9-5-1992

Psychoanalytic Object-Relations Theory and Western Orthodox Theology: Toward an Integrative Dialogue

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Presented to the Faculty of
George Fox College
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Psychology
in Clinical Psychology

Newberg, Oregon
September 5, 1992

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Abstract

This is a study of humankind from the perspectives of a representative from psychology, the psychoanalytic British object-relations physician and psychoanalyst, William Ronald Dodds Fairbairn, M.D. (1889 to 1965), and from theology, the Western Orthodox Christian Dominican theologian and Doctor of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P. (Order of Preachers) (1225 to 1274).

These theorist/practitioners share a common scientific and philosophical method dedicated to the discovery of reality under God. Each believed that a person's nature is relationally based. Both believed that the person is a psyche and *soma*, a psychological and biological, unity. Each believed that turning from real relationship and turning to less real relationship is against the nature of the person, separating the

person from reality, splitting one in one's devotion, and thus causing detrimental psychological, or spiritual, consequences.

This author asserts that the concept of relationship is the key to a psychoanalytic object-relations theoretical and Thomistic theological understanding of the human personality. It also posits that this concept of relationship may serve as an integration point between psychology and theology.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Focus

Broad Focus

The study of humankind is undertaken by various disciplines such as medicine, nursing, sociology, psychology, and theology. Each has a different and helpful perspective. Taken together, these fields offer a wide perspective. Put together, these field are powerful resources for explaining and improving human life. It seems natural to compare and contrast views from distinct areas of study to augment and synergize findings. A goal of this paper is to show the inherent congruity of psychology and theology and the efficacy each holds toward explaining human living.

A cry is heard from the field of psychology to return to scientific standards of practice. "Clinical psychology has no standards of practice. . . . How is

competence to be judged in the absence of standards? . . . In the meantime, enthusiasm for licensure, designation, and other professionally competitive maneuvers continues unabated" (Sechrest, 1992, p. 682). Defining what is scientific and what is not is fundamental to this task. Needed are scientifically strong clinicians, experimenters, and theoreticians. But also fundamental are the assumptions and the logical methodology employed. For this, sound philosophical minds are needed.

Howard (1985) believes that to build a science of psychology, values are crucial. Commenting on Mahatma Ghandi's statement that one of the seven sins of the world is "science without humanity," Howard heralds the call to "construct a science of humans built upon an image of humanity that reflects and reveres human nature in all its diversity, complexity, and subtlety" (p. 264). Those professing a religious world view have special reason to pursue with integrity a value based science of psychology.

This paper is an investigation of one representative from the world of psychology and one from that of theology. Represented are two men who,

in some measure, met the challenge of Sechrest and Howard. One was a rigorous clinical and theoretical scientist with sound philosophical and theological training. The other was a theologian whose philosophical mind and dedication to empirical reality is unsurpassed. One was a psychiatrist of the 20th century. The other was a theologian of the 13th century. If commonalities exist between this pair separated by seven centuries, all the more timeless the truths would prove to be.

Narrower Focus

For this paper the focus in the area of psychology is clinical psychology and the focus in theology is Christianity. Further, the spotlight is narrowed within psychology to psychoanalytic British object-relations theory and within theology to Western Orthodox Christianity. The following figure may clarify these domains and subclassifications.

Figure 1. Focus of the paper.

Psychology	**Theology**
Clinical Psychology	Christianity
Psychoanalysis	Western Tradition
British Object-Relations	Western Orthodoxy
W. R. D. Fairbairn	Thomas Aquinas

As representative of psychoanalytic British object-relations theory, the subject is the Scottish physician and psychoanalyst, William Ronald Dodds Fairbairn, M.D. (1889 to 1965).[1] As representative of Western Orthodox Christianity, the choice is the Italian Dominican theologian and Doctor of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P. (Order of Preachers) (1225 to 1274). Each was a foundational theorist, who, though standing on the shoulders of great minds, Freud for

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[1]In this paper, Fairbairn's spelling of the term "object-relations," which he coined, is retained instead of the North American spelling which is without the hyphen.

for Fairbairn and Aristotle and the Church Fathers for Aquinas, themselves advanced their discipline to such a degree that their work has laid a firm foundation upon which current thinkers continue to build.

It is posited here that a careful reading and analysis of the work of W. R. D. Fairbairn, paired with an examination of the data of Thomistic theology, will bring to light the significance each holds for the other. Fairbairn's theory has particular application for psychodynamic therapists professing a religious, and especially a Christian, world view. Aquinas' works have been the cornerstone of much Christian thinking throughout the ages.

Method

Integration

Attempts at integrating theology and psychology can be hampered by a lack of conceptualization regarding how this should be accomplished. Much of the disagreement and confusion swirl around methods and data far out on the practical end of the spectrum. Because these practical theological and psychological

considerations are derived from theory, they include within themselves any inconsistencies that existed in their theoretical foundations.

This is the reason for the journey back to some of the foundations of psychoanalytic object-relations theory and Western Orthodox Christian theology. Successful work here would have the effect of opening the door to further integration at the philosophical level, the result being a greater congeniality between these domains.

Scope

This paper is written for those interested in the theory and practice of psychology, particularly clinicians. There is an attempt to put theological concepts in "user friendly" terms. This is not a systematic rendering of these men's works but a topical exposition of key issues. Yet it is intended to be true to the meaning of the authors cited. It is written, not by an expert in, but by an admirer and devotee of psychoanalytic British object-relations and Thomistic thinking. The paper is not the tight formulation of a new integrative paradigm but a

dialogical foundation for further work toward that end. It is not meant as the last word, but as an introduction. It is not a destination point, but a point of departure.

This work attempts to represent the actual positions of Fairbairn and Aquinas. There is no concentrated attempt at proving their ideas, though this author supports their veracity in the main, but only at presenting them accurately and clearly. There is, however, an attempt to show the parallels between the thinking of Fairbairn and Aquinas.

The remainder of this chapter discusses reasons for the selection of Fairbairn and Aquinas as representatives of psychology and theology respectively. It then puts forth the thesis, with necessary definitions, and outlines the structure of the paper.

Why Fairbairn?

Five reasons may be given explaining the motivation to present Fairbairn's theory in particular. First, of all the models in existence, Fairbairn's is arguably one of the clearest and purest expression of the shift from the Freudian drive model

to a relational model (Mitchell, 1988, p. 2; Sutherland, 1989, p. 162). Second, until recently, his work has been overlooked in the psychoanalytic community due to the difficulty in extracting theory from his papers and the perceived closeness of his work with that of Melanie Klein.

A third reason for making Fairbairn's theory the focus of the first part of this study is his exposure and adherence to Christianity. A fourth reason is the influence of Fairbairn's theory upon present psychoanalytic theorists. Sutherland made the following remarkable claim.

> [Fairbairn] was the first to propose in a systematic manner the Copernican change of founding the psychoanalytic theory of human personality on the experiences within social relationships instead of on the discharge of instinctual tensions originating solely within the individual. (p. 162)

In expanding object-relations of the individual to couple and family therapy, David and Jill Scharff (1991) of the Washington School of Psychiatry pay homage to Fairbairn, setting much of the theoretical

base of their work upon the foundation of his original writings. Stephen Mitchell, Greenberg's co-author (1983), has written a 1988 volume that references Fairbairn extensively. Seinfeld's newly released book (1991) is described by Eigen in this way: "What is especially important is his emphasis on Fairbairn, whose work has not received the attention it deserves in this country. . . I have long felt the neglect of Fairbairn has left a hole in my understanding of many clinical problems . . ." (Eigen, 1991, pp. 4, 5).

Finally, Fairbairn's work is striking in its anticipation. Current infant research has served to confirm a great many of Fairbairn's observations. In fact, two decades before Mahler's landmark infant studies (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975), Fairbairn was calling attention to the importance of the early dyadic relationship. The work of Stern (1985) has also tended to reinforce the prescient aspect of Fairbairn's insights.

Why Aquinas?

Aquinas' work is of an immense intellectual force. He is credited with having written over 90 works, of which many were in multiple volumes. Few

theologians have been more dedicated to the application of philosophical principles to the arena of Christian faith, to the melding of faith and reason, than he. *Commonweal* has said that the partnership of faith and reason is the very heart and soul of Aquinas' writings, and his work on this issue is a "challenge to eradicate prejudice in favor of argument, an opportunity to discover the indissoluable partnership of the two" (Gilson, 1963, p. 386). As such, his work has been chosen here, first, because of his monumental intellectual effort in the area of subjective and objective reality, of sacred and secular, of faith and science.

In his work, *The Intellectual Life*, the Dominican A. G. Sertillanges has said, "The Church believes today, as she believed from the first, that Thomism is an ark of salvation, capable of keeping minds afloat in the deluge of doctrine" (Aquinas, 1981, foreword). In great measure, Western Christianity has been built on the foundation Aquinas has laid. Though by no means representing a view homogeneous to Western Christianity or Roman Catholicism, he is nonetheless a standard by which subsequent theologies are compared.

Orthodox Protestants are also reclaiming alignment with Aquinas as the prejudice against him, borne out of reformation enmity, has diminished (Geisler, 1975, p. 192)). A second reason Aquinas' work has been chosen here, then, is because it represents a large and weighty segment of history and thought in the Western Orthodox Christian tradition.

The third reason St. Thomas was chosen is because of his intense work on the psychology of humankind. Gardeil (1959) has written an entire work devoted to Thomistic psychology. Much contemporary thought concerning the science and philosophy of human being is based on Aquinas' solid concepts. Agreed or opposed, all who deal in the subject of psychology are forced to grapple with the very same issues he did.

Why Fairbairn and Aquinas?

The reason for including Aquinas in a comparison with Fairbairn is the commonality each has with the other. This is covered more fully in chapter four. These men were not only theorists but practitioners. Fairbairn and Aquinas both introduced a Copernican-like change to their discipline while holding firm to the traditional foundations. Each provided a

foundation upon which others have built. Each was passionately dedicated to the lifelong pursuit of truth as expressed in reality. Each integrated sacred and secular fields of study and applied it to his particular discipline.

Thesis

The proposition for consideration in this paper is that there is a most important commonality between these two men. The essential theme within Fairbairn's psychoanalytic object-relations theory, the primacy of relationship, is an already embedded thematic within Christian theology as espoused by Aquinas. In essence, the task is to expose a pre-existing state of affairs.

This dissertation asserts that the concept of relationship is the key to a psychoanalytic object-relations theoretical and Thomistic theological understanding of the human personality. Second, that this concept of relationship may serve as an integration point between psychology and theology. But before this can be further elucidated, a definition of terms is necessary.

Human relationship is the irreducible minimum, necessary basis, most fundamental need, the *sine qua non* of human existence. It gives ultimate meaning and supreme value to human life. Relationship is the primary motivation for human living. Fairbairn said that relationship is the significance of human living and that "psychology may be said to resolve itself into a study of the relationships of the individual to his objects . . ." (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60). Aquinas has said, "man's perfect good is that he somehow know God." (Aquinas, 1975b, p. 35; Aquinas, 1981, p.583; Gardeil, 1959, p. vii).

Definition. "Relationship" is defined as "the state or character of being related or interrelated: connection, as in 'show the relationship between two things'" (Webster, 1973). Secondly, it is defined by Webster as "kinship" and thirdly as a "state of affairs existing between things having relations or dealings, as in 'had a good relationship with his family.'" This dissertation focuses on the use of the word as applied to persons.

A "relation," here, is "the attitude or stance which two or more persons or groups assume toward one

another," or "the state of being mutually or reciprocally interested (as in social or commercial matters)" (Webster, 1973). A personal relation occurs when a person has an attitude, stance, or a state of being interested in another person. This attitude of interest implies some form of communication involving intellect and usually behavior.

Primacy of relationship. This paper is not speaking of the relationship between things, concepts, or places but relationship between persons, external and internal. In speaking of relationship between persons, it is not focusing on the proximity, chronicity, or biologic interaction between persons, though these do describe processes involved in personal relationship. Instead, this paper focuses on the subjective experience, the existential quality of personal relationship, not as a means to production of something, but as an end in itself. Relationship is the production. In this dissertation, use of the word "relationship" denotes this specialized meaning unless otherwise indicated.

Structure

The manner in which Fairbairn reoriented drive theory can be traced relatively easily throughout his papers. The method of investigating that transition here is to examine what Fairbairn had to say about *personality theory*. This will involve exposition with the hope of tapping into the essential idea Fairbairn pursued with vigor for so many years. Aquinas' thought will similarly be analyzed with regard to his understanding of the theological discipline of *anthropology*. The following simple figure shows this parallel relationship and structure of the paper.

Figure 2. Structure of the paper.

Fairbairn	**Aquinas**
Personality Theory	Anthropology

The plan of this paper is to delineate the nature of the relationship between psychoanalytic object-relations psychology and Western Orthodox Christian theology. Analysis of W. R. D. Fairbairn's writings

will constitute the second chapter of the paper, followed by an analysis of the relevant data from the theology of Thomas Aquinas in the third chapter. From these analyses will emerge a common principle that will act as a unifying theme for both domains. This is covered in the fourth chapter.

CHAPTER 2

PRIMACY OF RELATIONSHIP FOR FAIRBAIRN

Introduction to Fairbairn

This chapter is in two parts. The first part introduces W. R. D. Fairbairn's work and the method he employed in his psychoanalytic object-relations theory. The second part discusses his innovative formulations on personality theory. Three questions of personality theory will serve as the major divisions of the second part. What is a person? How is a person put together? Why is there a problem?

Work of Fairbairn

Literature Review

The following two categories will provide the structure of the literature review. The first is the literature most basic and foundational, consisting of Fairbairn's works. In the second section, the first applications of object-relations theory to theological

studies, Christianity in particular, will be investigated. These have been included for their contributions to the interdisciplinary dialogue addressed in this dissertation.

Fairbairn's Works. Sutherland's (1989) remarkable claim about Fairbairn bears repeating.

> He was the first to propose in a systematic manner the Copernican change of founding the psychoanalytic theory of human personality on the experiences within social relationships instead of on the discharge of instinctual tensions originating solely within the individual. (p. 162)

Sutherland's (1989) book, *Fairbairn's Journey into the Interior*, is an important biography which links Fairbairn's life with his work.

Fairbairn's volume *An Object-Relations Theory of the Personality* (1952a) is foundational in the sense that it traces his journey from acceptance of the assumptions underlying Freud's drive theory to a theory of object-relations based upon radically different assumptions. The volume contains the five papers embodying the working out of his new point of

view, in addition to three clinical papers and five miscellaneous papers.

"Schizoid Factors in the Personality" (1940), the first of the theoretical articles, describes Fairbairn's decision to analyze a group of patients not normally considered good candidates for psychoanalysis. Resident within these schizoid clients, noted Fairbairn, is the basic psychic condition shared by all persons, namely, the presence of splits in the ego.

Evident in Fairbairn's structural description is the influence of Melanie Klein, the main provider of the tools Fairbairn would require to reorient Freud's theory. Also important in this article is the attention Fairbairn called to the earliest dyadic relationship. From this relationship, he postulated, could be traced the early phenomenon of ego splitting.

"A Revised Psychopathology of the Psychoses and Psychoneuroses" (1941) could as well have been titled, "How the Splitting of the Ego Originated." Fairbairn's growing discontent with Freudian precepts is conspicuous here. His headline, "The Inherent Limitations of Libido Theory", is telling.

Essentially, Fairbairn "recasted" orthodox libido theory based upon what he considered the proper unit of study. It is "high time", he wrote, that classical theory be transformed into "a theory of development based essentially upon object-relationships" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 31).

In the third of the theory articles, "The Repression and Return of Bad Objects" (1943), Fairbairn continued reworking the drive theory assumptions he was finding untenable. He critiques orthodox theory in terms of twentieth-century physics, proposing a theory of dynamic structure he finds more synchronous with the science of his day.

The cogency of Fairbairn's theory comes into clear view in this article in his description of repetition compulsion. While Freud had to go "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" for his rationale, the explanatory power of Fairbairn's theory is clearly demonstrated. In addition, Fairbairn begins to detail his notion of the ego.

"Endopsychic Structure Considered in Terms of Object-Relationships" (1944), the fourth article, intends, as the title implies, to offer a replacement

for Freud's tripartite structural theory. The lengthiest of Fairbairn's articles, it traces the process and mechanics of ego splitting. But while his writing becomes increasingly technical and involved, an ever-present aspect of his theory comes clear, i.e., the personal nature of the early mother-infant relationship.

He goes on to say that central to object-relations theory is the person and his or her relationships. This is in contradistinction to Freud's emphasis on the organism and its processes. Fairbairn is attempting to account for psychological conflict at the personal level. Freud's explanations, by virtue of their underlying assumptions, necessarily took him outside the personal domain.

The fifth of Fairbairn's main papers, "Object-Relationships and Dynamic Structure" (1946), continues to develop lines of thought begun in earlier writings. His main thesis is summarized by a female patient who protested, "You're always talking about my wanting this and that desire satisfied; but what I really want is a father" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 137). Other contrasts between his theories and Freud's are

enumerated, with Fairbairn's conveyance of due respect for Freud in spite of their central points of difference. Fairbairn here declares that "Freud's whole system of thought was concerned with object-relationships" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 149). Fairbairn believed the difference between Freud and himself was in how each accounted for object-relationships.

Object-relations applied to theology. Harry Guntrip, a protegee of Fairbairn, is especially qualified to discuss the relationship between Fairbairn's theory of object-relations and religious issues. Trained in religion and philosophy (like Fairbairn), clergyman Guntrip became enamored with Fairbairn's theory, and saw in it the needed corrective to drive theory.

Though his representation of Fairbairn's theory has been criticized by some, Guntrip has done a service not only by calling attention to the significance of Fairbairn's work, but by seizing upon the reason it is significant. In his *Personality Structure and Human Interaction: The Developing Synthesis of Psychodynamic Theory* (1977), the stated theme is to trace the way in which psychoanalysis has

"outgrown its origins in a neuropsychological and psychobiological philosophy of man, using the instinct concept as the basis of theory, into a truly psychodynamic theory of the personality implying a philosophy of man that takes account of his reality as an individual person" (p. 17). Guntrip believed Fairbairn's object-relations theory represented that truly psychodynamic theory into which psychoanalysis was growing. Guntrip (1977), commented on Fairbairn's integration of religion and psychology:

> For Fairbairn religion is an impressive activity and experience of human beings . . . and is to be approached . . . with sympathetic insight in order to understand what human beings have actually been seeking and doing in their religious life, . . . religion provides a more illuminating analogy to the aims and processes of psychotherapy than either science or education do. He [Fairbairn] even recognizes no inconsiderable part of psycho-dynamic theory implicit, if not yet scientifically formulated, in religious concepts. . . . Fairbairn's interest in the psychology of religion is one

> expression of his fundamental concern with 'object-relationships' as the substance of human living. (pp. 252, 253)

Another clinician influenced by Fairbairn's works is Ana-Maria Rizzuto. Her book, *The Birth of the Living God* (1979), attempts to trace "the genesis of a person's representation of God" in the course of development and how the person uses that representation during the life cycle (p. viii). Her review of the psychoanalytic literature includes both Klein and Fairbairn, whose theoretical constructs provide a useful way of viewing an important aspect of religious behavior. W. W. Meissner, an endorser of Rizzuto's book, has contributed in this same arena. *Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience* (1984) marks his effort to bring about a rapprochement between these two domains. Meissner mainly calls upon the contributions of Winnicott (1971), a contemporary of Fairbairn's.

John McDargh (1983) has provided a comprehensive example of object-relations perspectives informing religious thought, with *Psychoanalytic Object-relations Theory and the Study of Religion: On Faith*

and the Imaging of God. He regards the contributions of Fairbairn as foundational for any study concerned with these two disciplines. His colleague, Jones (1991), a clinical psychologist and professor of religion, wrote *Contemporary Psychoanalysis and Religion*, drawing from more recent object-relations theorists in addition to Fairbairn.

His Thought

Fairbairn himself summed up his theory in his 1958 article, "On the Nature and Aims of Psycho-Analytical Treatment" (p. 374).

> In brief, my theoretical position may be said to be characterized by four main conceptual formulations:--viz. (a) a theory of dynamic psychical structure, (b) a theory to the effect that libidinal activity is inherently and primarily object-seeking, (c) a resulting theory of libidinal development couched, not in terms of presumptive zonal dominance, but in terms of the quality of dependence, and (d) a theory of the personality couched exclusively in terms of internal object-relationships.

Fairbairn goes on to say that he sees the first two of these to be a substitute for Freud's classic libido theory and final theory of instincts. The third he views as a revision of Abraham's version of Freud's theory of libidinal development. Fairbairn means for the fourth to replace Freud's description of the mental structure of id, ego, and superego.

> This last [fourth] has assumed the form of a description in terms of a libidinal ego, a central ego and an antilibidinal ego, together with their respective internal objects; and the basic endopsychic situation so constituted is conceived as resulting from the splitting of an original, inherent, unitary ego and of the object originally introjected by it. (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 374)

This brief overview precedes the more detailed account of Fairbairn's work in the following sections. The next section is meant to provide the reader with an introduction to the scientific method Fairbairn employed in his clinical and theoretical work.

Method of Fairbairn

Writing Style

Several challenges and privileges meet the Fairbairn researcher. One, is that he himself said of his major work that he is offering "not the systematic elaboration of an already established point of view, but the progressive development of a line of thought" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 133). His work is a collection of papers and so, as with Freud, one is enabled to re-live the unfolding of the issues with which he grappled.

Fairbairn wrote in an analytical and systematized manner, compressing many concepts into few words. In poetry, the qualities of brevity, aesthetics, and logical permutations and combinations are integral to the powerful creative force of the work. Perhaps Fairbairn's background in philosophy and theology, like that of the poet T. S. Eliot, helps give his writing its depth. Something of the dynamic of Fairbairn's work is in his style. It is his very preciseness and incisiveness on *major* issues in personality theory which has made history. He has done so with great clarity and impact.

Psycho-analytic Science

Fairbairn deals with the methodology of psychoanalysis in his 1952, 1955, and 1958 articles. In his 1958 paper, he begins by quoting his 1955 article's view of *science in general*. He says that science is

> 'essentially an intellectual tool and nothing more.' From this point of view, scientific truth, so far from providing an (even approximately) accurate picture of reality as it exists, is *'simply explanatory truth;' and the 'picture of reality provided by science is an intellectual construct representing the fruits of an attempt to describe the various phenomena of the universe, in as coherent and systematic a manner as the limitations of human intelligence permit, by means of the formulation of general laws established by inductive inference under conditions of maximum emotional detachment and objectivity on the part of the scientific observer* [italics original].' (p. 376)

Farther along in this article he gives his view of the particular science in which he admits operating--*psychological science*.

> 'Where psychological science is concerned, a certain difficulty arises owing to the fact that the subjective aspects of the phenomena studied are as much part of the phenomena as the objective aspects, and are actually more important; and the subjective aspects can only be understood in terms of the subjective experience of the psychologist himself.' (Fairbairn, 1958, pp. 376, 377)

He then says that the psychologist must adopt as detached and objective a stance as possible, with respect to his own experience and the experience of those he observes. He posits that this has particular application to those involved in "*psycho-analytical science*." He notes that the psycho-analyst (his spelling) is not primarily a scientist but a psychotherapist and as such is involved a departure from the scientific method. Being a psychotherapist implies that the value of being free of symptoms is better than being dominated by them, whereas being a

scientist does not. Taking on the therapeutic role necessarily involves "'the acceptance of human values other than the explanatory value which is the sole value accepted by science'" (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 377).

Even still, Fairbairn claims that object-relations (his spelling) theory, with its emphasis on the real relationship between the therapist and patient, provides a psychology which "not only promotes therapeutic aims more effectively than the predominantly 'impulse-psychology' formulated by Freud, but actually corresponds more closely to the psychological facts and possesses a greater explanatory value from a purely scientific standpoint" (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 377).

How is psycho-analysis science? Fairbairn says the technique itself constitutes a valid experimental method. The limitations imposed are not those inherent in the method but from the commitment to the humanitarian values of being therapeutic. Based on the technique of free association, the phenomenon of transference, and the inference of a present inner reality, Fairbairn says

> the analytical session may now be seen to satisfy the experimental requirement of providing an opportunity for (to quote Ezriel) 'the observation of *here and now* [italics original] phenomena in situations which allow us to test whether a number of defined conditions will produce a certain predicted event' (Ezriel, 1951, p. 30). (Fairbairn, 1952, p. 127)

The preceding introduction to Fairbairn's method is meant to serve as a guide to assessing and appreciating the content, reliability, and validity of his work. The following section, the second part of this chapter, deals with Fairbairn's concept of the person, his theory of personality.

Personality Theory

This section presents Fairbairn's view of what a person is (nature), how a person is put together (manner), and why there is a problem for the person (reason). Webster's first definition of "nature" is "the inherent character or basic constitution of a person or thing: essence" (1973, p. 766). By "manner"

is meant the way or method, according to Webster, in which a person is structured (Webster, 1973, p. 700). "Reason" is defined by Webster as "a statement offered in explanation or justification" (1973, p. 962). The first part, then, discusses the person' nature as object seeking, the second speaks of the manner in which a person is structured as a pristine mind/body unity, and the third shows the reason there is a problem, namely, that of splits in the ego.

What is a Person--Nature?

Introduction

To understand Fairbairn, one must start with Freud. The following is Guntrip's (1973) rendering of an aspect of connection between the two.

> Freud's ideas fall into two main groups, (1) the id-plus-ego-control apparatus, and (2) the Oedipus complex of family object-relationship situations with their reappearance in treatment as transference and resistance. The first group of ideas tends to picture the psyche as a mechanism, an impersonal arrangement for securing detensioning, a homeostatic organization. The

> second group tends toward a personal psychology of the influence people have on each other's lives, particularly parents on children. (p. 28)
>
> In the 1940s and early 1950s Fairbairn did call his work object-relationships theory, implying not a new theory, but a deliberate emphasis on the personal side of Freud's theory of parent-child (Oedipal) relations. . . . Object-relations is not a school of thought but a broad stream of thought, a steadily developing concentration on "the personal ego in object-relations. (p. 24)

Relationship Seeking

Briefly stated, Fairbairn believed that life begins with the need for relationship, that a child's need for an object in the beginning is the motivation for development. It is the internalization of experience with the primary caregiver (object) that constitutes the vicissitudes of life.

Fairbairn (1952a), in his 1940 paper on schizoid factors, describes the first outworking of this drive for relationship in the infant.

> The child's oral relationship with his mother in the situation of suckling represents his first experience of a love relationship, and is, therefore, the foundation upon which all his future relationships with love objects are based. It also represents his first experience of a social relationship; and it therefore forms the basis of his subsequent attitude to society. (pp. 60, 61)

Guntrip (1989) speaks of the shift in psychoanalytic thinking that this represented in terms of libido.

> Fairbairn's object-relations theory arose out of his study of schizoid problems, and throws much light on the schizoid's 'life inside himself.' He laid it down that the goal of the individual's libido is not pleasure, or merely subjective gratification, but the object itself. He says: 'Pleasure is the sign-post to the object' (1952a, p. 33). The fundamental fact about human nature is our libidinal drive towards good object-relationships. The key biological formula is the adaptation of the organism to the environment.

> The key psychological formula is the relationship of the person to the human environment. *The significance of human living lies in object-relationships, and only in such terms can our life be said to have meaning, for without object-relations the ego itself cannot develop* [italics original]. (pp. 19, 20)

Fairbairn says that this theory of object-relationships is not such a revolutionary step in psychoanalytic theory because many of the writings of Freud himself take for granted that libido is specifically object-seeking. Fairbairn quotes from page 95 of Freud's 1930 work, *Civilization and its Discontents*, which refers to Freud's original theory of instincts, though the distinction here made by Freud was later abandoned by him with his concept of narcissism.

> Thus first arose the contrast between ego instincts and object instincts. For the energy of the latter instincts and exclusively for them I introduced the term libido; an antithesis was then formed between the ego instincts and the libidinal instincts directed towards them. . . .

> Love seeks for objects. (Freud quoted in Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 83)

Fairbairn (1952a) plots his course toward a theory emphasizing the personal, relational side to psychoanalysis in his 1941 paper, "A Revised Psychopathology of the Psychoses and Neuroses." There, his first statement to this end starts by paying homage to Freud's libido theory yet moves on to propose a different one.

> The historical importance of the libido theory and the extent to which it has contributed to the advance of psychoanalytical knowledge requires no elaboration; and the merit of the theory has been proved by its heuristic value alone.
>
> Nevertheless, it would appear as if the point had now been reached at which, in the interests of progress, the classic libido theory would have to be transformed into *a theory of development based essentially upon object-relationships* [italics original]. The great limitation of the present libido theory as an explanatory system resides in the fact that it confers the status of libidinal attitudes upon various manifestations which turn

> out to be merely *techniques for regulating the object-relationships of the ego* [italics original]. The libido theory is based, of course, upon the conception of erotogenic zones. It must be recognized, however, that in the first instance erotogenic zones are simply channels through which libido flows, and that a zone only becomes erotogenic when libido flows through it. *The ultimate goal of libido is the object* [italics original]: . . . (p. 31)

He goes on to explain that, in its search for the object, libido, operating like the laws which determine the flow of electricity, takes the path of least resistance, the erotogenic zone being considered the path of least resistance. In infancy, this path is the mouth, whereas in maturity, it is the genitals. "The real point about the mature individual is not that the libidinal attitude is essentially genital, but that the genital attitude is essentially libidinal" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 32).

> At the same time, it must be stressed that it is not in virtue of the fact that the genital level has been reached that object-relationships are

> satisfactory. On the contrary, it is in virtue of the fact that satisfactory object-relationships have been established that true genital sexuality is attained. (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 32)

Two years after the 1941 paper on revised psychopathology, Fairbairn wrote "The Repression and the Return of the Bad Objects (with special reference to the 'War Neuroses')." In it, he declares that, "the time is now ripe for a psychology of object-relationships" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60). He goes on to say that

> psychology may be said to resolve itself into a study of the relationships of the individual to his objects, whilst, in similar terms, psychopathology may be said to resolve itself more specifically into a study of the relationships of the ego to its internalized objects. (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60)[2]

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[2]More will be said about internalized objects in the succeeding sections of this paper.

Thus Fairbairn affirmed a different thrust to psychoanalytic theory, the primacy of relationship as the substance of human living. The next section here looks more closely at how a person is structured, psyche and soma, mind and body, in order to seek relationship.

How is a Person put together for Relationship--the Manner?

Introduction

The previous section on the nature of the person alluded several times to a person's erotogenic, biological functions (soma, body) as well as to the object seeking, psychological workings (psyche, mind). How does Fairbairn see these interrelating? And is there essential unity in the self from birth, especially in the psyche? This is the subject broached in what follows here.

Mind-Body Unity

As regards the question of whether there is unity in the psyche of a new born, Fairbairn would answer yes, listing as his first theoretical assumption concerning the self, that the pristine personality of

the child consists of a unitary dynamic ego.[3] This is in contradistinction to Freud who conceived of the ego as a structure which is essentially acquired (and not pristine), constituting, in essence, a modification. Freud said the ego originated as a structure which develops in the psyche to regulate id impulses in relation to the reality of the outside world.

> Thus it is an integral feature of Freud's description of 'the ego' that this structure is essentially a defensive (and not, like my 'original ego', an inherent) structure; and it would appear to follow that Freud's 'ego' is founded upon a basis which is essentially psychopathological. (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 375)

Fairbairn (1954) explains his method of describing the endopsychic situation in contrast to Freud's with a comparison to methods in physics.

> The conception of this basic endopsychic situation provides an alternative, couched in

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[3]Fairbairn later agreed with Guntrip that 'self' was a better term than 'ego' and so the two are used interchangeably in this paper (Scharff, 1990).

> terms of personal relationships and dynamic ego-structure, to Freud's description of the psyche in terms of id, ego and super-ego, based as this is upon a Helmholtzian divorce of energy from structure no longer accepted in physics, and combined as it is, albeit at the expense of no little inconsistency, with a non-personal psychology conceived in terms of biological instincts and erotogenic zones. (p. 109)

Fairbairn believes that what classical Freudian metapsychology does is to take the human person

> who *is* [italics original] energy operating in directional ways (toward objects) and to superimpose upon that human process an artificial distinction between the activities and the energy presumed to be fueling them. . . . one is left with a set of energyless structures (the ego) and a pool of structureless energy (the id). . . . For Fairbairn, . . . Ego structures have energy--*are* [italics original] energy--and that energy is structured and directed toward objects from the start. (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 155)

Thus, it is argued by Fairbairn that the ego is an integrated structure from the outset. He says that this conception is in conformity with the trend of biological science which says that the organism is conceived as a "patterned structure which functions as a whole in the absence of disintegrating influences" (Fairbairn, 1955, p. 149).

A year subsequent to the 1943 paper on the return of the bad objects, Fairbairn wrote, "Endopsychic Structure Considered in Terms of Object-Relationships." Herein he articulates some of the intricacies of the relationship between the psychical phenomenon of object-relationships and the somatic realities of instincts and impulses.

> The limitations of impulse psychology make themselves felt in a very practical sense within the therapeutic field; for, whilst to reveal the nature of his 'impulses' to a patient by painstaking analysis is one proposition, to enable him to know what to do with these 'impulses' is quite another. What an individual shall do with his 'impulses' is clearly a problem of object-relationships. . . . In a word

> 'impulses' cannot be considered apart from the endopsychic structures which they energize and the object-relationships which they enable these structures to establish; and, equally, 'instincts' cannot profitably be considered as anything more than forms of energy which constitute the dynamic of such endopsychic structures. (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 84, 85)

This formulation would suggest that the biological is substantially in the service of the psyche, to promote its ends of object seeking. But it is not a slave relationship, as if one ruled the other, but a cooperation, a unity of mind and body relating. Fairbairn says it is not, as Freud believed, that the ego regulates id impulses in relation to the reality of the outside world but that the ego is the source of impulse-tension from the beginning. "No 'impulses' can be regarded as existing in the absence of an ego structure, it will no longer be possible to preserve any psychological distinction between the id and the ego" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 88). In other words, the person starts out with a pristine, unitary structure, with its own dynamic impulses

originating from within the ego itself, not with impulses acting on it from another structure (id).

> This inclusion of the id in the ego will, of course, leave essentially unaffected Freud's conception of the *function* [italics original] served by the 'ego' in regulating the discharge of impulse-tension in deference to the conditions of outer reality. It will, however, involve the view that 'impulses' are oriented towards reality, and thus to some extent determined by the 'reality principle', from the very beginning. (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 88, 89)

Cooperative Unity of Mind/Body Seen in Development

Development of pysche and soma is coordinated and parallel, according to Fairbairn. He sees the physical, erotogenic zones as providing pathways for meeting the psychical, object-seeking needs. Naturally, these zones develop in maturity on a biological timetable. That they are employed in a psychologically mature way is not a psychical given. For example, Fairbairn would say that true genital sexuality is not attained just by reaching the biological stage of genital development but when

satisfactory object-relationships have been established. It is the coordination of the technique (erotogenic zone) with the goal of object seeking (psychological reality) which constitutes healthy development. The libidinal technique does not determine the object-relationship. It is the object-relationship which determines the libidinal technique.

The function of libidinal pleasure is essentially to provide a sign-post to the object. To say the opposite, that the object is a sign-post to libidinal pleasure, is to put the cart before the horse and mistake technique for a primary libidinal manifestation. Fairbairn (1952a, pp. 33, 34) shows the difference in these two ways of thinking in answering the question, 'Why does a baby suck his/her thumb?' He says that if one answers that the baby's mouth is an erotogenic zone and sucking provides him/her with erotic pleasure, one is missing the point.

A further question need be asked, 'Why the thumb?' Fairbairn would answer, 'Because there is no breast to suck.' "Even the baby must have a libidinal object; and, if he is deprived of his natural object

(the breast), he is driven to provide an object for himself" (1952a, pp. 33, 34). Fairbairn goes on to comment on autoerotism, that it is fundamentally a "technique whereby the individual seeks not only to provide for himself what he cannot obtain from the object, but to provide for himself an object which he cannot obtain" (1952a, pp. 33, 34).

Of development, then, Fairbairn says, "*the whole course of libidinal development depends upon the extent to which objects are incorporated and the nature of the techniques which are employed to deal with incorporated objects* [italics original]" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 34).

> The development of object-relationships is essentially a process whereby infantile dependence upon the object gradually gives place to mature dependence upon the object. This process is characterized (a) by the gradual abandonment of an original object-relationship based upon primary identification, and (b) by the gradual adoption of an object-relationship based upon differentiation of the object. The gradual change which occurs in the nature of the object-

> relationship is accompanied by a gradual change in libidinal aim, whereby an original oral, sucking, incorporating and predominantly 'taking' aim comes to be replaced by a mature, non-incorporating and predominantly 'giving' aim compatible with developed genital sexuality. (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 34, 35)

Fairbairn charted the development of object-relationships, their accompanying erotogenic zones, and their natural objects (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 38-41). This scheme is represented in the following figure.

Figure 3. Development of object relationships.

Developmental Stage	**Characterized by**	**Object**
1. Infantile Dependence	•attitude of taking •incorporating	
a. Early Oral	•suck or reject (pre-ambivalent)	•breast of mother (part object)
b. Late Oral	•sucking or biting (ambivalent)	•mother w/ breast (whole obj treated as part obj)
2. Transition between Infantile Dependence and Mature Dependence, or Stage of Quasi-Independence	•dichotomy and exteriorization of incorporated obj	•person (whole obj treated as contents)

(figure continues)

Figure 3--Continued

3. Mature Dependence	•attitude of giving •accepted and rejected objects exteriorized	•person (whole obj with genital organs)

Maturity, that is, mature dependence, is not seen as the state of not needing others. In his 1941 article, Fairbairn (1952a) contrasts this stage with infantile dependence.

> It is true, of course, that mature individuals are likewise dependent upon one another for the satisfaction of their psychological, no less than their physical, needs. Nevertheless, on the psychological side, the dependence of mature individuals is not unconditional. By contrast, the very helplessness of the child is sufficient to render him dependent in an unconditional sense. . . . His psychological dependence is further accentuated by the very nature of his object-relationships; for, as we have seen, this is based essentially upon identification. . . . Identification may thus be regarded as representing the persistence into extra-uterine life of a relationship that existed before birth. In so far as identification persists after birth, the individual's object constitutes not only his world, but also himself; and it is to this fact, as has already been pointed out, that we must

> attribute the compulsive attitude of many schizoid and depressive individuals towards their objects. . . . Normal development is characterized by a process whereby progressive differentiation of the object is accompanied by a progressive decrease in identification. (p. 47)

In infantile dependence, the conflict of the early stage is 'to suck or not to suck,' that is, 'to love or not to love.' This underlies the schizoid state. The conflict of the late oral stage is 'to suck or bite,' that is, 'to love or to hate.' This underlies the depressive state. "The great problem of the schizoid individual is how to love without destroying by love, whereas the great problem of the depressive individual is how to love without destroying by hate" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 49).

In order to defend against the schizoid or depressive position, several techniques are used in the transitional stage. Each technique is a specific method for dealing with the conflict of the transitional stage, a conflict between the developmental urge to advance to an attitude of mature dependence on the object and a regressive reluctance

to abandon the attitude of infantile dependence on the object (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 38). They are not utilized in any order and may operate in combination.

These techniques are put in chart form by Fairbairn and are presented below (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 43-46). It should also be noted that each object, the accepted and rejected object, is an internal object. "Internalized" means the person sees the object as *in* himself/herself. "Externalized" means the person sees the object as *outside* himself/herself.

Figure 4. Transitional stage techniques.

Technique	**Accepted Obj**	**Rejected Obj**
Obsessional	Internalized	Internalized
Paranoid	Internalized	Externalized
Hysterical	Externalized	Internalized
Phobic	Externalized	Externalized

As can be seen, this account of the unitary ego, the interplay between psyche and soma, and the course of development is not the whole story in the life of an individual. Introduced above is the idea of externalizing and internalizing internal objects in the transitional stage and identifying in the oral stages, the object even being perceived as the infant himself/herself. Although Fairbairn states that the newborn has a pristine, unitary, and inherently object-seeking ego, with the psyche and soma operating together through developmental stages and their appropriate erotogenic connections, he also observes a problem occurring which disturbs this course. The

reason why there is a problem is the subject of the next section.

Why is there a Problem in Relationship--the Reason?

Introduction

According to Fairbairn, life begins with the need for a relationship. The child's need for an object in the beginning is the motivation for development. The internalization of experience with the mother, the primary object, is that which constitutes the vicissitudes of life. It is the struggle to take in that experience and also to be one's own self, that is, to keep out aspects of the experience, to be autonomous, that determines development.

In the beginning, the child takes in the pre-ambivalent object. The only option is to take in or leave out, accept or reject. Then the child splits out what is too painful to be borne in consciousness. So splitting is the first organizing phenomenon, and it happens as a defense against painful experience, the mother who is not there when the infant needs her. This is the reason why there is a problem in development--splitting of the ego (Scharff, 1990). An

explanation of this phenomenon follows under the next sub-heading.

The following figure on Fairbairn's ego structure is provided as a guide to the subsequent material. It is a rendering of Fairbairn's ego structure with the direction of repression indicated by arrows (Scharff & Scharff, 1991, March).

Figure 5. Structure of the ego.



Split in Integrity of Relating

Fairbairn (1952a) explains his theory of splitting in his 1954 article. The pristine personality of the child consists of a unitary and dynamic ego. The first defense employed by the original ego to deal with unsatisfying personal relationship is mental internalization, introjection, of the unsatisfying object. Jill Savage Scharff says that introjection

> is a way of dealing with an object that feels bad, by taking it inside and controlling it there by pushing it out of consciousness. This mechanism leaves good aspects of the object uncontaminated by the more troublesome exciting and rejecting aspects. (1992, p. 57)

The unsatisfying object has two disturbing aspects, an exciting aspect and a rejecting aspect. The second defense used by the ego is to reject and split-off from the internalized object two elements--one representing its exciting aspect and one

representing its rejecting aspect.[4] David Scharff (1990) gives as an example of the exciting object, or the object excessively excitative of need, the mother who offered ice cream when milk would have done better, the mother who hovers too close because she is afraid of separation from the infant. She is always inducing the feeling that she must be needed, or why would she hover so closely?

The internalized object is therefore split into three objects: exciting object, rejecting object, and the nucleus which remains after these elements have been split-off. This residual nucleus represents the relatively satisfying, tolerable, aspect of the internalized object. It is therefore not rejected by the ego but remains actively cathected. It is called the ideal object. Scharff (1990) calls this the "good enough object." The rejection and splitting-off of the exciting and rejecting objects constitute an act of "direct and primary repression" on the part of the

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[4]"Repression and splitting of the ego represent simply two aspects of the same fundamental process" (Fairbairn, 1954, p. 106).

ego. Since the exciting and rejecting objects remain cathected while in the process of being repressed, their repression involves a splitting-off from the substance of the ego of two portions of the ego. These portions represent the respective cathexes of the two repressed objects.

The splitting-off of these two portions of the ego from its remaining central portion represents an act of "direct and secondary repression" on the part of the central portion. The resulting endopsychic situation is one in which there is a central ego cathecting the ideal object as an acceptable internal object and two split-off and repressed ego-structures, each cathecting a repressed internal object. Fairbairn called the repressed ego-structure cathecting the exciting object, the libidinal ego, and the repressed ego-structure cathecting the rejecting object, the antilibidinal ego.[5]

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[5]The name Fairbairn first used for the repressed ego-structure cathecting the rejecting object was the "internal saboteur" instead of the "antilibidinal ego." Scharff (1990) says that this was his more

The name, "antilibidinal ego," is used on the grounds that the repressed ego-structure so designated, being in alliance with the rejecting object, has aims inherently hostile to those of the libidinal ego in its alliance with the exciting object. Being a dynamic structure, the antilibidinal ego implements its hostility to the aims of the libidinal ego by subjecting the libidinal ego to a sustained aggressive and persecutory attack which supports the repression already exercised against it by the central ego, and which it thus seems appropriate to describe as a process of "indirect repression."

This indirect repression, where the antilibidinal, rejecting complex attacks the libidinal, need exciting complex, is seen in clinical settings. Scharff (1990) notes that couples act this out, coming in fighting like cats and dogs, yet not wanting a divorce. The anger is magnified to cover up

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clinical description while "antilibidinal ego" was the term he devised later when trying to smooth out his theoretical formulation with a clean symmetry.

this very painful longing. In this sense there is nothing as painful as unrequited longing for each other. These are people who have not been able to feel that their longing will be able to get a loving satisfaction from each other and they fight in order to subdue it, to keep down this unrequited longing.

Although direct and indirect repression of the libidinal ego are two processes of a quite different nature, they are both included under the single term "repression" as understood by Freud. It should be noted that Freud took little account of direct repression of the antilibidinal ego by the central ego. The only references are in

> *The Ego and the Id* (Freud, 1927, pp. 52, 53, 74, 75) in which he raised the questions why the super-ego is unconscious, and whether, in the case of the hysterical personality at any rate, this instigator of repression is not itself subject to repression--questions to which the exigencies of his own theory did not permit of a satisfactory answer. (Fairbairn, 1954, p. 108)

Although the antilibidinal ego, the rejecting object and the ideal object are all independent

structures playing different roles in the economy of the psyche, they are all included by Freud in the comprehensive concept of the "the super-ego;" and this source of confusion may be obviated by recognition of their independent character. The endopsychic situation resulting from the twin processes of repression and splitting, which have just been described, is one which, in its general outlines, inevitably becomes established in the child at an early age, and in this sense may be regarded as "normal;" but, especially in its dynamic aspect, it contains within it the potentialities of all psychopathological developments in later life.

By way of example, Fairbairn applies the foregoing explanation of splitting to the hysteric (Fairbairn, 1954, p. 109). For the hysteric, the exciting object is excessively exciting and the rejecting object is excessively rejecting. As such, the libidinal ego is excessively libidinal and the antilibidinal ego is excessively persecutory. This helps explain the intensity of the hysteric's repressed sexuality and the extent of her/his compulsive sacrifice of sexuality.

It might be helpful to refer to the Figure 4 in this chapter, the chart on four techniques used for dealing with the conflict of the transitional stage. In this figure, the hysteric technique is said to externalize the accepted object and internalize the rejected object. It must be remembered that each object, the accepted object and rejected object, are internal objects. The hysteric's externalized accepted object is seen in their intense love relationships. The internalized rejected object is seen in his/her dissociation, rejecting his/her own genitals which are identified "with the breast as the original libidinal object during the period of infantile dependence" (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 44, 45).

In contrast with the hysteric technique of overvaluing objects in the outer world, the paranoid technique is to regard objects in the outer world as persecutors. The hysteric dissociates as a form of self-depreciation while the paranoid attitude is extravagantly grandiose. The paranoid state involves the externalization of the rejected object and internalization of the accepted object (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 45, 46).

In his 1943 article, "The Repression and the Return of Bad Objects," Fairbairn speaks to the futility of repression as a means of coping. This is seen in the mechanism persons routinely use which he calls "the moral defense," or "the defence of the super-ego," or "the defence of guilt," against the bad object (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 65-67). The child would rather be bad himself/herself than to have bad objects. She/he takes into herself/himself, internalizes, the badness, the bad object in order to feel the sense of security which an environment of good objects can bring.

> The sense of outer security resulting from this process of internalization is, however, liable to be seriously compromised by the resulting presence within him of internalized bad objects. Outer security is thus purchased at the price of inner insecurity; and his ego is henceforth left at the mercy of a band of internal fifth columnists or persecutors, against which defences have to be, first hastily erected, and later laboriously consolidated. (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 66)

The dilemma is placed in religious terms when he says that the person prefers conditional badness over unconditional badness. It is much better to be a bad person living in a world ruled by God than it is to be a good person in a world ruled by the devil. If you live in hell, there is no hope, it is unconditional, and being a good person doesn't help. But if you live in a world in which you are a sinner but salvation is eminent, there is always hope (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 65-67).

Why does the child internalize bad objects? She/he is compelled to internalize them in order to control them. Yet, in attempting to control them in this way, the child is internalizing objects which have wielded power over her/him in the external world and which then retain their power over her/him in the inner world.

> In a word, he is 'possessed' by them, as if by evil spirits. This is not all, however. The child not only internalizes his bad objects because they force themselves upon him and he seeks to control them, but also, and above all, because he *needs* [italics original] them. If a

> child's parents are bad objects, he cannot reject them, even if they do not force themselves upon him; for he cannot do without them. Even if they neglect him, he cannot reject them; for, if they neglect him, his need for them is increased. (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 67)

Freud's paper on a artist, Christoph Haitzmann, who made a pact with the Devil, conceptualizes the situation in classic "libido is primarily pleasure-seeking" framework. Fairbairn disagrees when he comments on Freud's paper that

> the whole point of a pact with the Devil lies in the fact that it involves a relationship with a bad object. Indeed, this is made perfectly plain in the terms of Christoph's bond; for, pathetically enough, what he sought from Satan in the depths of his depression was not the capacity to enjoy wine, women, and song, but permission, to quote the terms of the pact itself, 'sein leibeigner Sohn zu sein' ('for to be unto him euen [sic] as a sonne of his bodie'). What he sold his eternal soul to obtain, accordingly, was not gratification, but a father, albeit one who

had been a bad object to him in his childhood. (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 71)

Fairbairn says that "libidinal 'badness' should be related to the cathexis of bad objects ('sin' always being regarded, according to the Hebraic conception, as seeking after strange gods, and according to the Christian conception, as yielding to the Devil). . ." (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 74). This again emphasizes his idea of selling one's relationships in the external world in exchange for relationships with the gods, or Devil, of the internal world.

This section has spoken of Fairbairn's views on splitting and its effects on the persons functioning as she/he defends against the effects of such splitting. It has to do with exchanging the truth of the external world for the lie of the internal world, the pain of real relationships for the hope of more controlled, tolerable relationships, indeed, selling one's relationship with the outside world for one with devils. Regarding all psychopathology, Fairbairn says the following.

> It is to the realm of these bad objects, I feel convinced, rather than to the realm of the super-ego that the ultimate origin of all psychopathological developments is to be traced; for it may be said of all psychoneurotic and psychotic patients that, if a True Mass is being celebrated in the chancel, a Black Mass is being celebrated in the crypt. It becomes evident, accordingly, that the psychotherapist is the true successor to the exorcist, and that he is concerned, not only with 'the forgiveness of sins,' but also with 'the casting out of devils.' (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70)

Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced W. R. D. Fairbairn's work, his method, and his groundbreaking formulations on personality theory. Three aspects of personality theory were discussed: that persons are object-relationship seeking, that the ego is pristine and unitary at birth and develops as a psyche and body, and the problem of ego splitting.

The next chapter asks the same questions of St. Thomas Aquinas as were asked of Fairbairn concerning the person, only Aquinas' lens is that of the theological discipline of anthropology instead of the psychological one of personality theory. The questions asked concern introductory matters around Aquinas' work, his method, and his history making thinking on anthropology. What is a person? How is a person put together? Why is there a problem? These are the questions which will be explored as the next chapter unfolds.

CHAPTER 3

PRIMACY OF RELATIONSHIP FOR AQUINAS

Introduction to Aquinas

Like the previous chapter, this chapter is in two parts. The first part introduces Thomas Aquinas' work and the method he employed in his philosophy and theology. The second part discusses his innovative formulations on anthropology. Three questions of anthropology will serve as the major divisions for the second part. What is a person? How is a person put together? Why is there a problem?

Work of Aquinas

Literature Review

This section divides Aquinas' works into two categories, translations of his actual works and commentaries on his life and work. Of his works, the major ones consulted here are the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (written 1258-1263), *Summa Theologica*

(written 1272-1273), *Questions on the Soul* (written 1268-1270), and selected theological texts (Gilby, 1955; Glenn, 1978; Pegis, 1948). Of commentaries on his life and work, five are especially important for this paper. They are written by G. K. Chesterton (1956), H. D. Gardeil (1959), F. C. Copelston (1970), and E. Gilson (1963).

Each of Aquinas' works below can be seen as a mixture of philosophy and Christian theology, each informing the other. The best know works of Aquinas are his two systematic ones, *Summa Contra Gentiles* (A Summary against the Gentiles) and *Summa Theologica* (A Summary of Theology). His thought is most developed in these. The former was written first and is divided into four books. The first book was written in Paris and the other three in Italy. Tradition says that it was written to assist missionaries in the conversion of the Moors in Spain but the 'Gentiles' in his work are more naturalistic philosophers than Islamic devotees. "One of Aquinas' aims was to show that the Christian faith rests on a rational foundation and that the principles of philosophy do not necessarily

lead to a view of the world which excludes Christianity, . ." (Copelston, 1970, pp. 11-12).

In the first book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, *God*, he addresses the nature and existence of the divine. In the second book, *Creation*, he grapples with creation and the nature of the human soul, along with its relation to the body. The third (*Providence*) and fourth (*Salvation*) books look at the final end of humans, the former from a more rational perspective and the latter with a heavier draw on Christian doctrine.

Aquinas stated that the *Summa Theologica* was written as a systematic summary for theology students.[6] Pegis says it is "a classic synthesis of Christian thought and represents St. Thomas at his distinctive best" (1948, p. xii). History indicates that it was composed largely in Italy and also while in his second stay in Paris (1269-1272). There are three parts to the *Summa* and a supplement. The first

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[6]Pegis says the correct title of the work is either *Summa* or *Summa Theologiae*, though tradition accepts the name *Summa Theologica* (1948, xii).

concerns the subjects of God and creation along with a discussion of human nature and human intellectual life. The second has to do with human moral life, the first sub-part dealing with general moral themes and the final end of humanity and the second part directing attention to specific virtues and vices. Christ and the sacraments is the topic of the third part.

Questions on the Soul (Aquinas, 1984) was written during St. Thomas' return residence in Paris. Its doctrinal organization runs parallel to that of the *Summa Theologica*. Translator J. H. Robb says the work concerns key points on the doctrine of the nature and constitution of the human being with an awareness of the Averroistic controversies then erupting at the University of Paris (pp. 17-19). The Islamic philosopher Averroes interpreted the third book of Aristotle's *De Anima* as affirming that there is only one intellect in all humans, all human minds being the internal modifications of the divine mind (Copelston, 1970, pp. 176-178).

Collections of theological texts compiled by Gilby, Pegis, and Glenn, provide an introduction to

Aquinas' works and a filling in of gaps on the topics covered in this paper. Glenn's helpful *A Tour of the Summa* is a "turnpike trip" through the entire *Summa Theologica*, a condensed paraphrase of its essential teaching. It includes an index. As such, *A Tour* is a précis strictly dictated by the text but reads like a brief commentary. Pegis' *Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas* is a topical presentation of selected materials from the basic writings of Aquinas for the general reader. It draws from the *Summa Theologica* and the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and includes a good introduction but no index.

Thomas Gilby has written a companion volume to his previous one on the philosophical texts of Aquinas, *St. Thomas Aquinas Theological Texts*, which likewise follows the organizational plan of the *Summa Theologica*. Gilby has intricately woven together major texts and *opuscula* (smaller works) of St. Thomas and cross referenced them with notes and an index. Where his paraphrase is deemed clearer, it is used instead of another, though the original is cited.

The commentaries are indispensable for the rich store of textual, contextual, and theological guidance

they provide to Aquinas' difficult and profound works. There is no introductory work finer than that of Catholic layman G. K. Chesterton's, *Aquinas* (1956). Although Chesterton says of it that it is merely "a popular sketch of a great historical character who ought to be more popular," Aquinas scholars Pegis and Gilson highly acclaim it (pp. 12-15). Its genius is not in exhaustive treatment of the man and his work (there is no index) but in incisive comprehensiveness and literary style within the pages of a small volume. It presents Aquinas' biographical, philosophical, and theological insights in a way which compels the Protestant and modern thinker to rediscover Aquinas as foundational to Western society.

H. D. Gardeil, O.P. shares the Dominican tradition with Aquinas. His work, *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: Psychology*, originally appearing in French as the third in a four volume set, is the first volume translated into English. It is a philosophical psychology, the doctrine of living being, which is aware of modern psychological thought. He follows closely the arrangement of Aristotle's *De Anima* and Aquinas'

commentary on the same. After tracing the history and meaning of psychology and the sources of St. Thomas' psychology, Gardeil defines life and the soul, vegetative and sensitive life, and the activities and nature of the intellectual soul.

Father Copleston's *Aquinas* contains an excellent introduction to his work and then gives a strictly philosophical exposition of Aquinas' philosophical and theological works under the topics of metaphysics, God, creation, man, and Thomism. This scholarly yet accessible work includes a helpful index and biographical notes.

One of the foremost conservative Thomist scholars, a member of the Pontifical Academy of Saint Thomas Aquinas in Rome, Etienne Gilson, has written a careful religious analysis, *The Elements of Christian Philosophy*, illuminating the key theological ideas of St. Thomas. Gilson (1963) accepts Pope Leo XIII's description of "Christian philosophy" as "that way of philosophizing in which the Christian faith and the human intellect join forces in a common investigation of philosophical truth" (p. v). The stated purpose of this work is to present Aquinas' key notions and

doctrinal positions, the essential elements, which are not always explicitly stated in the discussion of each particular problem in Aquinas' works but which are necessary for a complete understanding of St. Thomas' Christian philosophy. It contains a subject and proper name index.

The following abbreviations are used in referring to Aquinas' writings:

Figure 6. Abbreviations for Aquinas' writings.

Summa Theologica		ST
Pars Prima	First Part	Ia
Prima Secundae	First Part of Second Part	Ia IIae
Secunda Secundae	Second Part of Second Part	IIa IIae
Pars Tertia	Third Part	IIIa
Supplementum	Supplement	Suppl.

The *Summa Theologica* is divided into the above sections and also into questions (q) and articles (a) within these sections. Thus, a reference to ST, Ia IIae, q4, a3 would direct the reader to the *Summa*

Theologica, the First Part of the Second Part, question 4, article 3.

The *Summa Contra Gentiles* (SG) is divided into books and chapters so that a reference to SG, 1, 3 would mean the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, book 1, chapter 3. The other works are divided into questions and articles so that a reference to *De Potentia*, 5, 3 would refer one to *De Potentia*, question 5, article 3. The *Summa Theologica*, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, and other works such as *De Potentia* and *De Anima* also contain objections, which are hypothetical arguments which Aquinas poses against his own and then answers (ad). Thus ST, Ia, 97, 2, ad I would mean that the quotation had been taken from the *Summa Theologica*, First Part, question 97, article 2, in the reply to the first objection.

It should also be noted that Aquinas does not use inclusive language, using terms like "man" to denote "humanity." Though this paper does not change his words when quoting him, an effort has been made to employ inclusive language otherwise throughout the paper.

His Work

The subjects about which Aquinas has written are vast and profound. It is impossible to give an adequate overview of his work but some of those things for which he is most well known are here presented (Helm, 1981, pp. 60, 61).

Aquinas regarded all human knowledge as sensory in origin, data being derived from *matter*. But humans are able to take this understanding and abstract to the knowledge of the *forms* of matter. This replaced Augustine's view that intellectual illumination of form was more certain and reliable than sense impressions of matter. Aquinas saw the two working together. Much of Aquinas' writing attempts to explain how this concept, that all knowledge is sensory in origin, still allows one to know God.

He made a distinction between sacred doctrine and philosophy, which will be covered in the next section. He did affirm that God's existence could be proven philosophically. His famous "Five Ways," five *a posteriori* arguments, are based on God's effects in the world, data which is accessible to the common person and not just the metaphysician. Aquinas says

God is known through His effects in nature and also in the revelation of Scripture, of which Aquinas was an eminent philosophical exigete. And yet Aquinas stressed how little and imperfectly God is known, that He is known only by analogy (i.e., Solomon's wisdom is *like* God's wisdom in some ways) and negation (i.e., God is *not* finite). Analogy is one of Aquinas' crucial concepts.

He also distinguished between faith, opinion, and knowledge. Faith, which is personal and propositional, is stronger than opinion because it involves a firm assent to its object. But faith is less than knowledge because it lacks full comprehension. Religious faith is a disposition which comes by the grace of God. Aquinas' ethics stress the teleological character of human choice, distinguishing moral theology, which is from divinely revealed law, and natural law, which is accessible to everyone.

St. Thomas affirms God as the uncreated "first cause" of all things, excepting evil which is a privation of goodness. As such, God is the first and only principle of reality upon whom all reality is based and contingent, and with regard to whom all

other realities are lesser. Therefore, God knowingly determines and determinantly knows all things, while allowing for human freedom and responsibility, in the eternal present. The concept of act and potency is crucial for Aquinas here as in other areas.

By Leo XIII's 1879 encyclical, Roman Catholicism gave Aquinas' works official, though not exclusive, place in the Church's thinking. Protestants have repudiated some of Aquinas' speculative excesses and perceived biblical errors yet have affirmed his efforts in apologetics and philosophical theology. Some prominent modern Protestant theologians embrace Aquinas (Geisler, 1982; Vos, 1985).

Method of Aquinas

Writing Style

St. Thomas' writing style fits the philosophical method he employs. He is precise not prolix, plain not pleonastic. His words are brief while his works are long. His style, unlike Augustine, is always "penny plain rather than twopence coloured" (Chesterton, 1956, p. 153). Yet he

> very specially possessed the philosophy that inspires poetry; as he did so largely inspire Dante's poetry [which inspired T. S. Eliot]. And poetry without philosophy has only inspiration, or, in vulgar language, only wind. He had, so to speak, the imagination without the imagery. And even this is perhaps too sweeping. (Chesterton, 1956, pp. 152, 153)

The second thing that can be said about his writing is that it utilizes common sense. He is logical, not paradoxical. Chesterton believes that practical politics and abstract philosophies of the modern world which deviate from Aquinas in this way, do so to their detriment.

> Since the modern world began in the sixteenth century, nobody's system of philosophy has really corresponded to everybody's sense of reality; to what, if left to themselves, common men would call common sense. Each started with a paradox; a peculiar point of view demanding the sacrifice of what they would call a sane point of view. That is the one thing common to Hobbes and Hegel, to Kant and Bergson, to Berkeley and William

> James. A man had to believe something that no normal man would believe, if it were suddenly propounded to his simplicity; as that law is above right, or right is outside reason, or things are only as we think them, or everything is relative to a reality that is not there. The modern philosopher claims, like a sort of confidence man, that if once we will grant him this, the rest will be easy; he will straighten out the world, if once he is allowed to give this one twist to the mind. . . . Thomist philosophy is nearer than most philosophies to the mind of the man on the street. (p. 146, 147)

Philosophical and Theological Science

It is difficult if not impossible to separate St. Thomas' philosophy from his theology because his purpose was certainly theological and his method employed the highest of philosophical devices. Here, his philosophical method will be emphasized. Of his theology, it can be said generally that he held to the text of the Scriptures as well as the doctrine of the church of his day as tested by his philosophical science.

In his philosophy Aquinas is unashamedly Aristotelian. St. Thomas was rigorous in testing his assumptions, painstaking in his observations of data, and ruthlessly logical in his analysis and interpretation of that data. And he begins, as does science of today, with the empirical data. In ST, Ia, 78, 4, ad 4, he declared that everything that is in the intellect has been in the senses, that the mind knows only through sense knowledge but it knows more than sense knowledge (Aquinas, 1981, p. 396). This is quite different from those who might take a more mystical view, such as Plato or some modern philosophers, who say that the mind is informed from within.

Aquinas, like Aristotle, used deduction, believing that true premises produce a true conclusion. Logic is based on reality not the other way around. He knew that no matter how many inductive premises are collected from data, deduction must be employed to reach a conclusion. There are no "interpra-facts," no data that explain or interpret themselves inductively apart from a deduction.

Chesterton says some moderns believe induction can replace deduction.

> But the process of deduction from the data is the same for the modern mind as for the medieval mind; and what is pompously called induction is simply collecting more of the data. . . . But many modern people talk as if what they call induction were some magic way of reaching a conclusion, without using any of those horrid old syllogisms. But induction does not lead us to a conclusion. Induction only leads us to a deduction. . . . In this world there is nothing except a syllogism and a fallacy. (Chesterton, 1970, pp. 153-155)

What are some of the St. Thomas' assumptions regarding philosophy? Aquinas' first principles of knowledge, or epistemological assumptions, are as follows: the principle of identity, the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of excluded middle, the principle of causality, and the principle of finality (Geisler, 1980). A principle is that from which something follows. A cause is that from which something follows with dependence. As stated in ST,

I, 33, 1, a first principle is the first from which something follows. The following figure of the first principles is based on *V Metaphysics*, lect. 11; *I Sentences*, 19, 1, 1; *II Sentences*, 34, 1, 3; and *On Power*, II, 1 (Geisler, 1982).

Figure 7. First principles.

Principle	Ontological	Epistemological
Identity	being is being	being is intelligible
Non-contradiction	being is not non-being	contradictions cannot be simultaneously true
Excluded middle	either being or non-being	either affirmation or negation is true
Causality	every contingent (finite) being is caused by another	every contingent proposition is caused (dependent) on another
Finality	act communicates act, or being is finalized	every agent acts for an end

On the origin of first principles, 'what' is known comes first, then 'how' it is known. Aquinas' *De Anima*, III, 4 states that all knowledge begins in sensation (Aquinas, 1984, p. 65f). But ST, Ia, 84, 6, ad1 states that there is also a need for an agent intellect to abstract (Aquinas, 1981, p. 428). How is it that first principles are known from the senses? By means of agent intellect and natural knowledge. Natural knowledge is where agent intellect engages in an unconscious use of the first principles. It is the natural capacity of the mind existing without contents, structure without stuff, before sensation (Geisler, 1980).

Having defined first principles it is important to see how Aquinas actually develops theology and philosophy upon this foundation. For instance, in *XII Metaphysics*, lecture 12, Aquinas posits, "The entire universe is one dominion and realm, governed by one ruler, who is the first mover, the first truth, the first good--God, blessed for ever and ever" (Gilby, 1955, pp. 76, 77). Thomas Aquinas is well known for

his method of using philosophy and theology to do his work. This paper explores a topic, anthropology, in which he, of necessity, brings to bear truths from both philosophy and theology. How philosophy and theology articulate and inform each other is explained in Aquinas' words in the following from *De Trinitate*, ii, 3.

> The gifts of grace are added to us in order to enhance the gifts of nature, not to take them away. The native light of reason is not obliterated by the light of faith gratuitously shed on us. Hence Christian theology enlists the help of philosophy and the sciences. Mere reasoning, can never discover the truths which faith perceives; on the other hand, it cannot discover any disagreement between its own intrinsically natural truths and those divinely revealed. (Gilby, 1955, p. 7)

Thus Aquinas sets philosophy (and science) and theology beside each other as complementary disciplines not contradictory. The "gifts of grace" known through theology enhance the "gifts of nature" known through philosophy and science.

He goes on, in *De Trinitate*, ii, 3, to describe and delimit the domains of theology and philosophy (including science). "The principles of reason are the foundations of philosophy, the principles of faith are the foundation of Christian theology. . . . Nature is the prelude to grace. It is the abuse of science and philosophy which provokes statements against faith" (Gilby, 1955, p. 7).

Aquinas then gives three uses for philosophy in theology: for proving religious presuppositions, for showing analogies between the realms of science/philosophy and religion, and for defending the faith.

> Accordingly Christian theology may call on philosophy to perform three offices. First, to demonstrate the groundwork of faith, for the truths of natural religion--for instance, that God exists, that there is one God, and so forth--can be proved by philosophy and are presupposed to religious belief and are necessary elements in the science of faith, or Christian theology. Secondly, to declare analogies common to nature and grace; thus Augustine draws illustrations of

> the Trinity from philosophical teachings. Thirdly, to resist attacks on faith, by showing that they are either wrongly conceived or at least unsupported and cannot be pressed. (Gilby, 1955, p. 7, 8)

Gardeil (1959) expresses Aquinas' doctrine of knowledge (epistemology) and the connection between empirical science and metaphysics in part as follows:

> This doctrine, to be sure, appeals in some measure to experience and observation. Indeed, it begins with knowledge as a fact of experience; but the experience is studied in its most general aspects and in terms of a metaphysics of being, especially of natural, that is, bodily being, which is the constant point of reference.
>
> It may be granted, then, that such a study holds out small attraction for anyone who intends at all costs to keep his inquiry on the empirical level. But if we want to probe beneath the surface, and if we have any curiosity at all as to the inner nature of knowledge, then we must come to the task prepared with metaphysical tools. Such a course is the more imperative

> when, with the feeble light of human understanding, we try to penetrate the world of the spirits, whether of our own, which we can but faintly discern, or of God and the angels, which is wholly beyond our direct view. Before we can have some understanding of the workings of the spirit world, our notions from sense must be set to a metaphysical key; it is here above all, in this metaphysical transposition, that the principles of knowledge supplied by our former masters prove their truest and most abiding worth. (pp. 102, 103)

Copelston (1970) compares the method of metaphysical science to the apprehension of the everyday world.

> It is not that the metaphysician discovers a new fact . . . in the way that an explorer may discover a hitherto unknown island or flower: it is rather that he makes explicit what is implicitly contained in our apprehension of actual things. [Metaphysical understanding] cannot be equivalent to a privileged mystical experience on the part of metaphysicians, a

> conception which Aquinas certainly did not admit. Nor can it be equivalent to the communication of a piece of factual information to a select few. It would presumably be more akin to seeing something familiar 'for the first time' or 'in a new light.' (pp. 103, 104)

Anthropology

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines anthropology as, 1. the science of man and "2. teaching about the origin, nature, and destiny of man especially from the perspective of his relation to God" (1973, p. 49). It is this second definition to which we turn our attention. This paper defines anthropology as the theological and philosophical study of the person. The Greek word "anthropos" is the word which denotes "mankind," or better rendered "humankind," and does not refer to the gender "male" but to the race "human."

What is a person? In ST, Ia, 29, 3, Aquinas says "Person signifies what is noblest in nature, namely a complete substance of an intellectual kind, . ."

(Aquinas, 1981, pp. 157, 158). And in ST, Ia, 29, 4, "*Person* [italics original] in general means an individual substance which is intelligent, individual, that is, single in itself and distinct from others. But human person also implies this body of flesh and bones and this soul . . ." (Aquinas, 1981, p. 158, 159.

G. K. Chesterton (1970) says that St. Thomas is foremost an anthropologist.

> *Homo Sapiens* [italics original] can only be considered in relation to *Sapientia* [italics original]; and only a book like that of St. Thomas is really devoted to the intrinsic idea of *Sapientia* [italics original]. . . . In this sense St. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps more than he is anything else, is a great anthropologist. (pp. 159, 160)

Anthropology is the topic addressed in the second part of this chapter.

In this chapter, the following three parts on anthropology present Aquinas' view of what a person is (nature), how a person is put together (manner), and why there is a problem for the person (reason).

Webster's first definition of "nature" is "the inherent character or basic constitution of a person or thing: essence" (1973, p. 766). By "manner" is meant the way or method, according to Webster, in which a person is structured (Webster, 1973, p. 700). "Reason" is defined by Webster as "a statement offered in explanation or justification" (1973, p. 962). The first part, then, discusses the person's nature in terms of the image of God, the second speaks of the manner in which a person is a soul/body unity, and the third shows the reason for there being a problem, that of separation from God.

What is a Person--Nature?

Introduction to the Person as Relational

For Aquinas, intellect, the ability to know, is the highest of all the abilities possessed by humanity. Here he affirms that the highest use of this highest ability is in relationship with God. Aquinas states in the first paragraph of the first chapter of his work on salvation in *Summa Contra Gentiles* that "man's perfect good is that he somehow know God" (Aquinas, 1975b, p. 35). His chapter

expands on this theme with the ways that God has given humans to know Him, ways that God has given "out of a superabundant goodness, therefore, so that man might have a firmer knowledge of Him, . . ." (Aquinas, 1975b, p. 36). He states in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, book three, 120, 10, on providence that "man's ultimate felicity consists solely in the enjoyment of Him" (Aquinas, 1975a, p. 136).

Aquinas begins his prologue to the first part of the second part of the *Summa Theologica*, Ia, IIae, prologue, by affirming that man is made to the image of God, *Homo ad imaginem Dei factus*, that "the ultimate explanation of our being lies in its being kindred with God" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 583). The familial analogy, calling it "kindred," is here called upon to describe this relationship with God. And this fact of relationship, he declares, is the absolute explication of what it means to be human.

In Marquette University Professor James Robb's (1984) translation of *Questions on the Soul*, or *De Anima*, he begins by saying, "I dedicate this volume to my friends and to my students, who are also friends, since it is from them that I have over the years

learned and continue to learn that if through wisdom we can be united to God in friendship, then it is also true that through deep and continuing friendships we may make progress in our pursuit of wisdom" (dedicatory leaf). Robb asserts that, "Aquinas treats human beings as incarnate spirits, spiritual beings who, incarnate in the world of space and time, are constantly transcending the limits of nature through knowledge, love and friendship" (Aquinas, 1984, dedicatory leaf). For St. Thomas and Thomists alike, the use of the person's highest human ability, intellect, in having a relationship with God and others is the ultimate essence of being human. Relationship defines a person's existence, it constitutes who one is.

Image of God as Relational

That the human person is like the divine person is revealed in Genesis 1:26 where God says, "Let Us make man in our image, according to Our likeness; . . ." Augustine, Bonaventure, and Aquinas base their anthropology on this verse. Before delving into the image one should know something about the original. It is important to know more about God. Aquinas says,

in ST, Ia, 30, 1, that "*Person* [italics original] in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 160-161). Before this sentence, in ST, Ia, 29, 4, he makes some supporting statements about the relationship with the trinity and the nature of God.

> To inquire into the meaning of personality in general is one question, to inquire into the meaning of divine personality is another. *Person* [italics original] in general means an individual substance which is intelligent, individual, that is, single in itself and distinct from others. But human person also implies this body of flesh and bones and this soul: these are the individuating principles for men, but not for every kind of person.
>
> Now distinctions in God arise from relations of origin. A relation in God is not, as it is with us, an accident modifying a subject, but the divine nature itself, and existing as a complete substance. As Deity is God, so divine fatherhood is the Father. Divine personality, then, signifies a relation existing as a complete

> substance. Thus a relation is denoted, which is a substance, a hypostasis subsisting in, and really identical with the divine nature. (Aquinas, 1981, p. 157-160)

This last sentence equates the nature of God with the relationship existing in the trinity. Here, the very nature of God is seen as relational. This is consistent with the Scriptural phrase which God spoke in the plural referring to Himself, "Let Us make man in our image, according to Our likeness; . . ." (The Open Bible, 1979, p. 2).

Having briefly looked at the divine nature, what does it mean for a human to be the image of God? Aquinas says humans are the image of God in two ways, reflecting God's divine nature, especially in intelligence, and the trinity of Persons in God, especially in being relational. In *De Veritate*, X, 2, ad 5, he says, "Mind is made to the image of God when he is mindful of him and bearing him; mind is present to itself and to God before it is roused by ideas taken from sense" (Gilby, 1955, p. 166). Aquinas usually explains each of these two ways in terms of relationship, usually familial.

Other passages from St. Thomas deal with this subject (cf. ST, Ia, 93, 4). The following is from *Sentences*, III, 10, 2, 2, 3.

> Man is made to the image of God, because he is created with an intelligence. Only intelligent beings are said to be made to his image; they only can be called his sons, and can be adopted through grace. Adoption goes further, for a right to the inheritance is implied. God's heritage is his own happiness, of which only intelligent creatures are capable, though they have no strict title to it from the fact of their creation; such happiness is a gift, the gift of the Spirit. Sharing of possessions is not enough: there must be a sharing of the heritage. And so the adoption of creatures means their communion in divine happiness.
>
> Christ should not be termed God's son by adoption, for he is begotten eternally by the Father, and his divine nature has the heritage by right, not by additional concession: "all things whatsoever that the Father has are mine" [John 16:15]. (Gilby, 1955, pp. 155, 156)

In the above quote, a human's intelligence and ability to relate to God as adopted children constitute being the image of God. That this adoption means "their communion in divine happiness" underscores the relationship aspect of this image. The trinity is alluded to in the last paragraph of the quote. It highlights the similarity and difference humanity has with Christ in the relationship within the trinity of the Father and Christ. The similarity is that each is a child of God, while the difference is that Christ is a natural child and humans are adopted. Each is afforded full privileges of sonship/daughterhood up to the full measure of his/her nature, Christ being infinite and humans being finite.

The following is from the *Summa Theologica*, Ia, 33, 3. It carries the theme of the relationship in the trinity as that which humans are, that which is the image of God.

> A term is primarily attributed to a subject which possesses its full meaning, not something else which bears some resemblance: what is borrowed comes back to what is owned. Lion primarily means the animal, not a lionheart or any other

sort of human lion. Now fatherhood and sonship at full strength are the Father's and the Son's who are one in nature and glory. Creatures are not related to God with the utmost sonship, because they and the creator are not of the same nature.

Nevertheless there are varying degrees of resemblance, and the more perfect a thing the closer it is to divine sonship. God is called the father of non-rational creatures because they are like his footprints; they resemble him because they are his traces: "Hath rain a father? Or who hath begotten the drops of dew?" [Job 38:28] Rational creatures are like him because they are his images: "Is not he thy father that hath possessed thee? Hath he not created and established thee" [Deuteronomy 32:6]? Of some he is father by likeness of grace, for they are called adopted sons because born of grace: "The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God, and if children, then heirs also" [Romans 8:16, 17]. And of others by a greater likeness, for they

> have entered into their inheritance of glory: "We rejoice in hope of the glory of God" [Romans 5:2].
>
> Perfect fatherhood, then, is a relation of Person to Person, and thence it is derived to include God's relationship to creatures. (Aquinas, 1981, pp. 174, 175)

In each of the above comparisons of God to creation, family relationships are called upon as analogy. Aquinas is saying, by the consistent use of the relational references in every one of the Scripture citations above, that these relational concepts are more than analogies used for illustration. They indicate ontological truth, reality about the nature of human beings as relational, rooted in the very nature of God as a triune relation. It is fitting then that human nature, as the image of God, would be so described.

That humans are the image of God by being relational becomes more difficult to understand when one considers the physical part of a person, the body, as opposed to the soul. Is it only the soul that is like God? How do the soul and body relate? If humans

are relational, how are they put together for relating to themselves, the world, and God? This is the purview of the next section.

How is a Person put together for Relationship--the Manner?

Introduction

How the soul and body relate to each other is important because it affects one's view of how humans have relationship. There are two possible extreme views of how the body and soul relate to each other. One is to say that the 'real' human is the soul which inhabits the body, the body being either an instrument or a prisoner of the soul. This is known as dualism and is the view of Plato. The other is to reduce the soul to the body. This is known as monism and is the view of atomists, materialists, and some epiphenomenalists.

> One can say in general that those philosophers who have concentrated their attention on the higher psychic activities and on man's religious and moral life have inclined to some form of dualism, while those who have paid special

> attention to the dependence of psychic processes on physical conditions have inclined to a monistic interpretation of the relation of soul to body. (Copelston, 1970, pp. 157, 158)

Is there then a truth which strikes a middle course between the extremes? Yes, and St. Thomas proposes such a one, combining principles from Aristotelian psychology and Christian theology.

Soul-Body Unity

For Aquinas, as stated in ST, Ia, 75, 1, 'soul' is equivalent to Aristotle's 'psyche,' and is "the first principle of life in living things about us" (Aquinas, 1981, pp. 363, 364). G. K. Chesterton, in describing Aquinas' view of what a person is, states that

> For him the point is always that Man is not a balloon going up into the sky, nor a mole burrowing merely in the earth; but rather a thing like a tree, whose roots are fed from the earth, while its highest branches seem to rise almost to the stars. (1970, p. 164)

Aquinas himself says in *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, 3, ad 2,

> An excellent form brings all and more than lesser forms can provide. Matter is as richly endowed by a higher form as by a lower; in addition it also becomes the proper subject of complementary perfection. Thus our body is both a physiological and a psychological object, is both organic and charged with human interests and values. (Gilby, 1955, p. 96)

Aquinas' foundational use of Aristotle is clearly seen in his formulation of the unity of body and soul. Aristotle solved the dilemma by formulating a middle ground between materialism and dualism.

> If, as Aristotle was convinced, the materialism of the ancients was unable to explain the distinctive characteristics that living things display both in their structure and activity, and if, as he was equally convinced, Platonic dualism sundered the unity of these beings to the point of no repair, clearly, then, what was needed was to find a new and more comprehensive interpretation, one that would account for all the facts at hand. Accordingly, Aristotle has recourse to the doctrine of hylomorphism,

> declaring the soul to be neither more nor less than the form of the body. With that, the dilemma between materialism and dualism collapses. (Gardeil, 1959, p. 35)

That the soul of a person is the "form of the body" is the great philosophical and theological understanding to which Aquinas subscribes. It is a short four word phrase of deep and inestimable aid in defining humanity. Beyond the scope of this paper would be an account of the many attempts made in history to explain the relationship between the soul and body. What Aquinas has accomplished is a marriage of the rational and the revealed concerning the makeup of a person. That the soul is the form of the body is but the first of his contributions simply stated. St. Thomas sums up Aristotle's argument on the definition of the soul, in Aristotle, *De Anima, II*, lect. 1, no. 221, as follows.

> Since, then, substance may be taken in three ways, namely, as composite, matter, and form and since the soul is neither the composite, which is the body having life, nor matter, which is the body as the subject of life, we are compelled by

> the logic of division to say that the soul is substance in the manner of form, being the form of a particular kind of body, namely, of a physical body having life in potency. (Gardeil, 1959, p. 33)

First, the soul is "the first act (or form) of a physical (natural) organic body having life in potency," says Aristotle in *De Anima, II*, lect. 1, no. 221 (Gardeil, 1959, p. 33). Second, Aristotle says in *De Anima, II*, lect. 2, no. 273, that the soul may be defined as the principle of its activities, the soul is "the first principle by which we live, sense, move, and understand" (Gardeil, 1959, p. 34).

Aquinas' *De Anima*, 1, ad 1, deals supremely with the question of the soul-body unity. He says that Plato, with whom Aquinas disagrees,

> holds that a soul not only subsists *per se* but even that it possesses in itself the fullness of a specific nature. For he held that the full nature of the species is in the soul, defining a human being not as something composed of soul and body but as a soul using a body, and thus the relation of the soul to its body is that of a

> sailor to his ship or of a clothed man to his garments. However this position cannot be maintained; for it is clear that that by which the body lives is its soul. Now to live is the "to be" of living things. Therefore the soul is that by which a human body actually exists; but to confer being is a characteristic of a form. Therefore, a human soul is the form of its body. (Aquinas, 1984, p. 47)

He carries this analogy further by saying that when a body is dead, a corpse, no longer living (separated from the soul), it no longer carries on its specific nature, that is, the eye no longer sees. This shows that there is a stronger connection between soul and body than sailor and ship. When the sailor leaves the ship, the ship does not suffer corruption. But when the soul leaves the body, the body suffers corruption such that human nature is incomplete. "For a thing is not complete in nature unless it possesses those things which are demanded for the proper operation of its nature" (Aquinas, 1984, p. 48).

> Therefore, one must maintain that the soul is an entity, as being able to subsist *per se* [italics

> original] but not as possessing in itself a complete specific nature, but rather as completing human nature insofar as it is the form of its body; and thus at one and the same time it is a form and an entity (Aquinas, 1984, p. 47).

Aquinas shows that "from the operation of the human soul the mode of existence can be known" (Aquinas, 1984, p. 48). This means that how the soul operates says much about its makeup, about what it is, about its existence. That is to say, the object of its actions characterizes those actions and explains the nature of the subject. This is seen in the hierarchy of various forms of matter. The essential operation of various forms lower than persons gives a clue as to the principle employed by that form. The higher the form, the more it is like and approximates higher principles.

For instance, elements are the lowest forms and those closest to matter. Their operations only go so far as general active and passive qualities. The next higher form operates with higher principles. These are compounds which, over and above the abilities of elements, have operations derived from the celestial

bodies, such as magnets attract iron. And this is not due to an accidental quality or state such as heat or cold but due to the nature of the compound's form itself, that of participating in celestial power. The following is a chart derived from Aquinas' discussion on this topic. It lists the form in ascending order, lower to higher, along with its characteristic operation and principle. Important to note is that each succeeding form possesses the operation and principle of the ones before it.

Figure 8. Hierarchy of various forms of matter.

Form	**Operation**	**Principle**
element	compactness	active/passive qualities
compound	magnetism	celestial power
plants	moving	like celestial body movers
animals	knowing (mater.)	like substance of movers
human	knowing (immater.)	like substance of angels

What is the meaning of this? Perhaps crudely it may be said that "if it walks and quacks like a duck, it is a duck," or "a tree is known by its fruit." A thing is known by what it does, a form is known by its operation according to its inherent principle. Aquinas sums up in the following way.

> Thus in such a fashion from the operation of the human soul the mode of its very existence can be known. For insofar as a soul possesses an operation which transcends material things, its very existence is raised above and does not depend on its body. But insofar as a soul by nature acquires its immaterial knowledge from

> what is material, it is clear that the fulfillment of its nature cannot be achieved apart from union with a body. For a thing is not complete in nature unless it possesses those things which are demanded for the proper operation of that nature. In this way, therefore, a human soul insofar as it is united to its body as its form still possesses an act of existence which is elevated above the body and does not depend on it; clearly then this soul is constituted on the boundary line between corporeal and separate substances. (Aquinas, 1984, p. 48)

As stated in this section above, St. Thomas' incorporation of Aristotle's "the soul is the form of the body" is but the first of his contributions to the discussion. To this philosophical position he adds a very important theological understanding. He declares that the soul is not only the form of the body but is also capable of existence without the body--it is immortal.

Why is there a Problem in Relationship--the Reason?

Introduction

Aquinas says, *II de Malo*, II, that sin is what obstructs one's relationship with God; "Sin is like an obstacle interposed between the soul and God: *your iniquities have separated between you and God* [italics original] [Isaiah 59:2]" (Gilby, 1955, p. 139). The Isaiah passage goes on to say "And your sins have hidden His face from you, so that He does not hear" (The Open Bible, 1979, p. 678).

In ST, IIa, IIae, 94, 1-3, Aquinas asserts that, on the part of the sin itself, idolatry is the most grievous sin, idolatry belonging to superstition, which is "to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 1589-1592; Gilby, 1955, p. 143). In ST, IIIa, 3, ad 1, he says, "Man fell back to earth by deserting God" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 1589-1592; Gilby, 1955, p. 143)

Separation and Fragmentation Caused by Sin

Aquinas says, in ST, IIIa, I, ad 3, that "sinfulness abandons the art of divine wisdom and the plan of divine goodness" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 3003).

In, *IV de Malo*, 2, Aquinas speaks of sin as a "turning away from" and a "turning to:"

> The human quality of the motions of hands and eyes is communicated by the will, and it is thus that physiological and psychological processes are invested with morality. Gestures reveal what the will is like; if it be disordered, then it produces a corresponding outside effect and impression. We commit a sinful act by turning to a temporal attraction without being duly directed to our last end. In effect we turn away from eternal blessing. There is a turning to, and a turning away; the first, the self-indulgence and the wasteful love, represents the material element in sin; the second, the aversion and the hate, represents the formal element, formal because morality is defined with reference to our last end. . . . The sin of our first parents contained these two elements, the formal element of turning away from God, and the material element of turning to vanity. . . . We may draw an analogy with actual and personal sin: there the turning away from God is formal, and the

> turning to creatures is material. Likewise original sin; it estranges us from God, and commits us to this world. (Gilby, 1955, p. 124)

That people turn from God to vanity, he says in *IV de Malo*, ad I, i, is both natural and unnatural for humans.

> *Natural to man* [italics original] has a double ring, natural to animal--and so we can desire anything attractive to our senses; and natural to human--and so we desire pleasure according to the measure set by reason: thus the concupiscence which is ready to scrap reasonableness for what takes our fancy is against human nature . . . . (Gilby, 1955, p. 126).

Thus, in ST, Ia IIae, 71, 1, he says sin is against rational human nature. He also states that sin is against the natural divine order of things. "Sin, the direct opposite of an act of virtue, is a disordered activity; vice, the direct opposite of virtue, is the condition of a thing out of its proper natural bearings" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 897).

Based on the fact that sin is against the natural order of things, Aquinas goes on to note, in ST, Ia

IIae, 72, 1, that sin tends toward a split in the person, a disunity and chaos rather than unity and coherence.

> A good man's purposes are unified, a sinner's scattered. Virtues make us bent on pursing the reasonable life; prudence links them together in a common plan of rightful activity. All purposes then converge. Not so with sinful intentions. For the sinner does not set himself to depart from the rules of reasonable living. He sets out to indulge himself with something that attracts him, and it is this which gives a positive tone to what he does. Variegated are the attractions for whose sake he is ready to turn away from right reason; there is no essential combination between them, one with another, indeed sometimes they are conflicting. Since they stamp specific character on sins it follows that sins are not all in alliance together. The life of sin is a fall from coherence to chaos; the life of virtue a climb from the many to the One. (Aquinas, 1981, p. 902, 903)

This exchanging of worship of the one and only first principle of reality, God, for worship of multiple lesser realities separates humans from the holy, uncreated God and joins them in an unholy alliance to created beings.

Separation and Fragmentation Caused by the Sin of Idolatry

In ST, IIa, IIae, 94, 1-3, Aquinas says idolatry is the most grievous sin, idolatry belonging to superstition, which is "to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 1589-1592). Aquinas stated that divine worship should only be given to whom it should be given. Thus, he said in *I Sentences*, I. iii, c., ad 3, 4, created things, animals, man, angels, images, and so forth should not be worshiped because only the creator should be worshiped. "In themselves creatures are no obstacles to eternal happiness. We make them so, by abusing them and by committing ourselves to them as if they were our ultimate goal" (Gilby, 1955, p. 130).

Book three of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, 120, 23-25 says the following:

> Therefore, it is clear from what we have said that the cult of latria [that is, giving ultimate worship] is due to the one, highest God only. Thus it is said in Exodus (22:20): "He that sacrificeth to the gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord;" and in Deuteronomy (6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only." And in Romans (1:22-23) it is said of the Gentiles: "For, professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man and of birds, and of fourfooted beasts and of creeping things;" and later (verse 25; Douay modified): "Who changed the truth of God into a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, Who is God above all blessed for ever." So, since it is unfitting for the cult of latria to be offered to any other being than the first principle of things, and since to incite to unworthy deeds can only be the work of

a badly disposed rational creature, it is evident that men have been solicited by the urging of demons to develop the aforesaid unworthy cults, and these demons have been presented in place of God as objects of men's worship because they craved divine honor. Hence it is said in the Psalm (95:5): "All the gods of the Gentiles are devils;" and in I Corinthians (10:20): "the things which the heathens sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not to God." Therefore, since this is the chief intent of divine law: that man be subject to God and that he should offer special reverence to Him, not merely in his heart, but also orally and by bodily works, so first of all, in Exodus 20, where the divine law is promulgated, the cult of many gods is forbidden when it is said: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before me" and "thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor any likeness." (Aquinas, 1975a, p. 140, 141)

Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced Thomas Aquinas' work, his method, and his groundbreaking formulations on anthropology. Three aspects of anthropology were discussed, that persons are relational by virtue of their being the image of God, that the soul and body are unitary, and that the great problem of humankind is separation from God, especially through idolatry.

The next chapter synthesizes integrative issues of Aquinas' theological discipline of anthropology and Fairbairn's psychological discipline of personality theory. After a comparison of their work, further suggestions are offered on maintaining a dialogue between theology and psychology toward an integrative paradigm.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS TOWARD A DIALOGUE

Introduction

The author's plan in this paper has been to begin a dialogue between psychoanalytic object relations psychology and Western Orthodox Christian theology, with Fairbairn representing British object relations theory and Aquinas representing Western Orthodox Christianity. In the first chapter, the stage was set by sharpening the focus, discussing the method, and defining the scope and thesis of this paper. An analysis of W. R. D. Fairbairn's writings constituted the second chapter of the paper, followed by an analysis of the relevant data from the theology of Thomas Aquinas in the third chapter.

From the exposition in chapters two and three, a common principle emerged from the writings of each man. This principle acts as a unifying theme for both domains, psychology and theology, and is the subject

of this last chapter. It is the author's intent in this chapter to build on what has been found to be implicit in Fairbairn and Aquinas thus far. What is this unifying theme? It is the primacy of relationship.

Review of Chapters Two and Three

The plan of Chapters Two and Three followed the same format. The following figure illustrates that each chapter was divided into two parts, an introduction and the study of the person, with sub-points under each.

Figure 9. Overview of Chapters Two and Three.

	FAIRBAIRN (CH 2)	AQUINAS (CH 3)
• Introduction -Work -Method	Fairbairn •Lit. review and his thought •Psychoanalytic science	Aquinas •Lit. review + his thought •Philosophy/ Theology
• The Person 1 What is a person?-Nature 2 How made?-Manner 3 Why problem?-Reason	**Personality Theory** •Relationship seeking •Pristine, unitary ego •Split ego	**Anthropology** •Image as relational •Soul/body unity •Separation and idolatry

In the introduction, each man's *work* was highlighted, through a literature review and brief overview of his thought, followed by discussion of each theorist's *method*, "psychoanalytic science" for Fairbairn and "philosophy and theology" for Aquinas.

In the second part of each chapter, the study of the person, "personality theory" for Fairbairn and "anthropology" for Aquinas, was approached by posing three questions. The first question, "What is a person?," investigated the *nature* of a person. The answer for Fairbairn is that a person is relationship seeking and for Aquinas is that a person is made in the image of God, which is relational. The second question, "How is a person made?," investigated the *manner* in which a person is put together. For Fairbairn, the answer is the pristine, unitary ego, while Aquinas affirms the soul/body unity. The third question, "Why is there problem?," investigated the *reason* a person has a problem. Fairbairn's answer is splitting of the ego and Aquinas' is separation and idolatry.

Preview of this Chapter

First, an exposition is made on Fairbairn's use of the sacred and Aquinas' use of the secular. Second, a comparative analysis of the work of Fairbairn and Aquinas is set forth.

The Sacred in Fairbairn and the Secular in Aquinas

In Chapter Three, in the section on method, it was demonstrated the great extent to which Aquinas went to integrate the secular and sacred. He stated that "the gifts of grace are added to us in order to enhance the gifts of nature, not to take them away. . . . Hence Christian theology enlists the help of philosophy and the sciences" (Gilby, 1955, p. 7).

Having previously established Aquinas as an integrator of the sacred and secular in his own right, it is the task here to demonstrate Fairbairn's secular work as containing a core of theological integration. If each man is found to be an integrator of the sacred and secular within his own work, then it would seem reasonable that, taken together, there would be more points available for comparison.

Fairbairn's exposure and adherence to Christianity are well documented. As a boy he attended church with his parents every Sunday, both morning and evening. He seemed to prefer Episcopalian services to Presbyterian. Sutherland (1989) makes mention of young Ronald's "practical Christianity," citing his work in clubs and organizations serving the deprived parts of the community. "That his marked altruistic and religious feelings were merged with his whole upbringing is clear . . ." (p. 5).

By age 18, Fairbairn had decided to become a clergyman, as the journal entry on his 21st birthday indicates. Fairbairn mentions he is not the humble servant only of King George, "but also of Jesus Christ." Fairbairn writes in his personal journal, "True Christianity ought to satisfy every legitimate instinct and aspiration. It ought to be a working and workable philosophy of life for man and boy, matron and maiden; it ought to be adaptable to the condition of schoolroom and football field, of office and golf-course, of factory and home . . . I have decided to devote my life to the cause of religion; but may it be a manly, healthy, whole-hearted strong religion,

appealing to enthusiasm of youth as well as the quiescence of old age -- in other words may it be a Christlike religion" (Sutherland, 1989, pp. 6, 7).

Shortly thereafter, Fairbairn pursued Hellenistic studies before taking a degree in divinity at London University. World War I took him to Jerusalem, where his varied reading resulted in a newfound interest in medical psychology. By the time he returned home his earlier plans, involving vocational ministry, had changed. In January, 1919, he commenced a four-year training program in medicine, intending to become a psychotherapist upon completion.

By year two of his program, Fairbairn began reading Freud and Jung. Concurrently, he initiated a personal analysis with an E. H. Connell, whom Sutherland (1989) describes as "a very full-blooded Christian" (p. 7). An analysis with Ernest Jones followed, ensuring that, as he began seeing his own patients, Fairbairn would be well-entrenched in classical Freudian orthodoxy.

While Sutherland (1989) describes Fairbairn's change of career as abandoning the church (p. 12), there is no evidence that Fairbairn's interest and

commitment to religion diminished simply because he pursued an alternate livelihood. One can see that Fairbairn considered the two disciplines not as mutually exclusive, but complementary. In fact, Sutherland (1989) says that "one matter he never raised was his continuing religious convictions. Though forsaking the career of a clergyman, he had remained a regular churchgoer, especially to its main festivals" (p. 31). His theological experience, integrated in such a fashion as to be reflected in behavior, had no small effect on his theory and practice.

In his 1955 paper, Fairbairn discussed the patient who seeks psychotherapeutic help. What that person seeks is "not so much health as salvation from his past, from bondage to his (internal) bad objects, from the burden of guilt, and from spiritual death. His search thus corresponds in detail to the religious quest" (p. 155-6). Fairbairn's 1927 paper on the religious fantasies of a female patient shows his acceptance of a normal religious experience as well as a neurotic one. This further demonstrates that

Fairbairn's theological, or sacred, beliefs were inherent in his emphasis on relationship.

Comparative Analysis of Fairbairn and Aquinas

In this first section, a schematic of the major parallels in Fairbairn and Aquinas is provided. In the second section, a comparative analysis is made of each man's literary and scientific method and of each one's contribution to the study of the person. In the third section, based on the comparison of the work of Fairbairn and Aquinas, implications and suggestions for further research are given.

Parallels Diagrammed

Figure 9, reproduced here from the introduction to this chapter, notes the parallels between the thought of Fairbairn and that of Aquinas as presented in Chapters Two and Three respectively.

Figure 9. Overview of Chapters Two and Three.

	FAIRBAIRN (CH 2)	AQUINAS (CH 3)
• Introduction -Work -Method	Fairbairn •Lit. review and his thought •Psychoanalytic science	Aquinas •Lit. review + his thought •Philosophy/ Theology
• The Person 1 What is a person?-Nature 2 How made?-Manner 3 Why problem?-Reason	**Personality Theory** •Relationship seeking •Pristine, unitary ego •Split ego	**Anthropology** •Image as relational •Soul/body unity •Separation and idolatry

In this section of Chapter Four, the topics identified in the above figure serve as an outline for comparing the views of the two men, beginning with each theorist's *method*. Then the topic of the person is broached, comparing Fairbairn and Aquinas' answers to the questions of *what* a person is, *how* she/he is made, and *why* there is a problem.

Method of Fairbairn and Aquinas

Each was precise and plain in writing. Each had a dedication to systematic analysis of detail. Each was trained in philosophy and theology. These qualities assure that their sacred and secular assumptions and interpretation of data are well thought through according to the integrity of their method and the congruity of their professional disciplines. This is especially true of their study of the person, a topic which so necessarily intertwines secular and sacred, objectivity and subjectivity, corporeal and spiritual.

They were both scientists of rigorous discipline, dedicating their lives to the art of spinning theory from existential substance; that is, from experience.

The data they used was experience itself, perceived through the senses--for Aquinas, everyday experience; and for Fairbairn, clinical psychotherapy. Aquinas employed analogy in explaining his theory, bridging the gap between concrete and abstract. Fairbairn used case examples to demonstrate the connection of data with theory.

Each has been criticized by modern readers for not having given enough clarifying examples. Aquinas' writings were described as having "imagination without imagery" (Chesterton, 1956, p. 152). Fairbairn's writing style has been seen as abstract and systematized (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 153).

Aquinas was exhaustive in his approach, seemingly attempting to "tie up all loose ends," but without equal clarity on every point. Fairbairn was more general in his coverage, leaving some implications to further interpretation and elaboration, and thus leaving some lack of clarity on issues. If their writings are heavy on theory, it is not because they were light on data collection, but because of their abstract writing style and the complexity of their subject matter--humanity.

Their style is part of the meaning, the medium part of the message. Scientific scrutiny of the data, analyzed and reassessed, is the process resulting in distillation into theoretical formulation. Aquinas and Fairbairn allow the reader in on the process of inquiry, thus documenting the legitimacy of their method, yet therefore sometimes taking away from the simplicity of direct explanation.

Aquinas and Fairbairn each drew from tradition in both sacred and secular realms as well as from newer ideas, including their own discoveries. Fairbairn drew on the tradition of Freud, but also incorporated the newer theories of Klein, and combined this with his own clinical observations. Aquinas drew on the church fathers and Scripture, yet infused their thinking with the philosophy of Aristotle, and added his own logical analysis of experience. In so doing, each man forged an amalgam never before manufactured and which has demonstrated a strength and durability to stand the test of time.

Perhaps the key element common to both Fairbairn and Aquinas is their dedication to truth, the adherence to reality. This represents a philosophical

presupposition, an assumption to scientific practice which is brought to the data and found in the warp and woof of inductive and deductive data interpretation. That they agree on this matter is an important principle to the assertion that the two separate theorists may be integrated together. It also has implications as to how each one in himself integrated the secular and the sacred.

Each theorist started with the empirical data, inductively, and then moved to interpretation, deductively. But the goal in all of this was the discovery of reality, the way things are, not the spinning of intriguing philosophical ideas. Fairbairn said that science provides a picture of reality by way of an intellectual construct (deduction) of various phenomena (induction) (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 376). Aquinas said that everything in the intellect has been in the senses, the mind knowing only through sense knowledge (induction) but knowing more than sense knowledge (deduction) (Aquinas, 1981, p. 396). Each man set the notions of sense to a metaphysical key.

Each man strove to *explain* reality through logical reasoning. Aquinas said that logic is based

on reality, not the other way around (Chesterton, 1956, pp. 153-155). Fairbairn said that object relations theory corresponds more closely with the psychological data and possesses more explanatory value from a purely scientific point of view than Freud's psychology (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 377).

That each man was dedicated to the adherence to truth through the discovery of reality is also evident in their view of the human person. Fairbairn believed that the reality of external, not internal, relationships is the optimum for all persons. Aquinas believed that relationship with God, the first principle of reality, is the goal for all persons. More will be said of this in the following paragraphs.

What is clear is that each man, employing his method as writer, philosopher, scientist, and practitioner, was breaking new ground which would serve as the foundation for later work on the human person as a theological and psychological being. In the following section, the author compares their studies of the person for the purpose of showing the compatibility and synergy of each in formulating an integrated secular/sacred concept of the person.

The Person as seen by Fairbairn and Aquinas

Fairbairn's personality theory and Aquinas' anthropology each explain the person in a strikingly similar way. Central to each view is the primacy of the relational nature of human beings. This is strongly upheld by both theorists. For Fairbairn, this is the point which distinguished him from his predecessors. It is his hallmark. For Aquinas, *what* he held was not new on this issue, but the *way* he held and explained it was; that is, his non-Augustinian view of the unity of body and soul and his view of the compatibility of science and religion.

Each man was committed to linking with the orthodox tradition of his field, Freud for Fairbairn and the church fathers and Scripture for Aquinas. Yet each drew from theorists whose works had not been applied in the way he applied them. Fairbairn utilized Klein's work and Aquinas leaned heavily on Aristotle. Each man also carried tradition and the theories of others to new heights with his own assumptions, data, and interpretations.

Implicit in their unique theoretical additions were each man's own secular and sacred resources. It is on the topic of the human person that these scientists focused their psychological and theological integrative powers. And taken together, their efforts are even more significant toward providing an integrative dialogue for understanding the person. In the following analysis, the author looks at the three questions defining this study of the person. The first two questions, the nature (what) and manner (how), are covered briefly, while the third question, the reason (why) is elaborated on more fully.

What is a Person--the Nature?

Both theorists see the nature of a person as relationally based. Fairbairn says that relationship is the substance of human living and that "psychology may be said to resolve itself into a study of the relationships of the individual to his objects . . ." (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60). Aquinas says that "the ultimate explanation of our being lies in its being kindred with God" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 583).

That relationship defines not only the normal behavior but also the very nature of the person is

made even more clear in Fairbairn's statement that one cannot develop a self or selfhood without being in relation with others. Aquinas roots the nature of the person as being the very image of God, a God whose trinitarian nature is itself relational.

How is a Person put together--the Manner?

As Fairbairn's view of the relationship of the psyche and body disengaged him from Freudian hydraulic tradition, so Aquinas' concept of the relationship between soul and body distinguished him from the Augustinian Christian tradition. Each theorist, opposing his respective tradition, saw the psychological aspects (psyche or soul) and physiological aspects (body) working in harmony, unity.

There are two extremes on either side of the argument for the unity of the psychological and physiological. Monism, held by materialists, reduces the psychological to the physiological. This is the Freudian view against which Fairbairn fought. The other extreme is dualism, held by Platonists, which sees the "real" human as being only the soul, which inhabits the body, the body being the soul's

instrument, or prison. This is the Augustinian view against which Aquinas fought.

Fairbairn affirms both aspects of the person operating in unity, stating that "the pristine personality of the child consists of a unitary dynamic ego" (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 375).

> In a word [biological] 'impulses' cannot be considered apart from the endopsychic structures [of the ego] which they energized and the object relationships which they enable these structures to establish . . . No 'impulses' can be regarded as existing in the absence of an ego structure, it will no longer be possible to preserve any psychological distinction between the id and the ego. (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 85, 88)

Likewise, Aquinas holds to the co-working of psyche and *soma*. "Thus our body is both a physiological and a psychological object, is both organic and charged with human interests and values" (Gilby, 1955, p. 96).

How does this impact the concept of the person as relational? Fairbairn makes it clear that the impulses which drive human interaction are not

impersonal but personal. Aquinas makes clear that a person can relate to God with his/her whole self, not being ashamed of the body as if it were evil as some ascetics would say. This gives dignity and worth to the human condition, psyche and *soma*, as unified in making contact, relationship with others, including God.

Why is there a Problem--the Reason?

Fairbairn and Aquinas alike see the reason for the problem of a person as separation from real relationship and turning to less real ones. For Fairbairn, this translates into the infant's turning from relationship with real, external care givers to relationship with less real, internal object representations of these care givers, which the child creates through ego splitting, in an attempt to maintain a controlled relationship with them on her/his own terms. This separation from real, external relationship causes a split in the person's self, a fracturing of the self due to a less real, internal configuration of relational loyalties. Because the person is essentially in need of real, external relationship, this does not work, and the

person ends up manifesting maladaptive psychological symptoms.

For Aquinas, it is the turning of the individual away from relationship with the real, external God, the one and only first principle of reality, to relationship with less real, idolatrous representations supplanting God in an attempt to continue a controlled relationship with Him on her/his own terms. This separation from the first principle of reality, upon which all reality is contingent, results in a fracturing of the person into unholy relational alliance with created things rather than the Creator of being. Because the person is essentially in need of relationship with the external, first principle of reality, God, this does not work and the person ends up manifesting maladaptive spiritual symptoms.

Fairbairn sees the apogee of psychological health and functioning in the despair of the schizoid personality. This is the person who is almost completely given over to relationship with less real, internal objects instead of real, external objects. The epitome is the solitary person. However, there

are others with seemingly higher functioning who, despite their external, social facade, are actually operating intrapsychically at a schizoid level.

Fairbairn says the schizoid position is a tragic situation and is a theme of much literature, especially tragedy and poetry. He alludes to the "Lucy" poems of Wordsworth as providing an example (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 25). In one of these poems, entitled "Lucy Gray; or Solitude," a little girl, lovely to all appearances but actually quite lonely, is finally lost from her parents after a snow storm. The first two and the last two stanzas read as follows.

> Oft I had heard of Lucy Gray:
> And, when I crossed the wild,
> I chanced to see at break of day
> The solitary child.
>
> No mate, no comrade Lucy knew;
> She dwelt on a wide moor,
> --The sweetest thing that ever grew
> Beside a human door!

[Lucy is then lost in the snow]

--Yet some maintain that to this day
She is a living child;
That you may see sweet Lucy Gray
Upon the lonesome wild.

O'er rough and smooth she trips along,
And never looks behind;
And sings a solitary song
That whistles in the wind. (Wordsworth, 1973, pp. 135, 136)

Fairbairn sees this as painting the picture of the tragic despair of a schizoid person, a person so caught up in her inner world that she ends up losing touch with her parents and her outer world, never growing emotionally beyond childhood, only, and for all time, singing a "solitary song that whistles in the wind." This is the height of psychological illness for Fairbairn, a kind of psychological death, complete separation from real relationship and being a prisoner of the internal, less real relationships of the split self.

Aquinas also sees separation from real relationship and commitment to less real, idolatrous relationships as the most tragic. For him, it is separation from the one and only first principle of reality, God, which is the most horrible consequence of sin. In ST, IIIa, 3, 1, ad 4, he states:

> Now it [sin] is hurtful to him [a person who has sinned] chiefly because it separates him from God; and in this respect the separation from God which is a punishment, should be more displeasing than the sin itself . . . Consequently, since this is the greatest hurt, inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest good, the greatest of all punishments will be separation from God. (Aquinas, 1981, p. 2568)

Physical death is the soul being separated from the body but spiritual death is the soul being separated from God, who is the first principle of reality. For Fairbairn, the self being separated from relationships in reality, with real persons, is like a psychological death.

Aquinas says, in ST, IIa, IIae, 94, 1-3, that idolatry is the most grievous sin, idolatry belonging

to superstition, which means "to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 1589-1592). For Aquinas this includes exchanging the truth of God for a lie, worshiping creatures instead of the Creator. Whether it be animal, man, demons, devil, or symbols like idols, it is all said to be idolatry (Aquinas, 1975a, pp. 140, 141). Yet, he is clear that creatures in themselves are not obstacles to one's communion with God. In *I Sentences*, I. iii, c., 3, 4, he says, "We make them so, by abusing them and by committing ourselves to them as if they were our ultimate goal" (Gilby, 1955, p. 130). Thus, idolatry is the exchange of worshiping the first principle of reality, which is God, for the lie which is worshiping of lesser realities as if they were the ultimate.

Fairbairn speaks of the person as internalizing bad objects to control them yet therefore losing real relationship with external objects; making a pact with the devil as an ersatz father at the expense of true, external parental relationship; succumbing to "possession," as if by evil spirits, by internal bad

objects in place of external objects (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 67, 70, 71). Fairbairn says that "sin" is always "regarded, according to the Hebraic conception, as seeking after strange gods, and according to the Christian conception, as yielding to the Devil . . ." (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 74). Here Fairbairn speaks in terms of idolatry, seeking after gods or the Devil instead of seeking after God.

This again emphasizes his idea of selling one's relationships in the external world in exchange for relationships with the gods, or Devil, of the internal world. Aquinas would say the person sells relationship with God for relationship with gods, idols, or the Devil, any created thing versus the Creator, any lesser reality than the first and only principle of reality, which is God. Fairbairn rarely employs as powerful an image to drive home his point as he does when he states, "for it may be said of all psychoneurotic and psychotic patients that, if a True Mass is being celebrated in the chancel, a Black Mass is being celebrated in the crypt" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70).

Here one can clearly see the striking parallels in the thought of Aquinas and Fairbairn. Aquinas says that sin separates a person from God by turning the person from the first principle of reality to a lesser reality. Fairbairn says that turning from dealing with reality of external objects is the costly price paid for turning to internal objects, and that the person needs the psychotherapist to be a kind of priest for "'the forgiveness of sins'" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70). Aquinas says that idolatry, as a part of superstition, is the most grievous sin, giving devotion to whom or what it is not due. Fairbairn says the person's devotion to the idols of internal objects and the person's subsequent "possession" by them necessitates the psychotherapist being "the true successor to the exorcist . . . [concerned with] 'the casting out of devils'" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70).

Fairbairn's concept of psychopathology and Aquinas' concept of sin are seen here as quite related and complementary. Each believes that turning from real relationship and turning to less real relationship is against the nature of the person, separating the person from reality, splitting one in

one's devotion, and thus causing detrimental psychological, or spiritual, consequences.

Implications and Suggestions for Further Research

A major benefit of research on a topic as complex as developing an integrative dialogue is the potential created for making implications and proposing further research. The preceding section compared Fairbairn and Aquinas' view of the person using three questions as an outline, the nature (what) of a person, the manner (how) in which a person is made, and the reason (why) there is a problem. Based on the above comparison of Fairbairn and Aquinas' study of the person, the author here utilizes the same three questions to raise implications and suggest research possibilities.

What is a Person--the Nature?

Fairbairn's view that one cannot develop a self or selfhood without being in relation with others raises the question of gender and gender identity formation. Is it necessary to have both same sex and opposite sex care givers in order to develop a sense of self? Does particular pathology result from the

lack of relationship with same sex or opposite sex care givers? Moberly would answer each in the affirmative. She says that, ideally, each child should have same sex and opposite sex attachment figures to relate to and that the absence of specific attachment figures may result in long-term damage to the child's capacity for attachment (Moberly, 1983, p. 79). Her discussion of Bowlby's comment on the detachment from and "disidentification" with mother argues for the importance of the gender of care givers in the formation of gender identity (Moberly, 1983, pp. 10, 60).

Another aspect of the topic of identity is humankind's link with God. Aquinas roots the nature of the person as being the very image of God, a God whose trinitarian nature is itself relational. Further research outside the western tradition would be enlightening. Eastern Orthodox theology has much to say on the trinitarian nature of God and how the Christian reflects that relational nature.

> The Christian God is not just a unit but a union, not just unity but community. . . . All, then, that is implied in our limited understanding of

> the human person and of human love, this we affirm also of God the Trinity, while adding that in him these things mean infinitely more than we can ever imagine. . . . The final end of the spiritual Way [sic] is that we humans should also become part of this Trinitarian coherence or *perichoresis* [italics original], being wholly taken up into the circle of love that exists within God. So Christ prayed to his Father on the night before his Crucifixion: "May they all be one: as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, so may they also be one in us" (John 17:21). (Ware, 1990, pp. 33, 35, 34)

An interesting implication to the foregoing views of Fairbairn and Aquinas can now be presented. Since Fairbairn says that a person needs relationship with other human persons to form a self and Aquinas says that a person is by nature the image of a relational God and should relate to that God, can a person develop a self without being in relationship with God? The Western Orthodox theological answer to any question about the ability of a human person to exist or function without God is that people are finite and

thus contingent on the infinite God--a person cannot *be* or *do* anything without God. By virtue of one's very existence, a person has a relationship with God, acknowledged or not. A person's very nature is rooted in God ontologically.

But the epistemological question remains. If a person chooses not to cultivate that relationship, chooses not to relate to or "get to know" God, can a self be attained? This author believes that the answer is yes and no, that the answer theologically is parallel to the development of the child psychologically. To have *life* at birth, the child need not know the full extent of the relationship with the mother. The child can relate to her as a part object and ascribe goodness or badness to her through undifferentiated splitting and projection. The mother must be good-enough regardless of the perspective of the child. But to have *health* past the early period, the child must develop enough to relate to the mother and others as whole objects and to separate and individuate from the mother and others in order to relate truly at a mature level.

Likewise, in one's relationship to God, to have *life* or existence at birth, the person need not know the full extent of the relationship with the God in whose nature one is created. A person can relate to God as a part object and ascribe goodness or badness to God through undifferentiated splitting and projection. God must be good-enough regardless of the perspective of the person. But to have *health* past the early period, the person must develop enough to relate to God and others as whole objects and to separate and individuate himself/herself from God and others in order to relate truly at a mature level.

Therefore, the answer to the question of whether a person can fully develop a self without maturely relating to God is similar to the question of whether a person can fully develop a self without maturely relating to mother and others--it is a matter of degree, a matter of maturity. The more developed self is that of the person who is more maturely relating to others, including mother and God. And how one relates to mother impacts how one relates to God and vice versa--mature relating to God assumes mature relating to others, such as mother. This is seen in

the Christian Scripture and tradition that love of God must include love of human persons (Matthew 22: 37-40; 1 John 2: 9, 10; 1 John 4: 19-21). Therefore, one cannot have a fully developed self if one is not relating maturely to real objects, whether these be mother and others (human persons) or God (divine persons).

That which constitutes mature relating to God is perhaps open to more subjectivity than a description of human relating. Yet the principle of relating well is constant whether it be with human or divine persons. The one who claims mature relationship with God is still subject to these principles. Further research here could focus on the exact nature of a mature relationship to each kind of object, divine and human, and how each impacts the other.

How is a Person put together--the Manner?

Against the reductionistic extremes of monism and dualism, Fairbairn and Aquinas affirm the working together of the psyche and *soma*. For Fairbairn, no biological impulses are regarded as existing in the absence of an ego structure. For Aquinas, the person's body is both organic and charged with human

interests and values. This gives dignity and worth to the human condition, psyche and *soma*, as unified in making contact and relating with others, including God.

After all, Christ himself took on a human body, lived a sinless life, and developed a perfectly mature self. And the very purpose of his life and death was to make relationships better for all creation--between God and humans and between humans and humans as well as between humans and the rest of creation (John 3: 16, 17; John 15; John 17). This was all accomplished when the Divine took on a human body. Certainly, mature relationships can be accomplished as a psyche/*soma* unity.

This points to the question of just how biology and psychology work together in daily life to relate maturely to God. How does one relate to God without the extreme uses of the body found in hedonism or asceticism? Are there implications for how the two genders relate to God based on biology? What is the role of sexuality? If these ways of relating are "hard wired in," can they be changed? The answer to

these questions is beyond the scope of this paper but they would seem fruitful for further research.

In some ways the answers to these may be likened to the mysteries described in physics, such as light being, at the same time and in the same way, both wave and particle. The analysis of the working together of psyche and *soma* may be like those processes which produce music, working together of left brain and right brain, linear and conceptual processing, words (psyche) and rhythm (body). The mysteries of theology and psychology take their place alongside those of the "hard sciences." Each can and should be explored and yet each opens up the unexplored. Such is the state of human understanding on the interrelationship of the human psyche and *soma*.

Why is there a Problem--the Reason?

Fairbairn and Aquinas alike see the reason for a person's problem as separation from real relationship and turning to less real ones. For Fairbairn, the self being separated from relationships in reality, with real persons, is like a psychological death. For Aquinas, it is separation from the one and only first principle of reality, God, which is the most horrible

consequence of sin. Physical death is the soul being separated from the body but spiritual death is the soul being separated from God, who is the first principle of reality.

What is the connection between physical death and emotional (psychological) or spiritual (theological) death? There are indications that lonely people do not live as long as others. It is known that people die physically shortly after anniversaries or holidays. These would seem to indicate a connection between emotional death and physical death. In healthy individuals, physical separation should resolve into psychological separation. Chronic depression can sometimes be seen as unresolved grief, the unwillingness to let someone or something go. Physiologically, how does psychological death precipitate physical death? Can spiritual death cause psychological or physical death? What is the relationship between psychological and spiritual death? These questions warrant further research.

Another point of comparison between the two theorists could be further explored. Fairbairn's concept of psychopathology and Aquinas' concept of sin

are seen as quite related and complementary. Each believes that turning from real relationship and turning to less real relationship is against the nature of the person, separating the person from reality, splitting oneself in one's devotion, and thus causing detrimental psychological, or spiritual, consequences. Aquinas says that sin separates a person from God by turning from the first principle of reality to a lesser reality. Fairbairn says that turning from dealing with reality of external objects is the costly price paid for turning to internal objects, and that the person needs the psychotherapist to be a kind of priest for "'the forgiveness of sins'" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70).

What is the source of the sin or pathology? It would seem that the "turning away" from the reality of real relationship is the root of the pathology or sin. The person, through one's own volition, is the source of the pathology or sin. Just what is the relationship between Fairbairn's concept of psychopathology and Aquinas' concept of sin? This author is saying that healthy relationship is the issue for both theorists and only the object of that

relationship is different. For Fairbairn, the object is other humans, particularly mother. For Aquinas, the object is God.

In John 8:32, Christ said, "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" (The Open Bible, 1979, p. 1023). This would apply to freedom from internal objects as well as from idols and it comes when the truth, or reality, of real relationship is known. For Fairbairn, the liberating truth is knowing, or relating to, the person in the external world of reality. For Aquinas, the liberating truth is to know, or relate to, the God of reality, particularly Christ, who is truth personified. Christ said, in John 14:6, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father but through Me (The Open Bible, 1979, p. 1031).

It may be simplistic to say that relating to humans deals with the psychological while relating to God deals with the theological. This is because inherent in relating to God are healthy relationships with humans. Therefore, the theological subsumes the psychological as a category. This is not to suggest a rigid hierarchy of object relationships necessary to

the development of the self, that is, first mother, then father, then God, but rather a complex and subtle interplay. Perhaps human objects are necessary, but not sufficient, transitional objects to God. And perhaps relationship with God informs one's relationships with others, the explicit context of relating to God being the context of relating with others. It would be interesting research to see what is the normal pattern in human subjects for the development of this mutually informing, accommodation and assimilation, figure and ground interplay.

Boston College professor John McDargh, S.J., states the case of this interplay well in his published Harvard doctoral dissertation.

> A colleague of mine challenged me with the question: "Are you trying to say that God is nothing but a cosmic teddy bear?" "No," I replied, "but I *am* arguing that we cannot understand fully what compels human beings to seek after that which they name 'God' until and unless we understand something about our relationship to our teddy bears." (McDargh, 1983, xiii)

Much has been made in this paper of the reason for there being a problem, the sin or pathology in a person. Further integrative dialogue could be done on Fairbairn and Aquinas' view of the solution to the problem, or what is curative, what restores health to the person. This would be a direct complement to this present paper.

Integration of psychology and theology would be furthered still if the questions on the study of the person were posed to more representatives from psychology and theology. This would provide a broader comparison and application. Also, as seen in the poem quoted in this chapter, vistas in English literature are open for further research, for finding psychological and theological truth in literary works. There is much to be explored in the way of data and analysis in this continuing integrative dialogue.

Conclusion

From the exposition in Chapters Two and Three, a common principle emerged from the writings of W. R. D. Fairbairn and Thomas Aquinas--the primacy of relationship. This principle served as a unifying theme for both domains, psychology and theology, and was the subject of this last chapter.

In this chapter, the author noted Fairbairn's use of the sacred and Aquinas' use of the secular, compared the work of both theorists, and set forth implications and suggestions for further research. In this way, the material in the preceding chapters served as a foundation for this integrative dialogue.

This dissertation asserted that the concept of relationship is the key to a psychoanalytic object-relations theoretical and Thomistic theological understanding of the human personality. Second, it suggested that this concept of relationship may serve as an integration point between psychology and theology.

It was seen that these theorist/practitioners share a common scientific and philosophical method

dedicated to the discovery of reality under God. Each believed that a person's nature is relationally based. Both believed that the person is a psyche and *soma*, a psychological and biological, unity. Each believed that turning from real relationship and turning to less real relationship is against the nature of the person, separating the person from reality, splitting one in one's devotion, and thus causing detrimental psychological, or spiritual, consequences.

New York University theoretical psychologist Paul Vitz sets down a challenge for further work in the area of integration. "It may be a good time for Christianity quietly to work out an intellectual rapprochement between its own spiritual psychology and genuine psychoanalytic insights" (Vitz, 1977, p. 13). In part, this paper is a response to that challenge.

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Appendix A

Vita

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Master of Arts in Clinical Psychology, Highest Honors, George Fox College, Newberg, Oregon, August 1990.

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EXPERIENCE

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