intelligence, moral excellence and power to an infinite degree. We know that he can love, pity, and pardon—that he can hear and answer prayer. We know God in the same sense, and just as certainly, as we know our father and mother. And no man can take this knowledge from us, or persuade us that it is not knowledge, but a mere irrational belief.  

Foster remarked after quoting the above statement from Hodge that he thought it was open to serious objections. However, he did not give his objections specifically but continued to differentiate between the acts of knowing and believing. He listed the following differences. (1) It is not in the fact that the object is more clearly before the mind in the one case than in the other. There is no doubt that matters of belief are generally more indistinct than matters of knowledge; but this is not necessarily so. A proposition may be as unequivocal as any reality. (2) It is not in the fact that the mind is more conscious of doubt or uncertainty in the one case than in the other. There is no question that doubt and uncertainty more or less attaches to beliefs, and that they neither can nor do exist in regard to knowledge; but a belief may and often does exclude all doubt. (3) It is not in the fact that what is known is true, and

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26 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
what is believed is not true. It is a fact that what is believed is not always true, and what is known always is, but, since some things believed are true, the difference is not in that which may be, and sometimes is, common to both states. (4) It does not consist in that; what is known is important, and what is believed is not important.

The difference is found in the following points.

(1) The mind is differently related to the objects of knowledge and belief. This difference of relation makes knowledge a necessary fact in one case and not in another.

(2) Things known are necessarily true as known; things believed may not be true. (3) Things known may not be doubted; things believed may be brought to doubt.

(4) Knowledge cannot be changed into belief; belief may pass into knowledge. (5) There is no difference in the certainty which attends knowledge; there is difference in the certainty which attends belief.27

In comparing the statement of Hodge with the distinctions made by Foster and checking both by Locke it has been, in some degree, possible to ascertain how clearly Foster was able to distinguish between the acts of knowing and believing. The whole business of knowledge and belief is more complicated than differentiating between the terms of knowledge and belief. As Foster said, any child knows the

27 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
difference between believing and knowing. This, however, has reference only to the difference between the terms.

Foster had no quarrel with what was affirmed by Hodge, but he did take issue with the manner in which it was asserted. A clear perception of truth is knowledge; there is no argument here but the great burden of the problem of knowledge is how it can be established that what is perceived does correspond with reality. Clarity of perception, as Locke pointed out, is not determined by the intensity of feeling associated with the conviction. The entire realm of beliefs, whether of natural things or what is supernaturally revealed, must undergo a thoroughly rational test. Nothing must be believed that does not carry with it credentials giving reason for such a belief. When credentials associated with beliefs are so strong as to remove all doubt knowledge has been reached.

The relation of reason to revelation. The problem of the relation of reason to revelation until recently was quite a settled problem in theology, almost as settled as the doctrine of the Trinity. However, in recent years, due to the great dust stirred up by the dialectical theologians, it has again become a pertinent issue of discussion. This is an instance not of a healthy ferment, preceding growth in a

28 Locke, op. cit., p. 591.
field of knowledge, but is rather a sign revealing the decay existing in a large strata of contemporary philosophy.

On the relation of reason to revelation Hodge and Foster saw eye to eye. Hodge wrote clearly and forcibly upon the subject. He admonished that Christians in repudiating rationalism in all its forms do not throw out reason in matters of religion. They acknowledge its high place and the responsibility falling upon them to use it. First of all reason is necessarily presupposed in every revelation. Revelation is a communication of truth to the human mind. The notion of communication of truth supposes the capacity to receive it. Revelation has nothing to communicate to brutes. Truths, to be received as objects of faith, must be intellectually apprehended. A proposition with no meaning, no matter how important the truth which it may conceal, cannot be an object of faith. If it be affirmed that the soul is immortal, or that God is a spirit, unless we grasp the meaning of the terms nothing is communicated to the mind. Knowledge is essential to faith. Nothing can be affirmed of that which is not known. The first task of reason is to grasp the truths proposed for our reception.

To Hodge it was important to bear in mind the difference between knowing and understanding. A child can know that God is a spirit, know what the terms imply but no

29 Foster, op. cit., pp. 264 ff.
created mind can fully comprehend the Almighty. It is possible to know the plan of salvation but at the same time be unable to comprehend the mysteries involved. Generally men know much more than they understand. God does not require of His creatures that they believe without knowledge. Such a thing would not only be irrational but also impossible.

It is the prerogative of reason to judge of the credibility of revelation. However, what is creditable to one mind may be incredible to another. To judge too narrowly of what is credible is intellectual suicide. Unless one is willing to believe things that are incomprehensible one's beliefs will be so limited as to restrict their mind to darkness. Extreme skepticism drives out knowledge completely. All that is left for the mind is to posit its beliefs and for these beliefs there is no objective standard by which they may be judged.

There is a difference between what is incomprehensible and what is impossible. The impossible cannot be maintained as a true belief. The statement of Tertullian to the effect that he believed because it is absurd is nonsense. God no more requires men to believe what is absurd than to do what is wrong. There is a distinction between belief and faith. Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true. It is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that to be true which it sees cannot possibly be true. As it
is impossible for God to contradict Himself, so it is impossible that He should, by an external revelation, declare that to be true which from a law of nature He has rendered it impossible for men to believe.

Scripture itself appeals to reason. The high ground of faith and knowledge is confidence in God. With the denial of reason would disappear all distinction between truth and falsehood, between right and wrong.

The cardinal service of reason is as a judge of the evidences which support a revelation. Faith without evidence is irrational. Evidences consist in different varieties. Historical truth requires historical evidence; empirical truth, the testimony of experience; mathematical truth, demonstration; moral truth, moral evidence; and the things of the Spirit, the demonstration of the Spirit.

To Foster the approach to revelation was thoroughly rational.

The final and supreme arbiter in every case as to what is truth, is the mind itself. It may mistake, but it must abide its own verdicts. It is its function to decide for itself. The ground of the decision, when it acts truly, according to its nature, must be satisfactory evidence. It can never be required to act otherwise. It is sole and supreme umpire. It must decide what to accept and what to reject. It is responsible for the decision. There may be a case when it cannot decide which of several alternatives ought to be believed—that is which is true. There may be sufficient evidence in its possession, and none within its reach by any search possible to it. In that case it remains undecided. Thus it appears that while it may, by the right use of the faculties, conclude from evidence what should be believed or not believed in a given case, and while it is itself
alone responsible in that case for its decision, there are cases which do not come within range of its faculties, with respect to which it has no power except by self abuse to have any belief, and with respect to which, therefore, it has a responsibility to withhold faith. Non-faith is then its true attitude; not disbelief nor yet belief.30

The reason decides on the evidences. The mind is obliged to believe just what the evidences prove. Further the mind is obliged to actively pursue truth, to hunt evidences in order to reach a just conclusion. The mind must know what constitutes evidence.31

Not only is the reason employed in dealing with evidences but also it is used in determining the meaning of the contents of Scripture. Foster posited two rules for Biblical interpretation. (1) No idea can be contained which is not according to truth, and hence, that no idea can be contained which is contradictory of some known truth, or which is contradictory in itself. (2) Ideas cannot be found in the book which are subversive and contradictory of each other.32

The reason maintains the right to judge whether a passage in Scripture is authentic or not. If there should be an absolute conflict between reason and any purported revelation the verdict of reason is supreme.

30 Ibid., p. 269.
31 Loc. cit.
32 Ibid., p. 272.
Inspiration of the Scriptures. Foster held very liberal views regarding the inspiration of the Scriptures. To him the Bible need not be inspired in all its parts. To claim inspiration for the whole Bible was to make a needless assertion. All that is needed is to claim that the Bible is true. Untruth is the only thing which could put it in peril. The fact that Christ and the other New Testament writers recognized the authority of the Old Testament need not mean that they considered it as all inspired but simply that they regarded it as all true. Foster made his own peculiar distinctions between revelation and inspiration. The Bible, to him, was a revelation insofar as it is a self-manifestation of God, or a medium of God's disclosure of himself. Inspiration to Foster was an extraordinary influence exerted by the Spirit of God on the mind of the writer so that feelings and thoughts were directly imparted. To Foster there might be the possibility of other methods of revelation besides inspiration. Revelation has many incidents. The creation was a revelation. Likewise, the order of nature, the incarnation of the deity in human form, the miracles, the Bible itself are all revelations. The Bible could be a revelation without being inspired.

Let us look at the case in a common-sense way, and see what conclusion must force itself upon us either as necessary or the most rational. Here is a book of so many pages, words, letters, and punctuation points. By all it is conceded that it was written by a certain number of men at different periods of time; but a question is
started as to whether the men wrote as amanuenses or original authors. Now, if the book is true, it can, in fact, make no difference as to its intrinsic value how that question is answered since the answer one way or another can put nothing in the book that was not there before and can make the truth no more than true—no more important. Still, as a question of fact, it remains, were the writers amanuenses? How shall we answer that question? Have they said anything about it themselves? Does the book contain the answer? If the book be simply true, and if it makes a deliverance on the point, that would settle the case. Everything would turn on the question of the truthfulness of the book. Thus the question of truth of contents is again the question of ultimate importance. There are three views competing for acceptance, one of which must be true.33

This quotation has served as a basis for judging Foster's position on the inspiration of the Scriptures. The three views which he referred to were: (1) the plenary verbal view—each word was given to the writers from God; (2) the superintendence view—the Holy Spirit guided the writers in the selection and insured against error; (3) the view that the writings were to a large extent human records containing a truthful account, with many inspired portions delivered directly to the holy men.34 This last view corresponded with Foster's notion of inspiration.

It has been impossible in this study to determine how Foster derived such a liberal view of the inspiration of the Scriptures. In a quotation used in this study, Foster wrote that the Word itself said nothing about whether or not the

33 Ibid., pp. 281-82.

34 Ibid., p. 282.
writers were amanuenses. The Bible said nothing whatever about the mode of inspiration, it simply stated that "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God." Peter referred to the holy men of God who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. There are other simple references in the Bible, such as in the book of Revelation, where the writers were commanded to write. The Holy Spirit communed directly with the writers to command them to write and to instruct them in what to write. There are several references in the Bible to the Divine origin of the Scriptures. The hundred and nineteenth Psalm alone is full of references to the Word, the statutes of God, and the law of God. Though nothing has been given in the Bible concerning the mode of inspiration it is full of references to the Word of God as being sacred, as being inspired of God in its entirety. All of Scripture is sacred and composes a unit which in all translations has been designated the Holy Bible. It is not only all true but all of it has been put together under the guidance of the Holy Spirit

36 A.V., II Peter 1:21.
37 A.V., Revelation 1:11; Jeremiah 30:1.
for a special purpose.\textsuperscript{40} It is impossible to be acquainted with the Bible and not be profoundly impressed by this work of the Holy Spirit. One has only to read the Apocryphal books to realize that nothing but Divinely inbreathed literature can hold its place between the covers of the Holy Bible. What is only human cannot even guarantee that it is a hundred percent true. Truth involves not only an accurate account of statistics but also accurate judgments. The only explanation that can be made for Foster's liberal view of the inspiration of the Scriptures is that he chose a purely rational approach. Even so it is difficult to see how reason could arrive at such a conclusion. According to reason it would not be necessary for any portion of the Bible to be inspired if it were all true.

The Holy Spirit could have communed with the Holy men of God, the ten commandments could have been given, Moses could have delivered his addresses, the covenant could have been made with Abraham, Christ could have come, died and been raised from the dead, and all these things could have been truthfully recorded by contemporary witnesses. However, without the complete superintendence of the Holy Spirit they could never have composed the present unit. The liberal view of Foster stands without defense.

Miley accepted the fact of the agency of the Holy

\textsuperscript{40} A.V., II Timothy 3:16.
Spirit in the authorship of the Scriptures. Rather than a rational approach to the subject he took the approach of what Scripture says about itself. Miley distinguished between inspiration and revelation. Inspiration was to him "a mode of divine agency in the communication of religious truth, and that such truth is the product of the inspiration." On revelation Miley wrote:

Now, if we restrict revelation to the literal sense of the term, that is, a disclosure of unknown truths, and as here meaning such truths of religion as we receive only through the Scriptures, the same distinction between inspiration and revelation fully remains; and such is the only true distinction. But there may be a revelation through some other mode of the divine agency, as for instance the oral teaching of our Lord; and in such case there must be the same distinction between such agency and revelation as the product.

Miley differentiated a three-fold operation of the Spirit: (1) Illumination of the mediate agent; (2) Communication of the truth; (3) Agency in publication. In the illumination of the agent the operation is similar to when Christ opened the mind of his disciples so that they could understand the Scriptures. In the communication of truth the Holy Spirit directly communicates truths to the agent. The third, the agency in the publication, is itself concerned with the proper

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42 Loc. cit.

43 Ibid., pp. 481-82.
expression of the truth. Not in all Scripture were all three agencies required. While there is a place for inspiration in all Scripture, the threefold offices of the Spirit were necessary only with respect to their higher truths.
CHAPTER III

ANTHROPOLOGY

I. THE DOCTRINE OF NATIVE DEPRAVITY

History of the problem. Original sin has been used as a doctrinal formula for the expression and characterization of native sinfulness. The doctrine of original sin became a prominent subject with Augustine though it was a topic of theological study prior to his time. In the Augustinian anthropology, original sin included a common guilt of Adam's sin, a common native depravity, and a sinfulness which deserved both temporal and eternal punishment. According to Augustinian anthropology native depravity is, in itself, a punishment inflicted upon all men for their share in Adam's guilt. Miley felt that there was no necessity in treating native depravity, guilt, demerit, and penalty as all one problem but that they should be segregated and studied separately.

Definition of terms used. Depravity is not a physical entity or any form of essential existence but is a moral condition. In its purely metaphysical form it is not easily

2 Ibid., p. 442.
grasped in thought.\textsuperscript{3} Depravity has no real being but it is a mode of the moral nature which belongs to real being. Depravity is not restricted to the will though the will is profoundly affected, not only directly but also indirectly, through the depraved sensibilities which influence the will. Inordinate feelings, vicious impulses, evil tendencies arise from a disordered state of the sensuous nature. These are the "lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life." The moral nature itself is disordered. The moral reason may become darkened and the conscience powerless. Depravity is located in both the sensuous and the moral nature, constituting filthiness of both the flesh and the spirit.

\textbf{The modes of transmission.} The origin of depravity never has been disputed by evangelical theologians. By them the sin of Adam is attributed as the originating cause of depravity. The law of Adamic origin has two theories: (1) the theory of penal retribution; and (2) the theory of genetic transmission of depravity. The theory of penal retribution has two modes, the realistic and the representative. The origin of the realistic mode is to be found in Augustine.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{3} Miley, loc. cit.
\end{itemize}
However, it was more clearly developed by Anselm.\(^5\) In its final form, as it appears today, it is an unwarranted extension of the forms of philosophical thought into anthropology. According to moderate realism the universal essence exists in the particular members of a species. However, this universal essence is not such a real spiritual and material substance as is the individual human being. Guilt can only be associated with a person.\(^6\) It is unreasonable to consider an essence guilty. To Miley, the guilt of Adam's sin was purely personal to Adam and could no more become the guilt of a generic nature than any other non-personal being, such as the hand, could become guilty of the crime committed by its owner.

The representative mode involves a legal oneness of the race in Adam. This legal oneness is based on the theory that God instituted a covenant with Adam in which he became the federal head and representative of his race and in which capacity he sinned and thus the whole race became involved in the guilt.\(^7\) This sharing of the guilt is not the result of an actual sharing of the sin but becomes the possession of Adam's descendants by imputation. Neither the act nor the demerit of Adam's sin is imputed, only the guilt as an amenability to punishment is imputed by a judicial act of God.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 118.
\(^6\) Miley, op. cit., p. 488.
\(^7\) Ibid., pp. 493-94.
The early Calvinistic theologians blurred the two modes into one. The later Calvinists, such as Charles Hodge, presented very clearly defined views of the representative mode. To the arguments put forth in support of the representative theory Miley could not consent. These arguments were based on the principle of responsibility from representation. The minister binds the state, the parent the child. Such relations are providential relations. The relation of Adam to his descendants is such a providential relation, and hence the actions of Adam, in his capacity as a representative of the race, became binding on the race. To Miley these arguments could not be sustained. Neither guilt nor penalty is involved in the situations purported to be analogous. Before the law the father may have some responsibilities for the son, but under no circumstance is guilt imputed to the one or the other because of the deed of one. Civil law does not recognize such imputation. 8

To Miley both the realistic and the representative modes came short of being established by sufficient proof. The Biblical references put forth to establish the unity of guilt, to him, did not clearly indicate such validity of interpretation. Hodge 9 had used such Scripture references.


9 Ibid., pp. 189, 582.
Miley regarded the suffering of the children of criminals to be consequence and not penalty.\textsuperscript{10} It would be impossible for God to restrict consequences to personal demerit. Human society is too involved. It was for corrective ends, as a severe warning to people to abstain from sin because of its drastic consequences, that God so ordered the suffering of innocents.

The classical text in anthropology is that God "will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and fourth generation."\textsuperscript{11} Wesley had interpreted this text to refer especially to the sin of idolatry. Very drastic measures were required to restrain the people from idolatry.

II. ARMINIAN TREATMENT OF ORIGINAL SIN

So important to Miley was the problem of clearing up the inconsistencies of Arminian anthropology that he gave a second treatment of the subject in the appendix to the second volume of his main theological work. In this study Miley surveyed briefly, but pertinently, the views held by the older Arminians on the topic of guilt associated with native depravity.

\footnotesize{10} Miley, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 497.

\footnotesize{11} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 498.
According to Arminius, the whole of the original sin is common to the entire race who at the time of Adam's transgression were in his loins. He referred to Romans 5:12 as conclusive that all have sinned in Adam. Also he referred to Ephesians 2:3, where all men "are by nature the children of wrath" and are subject to temporal as well as eternal death. This guilt would remain upon all unless they were redeemed by Christ's atonement. According to this view, all men are sharers in the guilt of Adam's personal sin, and this guilt is the judicial ground not only of the corruption of nature or spiritual death in which we are born, but also of our native amenability to the penalty of temporal and eternal death. Arminius regarded the native depravity which entailed spiritual, temporal, and eternal death, as being in itself a penalty and thus not requiring that it entail demerit. Arminius, in regarding the race as existing in the loins of Adam, adhered to the realistic mode of the transmission of native depravity.

Wesley adhered essentially to the same views on original sin as Arminius. He regarded all men as being punished for the sin of Adam by death. He argued from this premise: that if all men were punished by God they were justly punished, and if they were justly punished they shared in Adam's sin. Miley was satisfied that Wesley believed that all

men shared in Adam's guilt and are justly amenable to its punishment. 13

Fletcher was in accord with Arminius and Wesley on this subject. He held to the doctrine of the common guilt of the race through Adam. This judgment Miley derived from the place which Fletcher gave to the atonement of Christ as taking away the guilt of native depravity. The grace of the atonement is universal. Fletcher expressed it thus:

It follows that as Adam brought a general condemnation and a universal seed of death upon all infants, so Christ brings upon them a general justification and a universal seed of life. And if Adam's original sin was atoned for and forgiven him, as the Calvinists, I think, generally grant, does it not follow that, although all infants are by nature children of wrath, yet through the redemption of Christ they are in a state of favor or justification? For how could God damn to all eternity any of Adam's children for a sin which Christ expiated—a sin which was forgiven almost six thousand years ago to Adam, who committed it in person? The force of this observation would strike our Calvinist brethren if they considered that we were not less in Adam's loins when he fell, according to the first covenant, we all received also an unspeakable blessing by being in his loins when God spiritually raised him up and placed him upon gospel ground. 14

Watson, who to Miley represented the most honored name among systematic theologians, also conceded the ground to Calvinism on this same point. He regarded the human race as such a unit that all men were involved in the guilt of Adam's

13 Ibid., p. 506.
14 Ibid., p. 507.
original sin. Watson expressed it as follows:

The circumstances of the case infallibly show that, in the whole transaction, they [Adam and Eve] stood before their Maker as public persons and as the legal representatives of their descendants, though in so many words they are not invested with these titles.\textsuperscript{15}

To Watson the guilt of sin and amenability to punishment was imputed to Adam's descendants. Watson's theory of imputation coincided almost exactly with the view held on the same subject by Calvinist theologians contemporary with Miley.

Pope, another English Methodist theologian, contemporary with Miley, adhered to a common hereditary guilt. He had three grounds on which he based this guilt: (1) the ground of a real oneness with Adam; (2) the ground of a representative oneness; and (3) the ground of intrinsic sinfulness of the depravity of nature inherited from Adam.\textsuperscript{16} According to Miley, these views could neither be reconciled with each other nor with the determining principles of Arminianism.\textsuperscript{17} As noted before in this study the first two modes of transmission of guilt cancel each other.

Summers rejected both the realistic mode and the representative mode but he found no real solution to the problem for he made the transmission of guilt one of imputation.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 508.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp. 508-09.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 511.
Thus, in the list of Arminian theologians which he brought to his study, Miley found in none of them a solution to the problem. They all had conceded ground to Calvinism. Miley saw clearly that if universal guilt could be established for the original sin of Adam then God is justified in sending all men to perdition. If God chooses to exempt some men from this fate he may do so with justice. Good gifts may be dispensed with at will according to the pleasure of the giver. Penalty may only be dispensed with according to guilt in the person to whom it is given. These principles are universally recognized as basic to the laws of crime and punishment.

Miley recognized clearly that if the Arminian soteriology was to have a solid basis it must clarify its anthropology. The traditional anthropology of Augustine did not match the soteriology developed by Arminius, Grotius, Wesley, and Watson.

Miley in rejecting any sort of transmission or imputation of the guilt of Adam to his descendants clarified and made consistent Arminian anthropology and cleared it of all concessions to the Calvinistic system. This rectified anthropology matches the conclusions of traditional Arminian soteriology. Though the evaluation of Miley's contribution to Arminian theology has been reserved for the concluding chapter, it has been pertinent to note here that this accomplishment of Miley, in clarifying Arminian anthropology,
has been a unique and very significant contribution to Wesleyan–Arminian theology.
CHAPTER IV

SOTERIOLOGY

I. THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT

Historical background. The development of systematic soteriology was a late development in the history of doctrine. Though Augustine¹ had developed a systematic anthropology his notions of the atonement were crude. He accepted the odd notion that the atonement is a payment made by God to Satan. Anselm living in the eleventh century was the first systematic soteriologist. The earliest treatment of the atonement had consisted of Scriptural statements without any attempt at doctrinal formation. The early doctrines which were developed were so crude, false, and inadequate that nothing could be developed from them. In the history of doctrine Anselm stands, in relation to soteriology, in the position in which Augustine stands to anthropology. Anselm² formulated the doctrine of the atonement which became acceptable to the theologies of the Reformation. He formulated what to him were basic principles from which a theory of the atonement could be constructed. These principles were: (1) sin is the withholding from God His rightful claim, and therefore is to Him, on account of

² Ibid., p. 275.
His character, an infinite wrong. (2) The sinner is thus brought to an infinite indebtedness to the Divine honor; (3) this debt must be paid. (4) God must not and cannot surrender his own personal honor, as he would do in a mere gratuitous forgiveness. (5) The sinner never can, by any personal conduct, satisfy this claim; (6) therefore, he must suffer the full punishment of his sins, or, as the only alternative, satisfaction must be rendered by another. (7) It follows that the only salvation is through the compensating service of a divine mediator. (8) In this exigency the Son of God, in compassion for perishing sinners, was incarnated in their nature and on their behalf gave himself up in holy obedience and suffering to the Father. Because of his theanthropic character his obedience and death are in full compensation to the violated honor of God, and therefore, a true and sufficient ground of forgiveness.³ Upon the principles of Anselm the theory of satisfaction has been developed. William G. T. Shedd⁴ in his history of doctrine, regarded Anselm as a man born out of his time, for he belongs, in his thinking, with the Reformation group. The theologians who appeared later, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries fell short of Anselm in their soteriology. The doctrines of such eminent scholastics as Scotus and Aquinas came far short of an

⁴ Shedd, op. cit., p. 273.
evangelical development in their treatment of the doctrine of soteriology.

Though Anselm has been regarded by the Calvinists as having originated the theory of satisfaction, strictly speaking his theory of the atonement was not the satisfaction theory as held by the Calvinists. The substitutive office of the active obedience of Christ was not in his doctrine. Anselm discriminated between punishment and satisfaction. To Miley the doctrine of atonement, as developed by Anselm, was very different from the doctrine of satisfaction. Miley regarded only two theories of the atonement as worthy of detailed study. He gave the bulk of his attention to the satisfaction and the governmental theories.

The satisfaction theory of the atonement. Miley was careful to delineate the development of the satisfaction theory of atonement as a conscious effort to make it fit a workable doctrine, able to fit the needs of the Calvinistic system. This system required a finished salvation in Christ. As man's sins were imputed to Christ so Christ's obedience could be imputed to man. With the Calvinists there are two factors in the atonement: (1) substituted punishment; and (2) substituted obedience. As man could not atone for his own

5 Miley, op. cit., p. 108.
6 Ibid., pp. 108-09.
sins but required a more potent substitute so also he is unable to fulfill the requirement of obedience. The obedience of Christ his substitute is imputed to him. This is the atonement of satisfaction. Christ took the place of the elect in both penalty and precept, and as their substitute, endured the punishment which, on account of sin, they deserve, and in his obedience satisfied the righteousness required of them. So justice and law are satisfied. The vicarious punishment dismissed the elect from the amenability to penalty on account of their sin, and Christ's vicarious obedience made them deserving rewardable with the eternal blessedness to which they have been predestined.\footnote{Ibid., p. 134.}

Though the core of the satisfaction theory is the satisfaction in the punishment of sin according to its merit, and solely for that reason, there are also included incidental aspects of the theory such as the moral influence exerted and the governing rectoral office. The principle fact however is that Christ takes the place of elect sinners before the law, and suffers in their place the penalty of which they are guilty and which suffering satisfies the demands of punitive justice.

Miley considered three forms of substitution: (1) in identical penalty; (2) in equal penalty; (3) in equivalent penalty. The first form has been largely discarded by
Calvinist theologians. Its difficulties were too numerous for it to long command serious consideration. The main difficulty was that it was psychologically impossible. How could the sufferings of a finite being, enduring for eternity, be made identical with the sufferings of Christ for a short duration.

The second form in equal penalty has also been largely discarded. It equated the sufferings of Christ with all the sufferings the redeemed would have endured. Miley regarded it too low an opinion to merit consideration.

The last form is the one which has gained recognition and acceptance. It holds that the superior rank of Christ, as substitute in penalty, is sufficient to pay the penalty of all men's sins. The Calvinists in using this form would restrict it to include only the sins of the elect.

Miley pointed out that atonement by substitution was not a basic part of the satisfaction theory alone, but that it was also a basic part of the governmental theory. There are many besides Calvinists who hold that such a penal substitution constitutes a really conditional ground of forgiveness. To this group the redemptive sufferings were the punishment of sin, but not such a punishment that the redeemed sinner must in very justice be discharged.

Penal substitution and a real conditionality of forgiveness must refuse scientific fellowship. We accept, therefore the view of Dr. A. A. Hodge, that it is 'by a happy sacrifice of logic' that Arminius himself, and some
of his leading followers are with the Calvinists on penal substitution; only we reject the epithet qualifying the sacrifice. We do not think it a happy sacrifice of logic on the part of an Arminian, whereby he mistakes the true nature of the atonement, and at the same time admits a principle that requires him, in consistency, to accept along with it the purely distinctive doctrines of Calvinism. But whatever the sacrifice of logic in the case, the fact of such a theory remains the same, and this fact denies to the doctrine of satisfaction the distinctive fact of penal substitution.

An absolute penal substitution remains the unique possession of Calvinism. This absolute penal substitution gives to all for whom it is a substitute an unconditional discharge of penalty for sin.

Miley posited four chief principles for the theory of satisfaction: (1) the demerit of sin; (2) a divine punitive justice; (3) sin ought to be punished; and (4) penal satisfaction is a necessity of justice. The first two principles Miley readily accepted as consistent with a strict satisfaction theory. The last two principles, to Miley, could not be held by a strict satisfaction theory but burst open the way into the governmental theory. God, of necessity, as a moral ruler must punish sin by direct punishment or by accepting an appropriate substitute for the sinner. In the strict bounds of the satisfaction theory this obligation to punish must be maintained simply on the ground of the demerit of sin. This, to Miley, was untenable and burst the bounds of the satisfaction theory, giving way to the governmental theory.

8 Ibid., p. 138.
From the nature of injustice the punishment of sin is necessary. The obligation is such that any omission of punishment would be an act of injustice. Thus from the very nature of divine justice, the necessary punishment of sin is deduced as a consequence. It is as essential and immutable in God as any other attribute; therefore he must punish sin according to its desert and upon that ground. Thus his justice binds him to the infliction of merited punishment upon sin, just as other moral perfections bind him to holiness, goodness, and truth.9

To Miley it was because the punishment of sin is a necessity in the rectitude of Divine justice that the only possible atonement is by penal substitution. A thorough-going satisfaction theory could not allow for penal substitution. Does the penal substitution maintained fulfill the alleged absolute obligation of justice to punish sin according to its demerit? There is no such answer or fulfillment.10 In going on with his argument to support his position that the satisfaction theory is inadequate, Miley contended that nothing could be punished in Christ which was not transferred to him, and in some real sense made his. This to him was self-evident. If sin with its demerit could not be put upon Christ by imputation, no punishment which he suffered fell upon such demerit, or intrinsic evil of sin. It is impossible to show how sin is punished according to its demerit in the total absence of such demerit from the substitute in punishment. With the omission of the theory, its only

9 Ibid., p. 143.
10 Ibid., p. 145.
recourse is in guilt as a distinct fact of sin. If guilt, as the amenability of sin to the penalty of justice, is separable from sin, and as a distinct fact transferable to Christ, and if his punishment is the punishment of sin according to its demerit and on that ground, then the penal substitution maintained answers to the asserted absolute necessity for the punishment of sin. If any one of these suppositions fails the theory, then the theory itself inevitably fails.\(^1\) Thus, Miley presented the crux of the matter. He then pointed out that guilt could not be separated from sin. Sin is not an impersonal something but is closely associated with a person. The person, in the last analysis, is what is punishable. To fulfill the requirement of a strict satisfaction theory Christ must be identified with all the guilt and demerit which the sinner possesses. If of necessity follows that Christ must be deserving of punishment, an utterly repulsive thought.

The strict satisfaction theory ushers squarely into the main tenets of Calvinism. Miley referred to Charles Hodge from whom he derived the following quotation.

If the claims of justice are satisfied they cannot be again enforced. This is the analogy between the work of Christ and the payment of a debt. The point of agreement between the two cases is not the nature of the satisfaction rendered, but one aspect of the effect produced. In both cases the persons for whom the satisfaction is made are certainly freed. Their exemption of deliverance is in both cases, and equally in both, a matter of justice.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 146.

Dick, another Calvinist theologian, quoted by Miley, took the same line of argument as did Hodge, to the effect that God would not punish sin twice, first in Christ and then in the sinner. In quoting from several other Calvinist theologians the chorus was strengthened to the effect that for those for whom Christ died there could be no more condemnation for sin as the price had been paid once and for all.

To Miley, this conclusion, which the satisfaction theory reaches in Calvinism, was a logical consequence which could have been predicted from the principles held on the theory. To him the reason for entering into the argument and bringing into it the quotations from the Calvinist theologians was to make the issue so clear as to silence all cavil.

The governmental theory of the atonement. The governmental theory gives room for the substitutional atonement, for conditionality of the atonement, and for substitution in suffering. To Miley the sufferings of Christ were an atonement for sin by substitution, in the sense that they were intentionally endured for sinners under the judicial condemnation, and for the sake of the forgiveness. The Scriptures are plain on the conditionality of the forgiveness of sin. The placing of the substitution of Christ in

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13 Miley, op. cit., p. 151.
suffering, rather than in penalty, finished the break of
Miley's soteriology with the satisfaction theory as developed
by the Calvinists.

The substitution, therefore, is in suffering, without
the penal element. This agrees with the nature of the
atonement as a moral support of justice in its rectoral
office, thus rendering forgiveness consistent with the
interest of moral government.14

Miley contended that the vicarious sufferings of Christ
did not lose in value without the penal element. It was the
same efficacious sacrifice manifesting the same love.

Yet without the penal element in the suffering of
Christ, we may attribute to them a peculiar depth and cast
arising out of their relation to sin in their redemptive
office, and find the explanation in the facts of psychology.15

Hodge had urged that penal substitution is necessary,
not only for the satisfaction of justice, but also for
satisfying the demands of a guilty conscience, which mere
pardon can never appease. Miley fully accepted the fact of a
deep sense of punitive demerit because of sin in an awakened
conscience, but to him relief to conscience comes in the
knowledge that one's sins are forgiven.

The governmental theory, though it had its origin with
Grotius, became identified as the New England theory and as
the Edwardian theory, after the son of Jonathan Edwards who
contributed to its formation. Though Watson dealt extensively

14 Ibid., p. 156.

15 Ibid., p. 157.
with the governmental theory his discussion was mainly a
dispute with the Socinian heresy and with Calvinism. With
the former he desired to establish the fact that there was an
atonement and with the latter he desired to prove the
universal ity of the atonement. Watson, to Miley, represented
the most worthy Arminian systematic theologian. He aspired
therefore, if possible, to improve upon the work of Watson
for he know that the one who could do that would make a real
contribution to systematic theology. Miley corrected Watson
on his anthropology, and he also found it necessary to correct
him on his soteriology. Miley recognized the service which
Watson had given in refuting the Socinian heresy and in his
soteriological polemics with Calvinism, but, aside from this,
he did not regard Watson's work in soteriology as clear or as
contributing a great deal to Arminian theology. Watson had
been greatly indebted to Grotius on this topic. Grotius
though he had originated the governmental theory had not given
it a thorough, scientific treatment. Grotius, who had started
out as a Reformed theologian, in turning to the Arminian
theology, still maintained the Calvinistic approach to the
subject of the atonement. Therefore, Grotius' treatment of
the governmental theory of the atonement did not receive full
development. Watson, according to Miley, did no better by the
subject than Grotius himself. This important subject was left
without thorough scientific treatment until a man able enough
for the task appeared upon the scene. The man recognizing the problem and at the same time possessing the ability to give it scientific treatment proved to be Miley himself. Pope, Foster, and Ralston all failed to tackle the problem, whether from failure to recognize it or from lack of ability to solve it no one knows. That Miley early recognized the importance of the problem of soteriology is proved by the fact that his first well-known work in theology was a work on the atonement. His systematic theology was but an expansion on this work which went intact into his work on systematic theology.

II. THE DOCTRINE OF ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION

Under the benefits of the atonement only the topic of entire sanctification has been treated in this study. The other topics were not eliminated because they were unimportant, but because they were less pertinent to this study. This thesis, of necessity, has been very limited in the material handled. The topics of justification, regeneration, and assurance have reached a relatively large degree of agreement among evangelical theologians. The topic of sanctification has been a theological storm center, and therefore an important subject for consideration in this study. Did Foster and Miley add anything to the thought of Wesley, Fletcher, and Watson? The doctrine of entire
sanctification was a specialty with John Wesley. He gave it thorough consideration. Fletcher and Watson followed closely in the steps of Wesley and used him as the supreme authority on the subject. The theologians in America were farther removed from the personal influence of Wesley. With an opportunity to give the subject a more objective treatment did they contribute anything to the material bequeathed to them by their predecessors? Did they find errors and inconsistencies in the doctrine?

To both Foster and Miley there was a problem concerning the sin which remains after regeneration.

I find evidences of obscurity in all the writings about it. The most eminent divines are not clear. They all agree in the fact; but when they attempt to explain they become confused. The difficulty is to make plain what that sin is, from which Christian men are not free, which remains in, or is found still cleaving to believers; how to discriminate between the same sin that is removed in regeneration and the same sin that remains. And it is just around this point that revolves the whole question of entire sanctification, both as to what it is and its possibility. It has to do with that sin that remains. It removes that remainder of sin. 16

The above quotation from Foster was seized upon by Miley, as expressing his own problem in regard to the same question. Though both Foster and Miley recognized the importance of this problem they had different solutions for it. Foster differentiated between the sin removed in regeneration and that removed in entire sanctification as actual sin entailing

guilt for the former and inherited depravity, not entailing guilt, for the latter. To Miley there was no such easy solution.

Miley found the problem of the remaining sin defiant to exact explanation. He did not regard this remaining sin as identical with native depravity, because regeneration accomplished different results in the hearts of people.

The question of a remnant of depravity is not without perplexity. As the nature of depravity as a whole is difficult for thought, so that of a remnant not different in kind from the whole is difficult. Consequently, there is perplexity in the notion of entire sanctification. 17

Miley later continued:

However, as the truth of native depravity is not conditioned in a capacity in us fully to apprehend it, or clearly interpret it in thought, so the truth of a remnant of depravity after regeneration is not so conditioned. In each case the inner state may be known through its activities, as manifest in our consciousness. There is another mode of information. By the observation of others, as to their tempers, words, and acts, we gain an insight into their inner nature, and may thus know its characteristic tendencies, whether to the good or evil. 18

Though Scripture, according to Miley, does not make explicit statements on the incompleteness of regeneration yet enough is given so that a sure basis can be found for the doctrine in Scripture. Though experience testifies of remaining sin yet Miley would not consider basing a doctrine upon experience. Experience to him should never be used as a

17 Miley, op. cit., p. 358.
18 Ibid., p. 359.
source of doctrine but only to confirm doctrine.

In regard to the mode of the inner work of sanctification Miley did not believe that perfect clarity was possible. He regarded Foster's work on the topic as clearly holding the view of repression. On examining the work of Foster at this point, it has been impossible to agree with Miley on this judgment. Below is a quotation from Foster, taken from the page marked, by Miley, as pertinent on this point.

It may be well to explain here, more particularly, both with respect to the natural dispositions and propensities. These are not supposed to be destroyed when a soul is entirely freed from sin, but only brought under right government and restored to a proper character—not allowed to be instruments of sin. Evil dispositions and propensities are but perverted forms of good ones, and hence, holiness or sanctification consists not in the eradication of them, but in the restoration of them to their legitimate character and use.19

If the propensities and impulses are rectified what is repressed?

That Miley regarded his own view, as well as Foster's and Whedon's, as favoring repression was unfortunate, because it did not give as clear a final statement to the problem of the mode of cleansing as it is possible to give. Certainly evil is no real being that may be cut out as a surgeon cuts out a tumor or a cancer, neither is it something to be repressed. The human nature may be governed by pure motives, pure desires. What takes place in entire sanctification is

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19 Foster, op. cit., p. 74.
the purification of motive and desire. Neither the terms eradication nor repression are suitable for explaining what takes place.

On the possibility of holiness in this life, that is a second work of grace, that the doctrine has a basis in Scripture, and that it is obtainable by faith, Foster and Miley were in agreement with the British theologians.
CHAPTER V

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

I. EVALUATION

Evaluation of Foster's contribution. Foster made a contribution to Wesleyan-Arminian theology in his elaboration of the philosophical basis to that theology. Though he never mentioned the name of Aristotle he lined his thinking squarely with the metaphysics of Aristotle. Wesley himself, though he gave references to the importance of maintaining Aristotle's logic, never worked out a philosophical basis to theology.

Watson clearly presented the problem of causality in relation to proving the existence of God.\(^1\) He recognized the power of the \textit{a posteriori} proofs. He also clearly showed how Divine revelation had aided the human reason in arriving at a first cause. The tendency of the pagan mind had been to regard matter as eternal and thus involve an eternal succession of causes and effects. To Watson, the rational proofs, by themselves, might never have arrived at a clear notion of a first cause, but in collaboration with Divinely revealed truth in regard to God they became an impregnable wall against the arguments of Atheism.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Richard Watson, \textit{Theological Institutes} (New York: Philips and Hunt, 1850), I, p. 276.

\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 273 ff.
Watson did not ground the arguments for God's existence in a metaphysical basis. Foster did. Consequently, he gave to the subject a thorough treatment such as it had never before been given in the Wesleyan tradition. Miley dismissed the philosophical approach completely, believing the basis of theology to be scientific. He did not recognize that science has a philosophical basis. Foster however, had an answer to the problem of the eternity of matter which Watson had not seen. "The adjustment of matter rather than its creation, furnishes the best proof of the divine existence." No Wesleyan theologian has been as concerned with the subject of rational theology as was Foster.

Foster's liberal interpretation of the inspiration of Scripture left him vulnerable on a very important issue. This placed him on the debit side of the ledger in his contribution to Arminian theology. In his evaluation of the Bible he started from the premise "that what is important is, that the Bible be true as a whole and in every part." Untruth alone could put it in peril. Thus Foster took a rational approach to the subject without taking the statements of Scripture upon the subject of its inspiration. It may have been that Foster, if given the opportunity to explain himself in greater detail, would have assured us that his conception

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4 Foster, *Theism*, p. 90.
of the inspiration of Scripture was not liberal after all. It was the first tentative conclusion of this study that perhaps Foster had simply inverted the terms of inspiration and revelation. However, on further study, this tentative conclusion could not be maintained. The term inspiration, as applied to Scripture, is purely a Biblical term and has no definition apart from its usage in Scripture. It is a term that defies exact definition. What the term implies in the manner or method by which Scripture became inspired could not be determined. Historically, the problem of the inspiration of the Scriptures did not receive elaborate treatment until the seventeenth century when theories regarding the manner of inspiration were developed. 

The early church fathers had no theories as to the inspiration of the Scriptures. Augustine did not regard the truth of Scripture as bound to the words but believed the thought was the important thing. None of the great reformers maintained a verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. These reformers, however, spoke in the strongest terms of the divinity, credibility, and infallibility of the sacred

6 Ibid., p. 614.
7 Ibid., p. 615.
8 Loc. cit.
The most influential men, in their utterances on the inspiration of Scripture, treated it very simply.

Would Foster, if pressed, have spoken in strong language of the divinity, credibility, and infallibility of the Scriptures? There is no clue in the Prolegomena that he would have done so. In regard to the truthfulness of the Bible Foster wrote:

To its truthfulness it is not necessary that it should be inspired in every part, unless it can be shown that it assumes that it is so inspired, or necessarily implies it. This cannot be shown, nor is it in any way important to be assumed; while, on many accounts, and for truth's sake especially, it may be important that it should not be assumed.9

The strongest point of emphasis, to Foster, was the truthfulness of Scripture. It may have been argued that since no human mind unaided by Divine influence could be one hundred percent accurate in its statements, entire truthfulness implies Divine influence and consequently the entire Bible is divinely inspired. If this was the argument of Foster he gave no indication of it.

The evaluation of Foster's contribution to the doctrine of entire sanctification is largely based upon Miley's regard for Foster's Christian Purity. Miley made few references to the writings of Foster. However, in his treatment of the doctrine of entire sanctification, he used Foster's Christian Purity as a basic work. Miley regarded Foster's emphasis upon

9 Foster, Prolegomena, p. 279.
the problem of the remaining sin after regeneration to be pertinent. Foster and Miley found different solutions to this problem. It has been the judgment of this study that Miley's solution to the problem was preferable to that of Foster. Foster's presentation of the subject was true to the Wesleyan tradition throughout. It clearly presented the cardinal points of the doctrine of entire sanctification: an instantaneous work of grace subsequent to the work of regeneration; obtainable by faith; the heart made perfect in love.

Evaluation of Miley's contribution. Miley saw two things that remained undone in Wesleyan-Arminian theology. He saw the need of clarifying both its anthropology and its soteriology. The problem of evaluating the contribution of Miley lies in the judgment of Miley's work on these two subjects. Were his solutions and corrections valid? It has been the conclusion of this study that the corrections which Miley made to Arminian anthropology and soteriology were valid. Miley, by removing inherited guilt from anthropology, has both given a clearer view of the justice of God and removed the last leg that could uphold the Calvinistic system. It has made Arminian anthropology thoroughly consistent with itself. His treatment of soteriology has exalted the conception of the atonement. There is, in his treatment, no calculus of suffering whereby Christ's sufferings pay in full the price of sufferings which elect men otherwise would have
endured, thus releasing them forever from condemnation. From the hand of Miley the atonement emerged free from the last vestige of penal substitution. Christ in love suffered in man's place. In no sense did He become guilty in taking man's place. This utterly repugnant notion that Christ actually became sin in order to atone for sin was refuted by Miley. With the removal of penal substitution and the imputation of man's guilt on Christ the props of the Calvinist system are removed. Miley's anthropology and soteriology gave the strongest argument from the Arminian side which had been presented in opposition to the Calvinist system.

Miley aspired to clarify the work of Watson whom he regarded as the top systematic theologian in the tradition. He realized that the one who could clarify and correct Watson would make a real contribution to Wesleyan theology. It has been the conclusion of this study that Miley did clarify and correct the work of Watson and therefore made a real contribution to Wesleyan theology.

II. CONCLUSION

The real purpose of this study has been to delineate the main current of Wesleyan-Arminian theology. The best method of accomplishing this objective seemed to be to limit the study to the most influential works in the movement. It

may have seemed that the selection was an arbitrary one. However there were only a few choices possible. No one would seriously question the place of influence which theological schools like Boston University or Drew Theological Seminary have had in the Wesleyan movement. It was the chair of theology at Drew which led in the argument against the Calvinism of Charles Hodge. Time has caused the influence of both Foster and Miley, at Drew, to loom large. The theology of Miley has not yet been transcended. The theologian who makes a real contribution to the Wesleyan tradition must do so.

It has been the purpose of this study to compare Foster and Miley with Wesley, Watson, and Pope. In comparing Miley's treatment of anthropology and soteriology with the treatment given these subjects by Wesley, Watson, and Pope, it was discovered that Miley had already, in the development of these topics, made copious references and comparisons, along with many quotations, to the three named theologians. What was vitally pertinent in the writings of the three men he had already appropriated to his study. Thus the comparisons were before the eyes in studying Miley. The same situation was encountered in studying both Miley and Foster on the subject of entire sanctification. This has considerably lessened the impressiveness of the study as few quotations have thus been made from the writings of the British theologians. However, it has facilitated the study.
In the matter of the philosophical basis to theology, once the subject has been thoroughly worked there is no room for advancement in that line. It is impossible to expand a basic metaphysics. On that subject, thoroughness and clarity are the only objectives. There are also doctrines, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, Christology, and the relation of reason to revelation, which have reached a settled conclusion among evangelical theologians. It was the purpose of this study to determine if more subjects could not be added to the store of those bearing the stamp of settled agreement, among at least the Arminian theologians. In determining the progress made by a theological tradition settled agreement is the chief concern. In determining the progress made by the Wesleyan tradition, the thorough-going work of Foster in the philosophical basis to theology should be added. The work of Miley in anthropology and soteriology should also be added to this fund of settled doctrines. To back down from the conclusions presented by these two men on the above named subjects would mean retrogression.

It is as necessary to remain loyal to a doctrine once conclusively established as it is to further develop hitherto neglected doctrines. In gaining new ground it is imperative to be watchful that no old ground is lost.

It is the conclusion of this study that the Wesleyan theologians in America have advanced and enriched their
tradition. Their most influential exponents have remained loyal to the old tradition. An apostasy common to all the great Protestant denominations has, in recent years, been a reason for the retarded development of theology in the line of true progress. This defection has, in part, motivated this study which has attempted to find the basic pillars upon which a sound philosophy and a sound theology rest.
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