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Crime and Evil: Meta-Theory, Theory, and Praxis in Forensic Psychology

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psychology

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Crime and Evil: Meta-Theory, Theory, and Praxis in

Forensic Psychology

by

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Approval

Crime and Evil: Meta-Theory, Theory, and Praxis in
Forensic Psychology

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Abstract

The prevalence of crime is a world-wide problem,
and concomitantly, the fear of crime grips the public.
Also, social scientists remain pessimistic about
solutions: many acquiesce in the "nothing works"
conclusion. The general populace views crime as both
pathological (i.e., sick) and evil. Privately, social
scientists may agree, but professionally they describe
crime as nothing but an illness. This research
establishes that such reductionism limits the
explanatory power of forensic psychology and that
ruling out the existence of evil a priori is
unscientific. First, the philosophy of science
underlying the study of crime is examined. The history

of science, the current realist versus antirealist
debate, the nature of scientific methods, and the
necessity of hermeneutics are reviewed. Charles
Darwin's Baconian methodology (i.e., consulting both
general and special revelation) will be adopted. Then,
the scientific character of theological constructs
(e.g., evil) and the religious a priori of all
theoretical thought are examined. Examining crime and
evil concurrently actually safeguards science from
dogmatism, while scientism is a self-refuting enemy of
true science. Second, criminological psychology is
investigated in the context of human nature in general.
Criminality is shown to be a quasi-psychological
construct, and Hippocratic and Aristotelian causality
is reviewed. Several psychological views of crime
(e.g., Cleckley's psychopathy, the Cognitive-Behavioral
approach, the Neopsychoanalytic view, and the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual's [DSM] Antisocial
Personality diagnosis) are analyzed alongside the
construct of human evil as developed in theological
anthropology. Third, psychological treatment of
offenders is examined. Only when evil is recognized
does criminal responsibility make sense. The common-
sense attribution that severe criminality is both evil

and psychopathological is affirmed. Further research in criminal moral development, abnormal psychology, and responsibility-grounded psychotherapy is suggested. Some possible public policy implications (e.g., restitution-based corrections) are discussed.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Prologue

The Study of Crime

Divergent opinions abound about crime, its rate,
its causes, and its solutions (Lewis, 1980). Latent
notions emerge when a heinous crime occurs in society,
such as the assassination of a president or the
occurrence of serial homicide (Dobson, 1989).

Yet, people have unclear and contradictory ideas
about crime (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). People fuse
scientific and moral attributions about the causes and
the cures of criminality (Harvey & Weary, 1985; Heider,
1958; Katz, 1988). Both the citizenry and the
professional community adopt a mixed vocabulary when
seeking to describe a criminal act: the same crime is
seen as illegal, sick, and evil.

While philosophers, psychiatrists, sociologists,
theologians, and criminologists all offer opinions
about crime and criminals, Eysenck (1977) argued that

psychologists are the professionals with the greatest potential contribution to make in understanding the causes and cures of criminality. "No system of criminology has any meaning that disregards the central feature of all criminology: the individual person we are trying to influence" (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989, p. 8). Professional psychologists are uniquely suited to investigate the perplexing problem of crime.

Forensic Psychology

Psychologists who serve in criminal or penal settings have a profound responsibility to benefit the client/patient and society. They are subpoenaed to offer expert testimony about crime and criminals (Kaplan & Sadock, 1988; Stone, 1988). They research the mental disorders afflicting criminals and are mandated by statute to develop treatment plans to ameliorate their criminality (Deering's California Penal Code, 1985). Forensic clinicians and researchers write opinions that have far-reaching ramifications. The safety of society may be at issue. So may the disposition of a patient's criminal case: he/she may receive life in prison, be committed to an institution or be given the death penalty. If inmates are found

guilty and treatment is adjudicated, then they have the right to effective treatment (American Psychological Association [APA], 1974, 1981). Therefore, the standards of psychological practice and the existence of the offender population behoove the forensic psychologist to develop effective treatment modalities based on sound, scientific theories.

The Problem

Scientism's Distortion of Science

For psychologists to study and treat criminals in a professional, ethical, and scholarly manner, they must take all of the psychological data into account. Sound, parsimonious theories that fully explain crime and human nature should be the goal of psychological theory-building (Miller, 1989).

However, many criminal psychologies omit humankind's free moral agency from the scope of scientific inquiry (Menninger, 1973; Peck, 1983). Also, radical reductionism, naturalism, and positivism have removed the idea of evil (and value-judgment in general) from psychology's domain (Berger, 1969; Bergin, 1987; Schuster, 1987).

Psychology, in an attempt to justify its scientific status, has adopted scientism instead (Moreland, 1989). Scientism is an inflated view of science in which knowledge in general is equated with modern scientific practice. Those holding this view also do little to define science or to place it in its historical context (Flew, 1979).

Scientism is a rather unsophisticated view, but it is pervasive in our culture due to the indisputable advances of science and technology. In short, scientism[1] is the view that "science has all the answers"; it is fundamentally a religious position and a dogmatic one at that (Morris, 1984).

Evil as Scientific Data

The experience of human evil is a real part of the human condition. Evil may be difficult to investigate, but pretending a phenomenon does not exist can never advance the cause of science. Staub called evil "part of a broadly shared human cultural heritage" (1989, p. 25). He found it necessary to invoke the concept of

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[1] "Scientism" and other technical terms are defined briefly in Appendix A.

evil in order to explain genocidal behavior. Fromm
(1973), White (1961), and Peck (1983) have also thought
that evil was well within the purview of psychological
study. Psychology itself is defined and redefined in
virtually every new textbook. Furthermore, the
definition of psychology and its scope is not even a
psychological question: it is a metaphysical question
and can only be answered by the philosophy of science
(James, 1890/1990; Pannenberg, 1973/1976).

Dooyeweerd (1960/1980), the eminent Reformed
philosopher, noted that all of creation is open to
systematic investigation. Therefore, the data of human
evil is open to scientific inquiry. Why? Because it
is there.

Also, to dictate that a particular phenomenon is
outside the boundaries of a science a priori is unwise
(Moreland, 1989). For example, a given phenomenon
(e.g., achievement, religiosity, or crime) is often
fruitfully investigated by sociology, social
psychology, and clinical psychology.

Moving from the general to the particular reveals
a problem, first in science, then in psychology, and
specifically in forensic psychology today. Scientists
have adopted scientism as their creed. Because of

this, they have neglected the obvious: the existence of human evil as a fundamental determinant of crime.

The Theory

<u>Rebuilding Forensic Psychology</u>

White (1987) followed William James (1890/1990) and argued that the soul (*psyche*) needs to be put back into psychology.[2] Others argue for a psychology reconstructed along these same lines (Carter & Narramore, 1979; Cosgrove & Mallory, 1977).

A forensic psychology that is reconstructed to include the entire data set of human experience should theoretically be more inclusive and be better able to explain deviant human behavior (Bellah, 1991; Hall, 1945). This study will contribute to that reconstruction by proposing the theory that *crime and evil can and should be examined concurrently in order to establish an adequate foundation for forensic psychology.*

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[2] Etymologically speaking, <u>psych</u>ology minus the <u>psyche</u> is the study of nothing.

<u>Corollaries to the Theory</u>

The theory that crime and evil should be examined concurrently will be postulated with three corollaries. The exposition of these corollaries and the evaluation of them in light of any data germane to forensic psychology will constitute the remainder of this study. The three subsequent sections of this dissertation will apply the crime and evil construct to these levels of analysis: meta-theory, theory proper, and praxis (see Table 1). Crime and evil theory and its three corollary theories will be held tentatively until the end of the inquiry.

Table 1

<u>Three Levels of Theoretical Analysis Critiqued with</u>
<u>Crime and Evil Theory</u>

1. META-THEORY:	Theory about theory.
2. THEORY:	Theory proper.
3. PRAXIS:	Theory applied.

First, the crime and evil postulate will be tested against the philosophy of science (meta-theory). Then it will be evaluated alongside the current psychological views of criminality (theory). Last, the

crime and evil model will be tested in the context of current psychologically-based criminal interventions (praxis) (see Table 2).

Table 2

Crime and Evil Theory and its Corollaries

The Theory
Crime and evil should be examined concurrently in order to establish an adequate foundation for forensic psychology.
The Corollaries
1. The Meta-theoretical Level.
Crime and evil should be investigated together in order to establish the philosophy of science underlying forensic psychology.
2. The Theoretical Level.
Crime and evil should be investigated together in order to understand criminal human nature.
3. The Practical Level.
Crime and evil should be investigated together in order to provide effective clinical treatment for criminals.

Methodological Tasks

More specifically, the following three goal statements parallel the three levels of inquiry above:

Investigation from a Meta-Theoretical Perspective

The foundational contribution of the philosophy of science to the problem of crime and evil will be examined. Definitions of science, the distinction between theory and meta-theory, the human science approach, the interpretation of data, and the problem of meaning will be discussed (Moreland, 1989; Pannenberg, 1973/1976; Polkinghorne, 1991; Van Leeuwen, 1985). Overall, the major question investigated will be whether evil can be investigated scientifically and whether a comprehensive crime and evil theory helps or hinders in establishing the foundation of forensic psychology. Also, the possibility of integrating psychology and theology will be broached. The view of science developed in the first section will provide the structure for the rest of the inquiry.

Investigation from a Theoretical Perspective

The use of medico-legal (crime) and moral (evil) attributions in criminologic descriptions will be explored. The terms *psychopathy* and *antisocial personality* will be examined. The status of DSM

criteria will be reviewed. Also, underlying assumptions in current personological theory will be discussed (Cleckley, 1976; Eysenck, 1986; Millon, 1986; Widiger, Frances, Pincus, Davis, & First, 1991). Concurrent with these inquiries, the quasi-psychological nature of criminality and the idea of criminal causality will be introduced. Then psychological explanations of crime (Hare, 1970; Meloy, 1988; Samenow, 1984; Walters, 1990) and theological explanations of evil (Erickson, 1985; Saucy, 1993) will be considered.

Investigation from a Practical Perspective

The ramifications that one's theory of crime and evil (i.e., attributions) has on the treatment and amelioration of criminality will be investigated. The issues of punishment, rehabilitation, and restoration will be explored. The difficulties and discouragements that come with treating severe criminals will be examined. Also, the importance of a sense of responsibility and adequate moral development in inmate/patients will be discussed (Colson & Van Ness, 1989; Fingarette, 1988; Kohlberg, 1981; Meloy, 1992; Umbreit, 1985).

Limits of the Study

This research is not intended to replace textbooks in forensic or abnormal psychology, the philosophy of science, or forensic treatment. Because of the breadth of this undertaking, the completed inquiry will take the form of a prolegomenon or introduction. Immanuel Kant wrote that prolegomena

> are designed for preparatory exercises; they are intended rather to point out what we have to do in order if possible to actualise a science, than to propound it. They must therefore rest upon something already known as trustworthy, from which we can set out with confidence, and ascend to sources as yet unknown. (1969, p. 313)

This research will seek to integrate the extant scientific knowledge concerning crime and evil in order to provide a needed preface to forensic psychology.

CHAPTER 2

META-THEORY: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE

Psychology in Context

Chapter 1 of this inquiry asserted the necessity
of considering the construct of evil alongside any
investigation into criminality. At first glance, given
the current intellectual milieu, this may seem like an
apples and oranges comparison.

This chapter will describe and characterize the
current state of psychological science. It will show
that the consideration of a construct like evil
enriches science. The fact that some current views of
science that ignore such constructs reduce science to a
mere caricature of itself will be shown.

Psychology in the Universe of the Sciences

Irwin Schrodinger, the great physicist, wrote
several books about science in general, but he felt

uneasy about these projects. An unwritten law in
science is that

> a scientist is supposed to have a complete and
> thorough knowledge, at first hand, of *some*
> subjects and, therefore, is usually expected not
> to write on any topic of which he is not a master.
> This is regarded as a matter of *noblesse oblige*.
>
> (Schrodinger, 1944/1990, p. 467)

Yet he did explore the wider field of science in
general because he believed in cross-disciplinary
studies. However, Schrodinger believed that no
scientist really understood her own discipline unless
she could understand it in the context of other modes
of study. He recounted how the word "university"
denotes a universal course of study and opined that
such a universal context was necessary for any true
learning to take place. Likewise, this inquiry will
attempt to place criminological or forensic psychology
in its universal context as a science.

Psychology and the Nature of Science

Modern psychological science was born slightly
more than one hundred years ago with the founding of
empirical psychology both in the United States and in

Germany. The liberation of psychology from philosophy marked its birth (Boring, 1957). Interestingly, Evans (1989) believed that many psychologists want to deny their philosophical birthright. He noted that "disputes in psychology are invariably philosophical in character, though psychologists themselves have a penchant for calling philosophical disagreements 'methodological'" (p. 24).

The Presuppositions of Modern Science

Sigmund Freud was more frank when he set forth his meta-psychological presuppositions: "Our best hope for the future is that the intellect--the scientific spirit, reason--should in time establish a dictatorship over the human mind" (1939/1990, p. 880).

The nineteenth century was dominated by an optimistic *zeitgeist*. Science was believed to be well on its way to solving all of life's problems. Leading physicists claimed that the world was basically understood; their work was finished.[3]

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[3] Einstein's equations confounded this claim (1916/1990). However, this has not dampened the scientific optimism of many, even until today.

Over and against the dictatorship of reason that Freud proposed, twentieth-century thinkers have examined the limits of science. Kuhn (1970) challenged the scientific community to examine the way science is done. Studies in the philosophy of science have abounded recently (Laudan, 1990). This spirit of scrutiny has not trickled down to all scientists, however. Many investigators seem to proceed with Freud's agenda.

Basic science researchers, practitioners, and laypersons generally share a common ignorance of what science is and how it is done. Moreland, recounting the narrow scope of his own scientific training and scientific training in general, recalled:

Serious study in the history and philosophy of science was singularly absent from most science curricula. The scientist is trained in first-order practi es of s udying amoebas, quarks, and the like. He is not trained in the second-order practice of studying science as a discipline. (1989, p. 57)

Kuhn was one of the first to emphasize that philosophy of science must fit the actual history of science and the practice of scientists. However, given

the explosion of literature in the philosophy of science, the public perception and the popular presentation of science is inexplicable.

Limitless, omnipotent science is treated with the reverence that the ancients accorded to the gods. For example, C. S. Lewis once described someone he knew who gave little thought to her own mortality because she confidently believed that science would soon solve the problem of death (1978). He noted that the word *science* carries an honorific connotation. Lewis, with tongue in cheek, coined the term *neophilia* to describe the current fascination with the latest technology and the newest ideas.

Neophiliacs aside, science does have a context and a history. Understanding the place of science is essential for psychologists and for all practitioners of science in order to best use and to avoid the abuse of science (APA, 1981).

A Brief History of the Physical and Human Sciences

The ancient Greeks are the earliest known systematic scientists.[4] Aristotle broke with his

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[4] For a discussion of pre-Socratic science, see Clark (1957).

mentor, Plato, and instead of being concerned primarily
with metaphysical ideas, began to study this-worldly
phenomena (Durant, 1961). The Aristotelian approach to
science dominated until the rise of English empiricism
(e.g., Roger and Francis Bacon) (Burtt, 1939). The
term science is derived from the Latin *scientia*, which
means "knowledge" (see Table 3). From antiquity,
science meant any orderly pursuit of knowledge.

Table 3

Dualistic Divisions of the Sciences

"Hard" Sciences	"Soft" Sciences	Theorist
Physical Sciences	Human Science	
Episteme	*Sophia*	Aristotle
Scientia	*Sapientia*	Augustine
Substantia Corporea	*Substantia Cogitans*	Descartes
Science Physiques	*Science Morale*	J. S. Mill
Naturwissenschaft	*Geistwissenschaft*	Dilthey
Naturwissenschaft	*Kulturwissenschaft*	(Windelband
Idiographic	*Nomothetic*	and Rickert)

Aristotle (1990a), in the Nichomachean Ethics,
makes a distinction between two kinds of knowledge,

episteme and *sophia*. However, Augustine's Latin terminology solidified the divide between what is now called the hard and soft or physical and human sciences (Pannenberg, 1973/1976). Augustine continued to use the term *scientia* but added the expression *sapientia* (wisdom) to describe theology and philosophy.[5]

Divisions of Science

Pannenberg (1973/1976) believed that modern philosophers of science were influenced by Descartes' dualism. Descartes had no fully developed philosophy of science of his own. He did, however, provide the dichotomous categories that influenced the philosophy of science, especially through the last century.

Descartes believed that there are two kinds of substance: mental (*substantia cogitans*) and physical (*substantia corporea*) (1644/1990). After Descartes, both the mental and the physical were considered equally real.[6] Radical dualism behooved subsequent

---

[5] The social sciences were subsumed under philosophy.

[6] Later English empiricism and German idealism were largely reactions to Cartesian dualism (Durant, 1961).

scientists to deal with these two very different
domains.

In 1843 John Stuart Mill published his _Logic_. In
chapter 6, he distinguished between the natural or
physical sciences and what he termed the _moral
sciences_. For Mill, the moral sciences included
empirical psychology, history, the science of society,
and what he called ethology.[7]

So, his use of the term _moral_ was broader than
common English usage. The derivation of moral in
Mill's work is likely from the French phrase _sciences
morales_, which was in use at that time and carried the
wider connotation (Alibert, 1806).

The German translation of Mill's work rendered
moral sciences as _Geisteswissenschaften_, or sciences of
mind. This terminology was no doubt chosen due to the
influence of German idealism, especially Hegel
(1821/1990), who used _Geistwissenschaft_ to describe his
philosophy of mind. The English "human sciences"[8] is a
translation of _Geisteswissenschaften_, for example, in

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[7] This was an ethical psychology, not Lorenz's ethology.

[8] Likely a compound from the Latin _humanitas_ (the humanities) and
scientia (Cicero, 1986).

Wilhelm Dilthey's <u>Introduction to the Human Sciences</u>
(1989).

The South-West German School of thought vigorously
rejected the term *Geistwissenschaft* perhaps because of
its Hegelian connotations (Rickert, 1986; Windelband,
1901/1935). They preferred the term
Kulturwissenschaft, but the difference in approach to
the human and physical sciences is far more than an
arcane study of foreign etymologies. Rickert and
Windelband on the one hand and Dilthey on the other
disagreed on something much more basic.

The Idiographic and the Nomothetic

Aristotle, Augustine, Mill, and Dilthey classified
the sciences based on subject matter. Some sciences
were "hard" sciences; other sciences were "soft."
Pannenberg writes:

Originally the classification of the sciences
according to the Cartesian dualism of nature and
mind was based on the assumption of a fundamental
difference in kind between the objects described
by these terms, and upholders of it reasoned from
this assumption to the necessity of a

corresponding difference in the methods used in their scientific study. (1973/1976, p. 116)

Windelband, and Rickert after him, distinguished the sciences based on their respective methods, not on the objects of study. This is still a controversy in the human science/physical science debate (Oakes, 1988).

Windelband and Rickert contrasted the individualizing (idiographic) approach of the human sciences with the generalizing (nomothetic) approach of the natural sciences (Rickert, 1986).

Rickert critiqued Dilthey's inclusion of psychology as a human science. The establishment of the psychological laboratories of Wundt, James, and others had demonstrated that psychology was not *Geistwissenschaft* only.

Rickert's distinction between idiographic and nomothetic procedures was not meant to draw hard and fast lines. Idiographic approaches are used in the natural sciences as well. Pannenberg agreed and noted several specific "hard science" uses of idiographic methods. In these cases, truly individual causes produce unique effects (see Table 4) (Pannenberg, 1973/1976).

Table 4

The Use of Individualizing (Idiographic) Methods in the

Natural Sciences

The Study of Malformations in Embryology.

The Meteorology of Low Pressure Systems.

The Study of Cosmology.

The Development of Natural Landscapes.

The Study of Heredity.

The human sciences use nomothetic methods as well.
The human sciences and even the humanities strive for
nomological certainty by using empirical methods.
Computer studies of vocabulary in literary texts is one
example (Friberg & Friberg, 1981).

Psychology is obviously one discipline where
idiographic (the case study) and nomothetic (the search
for psychological laws) approaches are both used.
Divergent schools of psychology use case studies to
verify their nomothetic theories; each has its own
little Hans or Albert.

Science: Multiple Descriptors of a Single Reality

The various sciences describe one reality.
Dividing science up dualistically into hard and fast

categories (like human versus natural sciences) or reifying the approved method of inquiry (the idiographic versus the nomothetic) does scientific inquiry a disservice.

Scientific Description of Reality

Psychologists and other scientists have an image of their disciplines. Currently, this image includes the notions of science as realistic, value-free, naturalistic, and positivistic. Whether science ever was, now is, or ever could be any of these things is doubtful.

Scientific Advance: Evolution or Revolution?

Henri Bergson (1913) thought that all of humankind's endeavors were moving forward with inevitable progress. Scientists often present science this way, advancing steadily and inexorably, even though this automatic progress is never defined or quantified.

However, Thomas Kuhn (1970), Paul Feyerabend (1975), and other philosophers of science have noted that science does not proceed smoothly: science is "a

series of discontinuous replacements" (Moreland, 1989, p. 164).

> The history of science is a somewhat jerky story of replaced theories that worked for a while but then dropped off the scene. If this is true, then why should we have any confidence in the approximate truth of our current theories or in the existence of the things they postulate? A pessimistic induction from the history of science justifies our believing that since most, perhaps all, of past theories were later abandoned, our current theories will be abandoned as well. (p. 159)

Science does not progress smoothly. New data cannot be said to sharpen older theories: they overthrow them. The adoption of a new theory is like a perceptual gestalt switch. One minute the percept appears to look like one thing and then with a blink of the eye the same data can be interpreted as something else.

Often little, if any, continuity exists between terms in many theories. Moreland noted, for instance, that Thomson's and Bohr's theories of the composition of an atom are incommensurable, that is, they really

refer to two very different things (1989). Comparing
the word "electron" in these two theories is like
comparing the word "red" in a paper on wavelengths of
light and communist "red" politics. In short, science
does not grow slowly, accurately, and methodically like
some scientists would have the public and larger
scientific community believe. Science moves with jerks
and spasms; it also follows false trails. Scientists
often try to gloss over the glaring inconsistencies in
their theories in order to preserve their respective
systems. For this, Feyerabend, who is not known for
understatement, has called modern scientists
intellectual criminals (Horgan, 1993).

Realism and Antirealism

Coupled with the popular idea of scientific
optimism and the idea of automatic human progress in
general is the notion that science provides a
progressively truer and truer picture of the world
(Laudan, 1990). This view, that science actually
describes reality, is known as scientific realism or
isomorphism (see Table 5).

Table 5

Technical and Common Usage of Realism and its Opposites

(see also Appendix B)

Common Usage:	Realism: Pragmatic, this worldly.	Idealism: Utopian, other worldly.
Philosophy of Science:	Realism: Science tells us about the real world.	Antirealism: Science provides useful fictions about the world.

Since the collapse of logical positivism, and
especially since Kuhn's Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1970), an absolute faith in scientific
realism has declined (Laudan, 1990; Van Fraasen, 1980).
Popularizers of science often still portray science
with realistic nomenclature, however.
Characteristically, this view of science includes the
idea that science has a unique methodology (i.e., the
scientific method) that the humanities and other
academic endeavors do not possess.

Scientific Method(s)

Introductory science textbooks usually begin with a definition of science and the scientific method. They often attribute the advances of science to the adoption of this method (Moreland, 1989).

A review of the history of science seems to bear this contention out to some degree. The birth of modern science in general is usually said to coincide with the inductive proposals of Francis Bacon in the late renaissance and the founding of the Royal Society in London. These early scientists departed from deductive and speculative arguments and began to gather data to support their conclusions. They wanted to move away from speculating how many angels could fit on the head of a pin, as had been done in the medieval university.

A review of Newton's _Principia_ (1687/1990) and Bacon's _Novum Organum_ (1620/1990b) and Advancement of Learning (1605/1990a) obviously shows that even these early scientists lacked methodological agreement. Newton and Bacon favored the introduction of inductivism, but these documents do not contain a single, unanimous, timeless scientific method as proponents of radical empiricism assert. These men

were "eclectics, methodological opportunists" (Feyerabend, 1982, p. 641). Newton, for instance, derived many of his results from mathematical models, not from any process resembling today's scientific method.

As Moreland (1987, 1989) noted, no one scientific method exists,[9] but rather recognizable scientific methodologies. Whether such a thing as a scientific method exists is itself a meta-scientific question that must be addressed by the philosophy of science (Feyerabend, 1975). To believe that natural science has a specific methodology at its disposal that is unavailable to the human sciences, the humanities, philosophy, or theology is a fiction.

Pure Empiricism

David Hume posed this famous question about academic inquiry:

Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames:

---

[9] Science texts usually assume or simplify the scientific method.

for it can contain nothing but sophistry and
illusion. (1748/1939, p. 689)

As noted, scientists pride themselves in their
liberation from deductive methods. Even though Hume's
criteria are very narrow and would scarcely allow any
science to take place at all, scientists often revert
to pure empiricism.

Besides the problem of Hume's assertion being
self-refuting (he has condemned his own book to the
realm of sophistry and illusion), David Hume called for
the supremacy of empirical methods. The problem with
radical empiricism alone is that one can never get
beyond particular data to generalize to other possible
phenomena (Heisenberg, 1958/1990).

The results of Hume's criteria are seen in the
parable about the man who filled notebook upon notebook
with uncensored observations. Near the end of his life
he brought them proudly to the Smithsonian. Of course,
they had no use for them because the jumble of data was
unstructured and uninterpretable (Moreland, 1989).

Pure empiricism leads only to chaos and
skepticism. A person can only claim to have a
particular sensation or perception. Nothing more can
be said about the data (Schaeffer, 1968b). No

generalizing or theorizing is admissible using purely empirical dictates.[10]

Counterpoint: Science as Operationalism[11]

Eve stated "science is not reality . . . it is, at best, a good approximation of reality--a model of it" (Stein, 1993, p. A-21). Gordon Clark (1964) believed that science only provides models or heuristics of the real world. Although he disavowed pragmatism as a comprehensive test for truth, he maintained that science solves problems and that is all. He noted that multiple models of the same phenomenon may have the same explanatory power, for instance, the wave and particle theories of light (Clark, 1964; Poincare, 1905/1990).

Clark noted that all sciences are like geometry in that they start with axioms (presuppositions). Because

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[10] Scientists seem to miss the point that Humean empiricism led to Kantian agnosticism. The real world (the thing itself) is forever unknowable.

[11] Operationalism is only one of the many nonrealist views of science (see also Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1970; Laudan, 1990; Van Fraasen, 1980).

of these presuppositions, science never completely describes real-world entities. Clark's conclusion was quite amazing. No scientific law has ever described any real event! Nor can it.

To show that scientific law, specifically the laws of Newtonian mechanism, do not describe how phenomena occur, the example of the pendulum will be used. The law of the pendulum, roughly expressed, states that the period of the swing is directly proportional to the square root of the length. But the scientific methods by which the equation is obtained are based on three remarkable assumptions. First, the mass of the bob is assumed to be concentrated at a point; that is, the body is homogeneous. *This condition is never met in actuality.* Second, the string must be tensionless. *There is no such string.* And third, the pendulum is supposed to swing on an axis without friction. *This is impossible. The necessary conclusion therefore is that the scientific law describes only non-existent pendulums, and that real pendulums do not move in accordance with the laws of physics.* [italics added] (Clark, 1964, pp. 137-138)

C. S. Lewis made a complementary argument in his book, Miracles (1978). He showed that the laws of nature have never caused anything. He used a pool table for his example. The law of conservation of momentum describes what will happen *if* the cue ball is hit a certain way, but no law can describe how or if it will be hit. In this way, the so-called laws of nature are shown to be only sketchy illustrations: they are never causal. Clark's and Lewis' arguments, taken together, depict a science that can only discover regularities in nature and this only with the constriction of a priori presuppositions (see Table 6).

Table 6

Clark and C. S. Lewis on the Laws of Nature

Gordon Clark:	No scientific laws have ever described any real world events.
C. S. Lewis:	No scientific laws have ever caused anything.

Operationalists note that a scientific concept is not an all-compassing descriptor of reality; it is merely a set of operations. In psychology, no diagnostic index of depression, for example, is ever

equal to what any person ever experiences as depression. A test may measure "MMPI-depression" or "Beck-depression," which do not exist as real-world entities; but these instruments never measure the real, felt depression that individuals experience.

The insights provided by the operationalist critique mesh with the discussion of the idiographic and nomothetic above. When one strives for nomological generality, individual cases are not covered.[12]

The operationalist assessment of naive realism is important to the dialogue between theology and the other sciences. If no hard and fast laws of nature exist in the Newtonian sense, then supernaturalism cannot be said to defy the laws of nature.

Value-Laden Science

Bergin (1981) and Ellis (1981) debated in The Journal of Clinical and Consulting Psychology over whether the inclusion of values was appropriate in psychotherapy. They discussed whether any values could be scientific.

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[12] Or, group means obscure individual differences (R. K. Bufford, personal communication, 1988).

Interestingly, Ellis adopted two (possibly discordant?) models of rationality to evaluate how a person should behave. Ellis used a positivist cannon: "Is it verifiable?" He also used an egotistical one: "Is this what I really want?" Both of these notions of rationality are values (Evans, 1989).

Indisputably, scientific enterprises are value-laden. Psychotherapist's values are prescribed by law and inscribed in state licensing regulations.

Basic researchers in all the sciences have values as well (Moreland, 1989) (see Table 7). These values

Table 7

The Axiology of Science: The Values of "Value Free" Science

Communal Sharing of Data	Academic Honesty
Skepticism	Objectivity
Peer Review	Openness to Refutation

are not always written as are the values of the licensed practitioner above, but they are very important to progress in research laboratories and institutions. Those who violate these norms may be

shunned by their colleagues, not attain tenure, or be refused for grants (Moreland, 1989).

Evans (1989) argued that psychology cannot operate at all without a value-critical stance. Practicing psychologists reinforce or discourage thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that they see as "unhealthy." Also, to practice psychotherapy without reference to implicit opinions about the meaning of life, human nature, or the freedom or bondage of the will, for instance, is impossible. Furthermore, a coherence between the values of the therapist and client/patient is a major factor affecting psychotherapy outcome (Bergin, 1987).

Still, despite the facts, psychologists and other scientists often vow value neutrality. When pressed, they may refer to the positivist social science of Auguste Comte.

Positivism in the Human Sciences

In 1830, Comte proposed that social science (as well as the rest of the sciences) be founded on firmly positivist ground. He was very optimistic that the positivist approach that he inherited from his mentor, Saint Simon, was adequate to explain all social

phenomena as well as all of life itself (Mathisen, 1990).

> The term "positive" has here the sense of that
> which is given or laid down, that which has to be
> accepted as we find it and is not further
> explicable; the word is intended to convey a
> warning against the attempts of theology and
> metaphysics to go beyond the world given to
> observation in order to enquire into first causes
> and ultimate ends. (Flew, 1979, p. 283)

Comte's positivism actually became a religion, and positivist societies were organized for "worship" in France. Comte may be distinguished as one of the great early fathers of social science. However, his assertion that positive laws of behavior could be constructed cannot be substantiated. To say that no metaphysical statements are allowed in social science is self-refuting because, obviously, this statement is metaphysical (Popper, 1963).

Positivist social science has the unique honor of being able to explain everything, except everything. As noted above, empirically-derived positivist theories cannot be used to generalize beyond specific phenomena (i.e., no theories are possible). Deductively-derived

positivist arguments never apply to any one case.
Wolfhart Pannenberg noted:

> The price to be paid for such a reduction of the
> traditional cultural sciences to theories of
> general structures and to approaches capable in
> principle of mathematical formulation is indicated
> by Kempski's remark that science thus defined
> merely describes a "field of possible action" from
> which real action is excluded. . . . Deductive
> nomological arguments . . . cannot *in themselves*
> supply the real cause of any particular event
> which requires explanation. (1973/1976, pp. 121,
> 141)

Naturalism: The Hidden Assumption in Scientism

Schaeffer noted that the Western world is now a
post-Christian culture (Schaeffer, 1968b). Belief in
science as the arbiter of all truth has filled the void
left by the collapse of Christianity as the predominant
Weltanschauung. This is especially ironic because the
Christian world view has forcefully been argued as what
made the birth of modern science possible (Merton,
1938).

The atheistic and naturalistic presuppositions that science has adopted for the last 150 years are now seen to be essential to the very continuation of science. Sagan, in his preface to Hawking's Brief History of Time, sounds like an apologist for atheism, not at all like an objective reviewer (1988).

Strangely, and contrary to the opinions of the founders of science, current scientists often see atheism as a prerequisite to scientific progress. For instance, German chemist Walter Nerst stated that denying the infinite duration of time would be to betray the very foundation of science (Jastrow, 1978).

Eddington's emotional attachment to the idea of a universe without a prime mover is obvious:

I have no axe to grind in this discussion [but] the notion of a beginning is repugnant to me . . . I simply do not believe that the present order of things started off with a bang . . . the expanding Universe is preposterous . . . incredible . . . it leaves me cold. (Jastrow, 1978, p. 102)

Jastrow, an eminent astrophysicist and a religious agnostic, pondered why these objective investigators are so emotional:

I think part of the answer is that scientists cannot bear the thought of a natural phenomenon which cannot be explained, even with unlimited time and money. There is a kind of religion in science. . . . Every event can be explained in a rational way as the product of some previous event; every effect must have its cause; there is no First Cause. . . . This religious faith of the scientist is violated by the discovery that the world had a beginning under conditions in which the known laws of physics are not valid, and as a product of forces or circumstances we cannot discover. (1978, pp. 103-104)

Jastrow's description of scientism is that of a failed religion--failed, not because science is not useful within limits, but because overzealous proponents have inflated it beyond its explanatory power. He noted that "it is not a matter of another year, another decade of work, another measurement, or another theory" (p. 105). Science has no hope of lifting the curtain on reality.

Scientism is self-refuting. Scientism claims that only what can be known scientifically can be known at all. Because this statement cannot be known

scientifically, it is inadequate as a test for truth.
Moreland calls this the "myth of ostrich scientism--
that needs to be laid to rest" (1989, p. 101).

Johnson's Critique of Naturalism

Naturalism is the idea that all phenomena have
natural causes; nothing can be supernatural. Johnson
(1991, 1993) noted that naturalism is often used to
prove itself in a circular fashion. In this way, for
example, neo-Darwinian theory is used to prove
naturalism. Assuming naturalism, evolution is perhaps
the best answer to the question of how life came to be.
Then, evolution, which assumes naturalism, is
fallaciously advanced as *proving* that only naturalistic
explanations of origins are plausible.

Johnson contends that scientific naturalism is not
science at all because it does not subject itself to
the possibility of falsification. No hypotheses are
advanced that if falsified could diminish the view that
the whole cosmos must be explained without reference to
the supernatural (Popper, 1963).

Naturalism is deemed true by definition. Evidence
that may falsify naturalism *cannot* exist. Such

research is deemed "uninteresting and generally unpublishable" (Johnson, 1991, p. 152).[13]

Science's Self-Image

The antirealist critique of realist science is successful in that it shakes the edifice of science as an omnipotent, sole arbiter of truth. Scientists need to re-examine their view of meaning because observations are paradigm-dependent and because reductionism, scientism, naturalism, and positivism are inadequate tests for truth (Apel, 1967; Gadamer, 1982). Perhaps science needs hermeneutics to enable it to understand itself and its subject (Dilthey, 1989).

Also, as noted, science is often prone to religious (or as currently, irreligious) zealotry. Perhaps, a sound hermeneutic can supply the tools to save science from this dogmatism (Pannenberg, 1988/1990).

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[13] See also Plantinga (1993b) on "Darwin's Doubt." To erect a science, especially psychology, on top of naturalism is impossible because one must remain agnostic about the verisimilitude of reason if reason was produced by blind chance.

The Indispensability of Hermeneutics in All Science

Hermeneutics is the science of interpretation. Hermeneutic "is connected with the name of the god Hermes, the messenger of the gods who announces their decisions" (Pannenberg, 1973/1976, p. 157). Plato contrasted the *hermenes* (interpreters) of Homer with those who merely recited it. Also, Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias* is titled *De Interpretatione* in Latin.

According to Kuhn (1970), interpretation or hermeneutics is always needed in science because raw data do not exist and facts do not speak for themselves. Whenever data are gathered, they are gathered inside an interpretative framework. Simple observation is not so simple. In Kuhnian terminology, all observations are paradigm-dependent. Moreland added, "Seeing something is not a passive matter of receiving stimuli on one's retinae. Rather, seeing involves seeing *as* or seeing *that*; it involves an interpretive element" (1989, p. 147).

In psychology and the social sciences, hermeneutics is all the more important. When interpreting human behavior, not just the interpretive framework of the data gatherer is at issue. The human subject performs his or her behavior in the milieu of

his or her own personal and social context. "There are no immaculate perceptions" (Evans, 1989, p. 52). The observer-status of a scientist or practitioner is not just influenced by negative biases that need to be discounted or factored out. Some observers may understand some phenomenon that is opaque to others.

Often observers need to be trained to notice and accurately report a phenomenon. For instance, a religious psychologist may better understand the psychology of religion (Evans, 1989).

Theology as Science

Is Theology a Science?

Moreland (1989) noted that theology and the other sciences are alike in the way they formulate and test hypotheses. Historically, theology was considered a science, even the queen of the sciences.

However, since Schleiermacher, theology has been thought of as the study of subjective religious experience (1799/1988). To remedy this, Wolfhart Pannenberg (1973/1976) strove to place theology back on equal footing with other academic departments in the university.

Pannenberg postulated Christian theological propositions as real-world descriptors of reality: each hypothesis needs to stand or fall on its own merits. Helmut Thielicke also thought theology was a science (1992). Barth agreed, but would not make theology submit to narrow definitions of science (*Wissenschaft*) (Barth, 1962).

Millard Erickson (1985) agreed with Barth that theology has its own internal consistency, that it advances with a consistent method, and that it deals with objective data (see Table 8). Moreland (1989) added that theology does in fact make predictions from its data and retrodictions (explanations of past phenomena) just like other sciences (see Table 9). In short, theology describes the real world just as well as any other science.

Mortimer Adler (1990b) argued that the unity of truth implies that theological study produces the same kinds of knowledge that other scientific disciplines produce. He rejected as Averröeism the recent views of Joseph Campbell and others that religion is mythic and contains only poetic truth. The scholastic and Averröeist views of truth will be further discussed below.

Table 8

Theology's Coherence (based on Moreland, 1989)

1. Theology has a definite subject matter.
2. Theology deals with the objective, not just with subjective feelings.
3. Theology has a definite methodology.
4. Theology has a method for verifying its propositions.
5. There is a coherence among its propositions.

Table 9

Theology's Correspondence with Reality

1. Theology abides by the cannons of logic.
2. Theology is communicable.
3. Theology uses scientific methods.
4. Theology makes predictions and retrodictions.
5. Theology shares subject matter with other sciences.

Sacra Doctrina Versus Scientific Dialogue

The abstract possibility of theology being a science might not bother too many investigators. However, if theology were to lay claim to the right to

enter into academic dialogue with other sciences, many scientists would become nervous indeed.

So first, the limits that the traditional sciences place on theology will be discussed. Then, whether theology can converse equally with the other sciences will be ascertained.

Harvey Conn noted how science "shakes up" hermeneutics to provide what he called "distancing." This keeps theology from reifying its conclusions. He wrote:

> Extrabiblical disciplines have also initiated the irritation process that leads to distancing. The behavioral sciences--psychology, cultural anthropology, linguistics, sociology, communications--are more and more shaking the cloistered world of the theologian and the church member. And out of this engagement, this intersection, new reexaminations are taking place in the hermeneutical spiral. (1988, p. 205)

Conn also noted that this irritation process makes many Christian people uncomfortable. And some have opted for making scripture an independent authority. This parallels St. Thomas' elevation of theology beyond the pale of other human inquiry. The investigation of

scripture, in this model, yields a *sacra doctrina* which cannot be questioned. This *sacra doctrina* is extant today in the religious antipsychologies of Adams (1970), Hunt (1987) and others. Harvey Conn, a colleague of Adams, continued:

> One of the dangers in this kind of response is that it can split apart the Word of God in the Bible (special revelation) from the Word of God in creation (general revelation). Is not creation also a continual source of God's truth (Ps. 19:1; Romans 1:20)? Cannot wise men and women, touched by the Spirit, also unlock divine truth through disciplined study of the creation? The hermeneutical task, after all, does not allow us to isolate the world we live in from the world of the Bible. (1988, p. 205)

Because no science should be elevated to *sacra doctrina* status, all sciences were created equal and can affect all other sciences via hermeneutics. Perhaps theology has the right, even the logical necessity, to dialogue with the other sciences.

Theology's Place Among the Sciences

Theology and the other special sciences are prone to dogmatism and imperialism. Only a critical look at the special sciences through the lens of the philosophy of science can keep science from becoming pseudo-science.

Dualistic views of science are false and unhelpful. The human science approach is constructive if one realizes that all science that is done by humans is in part a human science. Thus all sciences require hermeneutics.

No single definition of science exists. All such definitions are meta-scientific and hence philosophical. Science is theory-dependent and value-laden.

Not only is theology a science, but all science (as well as all human endeavors) is religious. A two-fold position (religious and regular) to truth is unhelpful and misleading. This bifurcated epistemology of science should be avoided.

An Augustinian Epistemology of Science

Integration of Psychology and Theology

If nothing else, the preceding discourse has shown that the nature of science is a meta-scientific question. Furthermore, Copleston, the Thomist scholar, argued that no friction exists between theology and the sciences per se.

> In general, the relation of science to religion
> and theology is not one of acute tension: the
> tension which in the last century was often
> alleged to exist between them does not really
> exist at all. The theoretical difficulty arises
> rather in regard to the relation of philosophy to
> theology. (1985, p. 424)

An adequate philosophy of science makes the integration of the sciences possible. No science should be excluded from the debate a priori.

In studying the phenomena of crime, for instance, sociology, psychology, neurology, theology, penology, and jurisprudence may all have legitimate contributions to make. Further, the work of one special science may either confirm or contradict the conclusions of

another. This tension indicates that further
investigation is necessary (Dooyeweerd, 1960/1980).

Darwin's Solution

The early Charles Darwin was apparently aware of
the impending division between theology and biology
that his work might cause. Interestingly, Darwin cited
Francis Bacon in the preface to his Origin of Species:

> Let no man out of a weak conceit of sobriety, or
> an ill-applied moderation, think or maintain, that
> a man can search too far or be too well studied in
> the book of God's word, or in the book of God's
> works; divinity or philosophy; but rather let men
> endeavour an endless progress or proficience in
> both. (1859/1990, p. xi)

This research will argue that Darwin was correct
in appealing to both special revelation and God's
creation as foundational for his investigation.[14]

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[14] Plantinga noted that belief in God is properly basic (i.e., one
may have epistemic warrant to believe in God) at least under some
conditions. This avoids the trap of having to prove a basic
presupposition via the methods of classical foundationalism
(Plantinga, 1983; 1993a; 1993b).

Whether he actually used the method he advocated is doubtful, but a critique of the Origin is outside the scope of this work.

The Modern Confusion of Reason

Modern thought straddles between rationalism and irrationalism (Bloesch, 1992; Plantinga, 1983). The failure of rationalism to deliver what it promised has caused many thinkers to shift to irrationalism. As Francis Schaeffer (1968b) called it, a "line of despair" was crossed. Since this "escape from reason," morals, absolutes, beauty, and goodness have been reduced to matters of taste (Schaeffer, 1968a).

According to Schaeffer (1968b), Kierkegaarde was the first to cross this line of despair. More recently, Martin Heidigger (1968) redefined thought as that which goes beyond the rational. In his What is Called Thinking, he asserted that despite all of our apparent thinking we are still not yet thinking. According to Heidigger, this is because since the time of the pre-Socractic philosophers, reason has turned away from the thinker. Krabbendam (1980) offered a similar, but decidedly Reformed analysis. According to Krabbendam, the rationalism/irrationalism dichotomy is

a pseudoproblem developed by humanity turning theoretical thought in an apostatic direction.

In antiquity, Augustine (1958) avoided positing a dichotomy between theology and the other sciences by postulating "*credo ut intelligam*" (I believe in order to understand). To Augustine and to Anselm (1969) after him, no bifurcation in theoretical thought existed. He was free to "spoil the Egyptians," that is to adopt any and all valuable elements in the world as a person of faith. He wrote:

> For, as the Egyptians had not only the idols and
> heavy burdens which the people of Israel hated and
> fled from, but also vessels and ornaments of gold
> and silver, and garments, which the same people
> when going out of Egypt appropriated to
> themselves, designing them for a better use.
> (1990, p. 737)

The Reformers and the Better Use of Reason

Martin Luther distinguished between the ministerial and magisterial use of reason. When reason is used magisterially, it is made absolute. Contrawise, the ministerial use of reason is reason serving faith (Bloesch, 1992).

John Calvin noted that the knowledge of God and of creation (in this case, ourselves) are a unity:

> Our wisdom, in so far as it ought to be deemed true and solid wisdom, consists almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But as these are connected by many ties, it is not easy to determine which of the two precedes, and gives birth to the other. (1536/1990, p. 1)

On Averröeism

Mortimer Adler described how Averröes, the Arabic interpreter of Aristotle in the middle ages, reconciled his faith and the deliverances of reason. According to Adler, Averröes proclaimed "there were two different bodies of truth: on the one hand the truths of faith; on the other hand the truths of reason. These two bodies of truth existed in what might be called 'logic-tight compartments'" (1990b, p. 24).

The Religious A Priori of All Theoretical Thought

Thomas Aquinas, also a medieval interpreter of Aristotle, adopted a different line of thought that was ultimately no more helpful. In the *Summa Theologica* I, 1, 5, St. Thomas (1990) asserted that *sacra doctrina* is

a science, but it is nobler than the "profane" sciences. He believed that theology was the *regina scientarium* (the queen of the sciences) and that all other branches of knowledge serve theology: the secular sciences are the handmaidens of theology.[15] Aquinas claimed exegetical verification for elevating theology by allegorically interpreting Proverbs 9:3. Wisdom has "sent out her maidens, she cries out from the highest places of the city."[16] [17]

Dooyeweerd posited that the elevation of theology to an other-worldly preeminence by the scholastic theologians was a syncretism, melding Greek and Christian thought: "The whole conception of the so-called sacred theology as the *regina scientarium* was of Greek origin" (1960/1980, p. 115).

This dualism lifts theology above and pits it against the other sciences. The same forced dichotomy can be found in the other Greek dualisms: form/matter,

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[15] *ancilla theologiae.*

[16] The New King James Version.

[17] See Ramm (1954) on allegorical interpretation in the Middle Ages.

substance/accidents, and phenomena/noumena, for
instance (Spier, 1954/1979).

In St. Thomas' use of the term *sacra doctrina*,
theology is raised to the rank of a supernatural
science exceeding all other sciences both in dignity
and certainty of knowledge (Dooyeweerd, 1960/1980).
Aquinas surely thought he was rendering theology a
great service; instead, he uncoupled all scientific
endeavors from the Word of God.

Can Theology Dominate Science?

All the data of creation must be open to
theoretical inquiry. Some thinkers attempt to use
theology, itself a science, to regulate the other
sciences, while at the same time, keeping theology
above the fray. Spier noted:

This fact . . . is sometimes ignored, as in the
case when the attempt is made to erect a Biblical
or religious psychology or anthropology from
Biblical data exclusively. We must examine God's
works scientifically. We must reflectively
contemplate all of created reality and must focus
our attention upon the cosmos itself. (1954/1979,
p. 9)

No one particular science can provide the framework for integrating other sciences, including psychology and theology.

> These fundamental theoretical problems exceed the boundaries of all special sciences. They are of a philosophical character, since their solution requires a theoretical total view of our temporal horizon of experience. Can Christian dogmatic theology as such provide us with this philosophical total view? (Dooyeweerd, 1960/1980, p. 129)

If so, then theology is no longer a science at all. It can no more provide a total view than biology, economics, or organic chemistry (Snoke, 1991).

Making theology the taskmaster over any other aspect of creation or mode of inquiry is actually idolatry (Romans 1:25). Any view, even a so-called Christian view, which makes this central and radical sense of God's Word (or even general revelation, i.e., the creation) dependent on theology, is unbiblical in its very fundamentals.

The Religious Root of Scientific Thought

As noted previously, all scientific activity betrays some religious commitments. God's living word-revelation to humanity cannot be the object of any single science; it is instead the central starting point of all human endeavors.

According to Dooyeweerd, as long as humankind's ear was open to God's general revelation (*phanerosis*), he or she was able to understand the world in all its diversity as being the one creation of God. But now, epistemological dualism has affected all thinking about science. Dooyeweerd wrote:

> By ascribing to the so-called natural reason an autonomy over against faith and the divine revelation, traditional scholastic theology merely gave expression to the false Greek view of reason as the center of human nature. (1960/1980, p. 140)

All science needs to be erected on the foundation of a radically Christian philosophy of science. The only other choice is a foundation of apostasy and fallacy. A philosophy of science made to conform on the surface with certain proof texts or ecclesiastical doctrines would not be rendered harmless. The result would only be a pseudointegration.

The question is not whether a science should be philosophically founded. It already is. The only question is which foundation to build upon (Spier, 1954/1979).

Rushdoony (1960/1980) noted that humanity creates a monster when it deifies science. In Bultmann's (1958) thought, for instance, science is first uncritically accepted as part of his program of demythologizing. Ironically, Bultmann later becomes wary of science as a source of evil.

Instead, the consistently Christian view, which refuses to idolize any aspect of creation including reason or science, can deliver a faithful and true science. "The view thus which seemingly 'rejects' science becomes the only source of true science, whereas any view which makes absolute that which is relative ends up by destroying the value of that aspect of creation and emasculating life and experience" (Rushdoony, 1960/1980, p. xv).

Psychology _Coram Deo_[18]

Archimedes reputedly said, "Give me a fixed point and I will move the earth." On adopting the only adequate Archimedean point, Spier (1954/1979) wrote:

> No one can occupy a position outside of himself. Our starting point may not be separate from ourselves, because it must be the starting point of the philosophy in which we are actively engaged. . . . Such an Archimedean point is to be found only in the heart or the soul of man. . . . The heart or soul of man may never be identified with any of our vital functions such as feeling or faith. It is deeper than any vital function, for man transcends in the bond with God all temporal created reality. The heart is the point where the whole human existence concentrates itself, where man determines his relationship to God. (pp. 16-17)

Dooyeweerd and Spier nowhere attempted to define the heart, since it is the deepest (created) presupposition. Dooyeweerd also noted that the choice

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[18] _Coram Deo_ (Latin, in the presence of God).

of the Archimedean point is not an academic endeavor:
it precedes all scientific activity.

The Cross-Traffic Among Psychology, Theology and the
Rest of the Sciences

Psychology is a scientific enterprise. As such,
it must be understood in the context of all the
sciences. It uses idiographic and nomothetic methods
to study its subject; it has attributes of the natural
and human sciences and must use hermeneutics and be
value-critical in order to access meaning.

As a science, psychology cannot be positivistic,
naturalistic, or scientistic without being internally
contradictory. It may be empirical but must avoid the
empiricist fallacy. It cannot provide the investigator
with absolute reality, but it can deliver models of
reality. Instead, psychology is inherently religious.
Like all human enterprises it has a religious root or
radix.

Theology is also a scientific activity; hence,
theology is an equal partner with the other special
sciences. No human enterprise can be arbiter of truth.

No human endeavor, theology included, can be allowed to become the mediator[19] of all truth.

Augustine's view of truth is more cogent than Averröes' two-fold division of reality. "For to the concept of truth belongs the unity of all truth, that is, the simultaneous existence, without contradiction, of each individual truth with all other truths" (Pannenberg, 1988/1990, p. 169).

The recent revolution in the philosophy of science has made science's pretheoretical commitments, including its religious character, explicit. If psychological science is characterized by a neglect of God at its very root, that alone is enough to explain psychology's general neglect of evil as a subject of study.

The view of science developed here makes the inquiry into both crime and evil possible. If evil is part of the data set of human experience, then the scientific investigation of evil is possible. Such an inquiry requires the tools of theological science. Theologians have produced some significant results in their study of evil. In the next section, these

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[19] There is but one mediator (1 Timothy 2:5).

theological results will be consulted conjointly with other scientific data pertaining to criminological psychology. As this investigation ensues, an attempt will be made to prevent any one special science from ascending as *regina scientarium*.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY: CRIME, EVIL, AND HUMAN NATURE

The Scientific View of Crime and Evil

A forensic psychology that has rejected absolute
scientism, positivism, and naturalism is emancipated to
view humankind in general and criminals in particular
as moral agents who have broken the moral law. As
noted in chapter 2, this is epistemologically
legitimate and in keeping with current advances in the
philosophy of science. Also, as noted above, this is
consistent with the common-sense attribution that
criminality is *both* pathological and morally wrong.

Furthermore, adding a theological analysis
broadens the scope of inquiry and is more common-
sensical. Because theology is a science, adding a
theological analysis to the inquiry makes it no less
scientific.

Crime and Evil Examined

Although psychologists are called upon to render opinions about criminals, neither the term *crime* nor the term *evil* are part of psychological or psychiatric nomenclature. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III-R) has no diagnostic category or epidemiological data on either criminals or evil-doers, per se (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1987).

In DSM-III-R, however, several diagnoses are closely related to criminal behavior. Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) and Conduct Disorder in children are characterized by criminal conduct. Several of the paraphilias, most notably Pedophilia, cannot be diagnosed without a crime having taken place. Impulse control disorders such as Kleptomania and Pyromania necessitate theft and arson respectively. Furthermore, other seemingly neutral mental disorders may be considered causal of various criminal acts. Schizophrenia, Affective Disorders and several Personality Disorders are often cited as inducing criminal behavior (Meloy, 1992).

Criminality is not a psychological term. It can be investigated psychologically, however. The quasi-

psychological character of criminality will be discussed after crime and evil are briefly explained.

The idea of causality in criminal behavior will then be investigated. The argument will be that evil may be admissible as a scientific cause of crime.

Then several current psychological and psychiatric theories of criminality will be presented. Even though some of the theorists responsible for them profess a positivist agenda, the intent will be to show that they all implicitly contain the idea of human evil.

Last, some of the insights of theological anthropology will be introduced to make explicit what has been implicit. That is, evil and crime must be explored together to clearly understand the phenomenon of criminal behavior.

Crime Defined

The fifteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica defined crime as "the intentional commission of an act usually deemed socially harmful or dangerous and specifically defined, prohibited and punishable under criminal law" (1992, p. 736). The penal codes of various jurisdictions and the several law dictionaries

use similar definitions (Black, 1991; Deering's
California Penal Code, 1985).

The two common compilations of crime incidence and
prevalence data in the U.S., the Uniform Crime Report
(UCR) and the National Crime Survey (NCS) limit their
definitions of crime to several "index crimes."[20] This
is done both for methodological reasons (i.e.,
definitional uniformity) and to describe the crimes
that matter most to researchers, law enforcement, and
the general public.

Walters (1990) in his psychological study of
"lifestyle criminality" also limited his research to
what he called "patterns of serious criminal conduct."
To specify a rather narrow definition of crime is
necessary in order to say anything meaningful about it
at all.

Narrow definitions of criminality yield both pros
and cons. On the one hand, to know how murder and
mayhem relate to driving three miles an hour over the
speed limit or taking pencils from work would be
interesting. However, these minor infractions are

---

[20] The UCR index crimes are murder, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

impossible to measure. The indetectability and *prima facia* triviality of petty crimes does not mean that one should reify the useful distinction between serious and minor offenses. A relationship across the criminal continuum may still exist (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1987).

For practical purposes, forensic psychologists and sociologists of crime define crime specifically. This study dealt with severe, chronic criminality. The diagnosis of APD, the psychological construct psychopathy, and the criminal personality as conceived by Yochelson and Samenow were used to examine the phenomenon of crime (APA, 1987; Hare, 1980; Millon, 1985; Yochelson & Samenow, 1976).

Evil Defined

Evil behavior, as defined by the dictionary, is any action that is "morally bad or wrong; wicked" (American Heritage Dictionary, 1992). Psychologists are often uncomfortable with discussions of evil, and some still advocate value-free science (Ellis, 1981). This is an inconsistent assertion because it is a value preference.

Some investigators allude to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in their defense of a morally neutral science. They argue that because reality is fundamentally indeterminate, only subjective values are scientifically defensible. Mortimer Adler disagreed.

> The fact that the ontological determinateness of the electron's position and velocity is not measurable by physicists and so is of no interest to them does not mean that it has no real existence, any more than time not measurable by physicists lacks reality. The substitution of the word "indeterminacy" for the word "uncertainty" indicates the illicit conversion by the Copenhagen school of a subjective into an objective probability. (1990b, p. 72)

Heisenberg's uncertainty principle does not mean that reality is ontologically indeterminate; only that it is sometimes epistemologically uncertain.

A close reading of the proponents of value-free psychology reveals that they do promote one set of values over another. Currently, to extend Freud's analysis of development and blame the patient's parents is popular (Forward, 1989). This changes the time and place of the wickedness, but not its existence.

Furthermore, psychologists are required by professional ethics codified both by the APA and by state regulations to make moral and ethical judgments about themselves and others (Sales, 1983). To agree that moral and ethical standards are binding among colleagues and then assert that they are irrelevant to the society at large is inconsistent.

A complete exposition of current ethics and how one decides what is right and wrong is outside the scope of this inquiry. However, Geisler (1971) noted absolute moral relativism is at an intellectual deadend because relativism logically leads to amoral nihilism, which necessarily concludes that no act is morally better or worse than any other. A general consensus exists among ethicists that at least some acts are morally better than others. Moral and ethical distinctions are not altogether meaningless (Lewis, 1990).

In order to determine what is right and wrong, psychologists need to consult state-of-the-art academic work in jurisprudence, ethics, and moral theology. Even if these sources of truth are unwisely ignored, the concept of human evil will find its way into criminological psychology of its own accord. Katz

(1988), in The Seduction of Crime: Moral and Sensual
Attractions of Doing Evil, documented a secular
criminology of temptation, a drive to do evil for
evil's sake.

The Quasi-Psychological Nature of Criminality

Psychologists work with criminals, but being a
criminal does not make one a mental patient.
Criminality is a multidimensional problem with
individual, societal, economic, moral and other facets.
The psychological analysis of criminality may be the
most important (Eysenck, 1977). However, investigators
in various fields of knowledge have a legitimate
interest in criminology. This is why psychologists
need to recognize the quasi-psychological nature of
criminality.

Edwin Shneidman's (1993) work on suicide provides
an appropriate illustration because suicide is a crime
in many jurisdictions. More importantly, like
criminology, suicidology is done by investigators in
many fields. Shneidman, a psychologist, argued that
suicide is not understandable as a psychological
phenomenon alone (see Table 10).

Table 10

Various Contemporary Approaches to Criminology in

General and Suicidology in Particular

Shneidman's Levels of Analysis in Suicidology	Researchers of Crime/Evil Using Shneidman's Levels
Life History	Samenow (1984)
Personal Documents	Abrahamsen (1985)
Demographic/Epidemiological	McCord & McCord (1964)
Philosophical/Theological	Staub (1989); Hick (1977)
Sociocultural	Montagu (1976)
Sociological	Farrington[21]
Dyadic and Family	Elizur & Minuchin (1989)
Psychiatric	Millon (1985); APA (1987)
Psychodynamic	Meloy (1988; 1992)
Psychological	Hare (1980); Samenow (1984)
Constitutional	Wilson & Herrnstein (1985)
Biological/Biochemical	Raine & Dunkin (1990)

Shneidman noted:

the most evident fact about suicidology and

suicidal events is that they are multidimensional,

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[21] Barnett, Blumstein, Cohen, & Farrington (1992).

multifaceted, multidisciplinary--containing, as

they do, concomitant biological, sociological,

psychological (interpersonal and intrapsychic),

epidemiological, and philosophical elements.

(1993, p. 56)

In a similar way, any theory of criminality that

attempts to describe crime as it occurs *in vivo* should

account for crime's quasi-psychological character,

including its metaphysical and theological elements

(e.g., the existence of real evil). A robust

criminological theory must account for the evil that

criminals do.

The Causes of Crime

Etiology

Several recent investigators have sought to offer

large scale, comprehensive psychological explanations

for severe criminality (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989;

Walters, 1990; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). Finding the

cause of crime has become a *cause celébre*.

The idea of causality in psychology is itself very

complicated. Perhaps one's view of causality functions

as an unexamined assumption that affects the

conclusions of the investigation. The word *cause* is commonly used equivocally (Adler, 1990a).

Interestingly, the concept of etiology (or aetiology) now used in medicine and psychology was first used criminologically (Liddell & Scott, 1968). For instance, in the New Testament, $\overset{\text{'}\,\text{'}}{\alpha\iota\tau\alpha}$ is used of the charges against Jesus Christ and Paul (John 18:38; Acts 25:18,27) (Arndt & Gingrich, 1957; Gingrich, 1965). "In its legal sense it was used to point out where the responsibility lay" (Adler, 1990a, p. 120).

Kinds of Causes

Hippocrates (1990) believed that all diseases had *both* human and divine etiologies. Bonhoeffer (1971) dismissed this idea as limiting God to being a "God of the gaps." Moreland (1989) noted that Bonhoeffer's objection is irrational because all of science is plagued by many such gaps with no apparent weakening of its prestige. The notion of human and divine causation has been with both psychology and medicine from the beginning.

Hippocrates (1990) also divided causes into predisposing and exciting factors. This simple distinction helps clarify the current psychological

notion of etiology by separating the concepts of diathesis and stress.

Aristotle developed the Greek notion of etiology best in the *Posterior Analytics* (1990b). Here, he enumerated four different kinds of causality: material, formal, efficient, and final (see Table 11).

Table 11

Etiology According to Aristotle

Types of Causes	Aristotelian Shoe Example	Psychological Example
Material	Leather	Biological Organism
Formal	The Pattern	The Design Plan
Efficient	The Shoemaker	The Agent or Subject
Final	The Shoe's Purpose	The Behavioral Purpose

Aristotle's distinctions express the different conceptions of cause implicit in discussions of the causes of crime. The criminal is a human being who was designed by God (or evolution, for that matter) to be a normal person. Ideas of good behavior and

psychological wellness presuppose the concept of proper function (or formal cause).[22]

The material cause is the biological organism as he or she exists when the crime is committed: the material cause may include any biochemical or neuroanatomical equipment and all previously learned behavior.

The efficient cause is the moral agent with the capacity to act, delimited, of course, by the other causes. The final cause is the reason or purpose of the activity as apprehended by the agent and/or by God.

As Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) noted, the question of what causes crime, nature or nurture, is a poorly phrased query. Causality in psychology is at least as complicated as causality in medicine (diathesis/stress). The concept of cause or etiology should not be used naively.

Cause has several meanings. Logically, a single cause of crime will be impossible to find. The word cause needs to be specifically defined in each context. Otherwise investigators will find themselves working at cross-purposes.

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[22] See Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (1993a).

Theological causality, advanced by both
Hippocrates and Aristotle, should be admitted today.
Also, classical use of cause rescues the idea of
purposive behavior and moral agency while preserving
the role of material causality.

Psychological Nosology of Crime: Four Theories

The number of theories of criminality probably
equal the number of researchers and practitioners
studying criminals. Psychological theories can be
divided into two basic classes, those that attempt to
explain specific criminal acts (like pedophilia, arson,
serial homicide, etc.) and those that attempt to
explain criminality in a more general way.

Following is an exploration of four current
psychological theories of criminality (see Table 12).
Cleckley (1941) first described psychopathy as it is
currently construed. Two basic streams of psychopathy
research are extant today: the work of Robert Hare
(1980) as operationalized in the Psychopathy Check List
(PCL) and psychoanalytic psychopathy (Meloy, 1988;
1992). Antisocial Personality Disorder is current
psychiatric terminology and was influenced largely by

the personality research of Theodore Millon (1990).

Also, the work of Samenow (1984) and Yochelson and

Samenow (1976) is discussed. Their construct, the

criminal personality, is often used in correctional

settings (Thaler, 1991; Weinstock, 1990).

Table 12

A Grouping of Current Forensic Psychological Theories

of Criminality.

Theorist	Theory
Hare (1980)	Cleckley's Psychopathy
Meloy (1988)	Psychoanalytic Psychopathy
Millon (1986)	Antisocial Personality
Samenow (1984)	Criminal Personality

Psychopathy

Cleckley (1941) sketched the currently accepted

portrait of the psychopath. He brought together

earlier research on psychopathic inferiority and moral

imbecility and formulated the concept of the

psychopathic personality. Cleckley's construct heavily

influenced the first edition of the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American

Psychiatric Association [APA], 1952). DSM-II, III, and
III-R have moved toward a broader, more inclusive
category with the diagnosis Antisocial Personality
Disorder, which is discussed below (Eysenck, 1986;
Millon, 1986).

Pinel (1801) used the term *manie san delire* to
describe impulsive, criminal offenders who lacked the
delusions of the typical mental patient. Pritchard
(Thaler, 1991) and Rush (1812/1972) characterized
severe criminals as morally blameworthy, with Pritchard
originating the term "moral insanity."

About one hundred years ago, Cesare Lombroso
(1968) described severe criminals as atavistic throw-
backs to earlier evolutionary development. His view
combined some currently accepted criteria of
psychopathy (lack of conscience, aggressivity, and
insensitivity to social criticism) with the now
discredited notion that criminals possessed a kind of
visually discernible "Neanderthal" look (McCord &
McCord, 1964).

Goring used statistical analyses to discredit
Lombroso's physical criteria. He demonstrated that so-

called atavistic physical features[23] were just as

common in a sample of college students[24] (Meloy, 1988;

Yochelson & Samenow, 1976).

Koch was the first to describe severe criminals as

psychopathic, and Birnbaum used the term sociopathic,

terminology that is still accepted psychological

nomenclature (Meloy, 1988; Thaler, 1991). Psychopathy

and sociopathy are often used synonymously (Reid, Dorr,

Walker, & Bonner, 1986). Cleckley (1976) described

sixteen clinical signs of psychopathy (see Table 13).

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[23] Not all physical traits are unrelated to criminality.

Mesomorphy (muscular build) is significantly associated (Wilson &

Herrnstein, 1985). Neurological substrates are disputed: some

studies note cortical immaturity and bilateral slowing of

electroencephalograms. Studies of brain damaage in adult

criminals may be confounded by drug abuse and head trauma, which

are ubiquitous in this population.

[24] Genetic sequelae are outside the scope of this study. Walters

and White (1989) recently performed a meta-analysis of 38 studies.

The better designed studies showed the least effects.

Table 13

Cleckley's Sixteen Indicators of Psychopathy

1. Superficial charm and good intelligence
2. Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking
3. Absence of nervousness and other psychoneurotic manifestations
4. Unreliability
5. Untruthfulness and insincerity
6. Lack of remorse and shame
7. Inadequately motivated antisocial behavior
8. Poor judgment and failure to learn from experience
9. Pathological egocentricity and incapacity for love
10. General poverty of major affective relations
11. Specific loss of insight
12. Unresponsiveness in interpersonal behavior
13. Fantastic and uninviting behavior with drink and sometimes without
14. Suicide rarely carried out
15. Sex life impersonal, trivial and poorly integrated
16. Failure to follow any life plan

Currently, Hare and Meloy are producing a continuous stream of research on psychopathy (Gacono,

Meloy & Heaven, 1990; Hare, 1965, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1985; Meloy & Gacono, 1988). These researchers follow Cleckley's tradition. Hare (1980) wrote as an atheoretical general psychologist and has operationalized Cleckley's psychopathy with his Psychopathy Check-List (see Appendix C). Meloy, a psychodynamic theorist, has written extensively on psychopathy. He retained Cleckley's view but classified psychopathy as a variant of Narcissistic Personality Disorder (Kernberg, 1984).

Forth, Hart, and Hare (1988) noted that only 15-20% of incarcerated felons meet the criteria for psychopathy as operationalized in the Psychopathy Check List. Even so, Hare and McPherson (1984) opined that they commit a disproportionately large number of serious crimes.

Hare explained psychopathy as a cluster of personality traits and behaviors. He listed irresponsibility, impulsivity, hedonism, selfishness, egocentricity, low frustration tolerance, lack of guilt, remorse, or shame, and a chronically unstable and antisocial lifestyle as diagnostic of psychopathy. Psychopaths are also selfish, callous, and exploitative in their use of others, and often become involved in

socially deviant behaviors. According to Hare, these traits and behaviors appear in psychopaths without the attendant signs of other mental illness or deficiency (Hare & Jutai, 1983).

Hare (1970) noted that the personality structure and life history of the psychopath are quite different from those of the person whose antisocial or criminal behavior results from living in a criminal subculture. Unlike the psychopath, these individuals may be capable of forming strong, affectionate relationships and of experiencing concern and guilt over their behavior.

Meloy (1988; 1992), on the other hand, linked psychopathy with the other character or personality disorders. He and other psychodynamic researchers note that, like the other personality disorders, the general factor in psychopathy is narcissism (Gacono, 1990; Gacono, Meloy, & Heaven, 1990).

Hare's factor analytic studies of the PCL can be interpreted in accord with Meloy's opinion that psychopathy is an aggressive variant of narcissistic personality. Two factors have been identified. Factor 1 measures "a selfish, remorseless and exploitive use of others." Factor 2 describes an unstable, antisocial

lifestyle and is more behavioral (Harpur, Hare & Hakstian, 1989, p. 6).

Psychopaths are among the most treatment resistant of all psychological patients. This may be due to their lower than normal levels of distress and their perceptions that nothing is wrong in their behavior (Hare, 1970). Nevertheless, some studies have shown that the behaviors of some psychopaths seem to become less grossly antisocial with age. Other studies have shown that psychopaths actually remain criminally active longer than other criminals (Hare & Jutai, 1983).

Psychoanalytic Psychopathy

Psychologists and psychiatrists, beginning with Freud, have theorized that crime is a result of superego deficits. Although Freud was never optimistic about using psychoanalysis to treat character disorders (Freud, 1939/1990), his followers adapted his techniques to treat criminality and other personality disorders (Hartmann, 1940). Lowen (1985), the Reichian analyst, believed psychopathy is a variant of narcissism. He seemed to believe that he could successfully treat all character disorders.

Newer, neo-analytic explanations may hold more promise for understanding and treating character-level pathology, including psychopathy. The ego and self psychologists (Kernberg, 1984; Kohut, 1971), as well as the object-relations theorists (Hamilton, 1988, 1992; Winicott, 1953), propose an active faculty that organizes reality into cognitive schema.

These cognitive templates are both interpersonal and affect-laden (Kendall & Braswell, 1993). Yochelson and Samenow's (1976) criminal thinking patterns are also other-directed and are linked to feeling states. This explains the cross-fertilization of ideas between neo-dynamic theories of psychopathy and related cognitive-behavioral theories (Meloy & Gacono, 1988).

Meloy posited that psychopaths never achieve object constancy, the bedrock of socialization, and that their need for normal attachment is deactivated. Instead, he hypothesized that psychopaths identify with what they perceive as an aggressive parent. They view their parents as the enemy and internalize what Grotstein (1982) called the stranger self-object. This fantasy of a predator that the infant introjects is what he or she will eventually become (Meloy, 1988).

Like the narcissist, the psychopath is conceived
as having moved beyond borderline object relations:
the sense of "I" and "not-I" is intact. "The manner in
which self and its relation to others is conceived,
however, is distorted and exaggerated, reflecting the
fusion of self- and object concepts" (Meloy, 1988, p.
51).

Meloy added that psychopathy "predisposes,
precipitates, and perpetuates the expression of
predatory violence" (p. 191). He distinguished between
predatory and affective aggression. The former is
characterized by decreased autonomic arousal and lack
of affect, the later by intense sympathetic arousal.

The object relations extensions of psychoanalytic
theory do not repudiate earlier constructs. Meloy also
described superego deficits in psychopaths. He used
Kernberg's levels of superego pathology as diagnostic
of the severity of psychopathy (Kernberg, 1984).
Severe psychopaths "will verbalize full knowledge of
the moral requirements of society, but do not
understand what it means to internalize such standards"
(Meloy, 1988, p. 313).

Antisocial Personality Disorder

The term Antisocial Personality Disorder is the current nomenclature of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (1987). APD was adopted in 1968 with DSM-II (see Table 14).

Like all DSM categories, the diagnosis of APD is given by matching the person to a list of behavioral descriptors. In general, DSM-III-R assigns somebody to a discrete category. It was not specifically designed to describe the person's current thought patterns, emotional processes, or psychodynamics. Also, APD is a much broader term than psychopathy. Reid, Dorr, Walker, and Bonner (1986) noted that 78% of all incarcerated felons could be diagnosed with APD.

The way APD differs from criminality and psychopathy is illustrative of the nosological differences between psychological and psychiatric assessment in general. Hare (1970) believed that because discrete diagnostic categories (like APD) require exact assignment into one and only one diagnosis, they are more difficult to support than dimensional conceptualizations like psychopathy. Eysenck (1986) concurred. He believed that the current

DSM categories abandoned validity to achieve diagnostic consensus (i.e., interrater reliability).

Table 14

Synopsis of Diagnostic Criteria for APD

Pre-morbid Prerequisite:

Eighteen years of age or older and previous diagnosis of Conduct Disorder.

An Antisocial Lifestyle characterized by (4+):

1. Inconsistent work behavior

2. Disregard for societal norms of legal behavior

3. Assaultiveness

4. Failure to honor financial obligations

5. Failure to plan ahead or vagrancy

6. Lying, aliases and conning

7. Recklessness and disregard for safety

8. Disregard of parental responsibilities

9. Lack of monogamous relationship for one year

10. Lack of remorse for injury to others

Not Due to Psychotic Disorder:

This antisocial behavior not due to Schizophrenia or Manic episodes.

The dimensional view, or psychological view, describes traits as they exist on a continuum (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989). The question is, "How much of this characteristic is present and what other traits are present with it?" Whereas the question in the DSM is, "What discrete disease entity is present?"

Millon believed that even discrepancies in theoretical approaches will lead to breakthroughs in classification. In Toward a New Personology, he provided some historical perspective: "For the most part, traditional nosologies were the product of a slowly evolving accretion of clinical experience, fostered and formalized by the systemizing efforts of respected clinician-scholars such as Kraepelin (1899)" (1990, p. 102).

Millon believed that the adoption of his view of personality disorders is a great advance. He equated this with scientific progress. Millon and Klerman, in Contemporary Directions in Psychopathology: Toward the DSM-IV, wrote:

A change in the character of psychopathology has begun to evolve in the past decade. Slow though progress may be, there are inexorable signs that the study of mental disorders has advanced beyond

its earlier history as an oracular craft. No
longer dependent on the intuitive artistry of
brilliant clinicians and theoreticians who
formulated dazzling but unfalsifiable insights,
psychopathology has acquired a solid footing in
the empirical methodologies and quantitative
techniques that characterize mature sciences.
(1986, p. ix)

Others, like Hare, Hart, and Harpur (1991) had
reservations about the direction that psychiatric
classification is taking. Eysenck agreed: "There is
little likelihood that the DSM-IV will show any
improvement on the scientific procedures which have led
to the scientifically disastrous DSM-III" (1986, p.
74).

In the DSM-IV Update, the American Psychiatric
Association (1990) noted that Antisocial Personality
Disorder will be the Axis II diagnostic category "most
likely to undergo major changes" (p. 5). Multisite
field trials are now under way (Hare, Hart, & Harpur,
1991).

Criminal Personality: A Cognitive-Behavioral Theory

Directive, cognitive-behavioral treatment regimens are currently popular in criminal justice settings (Weinstock, 1990). Stanton Samenow wrote:

Despite a multitude of differences in their backgrounds and crime patterns, criminals are alike in one way: *how they think*. A gun-toting, uneducated criminal off the streets of southeast Washington, D.C., and a crooked Georgetown business executive are extremely similar in their view of themselves and the world. (1984, p. 20)

Yochelson and Samenow (1976) argued that criminals think differently from normal people. As a group, they are characterized by inaccurate thinking. Yochelson and Samenow believed that the most important difference between a criminal and a noncriminal is his/her distorted cognitive process.

Orling (1991) has recently developed the Cognitive-Style Questionnaire (CSQ) to operationalize Yochelson and Samenow's theory of distorted criminal thinking. The CSQ is a 289-item, Likert-scaled instrument.

Yochelson and Samenow's writings have been critiqued as being full of hyperbole and overstatement

(Weinstock, 1990). Sometimes their work sounds like a diatribe against criminals.

Like the work of Cleckley, this is a case-study oriented approach. However, some research is now being conducted to test the Yochelson and Samenow hypothesis (Thaler, 1991; Walters, 1990). Following is a representative list of criminal personality distinctives.

Energy

Yochelson and Samenow noted that the criminal is extremely energetic, both physically and mentally. They hypothesized that this activity is not just random mania but, instead, is purposeful and goal directed. Yochelson and Samenow contended that this excitability is not due to a neurological deficit, but is under the criminal's conscious control to "make life more interesting and exciting" (1976, p. 256).

Fear

The criminal is afraid primarily of two things: physical injury and injury to his or her self-esteem. Yochelson and Samenow (1976) believed that these fears are unlike neurotic fears or simple phobias in that the criminal does not admit them.

Corrosion and Cutoff

Criminals do have methods for modulating their fear and other negative affects. They can use "corrosion" and "cut-off." Corrosion is gradual, and cutoff is nearly instantaneous. Both are alike, however, because both methods are used by criminals to talk themselves out of being afraid and into committing a crime.

Corrosion, according to Yochelson and Samenow, is a gradual, conscious desensitization process that criminals use to reduce the fear that could deter them from committing a crime. Walters (1990) called this same process mollification. To mollify (or corrode) their consciences, offenders utilize any and all methods and devices to gradually rationalize their crimes or at least to mitigate against responsibility.

Sometimes the victim or society is blamed. Other times the crime is minimized out of existence. Walters cited Dobson's (1989) interview of serial killer Ted Bundy and noted:

> Bundy refers, not once, but twice, to the women he "has harmed," which seems a gargantuan understatement in light of the fact that he sexually abused, killed, and mutilated nearly all

of his victims. In summary, mollification entails

an effort by the lifestyle criminal to assuage,

exonerate or extenuate responsibility for his

violent and antisocial activities, which may or

may not be true, but which have nothing to do with

the individual's own behavior. (1990, p. 133)

Cutoff is used for the same purpose, but is

invoked almost instantaneously. This fear cutoff

mechanism is, like corrosion, hypothesized to be under

the offender's volitional control. Oftentimes, a

particular piece of profanity is used to trigger a

cutoff (Walters, 1990; Yochelson & Samenow, 1976).

Even though cutoff is so rapid and automatic, it is

hypothesized to be a habit under the criminal's

control.

Anger

This is common to all humans, but Yochelson and

Samenow wrote about a severe variant that results in

criminality. They posited that unlike anger in normal,

responsible people, the criminal's anger "metastasizes"

(1976, pp. 268-269). It escalates naturally when the

criminal's desires are blocked and results in acting-

out behavior. This anger is not globally directed

against society or authority figures unless they frustrate the criminal's wishes.

Pride

This is not the same as feeling good about a job well done. In contrast, criminal pride "corresponds to an extremely and inflexibly high evaluation of oneself . . . [it] is rigid in that it preserves a self-created image of a powerful, totally self-determining person" (Yochelson & Samenow, 1976, pp. 274-275). This rigidity is maintained in order to prevent the encroachment of the feared zero state.[25]

Criminals often are self-aggrandizing to the point of ridiculousness and megalomania. They may attempt superhuman feats which result in severe injury. Others have been known to become professional impostors. For example, Waldo Demara successfully posed as a psychologist, a philosophy professor, a surgeon, a prison guard, and a minister (Coleman, Butcher, & Carson, 1984).

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[25] Zero state is conceptualized as a feeling of low self-esteem and abandonment. This may be a common factor in Personality Disorders (Kernberg, 1984).

Power Thrust

The "power thrust" (Yochelson & Samenow, 1976) is the criminal's maladaptive response to compensate for the zero state. In a power thrust, a criminal acts out his or her fantasy of pride or omnipotence, usually in an interpersonal situation. It is an attempt to undo the zero state and reestablish an acceptable self-image.

When criminals use the power thrust as a coping response, they are displaying two thinking errors. First, they are overcompensating by replacing thoughts and feelings of worthlessness with unbridled grandiosity. Second, they are usually exhibiting callous disregard for others. Yochelson and Samenow conceived of this criminal will-to-power as a narcotic; it is the only antidote to the criminal's empty self.[26]

"Criminals crave power for its own sake, and they will do virtually anything to acquire it. Insatiable in their thirst for power and unprincipled in their exercise of it, they care very little whom they injure or destroy" (Samenow, 1984, p. 98).

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[26] The view of evil as pride can be seen in Schuster (1987) and Peck (1983), as well as in the theology of Strong (1899).

All criminal behavior is by nature exploitive and manipulative and, hence, a power thrust, according to Yochelson and Samenow. Sexually controlling behavior is one power thrust example they noted (1976). Another class of power thrusts proposed are those of speech. Criminals often misuse polysyllabic words to make themselves seem more intelligent, or "if his usage is correct, it is often pretentious. The criminal may use flowery language to appear suave and debonair" (Yochelson & Samenow, 1976, p. 280).

Walters (1990) noted that the criminal's tendency to oscillate between the power thrust and the zero state is a form of cognitive rigidity that one would expect to find in an adolescent.

> The repeat offender has resisted the societal push for increased self-discipline through responsible, internalized action and remains at a point in his development where external control and influence are viewed as predominant. Consequently, the world view of most criminals is immature, unsophisticated, and largely fatuous in that it focuses on a solitary dimension of human experience (strong versus weak). (1990, p. 139)

Sentimentality

This is described as "the Robin Hood syndrome" or the "one helluva fella" fallacy by Walters (1990). Sentimentality is the criminal's tendency to allege soft-heartedness, aesthetic interest, or a certain circumscribed morality.

In prison, certain crimes (e.g., rape, child molestation, and being an informant) are taboo even to the most hardened convict. Also, even violent offenders exhibit a soft spot. Yochelson and Samenow noted that criminals retain these lacunae in their criminality in order to be able to say that they are basically a nice person.

Ted Bundy, in his pre-execution interview with Dobson portrays himself as the normal "guy next door":

Basically I was a normal person. I wasn't some guy hanging out at bars or I wasn't a pervert. I was essentially a normal person. I had good friends; I lived a normal life; I wasn't perfect but, I want to be quite candid with you, I was okay. Okay I was. (Dobson, 1989)

Dobson was professionally interested in Bundy in order to document the role pornography played as a causal factor in the genesis of a serial killer

(Dobson, 1989). Walters believed that Bundy's agenda was to provide that information in order to exonerate himself by shifting the blame to an outside agent (i.e., the obscene material). Walters concluded that Bundy's goal was to take Dr. Dobson on a "sentimental journey" (1990, p. 143).

Religion

Yochelson and Samenow (1976) described a religiosity that is in service of an offender's criminal intent. Allport's (1950) research described a religious orientation that can be either extrinsic (directed toward some other, ulterior motive) or intrinsic, the converse. The criminal/religious factor that Yochelson and Samenow described appears to conform with Allport's extrinsic religious orientation.

Yochelson and Samenow believed that for criminals, their religion "has not evolved beyond their childhood forms," and "the criminal lacks the concept of religion as a way of life or as an ethical system. He believes that a few concrete acts . . . make him a religious person" (1976, p. 294). A criminal merely uses his or her religion as a way to atone for previous offenses. At the same time, he or she is planning new ones. This

religious behavior may actually take on the form of a
"monastic phase" (1976, p. 299).

Evil Inherent in Severe Criminality

Attribution of Evil Implicit in the Four Theories

The theories exposited above all point to the evil
inherent in criminality. Samenow's theory is the most
open about its value judgments, but each of these four
paradigms ascribes evil to criminals.

Under a section titled, "Hatred and the Wish to
Destroy," Meloy wrote that psychopaths "may hate
goodness itself" (1988, p. 331). Burnout is said to be
common amongst therapists treating psychopaths because
of extreme countertransference issues (Weinstock,
1990). Kernberg (1984) described the psychopath's
malignant narcissism. Meloy (1988) detailed the
problems treating them: therapists are to expect
sadism, manipulation, devaluation, denial, and
deception. To this he added that real fear of assault
exists concomitantly with the intense negative
countertransference. He also noted that this
countertransference is neither to be ignored nor

analyzed away. It should be heeded. The evil inherent in psychopathy is dangerous.

Hare's (1980) version of psychopathy also ascribes evil to psychopaths. The PCL describes them as irresponsible, deceitful, remorseless, arrogant, and promiscuous, for example.

APD criteria are lying, remorselessness, parental irresponsibility, destruction of others' property, forcing sexual activities on others, physical cruelty to animals and persons, and using weapons against others as indicators of the disorder (APA, 1987). These behaviors are indicators of moral failure cross-culturally (Lewis, 1947).

Meloy (1988) claimed to defer any moral or philosophical judgment on the aggressive behavior of psychopaths. He did suggest it as a topic for further research, however.

Attempting to construct a positivist psychology of crime is vain. Insofar as it succeeds, it will only produce theories which do not admit value judgments and are inadequate to explain the richness (and the depravity) of human behavior.

Criminals behave differently from noncriminals. The theorists above admit that sometimes criminal

behavior is overtly evil. To clearly describe this criminal behavior, the language of moral judgment must be retained.

Criminal Human Nature

Some psychologists (as well as some of the lay public) opine that criminals are altogether (qualitatively) different from normals. Others, like federal prison psychologist Walters (1990), contend that everyone commits some crimes; criminality is a question of degree. Stanton Samenow disagreed:

> Those who hold such a view go a step further, asserting that we are all, in a sense, criminals because we lie, lust and yield to temptation, but it is absurd to equate the white lie of the responsible person with the gigantic network of lies of the criminal. . . . At some point we and the criminal are very different. He is far more extreme in that crime is a way of life, not an occasional aberration. It is misleading to claim that the criminal wants what the responsible person wants. (1984, p. 21)

The question of whether all people are incipient criminals or whether criminals are categorically

different from noncriminals seems insoluble from the
extant psychological data alone. Hall noted that "some
of the ablest people have been the greatest criminals"
(1945, p. 364). The quasi-psychological status of
criminality necessitates a broader inquiry to answer
this dilemma. Therefore, the existence of evil will
now be considered more thoroughly.

The Existence and Proximity of Evil

The existence of evil may be readily apparent in
other persons, while at the same time defense
mechanisms may obscure one's personal responsibility
(Freud, 1939/1990). Emil Brunner (1950) noted that the
warp in humanity's understanding of a phenomenon may be
a moral problem. He called this the rule of proximity.

In brief, Christian anthropologists view humans as
having been created in the image of God, but that
humankind fell from that pristine state. In this
context Erickson explained the rule of proximity:

This is the idea that the effect of the fall upon
creation and upon perception of the truth is
greatest in those areas where the relationship
between God and humans is most directly involved,

and least where that relationship is not at all in

view. (1991, p. 540)

This principle explains another key difference between

the natural and human sciences described in chapter 2.

The human sciences may be contaminated by personal

blind spots. The view that humanity is fundamentally

good or evil may be a projection of the investigator's

self-concept. If humankind is prone to evil, then the

researcher may need to confront her own personal

immorality.

The Inadequacy of Contemporary Scientific
Anthropologies

Nontheological views of human nature exhibit

serious shortcomings. Saucy (1993) noted that while

naturalistic anthropologies may be able to account for

variety, they have no mechanism to account for

individual personality. This makes the psychological

study of the individual self impossible.

Also, Reinhold Niebuhr (1941) demonstrated that

nontheistic anthropologies cannot deal with the issue

of human transcendence over nature. Even when a person

describes himself as part of the natural world, there

must be a part left out (one's self) to do the explaining.[27]

A survey of the concepts of Christian anthropology germane to the psychology of criminality is included in the next section. Creation, the fall, human freedom, and conscience are discussed.

Creation in the Image of God

Ricour (1967) noted that the story of Adam in the Garden of Eden is superior to other ancient creation accounts. This is because it accounts for evil as real, it dispenses with ambiguous dualistic notions of evil, and it links evil to human responsibility.

The Bible states that Adam was created in the image (*tselem*) and likeness (*demuth*) of God (Genesis 1:27). This image was not a *donum superadditum*, an added gift, but was inherent in the original creation. Martin Luther (1958) noted the terms *image* and *likeness* are not different, but are a form of Hebrew parallelism. Calvin (1536/1990) added that the image is still present in humanity; it is only marred.

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[27] For a critique of Niebuhr's views, see Carl Rogers (1962). Klooster (1964) analyzed Niebuhr's existentialism, i.e., that sin is equal to finiteness.

Some expositors view the image of God as being explicit in the near context (in Genesis 1 and 2). They believe, for instance, that Adam and Eve were created to be creative or that the image occurs in their maleness and femaleness (Barth, 1962). Although Barth's gender interpretation may be far-fetched (Gerstner, 1962), the interpersonal implications of creation in the image of a triune God are inescapable.[28] Others see that participation in the _Imago Dei_ means that humankind is like God in more general ways, perhaps as an intellecting being (Aquinas, 1990).

The idea of personhood, as currently construed in Western thought, owes its existence to Christian theology (Erickson, 1991). The debates about the personhood of Christ provided the vocabulary and the concepts which made the elevation of the individual person possible (Pannenberg, 1977).

The implication of the image of God in humanity is, first and foremost, that people were designed by God and are of great value. Second, "the image is the

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[28] The interpersonal (trinitarian?) nature of personality is evident in many diverse psychological theories (White, 1961).

powers of personality which make man, like God, a being
capable of interacting with other persons, of thinking
and reflecting, and of willing freely" (Erickson, 1985,
p. 513).

Also, creation in the image and likeness of God
implies that the human race is responsible to God the
Law Giver. Implicit is a universal standard of right
and wrong as part and parcel of human nature.

> The precepts of the natural moral law must be the
> same for all human beings, everywhere and at all
> times, if they are inherent in human nature and
> discoverable by our understanding of what is
> really good and right for human beings to seek and
> to do. This is tantamount to asserting that there
> is only one sound, moral philosophy, one that
> directs each of us in leading morally good lives
> regardless of our individual and cultural
> differences. I am willing to make that assertion
> without hesitation. . . . There cannot be a
> plurality of incompatible moral doctrines all
> prescriptively true. (Lewis, 1947, p. 87)[29]

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[29] Lewis (1947) also presented evidence for the agreement of moral
codes, which he called the Tao.

The doctrine of creation implies human purpose, the possibility of wholeness, and a real right and wrong. God is the designer or formal cause of the individual person.

The Fall as an Explanation of Evil

Evolutionary expositions of evil, like the process theology of Teilhard de Chardin (1955), describe evil as the necessary byproduct of progress. Thus, process thought redefines evil as only apparently bad (Alsford, 1991). First, this is pantheism (or panentheism) with its attendant difficulties (Geisler, 1976). Second, it trivializes suffering and does not coincide with what most people mean by evil.

Some versions of Irenaean theodicy may also be critiqued from this perspective. John Hick (1977) described evil as the necessary byproduct of "soul-making." C. S. Lewis (1970b) emphasized the Irenaean approach in The Problem of Pain.[30]

The Augustinian view of evil "shares with the Irenaean an emphasis on human-freedom and

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[30] Wilson (1990) reported the reaction of Lewis' colleagues at Oxford. Lewis' argument exposed the inconsistency of those who expect God to correct all evil consequences in real time.

responsibility, but sees the imperfections and evils of creation as a *result* of, not a *prerequisite* of, such freedom and responsibility" (Alsford, 1991, p. 124).[31]

Paul's doctrine of the Old Man in Romans 6-7 illuminates the personal dimension of human evil. In contrast to the myth of human perfectibility offered by positivist criminology, the Bible affirms that humanity is fallen into sin (Romans 7:14). Paul affirms that humankind is radically affected by sin, that the natural state of human affairs (the flesh) can do nothing but serve the law of sin (Romans 7:25).

This is the doctrine of total depravity that was emphasized by Calvin (1536/1990). Total depravity does not mean that everyone is as bad as he or she might be but that every facet of human nature is touched by sin. In order to understand humanity most completely, endemic evil cannot be ignored.

Human Freedom

The freedom and responsibility necessitated by the fall are denied by many psychological determinists from

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[31] For a historical critique of the development of Augustine's view of evil, with special reference to his view of sex as evil, see Pagels (1988).

divergent schools of thought. In <u>Wisdom and Humanness in Psychology</u>, Evans (1989) noted that the Christian view of freedom is intellectually defensible.[32] He critiqued the reign of *event causality* (the view that everything is caused by a previous event) and defended the idea of *agent causality*[33] (the view that persons can be causes).

Agent causality provides an escape from determinism. While novel to some, it is implicit in the Bible. God, a personal agent Himself, is sovereign over all events, but He sovereignly decreed that human beings have actual responsibility (Brunner, 1950; Edwards, 1992; Reid, 1983).[34] This Christian view of actual moral responsibility is still extant in jurisprudence, but, interestingly, has been largely

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[32] Libertarianism (unrelated to the political movement) (Plantinga, 1990).

[33] This is equivalent to Aristotle's efficient cause cited above and corresponds to the shoemaker example.

[34] Brunner's view of God's sovereignty and human responsibility clarifies the Reformed view. See especially his historical account of how Calvin and Zwingli fell prey to the natural theology they dreaded (1950, pp. 303-353).

banished from the other social sciences (Montgomery, 1975).

The Conscience

The Bible provides data for science but is not a science textbook (Brunner, 1950; Morris, 1984). This conclusion applies to the science of theology as well. The Bible does not set forth an explicit, systematic anthropology. For instance, it often does not use anthropological terms, like soul, spirit, or conscience, in a technical sense (Gundry, 1987; Jewett, 1971).

Most Christian theologians have assumed, however, that this nomenclature does describe a real, substantive, but immaterial part of human nature (Aquinas, 1990; Moreland, 1993). Some theologians have attempted in recent years to reduce humanity to a completely physical entity (Meyers, 1978). This may in part be a result of the theological trend to dehellenize the New Testament in the last hundred years to move it towards naturalistic monism (von Harnack, 1901/1958).

Data from current cognitive science support mind as distinct from matter as well. R. W. Sperry

(1983),[35] the neuropsychologist known for his commissurotomy studies, and Sir John Eccles (1984a, 1984b), the Nobel prize-winning brain scientist, both believe that their data imply mind/body dualism.

A full treatment of the mind-body problem is outside the scope of this study.[36] However, the Bible does provide substantial information about these constructs (Issler, 1993).

The Bible pictures the conscience not as an innate moral code but as a God-given conscious sensitivity to be consulted.

> To repeatedly ignore the promptings of conscience will desensitize the conscience's promptings regarding a given conviction. As blind persons regularly use sandpaper to keep their fingertips sensitive for reading braille, so those who wish to pursue righteousness must be ever alert to the

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[35] Sperry is actually an epiphenomenalist, the view that a real mind supervenes over matter.

[36] See Body, Soul and Life Everlasting, (Cooper, 1989) for a discussion of biblical and rabbinic views of the soul, and see also Moreland's (1993) criticism of epiphenominalism.

promptings of conscience. (Issler, 1993, pp. 268-
269)

The dysfunctional conscience may be weak (1
Corinthians 8). Or it may be seared (1 Timothy 4:2),
that is, deadened.[37] Immanuel Kant, in a classic
passage, explained to have no conscience is impossible:

When, therefore, it is said, "This man has no
conscience," what is meant is that he pays no heed
to its dictates. For if he really had none, he
would not take credit to himself for anything done
according to duty. . . . *Unconscientiousness* is
not a want of conscience, but the propensity not
to heed its judgment. . . . The duty here is only
to cultivate our conscience, to quicken our
attention to the voice of the internal judge, and
to use all means to secure obedience to it. (1990,
p. 375) (see also Appendix D)

A clear view of the conscience is essential to
understanding its function in normal persons. This is

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[37] See (Hendriksen, 1979) on 1 Timothy 4:2. See also F. F. Bruce
(1984, pp. 353-356) on κεκαυτηριασμένων τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν, the
cauterized conscience.

true a fortiori in understanding the dysfunctional
conscience of the psychopath or other severe criminals.

Criminology Explained Scientifically
by Psychology and Theology

Christian theology and clear thinking help clarify
the theoretical issues surrounding the etiology of
severe criminality. First, psychologists should
realize that criminality is a quasi-psychological
phenomenon. Crime needs to be understood
psychologically, but broader perspectives on
criminality will add to, not detract from,
understanding crime.

Borrowing Aristotelian and Hippocratic language,
would-be criminals have various predisposing factors
(diatheses) that may incline them to criminality.
These factors (i.e., material causes) may, in part, be
the results of sins *against them*; that is, they may be
the victims of child abuse or sociocultural
deprivation. These predispositions may even be
genetic.

Criminals are still moral agents, however. As such, they are the efficient cause that actualizes their criminality.

Because all persons are created in the image of God (the design plan, or formal cause), they are created to be righteous. They retain that image even in their fallen state and, hence, ought to be able to act in accordance with that design. Even now, they can heed their consciences and receive the input necessary to modify their behavior.

This means that their behavior is purposive. The final cause of criminal behavior is that criminals believe that crime will achieve some goal. A return to the classical view of causality with its volitional implications makes psychological intervention possible.

CHAPTER 4

PRAXIS: INTERVENTION IN FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY

This chapter is built on the conclusions of the two previous chapters. Namely, that current advances in the philosophy of science and the nature of science allow for the scientific discussion of evil concurrently with the scientific study of criminality. This is the meta-theoretical foundation of this study.

As shown, crime and evil ought to be investigated simultaneously in order to best understand criminal human nature. The Christian view of human nature was introduced. The nature of etiology, conscience, and freedom were discussed alongside current descriptions of criminality. The argument advanced was that this expanded theory of human nature better describes criminal phenomena because it better describes human nature.

This section will move beyond theory to praxis. The crime and evil construct will be used to examine current issues in the psychotherapy and general amelioration of severe criminality.

Therapeutic Nihilism

Meloy (1988) described an oral tradition that
antisocial personalities are untreatable. As noted
above, pronounced negative countertransference toward
severe criminals is likely. The converse is also
possible: some therapists believe that a therapeutic
alliance exists when none is present. Therapists may
also be seduced by the lurid details of the crime or by
the infamy of the patient. "Consultation or
supervision is highly recommended" (Reid, 1986, p.
257).

Antisocial personalities are difficult to treat.
Like other personality disorders, the course of
treatment will be long, no matter what techniques are
used (Freeman & Leaf, 1989; Prins, 1986).

Gunderson noted several reasons for treatment
failure. These include the APD patient's "tendency to
explain and discharge affects externally" and a
"distrust for authority" (1988, p. 347). McConaghy
(1989), a behaviorist, treated psychopathic patients
but noted that they cannot be trusted either to
continue in therapy or to make accurate self-reports.

Conversely, Prins (1986) warned that the term psychopathy can become a derogatory term, a kind of psychological name-calling. Terminology like antisocial personality or psychopathy can become a

"dustbin" category, to which we have assigned all those patients, residents, inmates, and offenders who seem unwilling to be helped, are unpredictable, unresponsive, and who, in addition, may show aggressive behavior to a severe degree. There is, of course, much truth in this, but it is only a partial explanation. (p. 158)

Mental health professionals are likely to experience a whole range of emotions while treating severe criminals. They may choose not to treat them at all and apply their limited time and resources to treating other patients (Gunderson, 1988). This may be due to the pervasive opinion that "nothing works" in treating criminals (Martinson, 1974).

Recidivism and Cure

Recidivism rates for incarcerated offenders are high. No single, accurate rearrest rate for either treated or untreated criminals is agreed upon, however (DiIulio, 1991).

Comparisons across studies are difficult. Different investigators use different definitions of recidivism. Sometimes recidivism means committing the same offense; sometimes it means any new conviction. Or, a parolee may be returned to prison for an infraction that is not a crime for a citizen not under court supervision.

This matter is further complicated for psychologists because most offenses are not detected, many detected offenses do not lead to arrest, many arrestees are not tried, and many of those tried are not convicted. Also, even convicted reoffenders may plead guilty to a lesser charge, making them appear to have desisted their serious offending.

In short, recidivism is not equal to psychological relapse. Therefore, any measured reduction of criminal behavior based on recidivism rates may be spoiled data (DiIulio, 1991; Megaree, 1982).

One conclusion of the longitudinal Cambridge-Somerville youth study was that young offenders receiving treatment actually became worse than the control group (McCord & McCord, 1964). Martinson (1974) studied 231 treatment programs and concluded

that "nothing works." Since then the efficacy of the psychological treatment is suspect.[38]

Success rates for therapy in the community may not be much better. Garfield and Bergin (1986) noted a "rule of thirds" to describe therapy outcome. One third of clients get better even without treatment, one third improve with treatment, and one third get worse with treatment. If the Garfield and Bergin iatrogenic heuristic applies to forensic therapy, that could mean that thousands of psychopaths are being made worse by forensic treatment.

Treatment Successes

Some treatment successes with criminals are reported. Ross and Fabiano (1985) performed a detailed analysis of successful and unsuccessful treatment programs with offenders. They argued that criminality is related to delayed or impaired cognition (see Table 15).

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[38] Some treatments may work, the effects may just be immeasurable because of the confounding nature of recidivism. "Nothing works" sounds more dramatic than "retaining the null hypothesis."

Table 15

Outcome of Treatment in Inmate Programs With and

Without Cognitive Components

Outcome	Cognitive Treatment		Noncognitive Treatment	
Effective	15	(94%)	10	(29%)
Ineffective	1	(6%)	24	(71%)
Total Studies	16	(100%)	34	(100%)
x^2 = 18.02, df = 1, p < .001				

They contend that interventions that decrease
recidivism[39] address the criminal's disability with
interpersonal problem solving, critical reasoning,
meta-cognition, reflection, and values.

The directive and confrontative factor in
cognitive therapy may be the effective element in these
therapies (Dryden & Ellis, 1988). Samenow (1984)
directly challenged inmates to change their selfish

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[39] An alternative explanation to these data would be that
successful (i.e., cognitive) therapy makes for more stealthy
criminals.

thinking. Glasser (1965) also reported success with his directive Reality Therapy at the Ventura School for Girls.

Cognitive and cognitive-behavioral therapies often strive for narrow and circumscribed outcomes. Thaler (1991) listed the reduction of anger arousal, threatening behavior, and anxiety, as well as the increase of assertiveness as successful outcome targets in criminal populations. These are beneficial goals, but they are certainly less ambitious than curing psychopathy or eliminating criminality.

Reid (1986) reported several diversionary programs such as community-based corrections and wilderness experiences as being successful treatment for antisocial personality. Criminals in these programs are likely to be less serious offenders, however (Umbreit, 1985). Hence, the prevalence of APD or psychopathy in these groups is likely to be rather low.

The Ethics of Treatment and Punishment

Clinical psychologists working in forensic settings are responsible to the patient, to society, and to their profession (Sales, 1983). They are paid by the state, however. Also, therapeutic ideals yield

to custodial concerns, confidentiality is limited, and dual relationships abound. The most extreme example may be when a psychologist is called upon to treat a client to restore competency for execution (Megaree, 1982).

Weinstock (1990) reported another ethical concern. He stated that recidivism rates might be lowered in a way that runs counter to the values of a democratic society and professional ethics. Indeterminate sentencing, that is keeping inmates incarcerated until they meet therapeutic standards, has been reported to lower recidivism rates. Lewis elaborated:

> The things done to the criminal, even if they are called cures, will be just as compulsory as they were in the old days when we called them punishments. If a tendency to steal can be cured by psychotherapy, the thief will no doubt be forced to undergo the treatment. (Lewis, 1970a, p. 288)

Psychologists ought not allow their therapy to be substituted for punishment just as psychiatrists cannot ethically prescribe medication to punish (Toch & Adams, 1989). Ethically speaking, aversive therapy requires informed consent (McConaghy, 1989).

This ethical problem results from a subordinate view of humanity (Lewis, 1970a). If humans are created in the image of God and real good and evil exists, then they are responsible for their behavior (see chapter 3). The enlightened or "humanitarian" view that considers all punishment as barbaric strips criminals of their dignity (House, 1991).

If the Christian view of humanity is lost, then psychologists are reduced to "official straighteners" (Lewis, 1970a, p. 290).

> We demand of a cure not whether it is just but whether it succeeds. Thus when we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and consider only what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a "case." (Lewis, 1970a, p. 288)

Practically speaking, the results are countertherapeutic as well. Making psychotherapy the final end, above the ideal of justice, reduces therapy to a charade. It will produce inmates who fake-good in order to be paroled (DiIulio, 1991). Furthermore, faking good might be the rational thing for them to do.

The decline of the idea of just deserts in forensic psychology leads to the decay of forensic psychology. This decline results from the removal of moral agency from the criminal justice equation. Psychologists ought not insulate themselves from ethics and justice. The socially responsible and ethical solution is to put the soul (psyche) back into psychology (White, 1987).

Restorative Forensic Psychology

A medical model of psychopathology has benefits. Classifying human conditions helps explain commonalities in etiology and provides insights into remediation (Gunderson, 1988). The medical model may be extended beyond its usefulness, however. Chuck Colson, president of Justice Fellowship (a prison reform movement) and Prison Fellowship (a prison ministry), described the confusion between evil behavior and psychopathology; he observed:

> During a recent trip to Europe, I met with a
> psychiatrist in a model correctional institution.
> She explained how 71 percent of the inmates there
> had been classified as mentally abnormal, or

psychiatric cases, since they had committed

particularly heinous crimes. Since people are

inherently good, the doctor inferred, anyone who

does evil must be mentally ill. So inmates with

this "illness" were sent to her institution to be

"cured." (Colson, 1990, p. 170)

Fingarette (1988) noted a similar confusion in his

study, Heavy Drinking. The bad habit, drinking

excessively, has been transformed into an illness. He

noted that this transformation is bad science and moral

obscurantism. The "diseasing" of inmates or drunkards

is cruel because it disables their ability to change.

Instead, they must look for the right doctor with the

latest cure. They then only need to wait passively

while the cure is administered to them.

The perceived contradiction between moral behavior

and mental health may be a result of an oversimplified

popularization of Freud's theory that the restraint of

drives by moral oversight is "unhealthy."[40] Drives are

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[40] Freud sometimes appears to hold this view. Other times he

advocated moral restraint (see Civilization and Its Discontents

[Freud, 1929/1990] and the letters between Freud and Pastor Oskar

Pfister [Freud & Pfister, 1963]).

seen as mechanistic forces that will be expressed one way or the other. The expression of drives is viewed as natural and healthy; the repression of drives is not.[41]

The discovery of psychological regularities does not mean psychological determinism. The restoration of mental and moral wholeness to serious offenders ought to be the goal of forensic psychology.

Wholeness and Mental Hygiene

In contradistinction to the view that health is equated with the discharge of instinctual drives, the Judeo-Christian Scriptures advance an alternative view of health. Luck (1972), writing in the <u>Theological Dictionary of the New Testament</u>, noted that health (ύγιης, from which "hygiene" is derived) means soundness or balance. He also described how the translators of the Septuagint used ύγίνης to translate *shalom*, the Hebrew word for peace.

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[41] The deterministic view that disease causes behavior is problematic because it relies on simplistic notions of causality (see chapter 3).

Umbreit (1985) adopted the word *shalom* (peace) to develop his model of criminal justice. Crimes are sometimes called a disturbance of the peace. Umbreit's Old Testament criminology is designed to restore the peace.

Brown, Driver, and Briggs (1979) document that the Hebrew words for restitution and peace derive from the same root. Van Ness (1986) noted that under Hebrew law offenders were considered responsible for their actions. Therefore, they were required to pay back or recompense their victims. This fine (a response cost, in behavioral terms) was not paid to the state. In order to restore the peace in the community, the victim was paid restitution (Justice Fellowship, 1989; Van Ness, 1986).

"Response cost refers to the loss of a positive reinforcer" (Kazdin, 1989, p. 153). The most common response cost in everyday life is a traffic fine. Something positive the offender possesses (i.e., money) is taken from him or her. A synonym for response cost is negative punishment (Karoly, 1980) (see Table 16).

Table 16

Response Cost in Relation to Other Behavioral

Techniques

Procedure	Condition	Consequence	Result
Positive Reinforcement	Introducing	Pleasant	Increased Behavior
Negative Reinforcement	Removing	Unpleasant	Increased Behavior
Punishment	Introducing	Unpleasant	Decreased Behavior
Response Cost	Removing	Pleasant	Decreased Behavior

Olinger and Epstein (1991) have argued that response cost paradigms have been successful for treating adolescent aggressive behavior in institutional settings. Sandler (1980) reported that using overcorrection combined with response cost quickly reduced institutional theft.

Overcorrection is also found in biblical response cost/restitution paradigms. Old Testament offenders were required to pay back several times the amount stolen (Umbreit, 1985). In fact, the primary

difference between behavioral response cost and biblical restitution is that restitution specifies that the fine be paid to the victim.

Restitution was a component of other ancient near eastern law codes and suzerainty treaties (Archer, 1975; Johnson, 1987). Johnson described the Hebrew view of humanity represented in the Pentateuch; he argued that the Hebrew view incorporated an elevated anthropology compared to surrounding cultures. For instance, in ancient Israel capital punishment was not required for property crimes because humankind was created in the image of God.

House (1991) documented the shift from paying back the victim to "paying your debt to society." King Henry, the son of William the Conqueror, referred to the peace in his realm as the king's peace. Any offense to one's neighbor was now an offense against the crown. Under English common law and now in the United States, a crime is a grievance against the state. This is seen in the language of legal dockets that describe cases as "The State v. John Doe." The current victim's rights movement is an attempt to balance this view (Sank & Caplan, 1991).

Umbreit (1985) noted that contrary to public perception, in his state, 38% of all prison inmates are incarcerated for nonviolent property offenses. He noted that diversion programs that include restitution would reduce prison overcrowding; this would facilitate the detention of more severe criminals. Reduction of overcrowding would provide a better therapeutic milieu for treating psychopaths and other serious offenders (Megaree, 1982; Weinstock, 1990).

Milieu Therapy for Severe Criminals

McCord (1982) noted some success in treating antisocial personality with milieu therapy. Reid described the interpersonal emphasis in milieu therapy. "Great emphasis is placed on the individual's responsibility for himself and others in the program" (1986, p. 257).

Relatedly, Umbreit (1985) noted that the offender's sense of personal responsibility is increased in programs that require restitution. The psychological theories of criminality discussed above describe the criminal's evasion of moral responsibility. This linkage suggests

restitution/response cost studies as a possible line of future research.[42]

The Superiority of Response Cost to Punishment

Karl Menninger (1968) described the retributive, punishment-oriented penal system as criminal. The problems with this view have already been noted: compulsory psychotherapy by "official straighteners" may be more cruel than traditional punishment.

A softer reading of Menninger is instructive. Punishment may work. Punishment may reflect the concept of desert and free moral agency. However, punishment (especially demeaning punishment) may have negative side effects that cannot be ignored (Skinner, 1965).

Ramsay Clark (1970) and others may have overstated the view that prisons only serve to embitter inmates. Still, inmates do report being bitter.[43]

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[42] Justice Fellowship (1989) reported that reparative sanctions reduce recidivism. Diversionary programs may have a built-in selection bias, however. They generally do not choose severe or repeat offenders.

[43] Personal observation.

Current penological paradigms do not allow inmates to pay back any fine to their victims. Making license plates for the state (which they have offended under American law) does nothing to right the wrong to the victims. Fyodor Dostoyevski, an ex-prisoner from Siberia and author on crime, testified: "If one wanted to crush, to annihilate a man utterly, to inflict on him the most terrible of punishments . . . one need only give him work of an absolutely, completely useless and irrational character" (Colson, 1990, pp. 197-198).

Reid expects inmate/patients to improve in therapy if they can overcome their responsibility avoidance (Reid, 1986). Penal programs that included a response cost element would restore the inmate's sense of dignity. Criminals could be required to pay for their incarceration as well as pay restitution to victims (Justice Fellowship, 1989). This would restore the peace (*shalom*) and reconcile them to their victims. The restoration of *shalom* may make psychotherapy possible.

Moral Education

Moral development is a valid domain of study for psychologists. The most common subject in moral

development research is the acquisition of moral
reasoning ability in children (Edelman & Goldstein,
1982; Gibbs & Basinger, 1992; Kohlberg, 1981). Stunted
moral development is implicit in the theories of severe
criminality surveyed above. Criminals lie, steal, and
kill.

Moralizing or preaching at severe criminals is not
likely to be successful. However, some form of moral
education may make psychotherapy possible. Criminals
taught the existence of universal standards, empathy,
and responsibility may respond. Most moral development
research is done on normal, growing children (Gibbs &
Basinger, 1992). Whether Kohlberg's cognitive-moral
theory applies to remediating offenders is unknown.

Kegan (1986) believed so. He postulated that part
of the core of psychopathy is a moral-developmental
arrest. He saw psychopaths as fixated at Kohlberg's
instrumental level of moral functioning (i.e., stage 2)
(see Table 17).

Table 17

A Brief Description of Kohlberg's Cognitive-Moral

Developmental Stages

Levels and Stages	Stage Orientations
Preconventional Level	
Stage 1	Punishment and Obedience
Stage 2	Instrumental Relativist
Conventional Level	
Stage 3	Interpersonal Concordance
Stage 4	Law and Order
Postconventional Level	
Stage 5	Social Contract/Legalist
Stage 6	Universal Ethical-Principle

Some prison programs teach a values-clarification

approach to inmates (Elem, 1990). Edelman and

Goldstein (1982) noted that values clarification is

based on the untenable assumption that values are

relative.[44] The notion of values-relativity may appeal

to the morally-arrested psychopath all too well.

Other, more robust methods of moral education may be in

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[44] However, values-clarification exercises may have benefits,

especially for the morally mature (H. Lewis, 1990).

order, however (Edelman & Goldstein, 1982). Didactic
character education programs may be more appropriate
for criminal populations.

Character education need not equal indoctrination.
Edelman and Goldstein defined indoctrination as "the
teaching of certain values, attitudes, or beliefs
*without due regard to thoughtful reflection and direct,
open inquiry and discussion concerning their
reasonableness and worth in light of other, alternative
values or beliefs*" (1982, p. 260). As an example of
moral education without indoctrination, they cited the
Character Education Curriculum, which attempts to show
the reasonableness and utility of traditional values
(1982). Relatedly, Etzioni (1993) and Bellah (1991)
advocated the teaching of prosocial community values in
order to halt American moral decline. These moral
virtues could be taught to criminals as well. Teaching
them to "at risk" predelinquents may be even better.

The link between arrested moral development in
severe criminals and psychotherapy needs to be
addressed by empirical research. Also, teaching moral
values to the antisocially disordered may make them
more amenable to therapy.

Recognition of Evil: The Foundation of a Restorative

Forensic Psychology

Both the general public and practicing psychologists are pessimistic about rehabilitating severe criminals. Strictly speaking, criminals need to be habilitated, not rehabilitated.

The Christian view of real evil illuminates the importance of this task. Human beings are not naturally good. Left to themselves without moral education or responsibility acquisition, they will remain in a selfish, morally bankrupt homeostasis.

Psychologists who wish to practice ethically will not allow their services to be meted out as punishment. The distinction between professional psychological services and punishment can only be retained if social penalty is kept separate from psychotherapy. The Christian view of the dignity and responsibility of humanity makes this view tenable and saves psychological ethics.

Restorative justice is a biblical concept. It serves a psychological function by restoring the peace (*shalom*) and the sense of personal responsibility that makes psychotherapy possible.

The moral development of offenders needs to be studied further. The development of moral sensitivity may also make psychopaths and other severe criminals amenable to therapy. Primary and secondary prevention programs could be designed to help morally stunted youth as well.

The recognition of real evil in human nature facilitates the practice of forensic psychology. Therapeutic nihilism may be a premature conclusion. To move beyond the "nothing works" malaise that hangs over forensic psychology may be possible by adopting approaches to psychotherapy that directly address morality and personal responsibility in severe criminals.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, SUGGESTIONS, AND CONCLUSION

A Recapitulation of Results

In Plato's dialogue Gorgias (1990), Socrates argued that ignoring evil is worse than evil itself. He contended that the application of justice overcomes evil in the same way that the application of medicine overcomes illness.

Socrates also observed that criminals seek to avoid responsibility and think that avoidance will make them happy. It actually makes them "the most miserable of all men" (Plato, 1990, p. 270), because criminals are moral agents, men and women created in the image of God.

Restorative justice was advanced as a model on which to construct a forensic psychology. Directly addressing the issues of responsibility avoidance and moral fixation may make successful psychotherapy possible. Acknowledging evil and making restitution (a response cost) for it can make real growth possible.

Ignoring evil blocks therapeutic growth. The whole community suffers as well when the peace (*shalom*) is disturbed.

This restorative forensic psychology was based on an examination of human nature. Shneidman's paradigm was used to argue that criminality is a quasi-psychological construct. Criminal behavior, like suicidal behavior, does not fit into one diagnostic box. Therefore crime ought not be studied parochially. Philosophical, sociological, theological, and other perspectives should be examined as well. This methodology better accounts for human nature and effectively integrates into forensic psychology the common-sense attribution that severe criminality is evil.

Special treatment was given to criminality as it is currently conceived by major forensic theorists. Antisocial Personality Disorder and the criminal personality were discussed. The psychopathy construct as construed by psychoanalytic theorists and by Hare was reviewed. Inherent in these theories is the judgment that certain behavior is wrong or evil.

A discussion of psychological cause and effect focused on the Aristotelian and Hippocratic views and

showed that the idea of cause is not as simple as it seems. Divine and human agency are not contradictory. Also, causes may function as predispositions or excitations; from this psychology and medicine have derived the notion of diathesis and stress.

This means that everyone is predisposed to certain conditions or behaviors, criminality included. Being predisposed (the material cause) alone never means predestination. The idea of psychological well-being presupposes a design plan, or formal cause of behavior which is theoretically attainable. Personal choice or agency is always a factor in criminality. Finally, the notion of purpose, or teleology, implies a final cause.

Most importantly, moral agents are not objects. They are subjects who are the efficient causes of their behavior. Therefore, would-be criminals are not determined by their immature object relations (Meloy, 1988). Their criminal personality may be rigid, but it is not permanently fixed (Samenow, 1984).

Criminals were designed for something better, that is to image their Creator. They are fallen, but they still have a conscience to give them feedback. As Kant (1990) argued, not even psychopaths can have no conscience: they have only deconditioned it.

The fall was into real evil. Katz (1988) documented a real gangland temptation to be "bad." Staub (1989) could not explain Nazi criminality without recourse to traditional, Judeo-Christian beliefs about evil.

Evolutionary views do a poor job of describing evil. In such theories, evil is seen as a necessary byproduct of progress. These views would be irrational to believe even if they were correct. This is because evolution-derived views undermine the concept of rationality.

Augustine's (1990) view is better and in keeping with common-sense observation. Real evil is the result of real human actions. It is pervasive: real evil corrupts every person. Evil was shown to be a quality that exists in different quantities in every person. Therefore, Augustine's doctrine of total depravity was retained.

This analysis of human nature was rooted in the meta-theoretical discussion of the philosophy of science. The view of science developed made the inquiry into the crime/evil construct possible.

Theology was characterized as a science. The methods used in theology are not esoteric but are in keeping with other uses of the scientific method.

Psychology, theology, and the other sciences make use of idiographic and nomothetic methods. The scientific disciplines, psychology and theology included, need to adopt a value-critical stance. The fact-value dichotomy is false and misleading.

In psychology, as in all sciences, theories are undetermined by the facts. Theory-building is value-laden; it contains a tacit dimension. Scientism, not science, expects a neutral process to describe the sum total of reality. In fact, scientific work in the natural and human sciences requires hermeneutics. Thus, all facts are interpra-facts because facts are mute and cannot speak for themselves.

The view that all human activity is religious, including scientific activity, was maintained. When this is combined with the conclusion that evil is pervasive in every person, criminal and investigator alike, that scientists are prone to avoid examining evil is no wonder.

The idea of the unity of all truth, psychological, theological, criminological, and so forth, was

advanced. The notion that all truth is God's truth wherever it may be found was argued. Theism actually rules out dogmatism because no science is the queen of the sciences. Scientists are equal partners in the truth-gathering process.

Suggestions for Further Research

Therapies that directly confront the evil behavior of forensic patients could be devised and tested against traditional therapies. The PCL and criteria for APD could be used for screening and assignment purposes.

Orling's Cognitive-Style Questionnaire, an instrument with good validity and reliability, could be used as an outcome measure (Thaler, 1991). The Exner (1990) method and Gacono, Meloy, and Heaven's (1990) criteria could be combined to score the Rorschach. There is theoretical warrant to use measures of moral development and spiritual well-being as well (Ellison, 1983; Gibbs & Basinger, 1992).

Prison therapy programs that include restorative justice components could be tested against traditional corrections. The same outcome measures, as well as

recidivism rates, could be analyzed. However, the same caveats that apply to recidivism studies in general would apply. Also, large-scale changes in correctional policy require legislative mandate and financing. Spending money on prison programs is not usually a fiscal priority.

A more cost-effective method may be to study convicts in community-based restitution programs. They could be compared to other offenders in the community, such as those on parole and under electronic house arrest.

Churches have traditionally provided the type of social support that encourages reintegration into the community (i.e., the restoration of *shalom*) (Bufford & Johnson, 1982). Church and community-based Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs (V.O.R.P.) and their participants need further study (Colson & Van Ness, 1989). Confirming real psychological changes in offenders could validate these cost-effective programs.

Further, in a more general way, the crime and evil construct could be applied to other psychological dysfunctions. The recognition of the role of evil in other psychopathology should make for a more scientifically rigorous abnormal psychology.

Conclusion

The common-sense attribution that severe criminality is both evil and psychopathological is vindicated by this study. Evil is a real phenomenon. A psychological theory that arbitrarily disregards evil a priori is prejudicially excluding data that explain human behavior.

Criminals are difficult to treat psychologically. They are unlikely to change because a core factor in criminality appears to be an unwillingness to change. This unwillingness could also be called unrepentance.

The "nothing works" pessimism in forensic treatment is premature, however. Until forensic psychological theories attend to the whole data set of human behavior, not everything has even been tried.

Therapies that deal with the psychodynamics, cognitive-style, habits, and object relations of severe criminals need to be amalgamated with a recognition of the evil criminals do. Psychopathy has been called an ethical disorder (Mullen, 1992). Severe criminals need moral/ethical therapy.

The recognition of real evil will have real ramifications in therapy. Safety will be a concern. Countertransference will certainly be an issue, and not just for psychodynamic therapists. Firm limits will need to be set.

Patients with other mental health diagnoses resist psychological healing (Kernberg, 1984; Yalom, 1990). This problem is worse with severe criminal clients. Not only will they resist you, many will try to manipulate you. Some will threaten to kill you.

The therapist and patient have a common factor, however. Both have experienced the temptation to do evil. Real evil, a human universal, makes real empathy possible.

The universality of evil makes therapists and criminals into co-conspirators and accomplices. This makes therapy with a difficult population worthwhile and interesting because it teaches us about life and about ourselves.

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Appendix A

Glossary of Terms

Appendix A

Glossary of Terms

Archimedean point: a foundational or
presuppositional starting point for a theory, based on
the statement attributed to Archimedes, "give me a
fixed point (a fulcrum) and I will move the earth."

classical foundationalism: the position that one
is only justified in holding a belief if one has
sufficient evidence (warrant) for doing so.

crime: a legal classification determined by
statute. *Criminality* is the behavior of criminals.
Because most persons (especially males) commit some
crime in their lives, criminality is usually used as
denoting only severe criminality (Wilson & Herrnstein,
1985). *Crime rates* in America are measured with the
Uniform Crime Report (UCR), which is derived from law
enforcement reports, and the National Crime Survey
(NCS), a random survey of victimization. The UCR has
been criticized for being politically manipulated as it
is dependent on police reports. The NCS responders
also may underreport domestic violence because the

abuser may be present during the survey. It is also dependent on victims' memories, especially of when a crime happened (a crime that was actually outside the survey period may be counted).

critical rationalism: the view of science associated with Karl Popper that science can only falsify but never verify hypotheses.

criminological psychology: a term often used synonymously with forensic psychology in this investigation. Criminological psychology often has the connotation of postadjudication consultation.

empiricism: the view that reality is only known by experience; usually related to the idea that inductive methods are superior to deductive ones for ascertaining truth.

epistemic warrant and properly basic beliefs: in Plantinga's thought, the idea that some beliefs are properly basic and that one may be reasonable in holding them on the basis of no evidence at all. For Plantinga, belief in God exhibits proper basicality. This construct does not address the veracity of a truth claim, per se, but whether one could be considered reasonable for holding to that claim.

evil: morally wrong; immoral; wicked. This dissertation argued that people generally attribute evil (as well as pathological) motivations to criminals. However, since Nietzsche, the trend has been to transcend or go _Beyond Good and Evil_ in western thought (1886/1990). Instead, psychology should revive and employ the concept of evil in order to better describe criminal behavior.

forensic psychology: any psychological practice done in a forensic (legal) setting. This would include any (a) assessment, triage, and treatment in jails or prisons; (b) pre-adjudication determinations of custody, competency to stand trial, treatment to recover competency (to stand trial, be executed, etc.); and (c) determinations of dangerousness, suitability for parole or special programs as mandated by statute.

human sciences: sometimes thought of as a cross between the humanities and the hard sciences. As noted in chapter 2, the human sciences often describe a grouping of the sciences. Other researches write about human science methods, (i.e., idiographic methods).

irrationalism: in the philosophy of science, the view that scientific progress is more the result of

forces outside of science, such as politics, chance, social forces, and so forth, than of rational progress.

naturalism: the view that only natural explanations of phenomena are meaningful; an antonym of supernaturalism.

positivism: the view that metaphysics should be avoided in science and that parsimonious laws should be the goal of science (Popper, 1963).

pragmatism: usually refers to an eclectic model of the philosophy of science like that of Larry Laudan (1990). The pragmatist has many values in science, and these values must be weighted when measuring rival theories.

psychopathy: a personality construct refined by Cleckley; often used as a synonym for sociopathy. Hare has operationalized psychopathy with his checklist, the Psychopathy Check-List (PCL). Meloy, a psychodynamic theorist, has done much to develop the construct. Some believe that a psychopathy-like diagnostic label would be a more meaningful clinical tool than DSM antisocial personality.

realism: the view that the results and conclusions of science correspond exactly to the real world. Moreland (1989) acknowledged the antirealist

critique and adopted realism or antirealism on a case-by-case basis.

scientism: the view explained in chapter 1 that inflates science to a status as arbiter of truth. Lay advocates of scientism are often uncritically accepting of scientific experts and are usually unaware of the critique of science.

supernaturalism: the view that phenomena that defy currently accepted laws of nature should not be ruled out a priori. Supernaturalism does not imply that these phenomena are common, however.

theodicy: the investigation of the problem of evil in respect to God's righteousness. Theodicies attempt to explain how a good God can allow suffering, calamity, and death.

weltanschauung: world-life-view. The New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis provides a good definition: "an intellectual construction, which gives a unified solution of all the problems of our existence in virtue of a comprehensive hypothesis, a construction therefore, in which no question is left open and in which all we are interested in finds a place" (Freud, 1939/1990, p. 874).

Appendix B

Technical and Common Usage of Realism and its Opposites

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Technical and Common Usage of Realism and its Opposites

COMMON	Realism: pragmatic, this worldly.	Idealism: utopian, other worldly.
UNIVERSAL	Realism: absolutes are accepted.	Nominalism: absolutes are in name only
PERCEPTUAL	Realism: perception is of real objects.	Perceptual Dualism: one only perceives images.
METAPHYSICAL	Realism: particulars are real.	Idealism: the noumenal is real.
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE	Realism: science tells us about the real world.	Antirealism: science provides useful fictions about the world.

Appendix C

Hare's Psychopathy Checklist

Appendix C

Hare's Psychopathy Check-List

Score

(0,1,2)

_____ 1. Glibness/Superficial Charm

_____ 2. Grandiose sense of self-worth

_____ 3. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom

_____ 4. Pathological lying

_____ 5. Conning/Manipulation

_____ 6. Lack of remorse or guilt

_____ 7. Shallow affect

_____ 8. Callous/lack of empathy

_____ 9. Parasitic lifestyle

_____ 10. Poor behavioral controls

_____ 11. Promiscuous sexual behavior

_____ 12. Early behavior problems

_____ 13. Lack of realistic, long-term goals

_____ 14. Impulsivity

_____ 15. Irresponsibility

_____ 16. Failure to accept responsibility for own
actions

_____ 17. Many short-term marital relationships

_____ 18. Juvenile delinquency

_____ 19. Revocation of conditional release

_____ 20. Criminal versatility

Appendix D

Kant's Proof of the Existence of God from Conscience

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Kant's Proof of the Existence of God from Conscience

The consciousness of an internal *tribunal* in man (before which "his thoughts accuse or excuse one another") is CONSCIENCE.

Every man has a conscience, and finds himself observed by an inward judge which threatens and keeps him in awe (reverence combined with fear); and this power which watches over the laws within him is not something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but is incorporated in his being. It follows him like his shadow, when he thinks to escape. He may indeed stupefy himself with pleasures and distractions, but cannot avoid now and then coming to himself or awaking, and then he at once perceives its awful voice. In his utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to it, but he cannot avoid *hearing* it.

Now this original intellectual and (as a conception of duty) moral capacity, called *conscience*, has this peculiarity in it, that although its business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself

compelled by his reason to transact it as if at the command *of another person*. For the transaction here is the conduct of a *trial* (*causa*) before a tribunal. But that he who is *accused* by his conscience should be conceived as *one* and *the same person* with the judge is an absurd conception of a judicial court; for then the complainant would always lose his case. Therefore, in all duties the conscience of the man must regard *another* than himself as the judge of his actions, if it is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this other may be an actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames to itself. Such an idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be one who knows the heart; for the tribunal is set up in the *inward part* of man; at the same time he must also be *all-obliging*, that is, must be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be regarded as his commands; since conscience is the inward judge of all free actions. Now, since such a moral being must at the same time possess all power (in heaven and earth), since otherwise he could not give his commands their proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires), and since such a moral being possessing power over all is called GOD, hence conscience must be

conceived as the subjective principle of a
responsibility for one's deeds before God; nay, this
latter concept is contained (though it be only
obscurely) in every moral self-consciousness. (Kant,
1990, p. 379)

Appendix E

Vita

Appendix E

Vita

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EDUCATION

Psy.D., Clinical Psychology, George Fox Graduate School
   of Professional Psychology, Newberg, Oregon, 1993.

M.A., Clinical Psychology, Western Seminary, Portland,
   Oregon, 1990.

B.A., Biblical Education, Cedarville College,
   Cedarville, Ohio, 1985.

Word of Life Bible Institute, Schroon Lake, New York,
   1982.

DOCTORAL INTERNSHIP

Psychology Intern, California Men's Colony, San Luis
   Obispo, California, September 1990 to December 1991.
   Taught inmate psychological skill groups, provided
   group and individual therapy, performed intellectual
   and personality testing primarily for the D-Quad New

Arrival Team. Participated in intake evaluations,
category rejustification, Board of Prison Term
special calendar evaluations, and the Penal Code
2962 commitment process.

SUPERVISED PRACTICA

Outpatient Therapist, Outside In, Portland, Oregon,
September 1988 to August 1989. Provided individual
and couples therapy and performed psychodiagnostic
assessment for a downtown sliding-scale population.

Inpatient Therapist, Portland Adventist Convalescent
Center, Portland, Oregon, May 1987 to September
1987. Worked with social service staff to provide
inpatient counseling to young disabled adults and
children with primarily medical diagnoses.

Sex-Offender Therapist/Case Manager, The Morrison
Center, Portland, Oregon, September 1986 to January
1987. Co-taught didactic groups, provided
individual therapy, managed cases, and functioned as
co-therapist doing Structural Family Therapy with
adolescent sex-offenders referred by the courts.

RESEARCH/PUBLICATIONS

Kunkel, E. (1993). <u>Crime and evil: Meta-theory,</u>
<u>theory, and praxis in forensic psychology</u>. Newberg,
OR: George Fox College.

Brinkman, D., Capes, R., Kunkel, E., & Tackett, C.
(1989). <u>Revising the Spiritual Well-Being Scale</u>.
Portland, OR: Western Seminary.

Brinkman, D., Capes, R., Kunkel, E., & Tackett, C.
(1988). <u>Item content and variance of the Spiritual</u>
<u>Well-Being Scale</u>. Portland, OR: Western Seminary.

OTHER EMPLOYMENT/EXPERIENCE

Held variety of positions including primate research
center lab technician, computer consultant, interim
pastor, seminar teacher, college youth worker,
resident advisor, Open-Air evangelism team leader,
and church pulpit supply.

Have written many computer programs to administer and
score psychological tests and subscales.