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Dunn's "The Catholic Church in Russia: Popes, Patriarchs, Tsars and Commissars" - Book Review

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BOOK REVIEWS


The Catholic Church in Russia has had a symbolic prominence far beyond its actual historical impact, since it is seen in the context of the universal Catholic Church, Western political powers, or even the West as a whole. This parallels Russia's image of its own Orthodox Church, reflecting what Professor A. YU. Grigorenko in 1999 called Russia's "conflation of national and confessional identification." Hence, Russian writers on Catholicism relate its story to the broader issue of Russia's national identity, particularly vis-à-vis the West. For nineteenth-century authors like Yuri Samarin, Mikhail Moroshkin, or Dmitrii Tolstoi, Catholicism was a serious threat to Russian religious and national values. Twentieth-century Marxists, especially the East German Eduard Winter, and a host of Soviet polemicists far less scholarly than Winter, such as D.E. Mikhnevich and M.M. Sheinman, continued to describe Roman Catholic aggression against the Russian Church and the Russian state, but now with the Church as the agent of Wall Street and Western imperialism. Echoes of these pre-revolutionary and of Soviet attitudes persist today, for example, in the late Metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg and Ladoga's anti-Catholic jeremiads or T.B. Blinova's portrayal of the Jesuits in Belarus as instruments of Catholic and Polish domination.

Another long scholarly and popular tradition sees Roman Catholicism as potential benefit to Russia, emphasizing variously the superiority of its doctrine, ecclesiology, culture, morality, or political impact. Some, like Antonio Possevino, Joseph de Maistre, and Petr Chaadaev, criticized the shortcomings of Orthodoxy, while such Jesuit scholars as Adrien Boudou, Paul Pierling, Jean (Ivan) Gagarin, and Marie-Joseph Rouët de Journel showed greater sympathy for Russia and its faith, while lamenting official hostility towards Catholicism. In works on the Soviet era, Frs. Edmund Walsh and Walter Ciszek, James Zatko, Bohdan Bociurkiw, and Dunn here and earlier, have portrayed the Church as an innocent victim, more so than other religious groups, of Marxist-Leninist state persecution.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been what a young Russian Jesuit characterized to me in 2002 as an “explosion” of publications on Catholicism in Russia, part of a general flood of books and articles on religious topics. Many of these reflect a natural impulse to tell a story long suppressed or distorted and so often are descriptive rather than analytical and tending towards hagiography, such as O. A. Litsenberger's *Rimsko-katolicheskaia tserkov' v Rossii* or I.I. Osipova's *Hide Me within Thy Wounds.* A number of younger scholars are reexamining the story of Catholicism in Russia beyond the traditional categories of aggressor or victim, however, such as S.G. Iakovenko or E.N. Tsimbaeva.
The Catholic Church and Russia is stridently pro-Catholic, hostile to the pre- and post 1917 Russian regimes, and highly critical of the Russian Orthodox Church. Despite the title, the real emphasis, seven of ten chapters, is on the Soviet and post-Soviet era. Invoking Christopher Dawson's thesis that the Catholic Church was the primary source of the individual liberty, limited government, and civilized life of Western Europe, Dunn argues that the Church could have played, and perhaps even now could play, the same role in Russia. But, Dunn argues, although Russia's tsars occasionally were impressed enough by the achievements of the Catholic West to consider imitating its ideas and institutions, they instead chose autocracy with disastrous consequences for their own people and their neighbors. The Orthodox Church was coopted by the autocratic state in both the tsarist and the Soviet eras, stifling any chance of reform. Russia compounded its mistake in choosing autocracy, according to Dunn, when it adopted the anti-religious Western ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Under its domination, traditional hostility to Catholicism escalated into savage persecution, and anti-Catholicism persists, albeit less virulently, in Russia today.

Dunn's subject is important, particularly since no comprehensive account of the Catholic Church and Russia exists. Nor, as he emphasizes, do most accounts of Russia past and present pay adequate attention to the role of religion. The treatment of the Soviet era, on which Dunn has done considerable earlier work, is the best part of the book. But overall, and even in the twentieth century, Dunn applies his thesis in partisan and mechanical fashion, minimizing evidence that contradicts his point of view, and jumping to unsubstantiated conclusions. While most of the relevant sources are cited, they are used rather uncritically. The book is further marred by factual errors, misspellings, and transliteration inconsistencies and mistakes.

To claim that the Orthodox “Church used its position and influence with the Mongols and the East Slavs to erect a powerful autocratic government called Muscovy” (p.217) reverses causality; Muscovy was the creation of the grand dukes, with the Church playing a supporting but not primary role. To say that the seventeenth century schism was “precipitated” by “Catholics and Catholic-influenced Ukrainians” (p.218) ignores more important causes. Dunn states that Muscovy had no schools until the eighteenth century (p.12), but one was founded by Fedor Rtischev in 1648, another by Symeon Polots'kyi in 1665, and the Slavonic-Greek-Latin Academy established in 1685. There were no Catholic priests in Moscow in 1691, when Dunn claims SS. Peter and Paul Parish was founded (p.28). The Jesuits returned to Russia in 1698, not 1702 (p.28). The two Moravian clerics who came in 1692 were diocesan priests, not Franciscans (p.30).

It is misleading to state that, starting with Peter I, Russians “opened the door partially to Catholicism, because it had a proven track record in modernization” (p.ix). While he was willing to borrow from the Catholic West, Peter was influenced far more by Protestant states such as Sweden and Holland and Protestant models of church-state relations, especially as articulated by Feofan Prokopovich, whom Dunn does not mention. The Academy of Sciences was founded in 1725, not
Dunn says that Paul I's reversal of Catherine II's hostility to Catholicism was “an ephemeral, if not loony, reaction to being dominated by his mother.” (p.40). But while Catherine limited papal authority in Russia, she established a formal Roman and Uniate hierarchy, protected the Jesuits, and recruited Catholic settlers for Russia. Paul's support of the Catholic Church was no emotional whim but a key component of his general policy of opposition to revolution and atheism. Calling Napoleon's opponents “a group of religious powers” (p.53) misrepresents the real reasons they fought; witness the cynicism and skepticism which greeted Alexander I's 1815 appeal to Christian principles in the Holy Alliance.

James Flynn did not say that “the Jesuits were expelled primarily because of their support for education” (p.49) by Alexander I, but instead that they incurred his displeasure by opposing his educational reforms. Dunn is right that Nicholas I in particular was anti-Catholic, but none of the seven nineteenth-century Russian converts Dunn claims “had to emigrate because of intolerance” (p.54); several became Catholics while abroad, and others left Russia for non-religious reasons. Later in the nineteenth century, the link between Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism is not as close as Dunn implies (p.53). To suggest that “a turn to Catholicism was possible” after the Crimean War (p.56) is unfounded.

In the early twentieth century, the leaders of the French Third Republic and the Kingdom of Italy would have been surprised to learn they were part of a “Christian bourgeois global order” (p.72), not to mention the gap between the professed Christian principles of other states and their actual policies. And although Patriarch Tikhon may have called the Bolshevik Revolution “the work of Satan,” (p. 79), he refused to endorse the White opposition and hoped that the Orthodox Church could survive in a Soviet state. To speculate that the Catholic Church might not “have been much better off” if the Whites had won the Civil War (p.80) contradicts Dunn's own description of limited toleration for and occasional expressions of interest in Catholicism before 1917 and of near extinction under Soviet rule. Bishop Anton Zerr of Tiraspol died in 1934, not 1932 (p.82).

Calling England, France, Poland, China, and the United States “religious-based civilizations” against the “Nazi-Communist-Japanese campaign” (p.95) exaggerates the significance of religion among the Allies, particularly in China, and overlooks the Catholicism of such Nazi allies as Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia. Besides, no such “campaign” existed, as each of the three pursued its own ideological and geopolitical goals. Gorbachev did not admit that “Communism was the wrong choice for Russia's development” (p.vii) but instead continues to believe that a reformed Marxism-Leninism could have achieved a successful perestroika. Finally, it is improbable to suggest that Catholicism by itself or in combination with a reformed Orthodoxy “is the logical solution to Russia's [current] dilemma” (p.220)

Far too much of a book covering over a thousand years in 221 pages of text and notes is devoted to irrelevant discussions of topics like the Treaty of Rapallo, Nazi-Soviet relations, Pius XII
and the Holocaust, Reagan's foreign policy, or the breakup of Yugoslavia. There are numerous misspellings of foreign words, for example, Magaden for Magadan, Geimschaft for Gemeinschaft, Yevsei for Yevesi, or zamtki for zametki. Transliterations are inconsistent, so that the same Russian letter is rendered variously as -e, -eo, or -yo. Foreign first names sometimes are given in the original and sometimes in anglicized versions. Accents, umlauts, Russian soft signs, and other diacritical marks appear and disappear haphazardly in Russian, Polish, German, French, Italian, Czech, Croatian, Romanian, and Hungarian words.

Dunn's subject is important, but his grand concept of the Catholic option for Russia over the centuries is dubious. His picture of Russia and its Church is one sided and minimizes the impact on Russian historical memory of real Western aggression from the Teutonic Knights or during the Time of Troubles. An academic survey of the Catholic Church in Russia is long overdue. This book is not it.

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Both books deal with one of the most misinterpreted elements of the last wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991 to 1995: with the role of religious organizations, believers and clerics, and the role of religion in general in them. In some opinions, they are undoubtedly responsible because of their radical politization, even militarization; on the contrary, in some other views, they were presented just as another victim of the new nationalistic policies. Cvitković's and Perica's books go beyond these oversimplistic and reductionist views (which extended from pure ignorance to deliberate malevolence). Using different approaches and methods they both come to similar conclusions. Both show how, when and why religious organizations became part of dominant political and nationalistic platforms on all three sides, and as such have their share of responsibility – and also guilt – in what was happening there. Leading institutions and personalities of Croat Catholicism, Serbian Orthodoxy and Bosniak Islam were not only ‘used’, ‘instrumentalized’ by some political forces, as it is often assumed – they willingly entered in an alliance with them and they also ‘used’ or ‘instrumentalized’ nationalistic politics for their own goals. What is equally frightening, such tendencies persist in both countries even today, ten years after the end of the wars. So in many aspects - to paraphrase Clausewitz – ‘peace is just the continuation of war with other means’.

Ivan Cvitković is a sociologist of religion from the University of Sarajevo who experienced war in his besieged city. On one side his book contains very broad theological, philosophical and