

2004

David Rawson Notes: April 1994

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Notes

noted

15 APR 94 STATE ~~150~~ 99209

Rwanda Negotiations

- Flak

3. RPF victory would lead to further massacres
can conquer capital but not ~~not~~ reasonably rule
the country. Some in RPF agree with this analysis
a perception which kept RPF from attempting to
capture Kigali in ~~15~~ Feb 1993
4. We are passing our views informally to RPF but
most useful to attempt to persuade them
5. much of the Arusha Agreement has been rendered
inoperable by recent events. AA still provides
basis for a renewed ceasefire and a constitution
power sharing formula. It is the only vehicle
in which the Govt and the RPF had expressed agreement.
6. Urge M. to press RPF to accept immediately
Dallaire call for talks on a ceasefire locally
whether or not Mwanzi invites parties back to Arusha

Notes March 12, 04

not clear

24 Jan 94 USUN 00312 UN concern over Rwanda
UNDPKO Hedi Annabi and USUN Pol off meet.

4. Annabi outlined an emerging crisis:

Gert is actively involved in distributing arms and training militia; These covert activities particularly disturbing given presence of RPF in battalion in Kigali

Opposition parties are competing over lists for upcoming election which is blocking establishment of TB. Timetable for political reconciliation behind schedule - jeopardize Accord add to financial cost of the operation

5. backdrop of deteriorating economic & political situation.

6. in response to reports that P. Haby's militias ~~are~~ receiving arms, General Dallaire planned a very aggressive demand to the President; UN officials, ^{however,} ~~concern~~ concerned Dallaire that a more subtle approach might be more effective at this time. Accordingly a few weeks ago Dallaire simply discussed his concerns with the President. Although the President denied involvement in such work, apparently he noted and was impressed by the general's concerns.

23 Mar. 94 USUN 001187 Discussions on Rwanda Mandate & New
SRSG to Zaire

2. ~~Both~~ Preliminary discussion on the Rwandan mandate renewal. Both France & Belgium show preference for 3 months & reservation to anything more than strong language warning Rwanda that SC's patience is running out

not done

~~14014~~
May 14

94 State 128805 Subject:

Par 15. With regard to the issue of genocide, at this point the USG does not have a formal position as to whether genocide has taken place. Therefore pending further guidance, mission will need to be circumspect about this issue. It would be helpful to our own deliberations to have a better sense of the extent and source of pressure to declare Rwanda a genocide situation.

Par 5 With a ceasefire in place or as areas of the country become secure, a special rapporteur and monitors appointed by the UNHCR or by the High Commissioner for Human Rights could enter the country to investigate and document human rights violations and through their presence, perhaps deter further killing. Any further steps, such as the establishment of a mechanism against human violators would be a subject for negotiation between the Rwandan parties within the Arusha process.

Par. 101 Department supports notion of holding individuals accountable for crimes they have committed. However, mission should be cautious about support for any particular mechanism; for example, and tribunal of the sort established by the security council for Yugoslavia is a complex and controversial option which at this point the USG does not support.

Memorandum. Aug 27, 1993

HE/C to AF

Interagency group undecided on whether to

10-1 should support a peace keeping mission in Rwanda

✓
PC to Amman 4/23/94

RCF did not show up

RPF went & announced ceasefire with conditions

SC should not appear independent but really would not do much
MSF print in British hospital about in at home

APN
29

SC ~~not~~ concern about perception of ~~AN~~ in Africa
& US / UN cross purposes

Notes 12/17/04

- 30 April 94 Geneva ICRC, DHA and UNHCR brief the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group on the Rwanda Crisis
5. Paul Rusesabagina 2 kinds of violence - systematic massacre mainly of Tutsi and low level conflict of Army vs. RPF
 6. urged combat support of PM as moderate element and hear of army & means to control Interahamwe
 7. urged govt to keep battle from Kigali from occurring
 10. ~~Wanted~~ No. problem operating in RPF controlled northern part of Rwanda issue to maintain semblance of balance for assistance. expts not targeted
 11. Pursued forming UNAMIR troops essential.

09 APR 94 STATE 093754 Situation Report No 6 as of 1630 EDT

4. The Belgian PM asked Boutros Ghali to strengthen the UN contingent. The Belgians govt. wants enhanced equipment and/or prepare not an increase in Belgian Blue Helmets. The Belgians are willing to keep their UNAMIR troops in Rwanda after the planned evacuation but can't provide more troops 94 Brussels 4005

Notes 2/2/05 A/RPS

20 Apr. 94 State 104015 Dept Tello RPF to Stop Fighting Now

2. Called in Murganda April 18 reiterated public call for cease fire ^{between sides}, an end to violence ^{and reprisals} and a return to the Arusha process - install BCG
4. Mar. RPF had resumed fighting to stop killing by PB and extremists and protect 600 men force restore law and order not the best thing but no other choice military not stopping the killing but encouraging massacres radio broadcasts urged the even babies ~~not~~ be spared.
6. Both sides must agree to stop fighting at the moment - now
7. RPF must act for population and stop the fighting now leader - cease fire necessary to keep Kigali from being destroyed
8. Murganda reaffirmed RPF commitment to Arusha Agreement and its fundamental principles
11. Mar. complained that int'l response to events in Rwanda inadequate

NOT 4 9/2/05 A/RPS

~~April~~

15 April 94 State 09440 Talking Points on UNAMIR Withdrawal

3. Department has given careful consideration to the draft resolution and to the views of other UNSC members regarding status and future of the current UN PK force in Rwanda

The political and humanitarian reasons put forth for retention of UNAMIR elements have been taken into account fully in our determination of the appropriate response

4 consider prospect of additional violence related incidents would end April 15

insufficient justification to retain a UN PK presence in Rwanda and that int'l community must give highest priority to a full, orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel.

UNAMIR should take steps to ensure the safety of Rwandan civilians under its protection consistent with its mandate and provided the safety of UNAMIR personnel is not jeopardized does not require resolution.

19 Apr. 94 State 102433 Official - Informal No. 25

1. We and Europeans oppose keeping UNAMIR about withdrawal is the best approach but NAM wants UNAMIR to continue and we are outvoted so far.
2. Should not go beyond talking points in State 99440 but be cautious and not too categorical in recommending a pullout

Apr 2. Multi-party conf.

Comm visit May 10-11

(Decker arranged meeting Jan 19 1992 in Anshu
11 Feb. 92 Kigali 0552)