

9-23-1992

## Neutral Military Observers Group (NMOG) Activities in Rwanda

US Government

Ref. No. NMOG/OPS/SITREP/07

USA

SITUATION REVIEW OF NMOG ACTIVITIES FROM 2 SEPTEMBER 1992  
TO 23 SEPTEMBER 1992

REFERENCE:

- A. NMOG/COMD/OPS/OA DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 1992.

INTRODUCTION

1. The first review of the activities of NMOG in Rwanda was despatched on 4 September 1992. In that review I addressed the assessment of NMOG tasks (stated and implied), the concept of operations, Command and Control mechanism and the administrative and logistic requirements of the mission.

2. The very critical areas of the review include the need to define a Ceasefire Corridor, improving the manpower holding, funding and logistic support. In this review, I shall bring you up to date on the progress made in these and other areas of that review and report on areas in which the Ceasefire Agreement has been violated.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to review the activities of the NMOG in Rwanda from 2 to 23 September 1992 with a view to making recommendations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

4. In my earlier review, I did rationalize the need for a command and control structure for NMOG. Every organization whether military or civil, requires a control and coordinating centre to harmonize and direct its activities for the achievement of its objectives.

5. It is because of this need that I established an organizational structure that was recommended to you. Though, the staffing is still skeletal because of the absence of the Zimbabwean and Mali contingents. I am pleased to report that the HQ NMOG is fully operational and is functioning effectively like any other military headquarters in the field. I must, however, note the extra strain which the few staff must bear in order to carry out the jobs of those who are yet to arrive.

MANDATE

6. NMOG TASKS. The mandate of NMOG has remained the same till now. Consequently, the tasks and concept of operation of NMOG has also not changed. In my last review, I assessed all these tasks and related them to the manpower required to execute the concept of operation. A total of 223 officers and 84 soldiers were recommended to you.

7. This number, which is inadequate for an ideal situation, given the terrain in Rwanda, was recommended keeping the constraints of OAU

in view. When compared with the 3000 United States Marines required only for the protection of relief materials in Somalia it becomes clear that the number recommended is guaranteed to severally test every member of this Observation Group.

8. Despite the handicap in personnel, I have continued to march on by interim measures using what personnel are available now. From the personnel available, I have partially staffed HQ NMOG and the headquarters of the three Military Observation Zones (MOZs) and created 6 mobile patrols of 2 officers each. Given the frontages of each of these zones, it is extremely difficult for only 2 patrols to effectively cover each zone and witness all the numerous violations.

9. In an attempt to improve the effectiveness of our observations, I had to cause the Zonal Commanders and their staff, who should be controlling and coordinating patrol activities within their zones, to take part in physical patrolling. This arrangement has still not put us in a position to be physical witnesses to violations. The best we are able to do now to visit the sites of any violations reported and carry out investigations. Since our patrols may not be physical witnesses to these violations, we have on several occasions found it difficult to condemn some violations because of lack of obvious evidence.

CEASEFIRE CORRIDOR

10. An area in which NMOG has made much achievement is in the attempt

I was briefed by field commanders on both sides of the war zone. At each brief, I was given the battle positions of the forces of the commander in that sector. These positions were plotted on NMOG maps. From our maps, it was clear that many of the positions were mere claims. It was common to see the defences of one party located deep at the rear of the defence of the other party. Also there were claims to battle positions that have no units in them.

11. On 3 September 1992, I ordered a verification operation of all the battle positions on both sides. The patrols have been working on this since then by physically checking every claim and visiting each position. Authentic positions are then plotted on the maps and discussed with Chief Military Observers (CMOs) of both the Rwandaise Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front for confirmations and agreement.

12. These confirmations and agreements have led to the firm establishment of a total of 93 battle positions for the RGF and 79 for the RPF. A possible Ceasefire line around which a corridor can be defined is contained at Annex A. The grid coordinates of these positions have also been fixed and communicated to CMOs to forestal any future changes of positions.

#### VIOLATIONS

13. Within 3 weeks of commencing operations, NMOG received an avalanche of reported violations both from the RGW and RPF. The characters of

these violations varied from exchanges of artillery, mortar and heavy machine arms fires, to mine warfare. There were also reports on exchanges of small gun fires, massed attacks and assaults by infantry, occupations of new defensive positions and patrolling in no-man's land. Cases of kidnappings and lootings have also been reported.

14. NMOG has investigated each report it received and verified some. Some could not be verified because of lack of obvious evidence. Of all the violations, patrolling is the most rampant. Cases of exchanges of small arms occur mostly in areas where the no-man's land is very thin - between 50 and 150 metres apart. The areas where this condition exists are RUGARAMA, MASAKA, KABWOGA, KIBALI hills, RUHENDA Miyove, KAGOGO, and NDAGO. A mutually agreed separation of forces in these areas is desirable to reduce friction.

15. So far a total of 59 violation reports have been received. Details of the violations along with the facts of NMOG investigation and comments are contained in the Annex.

#### MONITORING OF SUPPLIES AND MOVEMENT OF TROOPS:

16. In my concept of operation, the monitoring of supplies and movement of troops were to be accomplished by the simultaneous applications of 3 different checks. The first is the monitoring of the infiltration and mass movement of troops in the forward areas. The second is the taking of stock of current levels of stores of ammunitions and weapons

these violations varied from exchanges of artillery, mortar and heavy machine arms fires to mine warfare. There were also reports on exchanges of small gun fires, massed attacks and assaults by infantry, occupations of new defensive positions and patrolling in no-man's land. Cases of kidnappings and lootings have also been reported.

14. NMOG has investigated each report it received and verified some. Some could not be verified because of lack of obvious evidence. Of all the violations, patrolling is the most rampant. Cases of exchanges of small arms occur mostly in areas where the no-man's land is very thin - between 50 and 150 metres apart. The areas where this condition exists are RUGARAMA, MASAKA, KARWOGA, KIBALI hills, RUHENDA Miyove, KAGOGO, and NDAGO. A mutually agreed separation of forces in these areas is desirable to reduce friction.

15. So far a total of 59 violation reports have been received. Details of the violations along with the facts of NMOG investigation and comments are contained in the Annex.

#### MONITORING OF SUPPLIED AND MOVEMENT OF TROOPS

16. In my concept of operation, the monitoring of supplies and movement of troops were to be accomplished by the simultaneous applications of 3 different checks. The first is the monitoring of the infiltration and mass movement of troops in the forward areas. The second is the taking of stock of current levels of stores of ammunitions and weapons

and then continue to monitor these levels by unscheduled inspections. And the third is to monitor movement of lethal military stores and troops into the combat zones by use of check points located in the communication zones of the 2 forces.

17. Due to the present inadequacy of manpower, it is not possible to carry out a simultaneous execution of these checks as planned. As an interim measure therefore, I have decided to prioritise the tasks and carry them out in phases.

18. The first priority is the monitoring of infiltration and mass movement of troops in the forward areas. Since these activities would occur in the forward areas, and because of the shortage of manpower, I had to tie this task into the verification operation for battle positions. Therefore, while the Military Observer Teams (MOTs) are visiting various battle positions to confirm claims and at the same time verifying reported violations, they must also look out for any infiltrations or mass movement of troops.

19. With only 2 patrols per zone who could be operating as far as 35 kilometres from each other, it is needless to say that the forward edges of the battle areas remain porous and subject to exploitation by any party for patrols and massed movements. But this is the best that can be done now without adequate strength of officers.

20. My second priority is monitoring the movement of supplies and troops from the rear to the combat zones. Again, without personnel,



it is not possible to mount check points to monitor the movement of lethal military stores and conveyance of troops.

21. Another interim measure I have taken in this case, is to commit the same patrols to assessing the strengths of fighting troops currently deployed in the battle positions. The aim of this assessment is to assist in monitoring any future changes in the level of the forces. Therefore, since NMOG may not know how and when reinforcements are moved from rear to forward areas because of the lack of check points, an observed increase in the strengths of forward units would alert us on the probability of an intended attack. NMOG is still compiling information from which it can make a reasonable estimate of the strengths on both sides of each of the 3 zones.

#### ADMINISTRATION

22. Out of Station Allowance. There are some civilian drivers assigned to NMOG. These drivers have been involved in duties that takes them outside Kigali to the 3 zones being covered by NMOG. It is in my view, that out-of-station allowance be worked out for them in conformity with the Rwandese Government pay and allowances regulations to her workers which is 2.50 FRW per day.

23. Since NMOG budget does not make provision for such allowance, I am suggesting that the OAU General Secretariat liaise with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kigali, to work out a modality of paying the drivers.

24. Insurance. The participants on NMOG including the civilian staff are, in the course of discharging their duties, exposed to some hazards.

In view of this, I am recommending that an insurance policy be worked out to cover all military and civilian staff on NMOG operations.

25. Medical. There is the need to arrange for a sound medical care for both the military and civilian staff of NMOG, a system that would allow for NMOG staff to receive medical consultations and attention from the Rwandese Government Medical Centres.

#### LOGISTICS

26. The logistic branch was established to enhance the functions of NMOG. This branch is however saddled with problems of transport, accommodation and supply.

27. Transport. Most of the vehicles organic to NMOG presently are old ones. As such, the fuel consumption rate of each of them is so high. Likewise they are constantly breaking down and thus being sent to the garage. To keep these vehicles on road and in good working conditions we require funds. In view of this, it is suggested that fund for maintenance and fuel be included in the OAU budget forecast for NMOG.

28. Accommodation. Accommodation for the Military Observers to be deployed to Byumba and Ruhengeri zones are ready. That of Mutara zone

is however not ready as they have not been furnished. The arrival of the contingents from Mali and Zimbabwe will mean increase in living accommodation requirement. The details would be communicated to you in due course.

29. Material. Some foreign embassies in Kigali promised NMOG some material. These include uniforms and radio communication sets. These are still being expected. I would wish however that OAU General Secretariat take up this issue with nations concerned, as these materials are very essential for enhanced operations of NMOG.

#### CONCLUSION

30. The month in review has seen NMOG operating in the field using interim means. There have been some good achievement especially as it concerns NMOG efforts at determining a possible corridor between the armed oppositions. The operations out in the field have also enabled us to adjudge the capability of vehicles on NMOG operations.

31. It is in this view that I am reiterating the need for OAU General Secretariat to review the strength of the contingents. It is also essential that attention be paid to issues highlighted in the initial situation report as well as this one to permit effectiveness of NMOG.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

32. It is recommended that:

- (a) Manpower requirement on NMOG be reviewed.
- (b) The armed oppositions be made to mutually agree to separate in areas where the no-man's land is between 50 and 150 metres apart.
- (c) Personal emolument for civilian drivers be approved.
- (d) An insurance policy be worked out to cover participants on NMOG operations.
- (e) A suitable arrangement for medical cover for NMOG personnel to be worked out with the Government of Rwanda by the OAU.
- (f) OAU General Secretariat should liaise with the donor countries who pledged logistic support to make good their pledges.

EB OPALEYE

Major General

Commander