

1994

David Rawson Notes: OAU in 1993 and USUN in 1994

David Rawson

12 Jan 95 - Military situation under control (not calm)
6 Jan 95 Demarche on Troops Contribution
11 Jan 95 enlft of Zambian contingent withing
Notes 10/31

Burundi 18 Apr 94 Burel 04337 Deputy Secy
Dallot's ~~call~~ April 13 call on Belgian Foreign
Ministry SYG Rollants comes Rwanda, Rwanda, &
Yugoslavia

3. Belgian MFA SYG and acting political director
Van Dael urged forceful US support in UNSC
for getting UNAMIR out of Rwanda - Dallaire told
he argued had nothing to do with UNAMIR mandate
UNAMIR force especially Belgians were vulnerable
Belgians could not afford to lose more peacekeepers ^{in the harrowing circumstances in which they lost 10 last wk}
Belgian withdrawal would gut UNAMIR but Belgians
did not want to be forced into a unilateral decision
UNSC should take the decision to withdraw UNAMIR
troops for their safety. DS. expressed condolences for
deaths of 10 Belgian peacekeepers and deaths of Belgian
civilians in Rwanda. He agreed ^{UNAMIR} mandate seemed no
longer to fit the circumstances.

04 Jan 94 State 149032.

M'Zehi to VP Core That he would urge his govt.
to consider providing 50 APCs to UNAMIR

Clinton - BOB conversation US would denude
African capitals for troops for UNAMIR

~~July I~~

State 17702 July I ^{Belgian-Congrat} Bureau of Min to decide whether to calculate
to ~~French~~ France's Rwanda operation

Moore - War Tribunal - Truth Commission
both had problems

In US - rule turning in favor of non-refugee

Williams - Importance of Rwanda framework

Burundi - Belgian surrounding security levels of preventive diplomacy

Moore - Salini - keep attention focus -
BOB practice on Burundi

Toussaint - out of 300 mil. lbs 15 are trustworthy 2

Notes 10/30

Stat 144263 May 27⁹⁴ - agreed simultaneous NY & caps demands on troops
93 ~~144263~~ USUN 02145 30 Apr.

UN planned to hold its report on Rwanda until
the completion of the Arusha talks - questioned utility
of helping OAU augment its force

BYG. The OAU was only fit for political or diplomatic
work not peacekeeping. If you put them something
practical to do, you'll end up with a mess. Truly
weak organization. Rwanda not the place for OAU to experiment
despite the ~~fact~~ situation was urgent. Considering that
we want for Arusha to end - feared UN could be
accused of interfering in the peace process.

144294 USUN 02232

4. Further The Secy was extremely concerned at how the
USG's new criteria on RKO had affected UN action on
Rwanda which he termed a major disaster. His analysis
was that The U.S. had led negatively which in turn caused
support and potential donors (like Australia) to get cold feet.
He said he could not sleep at night as the genocide
continued in Rwanda because of this major fault of the
UN, greater than all the others. While he acknowledged
that lack of French leadership ^{was} ~~was~~ (500 F. paratroopers
could have contained the situation) would looked to U.S. for
leadership. While in South Africa, African leaders had told
him that by putting the brakes on Rwanda, the U.S. had
deterred any effective ~~action~~ ^{UN action} to stop slaughter. In
Somalia, The U.S. decision to provide humanitarian
assistance had served as a magnet for others. In Rwanda,
we were repelling aid.