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# Neutral International Force (NIF) Proposal

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MEMORANDUM OF THE JOINT MISSION
"GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA -RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT"
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF A NEUTRAL
INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO RWANDA

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NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 16, 1993 RELEASED IN FULL

# O. Nature and Mission of the Neutral International Force (NIF)

On June 11, 1993 the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front submitted a joint request to the Secretary General of the United Nations, asking him to establish and deploy quickly a Neutral International Force (NIF) of which the United Nations would assume responsibility and command.

This request and the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of Armed Forces of the two Parties outline the various missions they would wish the NIF to carry out. These missions relate particularly to catering for the overall security of the country and supervising the process of the formation of the National Army and National Gendarmerie (Article 54).

Article 72 of the above-mentionned Protocol of Agreement links the establishment of Transitional Institutions, namely the Broad-Based Transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly as well as the process of disengagement and reintegration of Armed Forces, with a prior deployment of the NIF. The timetable of the implementation of the Peace Agreement, which stipulates that Transitional Institutions must be put in place within thirty-seven (37) days after the signing of the Peace Agreement (Article 7 of the Peace Agreement), has not been so far respected because the NIF is not yet established and deployed.

Considering that the two parties have entrusted the NIF with a key role in the framework of the implementation of the Peace Agreement, they decided to send a joint mission to appeal to the United Nations Secretary General and the Security Council so that a positive reply can be given as quickly as possible, in the shape of a Resolution voted by the Security Council for the establishment and deployment of a Neutral International Force to Rwanda.

A. The deployment of such a Force is necessary and urgent because of the following main reasons:

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#### I- Political reasons:

- The people of Rwanda urge that the delay in the timetable of the implementation of the Peace Agreement be addressed promptly because, if it were to be further extended, that delay, especially in the establishment of Transitional Institutions, would make the whole Peace process collapse.
- The political good will that motivates both parties may be seriously undermined if Political Institutions are not put in place quickly.
- 3) The 50,000 fighters of the two parties still in their respective positions may end up violating the ceasefire because of nervousness due to their difficult living conditions if political decisions are not reached soon.

## II- Humanitarian reasons

- The return of the displaced persons in to their property can only take place after the disengagement of the forces currently deployed in war zones. The disengagement and mine clearing operations can only be supervised by the NIF;
- 2) The rainy season is again about to start while the displaced persons are still homeless despite the fact that the two parties have already reached a Peace Agreement;
- 3) Those displaced persons should be resettled as quickly as possible because, if they were to miss the planting season of September-October 1993, there is likely to be famine.
- 4) The repatriation of the Rwandese Refugees who are eager to come back to their motherland can only occur after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government responsible for planning and carrying out that repatriation. The establishment of that Government is closely linked with the deployment of the NIF as seen above.
- 5) The beginning of the school year in September-October, 1993 must be effective otherwise school children living in the areas affected by the war will miss school for the fourth year in a row with a real risk for them to become illiterate. There is another category of school-age children who have not been able to start school for three consecutive years.

#### III- Economic reasons

The disengagement of the Armed Forces of the two parties shall allow the reopening and use of the Transit Roads of the Northern Corridor (Mombasa-Kampala-Kigali-Bujumbura), and thus contribute to boosting trade within the region

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#### B- Size of the NIF

The size (numbers) of the NIF should be determined in relation with the following factors:

- The importance and complexity of the missions ascribed to the NIF;
- 2) The hilly landscape of Rwanda which makes mobility extremely difficult;
- 3) The big numbers of the armies of the two parties (over 50,000 troops) whose disengagement, demobilization and integration must be supervised;
- 4) The presence of one RPF battalion in Kigali and thus the danger of bringing the soldiers of the two armies together in the Capital City while they are not yet integrated may jeopardize the whole peace process as witnessed in other conflict regions. As a result the presence of a Neutral International Force with sufficient personnel in Kigali is appropriate.

### C- Duration of the NIF mission in Rwanda

The Transition period shall last twenty-two (22)  $\chi$  months.

However there may be possibilities of considering the deployment modalities and disengagement modalities (end of the mission) in two stages for either case.

## 1) Deployment

In order to avoid further delay in the establishment of Transitional Institutions, it is suggested to deploy as soon as possible the first elements of the NIF and, if possible, by end of September or early October, 1993.

The other contingents would be deployed a little bit later in order to strengthen the first contingents and thus help them carry out all the missions ascribed to the NIF.

#### 2) Disengagement of the NIF

The end of the mission of the NIF may be viewed in two stages:

- Great reduction of personnel may occur at the end of the integration process of the armed forces of the two parties as well as at the end of the demobilization process.
- The rest of the reduced personnel may be kept in place until general elections to be organized at the end of the Transitional Period.

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#### D- CONCLUSION

The Joint Mission Government of Rwanda - Rwandese Patriotic Front, considering the insistent request of the people of Rwanda pleading for the establishment of those Transitional Institutions responsible for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, appeals for the understanding of both the UN Secretary General and Security Council, and submits to them the following request:

- 1) The Security Council urgently adopt a resolution favorable to a <u>rapid</u> deployment of the Neutral International Force in Rwanda;
- 2) To envisage a gradual deployment of the personnel of the NIF whose first elements would be expected in Rwanda before October 10, 1993.
- 3) As provided for in Article 53 of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of Armed Forces of the two parties, the members of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) should be incorporated within the first elements of the NIF (the NMOG offers the advantage of having one company currently present in Rwanda).

Done in New York, September 16, 1993.

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