

9-15-1993

## The French Stress How Important Rwanda is to Them

United States Department of State

UNCLASSIFIED

AZ *rw*  
*P. info*



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

9/15/93

RELEASED IN FULL

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM  
CONFIDENTIAL S/S  
DECL: OADR

COPY

*Russ*

TO: P - Mr. Tarnoff  
FROM: AF - George E. Moose  
SUBJECT: State Of Play On Discussions To Establish A  
Rwanda Peacekeeping Operation (PKO)

The UN Security Council will soon consider establishing a PKO in Rwanda. On more than one occasion, the French have told us that Rwanda is as important to them as Liberia is to us, and they expect the two issues to receive equivalent support at the UN. The Rwanda proposal will soon come up at a Deputies' Committee meeting because of this French linkage, in the context of peacekeeping operations elsewhere in Africa for which we need French support.

With a PKO in place, Rwanda stands a good chance of making a successful democratic transition--thereby advancing two of the president's key foreign policy objectives. Conversely, failure to establish a PKO would not only threaten the fragile peace there, but would damage prospects for cooperation with Paris on a whole range of key African issues (especially Liberia and Somalia). We note that supporting a PKO (estimated at \$50 million) is still less expensive than providing humanitarian assistance in the event the Arusha Accord cannot be implemented.

- A Rwandan delegation drawn from the government and opposition is currently at the UN seeking support for a PKO (which we've twice endorsed in principle there).
- A UN reconnaissance team will shortly present its report giving specifics on the scope and cost of the PKO.
- That report is likely to track with the French plan for rapid deployment of at least 500 UN-only troops in Kigali (the capital), plus at least 500 more troops outside Kigali.
- We should support the French on the Rwanda PKO, both on the merits and because we need them on Liberia and Somalia.
- However, we are encountering stiff opposition in the NSC Peacekeeping Core Group to a Rwanda PKO, which we need to resolve soon.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L. MILLS  
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200101636

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

96D143 Bx 1

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- IO believes that we should avoid bargaining approval of one peacekeeping operation for approval of another. Each operation should stand on its own merits.
- IO sees two significant differences between the U.S. and France regarding Liberia and Rwanda. First, the U.S. sees a role for non-UN forces (OAU, NMOG). France does not. Second, the U.S. is prepared to make voluntary contributions. France is not.
- IO believes the French vision of a UN force in Kigali is also too ambitious. The French see the UN providing security, which is quite different from a traditional observer force.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

W-SECC 3060 9/15/93

Drafted: AF/C:SAHonley 7-1707  
Cleared: AF/C:ARender  
AF/E:DSHinn  
AF/W:PChaveas  
EUR/WE:EHeaphy (subst)  
AF/FO:PBushnell  
IO:JSBrim

} *AK*