2013

Platonic and Stoic Passions in Philo of Alexandria

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Abstract

Philo of Alexandria forged his theory of the soul and its passions while expositing the meaning of Torah. Though writing as a Jewish teacher and disciple of Moses, his biblical reflections display a strong orientation toward Middle-Platonic philosophy. On the topic of the soul and its passions, however, Philo also exhibits significant Stoic influence. The introduction notes Philo’s apparent incompatible use of both the complex Platonic and the monistic Stoic psychological models. After assessing the degree to which Philo understood 'passion' to be a type of Stoic impulse or opinion (chapter one), chapter two demonstrates that Philo consistently drew upon the Stoics’ depiction of all passions as irrational, excessive, and unnatural. Though Philo also joined the Stoics in condemning the passions and championing their extirpation, he is unique, even among the Stoics, in the extent and degree to which he emphasized their blameworthiness. Chapters three and four examine Philo's Stoicizing treatment of the tripartite and bipartite Platonic elements in his psychology, including Plato’s chariot metaphor and variants. In each of these areas, Philo’s key deviations are noted. Chapter four concludes by demonstrating that Philo arranged the Stoic and Platonic accounts of the soul and its passions within a biblical and spiritual narrative of spiritual progress that moves from Stoic fool to Platonic progressing soul and finally arriving at the ideal of the apatheiac Stoic sage. The outlook summarizes the results and suggests lines of further research.
Acknowledgements

Writing a dissertation is in many ways a lonely process, but it is not a solitary one. I would never have finished this project without the support of many people. First, I want to thank my colleagues at George Fox Evangelical Seminary for their encouragement to pursue a dissertation in the first place. In this regard, thanks goes, above all, to Dr. Daniel Brunner, my Master’s Thesis advisor as well as to Dr. Steve Delamarter, Dr. R. Larry Shelton, and Dr. MaryKate Morse. Second, I want to thank Dr. Jules Glanzer and Dr. Chuck Conniry for their support as my Deans. It would have been nearly impossible to do the work necessary without the time and flexibility that they accorded to me.

Second, I want to thank my dissertation advisor, Dr. Markus Vinzent, for his guidance. I would not have explored Philo without his encouragement. Markus not only taught me the nuts and bolts of post-graduate research, he even inspired me to love the process! Though I relied upon his expert academic supervision along the way, I count sharing a cup of espresso or meals with his family to be among some of my treasured memories.

Finally, I would not have been able to complete this long journey without the support of my family. My parents, Martin and Shirley Kerns, and my in-laws, Darrel and Annie Snyder, helped in more ways than I can count. They shaped me to become the person that I am, offered financial support, and spent countless hours with my children. I also want to thank my children: Libby, Molly, Chloe, and Wesely. Each of them made significant sacrifices along the way, often without their knowledge of it. Indeed, Chloe and Wesley have never known life without ‘daddy in school’! Above all, I want to thank my wife Tiffany for her wholehearted support throughout the dissertation journey. Without her support, I certainly would not have succeeded. Though God has granted me many blessings in Christ, I count each of the people named above to be among the foremost.
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Abbreviations

**Ancient authors:**

AËTIUS (Aët.)

*Plac.* De placitis reliquiae

ALBINUS (Albinus)

*Epit.* Epitome doctrinae Platonicae sive Διδασκαλικός

ANDRONICUS Rhodius (Andronic.)

*Pass.* De passionibus

ARISTOTLE (Arist.)

*An.* De anima

*Motu an.* De motu animalium

*Eth. Eud.* Ethica Eudemia

*Eth. Nic.* Ethica Nicomachea

*Mag. mor.* Magna moralia

*Ph.* Physica

*Pol.* Politica

*Rh.* Rhetorica

*Sens.* De sensu

ASPASIIUS (Asp.)

*In Eth. Nic.* In ethica Nichomachea commentaria

Marcus Tullius CICERO (Cic.)

*Acad.* Academica

*Acad. post.* Academica posterior

*Fat.* De fato

*Fin.* De finibus

*Off.* De officiis

*Tusc.* Tusculanarum disputationum
DIOGENES Laertius (Diog. Laert.)

*Vit. phil.* Vitae philosophorum

EPICTETUS (Epic.)

*Diatr.* Diatribai (Dissertationes)

*Ench.* Enchiridion

GALEN (Galen)

*Plac.* De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis

HIEROCLES Stoicus (Hierocl.)

*Eth. Stoic.* Ἡθικὴ στοιχείωσις

NEMESIUS (Nemes.)

*Nat. hom.* De natura hominis

ORIGEN (Origen)

*Princ.* De principiis

PHILO Judaeus (Philo)

*Abr.* De Abrahamo

*Aet.* De aeternitate mundi

*Agr.* De agricultura

*Anim.* De animalibus

*Cher.* De cherubim

*Conf.* De confusione linguarum

*Congr.* De congressu eruditionis gratia

*Contempl.* De vita contemplativa

*Decal.* De decalogo

*Deo* De Deo

*Det.* Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat

*Deus* Quod Deus sit immutabilis

*Ebr.* De ebrietate

*Flacc.* In Flaccum
<table>
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<th>Author</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fug.</strong></td>
<td>De fuga et inventione</td>
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<td><strong>Gig.</strong></td>
<td>De gigantibus</td>
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<td><strong>Her.</strong></td>
<td>Quis rerum divinarum heres sit</td>
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<td><strong>Hypoth.</strong></td>
<td>Hypothetica</td>
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<td><strong>Ios.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Legat.</strong></td>
<td>De legatio ad Gaium</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Migr.</strong></td>
<td>De migratione Abrahami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mos. 1–2</strong></td>
<td>De vita Mosis I, II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mut.</strong></td>
<td>De mutatione nominum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opif.</strong></td>
<td>De opificio mundi</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Plant.</strong></td>
<td>De plantatione</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Post.</strong></td>
<td>De posteritate Caini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Praem.</strong></td>
<td>De praemiis et poenis, De exsecrationibus</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Prob.</strong></td>
<td>Quod omnis probus liber sit</td>
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<td><strong>Prov. 1–2</strong></td>
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<td><strong>QG 1–4</strong></td>
<td>Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim I, II, III, IV</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sacr.</strong></td>
<td>De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini</td>
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<td><strong>Sobr.</strong></td>
<td>De sobrietate</td>
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<td><strong>Somn. 1–2</strong></td>
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<td>De specialibus legibus I, II, III, IV</td>
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<td><strong>Virt.</strong></td>
<td>De virtutibus</td>
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**PLATO (Plato)**

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ap.</strong></td>
<td>Apologia Socratis</td>
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<td><strong>Cra.</strong></td>
<td>Cratylus</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Leg.</strong></td>
<td>Leges</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Meno</strong></td>
<td>Meno</td>
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<td><strong>Phd.</strong></td>
<td>Pheado</td>
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<td><strong>Phdr.</strong></td>
<td>Phaedrus</td>
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<td><strong>Phlb.</strong></td>
<td>Philebus</td>
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<td><strong>Prt.</strong></td>
<td>Protagoras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resp.</strong></td>
<td>Respublica</td>
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Symp. Symposium
Tht. Theaetetus
Tim. Timaeus

PLUTARCH (Plut.)
Comm. not. De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos
Stoic. rep. De Stoicorum repugnantiis
Virt. mor. De virtute morali
Quomodo Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus

Lucius Annaeus SENECA (Sen.)
Ira Ad Novatus de ira
Lucil. Ad Lucilium epistulae Morales

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS (Sext. Emp.)
Math. Adversus mathematicos
Pyr. Pyrrhonae hypotyposes

Joannes STOBAEUS Anthologus (Stob.)
Anth. Anthologus

THEMISTIUS (Them.)
In Ar. de An. In Aristotelis libros de anima paraphrasis

XENOPHON (Xen.)
Eq. De re equestri
Mem. Memorabilia

Biblical texts:
Gen. Genesis
Ex. Exodus
Lev. Leviticus
Num. Numbers
Deut. Deuteronomy
Unattributed texts:

*Aristae* Aristeae epistula ad Philocratem
Introduction

Psychology stood at the intersection of the various branches of philosophy in antiquity. The Old Academy, and later, the Middle Platonists,\(^1\) had accorded to the soul a ‘vital central and mediating role’ in the first principles of their philosophy.\(^2\) Reflection on the soul touched on topics in physics, logic, and ethics. Similarly, in moral psychology and anthropology, ‘passions’, ‘emotions’, or ‘affections’ (πάθη)\(^3\) had constituted a vital area of reflection, especially in the Hellenistic era following the rise of Stoicism, which had made ‘the demanding aspiration of getting rid of emotion … central in life’.\(^4\) Unlike contemporary perceptions of the emotions, Hellenistic philosophical reflection on the emotions was fundamentally about the correct assessment of one’s ‘impulses’ (ὁρµή) and management of one’s emotions, because these were understood to be either a ‘mental antecedent to voluntary action’ or to an improper movement of the soul itself.\(^5\) Consequently, one’s account of the

\(^1\) Although we will follow Dillon and others in speaking of a loose school of ‘Middle Platonism’ between the end of the sceptical Academy and the Neoplatonism inaugurated by Plotinus, we do well to heed Zambon’s caution regarding this label. While it represented a return to a dogmatic understanding of Plato’s teachings associated with Antiochus of Ascalon, Philo of Larissa, Posidonius of Apamea, and Eudorus of Alexandria, the positions of these and later writers is so varied and irreconcilable as to make it difficult to identify what doctrinal elements can properly be called ‘Middle Platonic’. See M. Bonazzi, ‘Towards Transcendence’ (2008), 233; T.H. Tobin, ‘Was Philo a Middle Platonist?’ (1995), 147-8; M. Zambon, ‘Middle Platonism’ (2006), 561-2. Of course, scholars debate whether or not we can correctly categorize Philo himself as a ‘Middle Platonist’ at all. Runia offers a helpful typology of scholarly opinion on the subject. See D.T. Runia, ‘Was Philo a Middle Platonist?’ (1995), 124-6. With Runia, I conclude that Philo was ‘doing his own thing’ as a loyal Jew, but drew extensively upon Middle Platonist and Stoic developments of his day in the process.


\(^3\) Price notes that in Greek antiquity, πάθος had the general meaning of ‘that which happens to a person or thing’; it came to be ‘commonly applied to experiences to which a person is subject’ as well as to ‘lasting states manifested in such experiences, or initiated or alterable by them’. A.W. Price, ‘Emotions in Plato and Aristotle’ (2009), 121. Tieleman points out that ‘passion’ is not exactly apt either in contemporary English, given ‘its specific sense of a very strong emotion, in particular (sexual) desire’, preferring instead ‘affectation’, because this preserves an aspect of passivity as well as the common sense of disease or illness associated with the notion in Stoicism. See T. Tieleman, *Chrysippus on Affections* (2003), 15-6. Nevertheless, given its long-standing use in the Western philosophical tradition, as well as by many contemporary Stoic experts, I will refer to πάθος as ‘passion’, except when speaking of it in a strictly anti-Stoic sense or in a non-pejorative, generic sense, in which case I will opt for the term ‘emotion’.


emotions often in turn impacted one’s psychology of action and, ultimately, one’s understanding of how to live the happy life – the life of virtue.6

Emotions functioned as an important factor of motivation in all the ancient theories. Plato, in outlining his tripartite theory of the soul, had sought to show how ‘certain states of feeling’ about circumstances ‘affect the ways one is inclined to act’. By dividing the soul into three ‘independent sources of motivation’, Plato underscored the psychological complexity of our actions.7 Alternatively, Aristotle had distinguished between what Fortenbaugh called ‘practical’ and ‘non-practical emotions’. Fortenbaugh argued that ‘practical emotion’ is oriented toward ‘a particular kind of goal and normally manifests itself in a particular kind of goal-direction behaviour’, whereas the ‘non-practical emotions’ by contrast are not oriented toward a particular goal, nor do they necessarily manifest in action.8

Emotions took centre stage above all in the Stoic account, because unlike the competing Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism understood a virtuous or vicious act to be complete from the moment of its inception in the heart, irrespective of its result. Thus, although both Aristotle and the Stoics were interested in the emotions as indicators of our motivations, passions took on a heightened importance in the Stoic account because for them all passions were ‘practical’. A single failure of thought – for the Stoics took a strongly intellectualist line on the emotions – can have ‘dire consequences for the agent’s whole moral condition’,9 not merely because it will often cause us to act wrongly, but because such failures are the ‘only and sole cause of wrong action’.10 The feeling-tones associated with the emotions were only of secondary importance, since they did not account for our actions.11

One of the most influential religious philosophers,12 who had a significant impact on the exegesis and theology of the early Christian writers, especially Origen

7 J.M. Cooper, ‘Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation’ (1999), 118-9, 121.
9 Ibid., 366.
11 Indeed, Brennan observes that the Stoics would have positively excluded any feeling-tone, such as gloominess, if this does not eventuate in action. See T. Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 91-2. This is indeed strange for those of us who live in the wake of Romanticism, with its idea ‘that experience itself, and in particular the variety and power of emotional experience, contributes to the value of life’. See B. Williams, ‘Stoic Philosophy and the Emotions’ (1997), 213.
12 Whether or not to call Philo a philosopher is, of course, a matter of some dispute. Runia, for instance, following his teacher Nikiprowetsky, argues that we should most aptly describe Philo as a ‘philosophically orientated exegete’, though a ‘serious philosopher’ nevertheless. D.T. Runia, ‘Was Philo a Middle Platonist?’ (1995), 120-3.
and Clement of Alexandria, was Philo of Alexandria. However, as Runia argued, before Philo ‘can be used to shed light on others’, he must first be ‘understood for himself’. On the one hand, like the Platonists, Philo had given soul a mediating role in his philosophy between the intelligible or noetic, and sensible or bodily realms, describing it as composed of elements from both. In the soul converged what is most excellent, divine, and immortal in us – the mind; and what is most earthly and mortal, that is, the body. On the other hand, like the Stoics, Philo had been highly preoccupied with the passions. One can read barely a single page of his writings without encountering some reference to the passions. Further, he also tended to follow the Stoics in considering the passions to be vicious motivations, vile in themselves, and the cause and source of all moral evil.

**Philo’s complicated approach to the soul and its passions**

One of the first things to confront readers is that in his pursuit of articulating what he understood to be the philosophy of Moses, Philo drew upon two apparently incompatible models of the soul and its passions; namely, the Platonic tripartite model versus the Stoic monistic and intellectualist approach. Plato had posited a genuine division in the soul that pits against one another three different ‘parts’ of the soul, described variously as the ‘rational’ (λογιστικός), ‘spirited’ (θυμικός), and ‘appetitive’ (ἐπιθυμητικός), or simply as ‘reason’ (νοῦς, ratio), ‘wrath’ (θυμός, ira), and ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμία, cupiditas). He treated each of these parts as genuine ‘centres’ in the soul, with the result that they took on ‘a homuncular’ character, each acting like ‘a little man’, that is, an agent-like independent centre, with its own desires and calculating ability.

Against the Platonists, the Stoics had posited a unitary theory of the soul, in which they divided the soul into eight parts or powers centred on ‘a commanding part’, variously described as ‘the hegemon[ikon]’ (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), ‘mind’

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14 D.T. Runia, ‘How to Read Philo’ (1990), 186.
17 Cic., *Acad.* 2.124.
18 Cic., *Tusc.* 1 10.20.
19 Long summarizes its importance as follows: ‘The Stoics’ unification of all mental functions in a single ‘governing part’ is their most far-reaching contribution to ancient psychology.’ A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Psychology’ (1999), 570.
(νοῦς/διάνοια), or ‘reason’ (λογισµός), and seven subordinate extensions, including the five senses, speech faculty, and the reproductive faculty. In this approach, the mind or hegemon alone engages in conscious decision-making processes, and thus features as the only ‘centre’ for all moral activity.

As we will show, Philo used both approaches to the soul and its passions, but unevenly. He explicitly invoked the Platonic tripartite theory on few occasions. If we include his much more common use of Plato’s myth of the charioteer and horses, which also implied a relation of three ‘parts’ of the soul, indeed, even if we include Philo’s related metaphor of the different kinds of ‘riders’ of horses as a genuine extension of Plato’s charioteer myth, we still find that Philo utilized the Platonic tripartite theory in a minority of his discussions connected to the soul.

In contrast, Philo often utilized features of the Stoic monistic approach to the soul and its passions throughout the bulk of his writings, usually without any reference to the Platonic, tripartite approach. Not only did he explicitly invoke the Stoic eightfold description in various forms, but he also made normative for his psychology the allegorical interpretation of Adam, Eve and serpent in Gen. 2-3 as man-sense-pleasure. The psychology outlined there, as I will show, reflects Stoic influence, though also situated within a strong body-soul dualism drawn especially from Plato’s Pheado. On a few occasions Philo even used both approaches alongside one another in a manner that suggests that he could do so without any sense of contradiction.

23 I will show in chapter 3 that while this horse and rider image is probably inspired by Plato’s charioteer myth, it in fact represents a highly Stoicized reinterpretation.
24 Philo’s use of Plato’s charioteer myth could itself be Stoic as there is evidence of wide Stoic use of the myth in the exposition of their moral psychology. See M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire (1994), 443. Additionally, Vander Waerdt suggests that Posidonius may have revived the use of the charioteer simile in his modification of Stoic ethics by introducing it as a ‘powerful new element in the interpretation of Platonic moral psychology that proved highly influential among later writers’. He even suggests Posidonian influence on Philo’s use of the metaphor. See P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 386, 390-1.
25 Lévy argues that Philo could express himself sometimes in Stoic terms, sometimes in Platonic terms, because he did not ‘adhere to any dogma in the domain of psychology’. For Lévy, Philo’s use of either approach depended rather on the biblical text that he was commenting. C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 155.
To complicate matters yet further, though Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics all would have considered the lower parts or powers ‘irrational’ in some sense, the Stoics meant it in the sense of non-rational, whereas for the Platonists and Peripatetics it rather denoted ‘ir-rational’ or perhaps ‘sub-rational’. With regard to the passions themselves, again, all parties agreed that they are irrational in the first sense of ‘ir-rational’, but exponents of the Old Stoa like Chrysippus differed from Plato and Aristotle in positing just one power, namely, the mind, as cause of the passions; a single source of motivation or impulse, rather than some alternative power in ‘an appetitive part’ of the soul. The question is, with which alternative did Philo align himself, if he did at all? One the one hand, as we will discuss, Philo embraced a thoroughgoing body-soul dualism derived especially from Plato’s *Phaedo*, as well as a rational-irrational dualism within the soul itself. On the other hand, excepting those places

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26 Oddly, Winston suggests that ‘the Stoics themselves made no such contrast’ between rational and irrational parts of the soul. See D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 214. The Stoics in fact did implicitly make such a contrast between the mind and lower parts of the soul, though by ‘irrational’ they meant that the lower parts are ‘non-rational’ and instrumental extensions of the hegemonikon or ruling part of the soul. Philo made precisely this distinction at *Sacr.* 45-7, when he identified the sort of unreasonableness wherein reason is eliminated, as in the case of the unreasoning animals.

27 SVF 2.989. Brennan observes that the Stoics recognized two senses of ‘irrational’: 1) any behaviour or mental activity that is inconsistent with the maximally rational activity of the sage, which is contrary to nature in some way, and 2) the mental states and activities of children and beasts, which might be better called ‘a-rationality’ or ‘non-rationality’. T. Brennan, ‘Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’ (1998), 23-5. This second sense of ‘irrational’ is based on the idea that animals and children have no reason with which to give assent. In adult humans, the soul’s capacities are subsumed within the ruling part on a developmental model without denying their logical independence.

28 The sharpness of the question would be attenuated to some extent if Gill is correct in suggesting that ‘the contrast between part-based and monistic conceptions of the psyche’ did not become an issue of debate until around the second century CE with Plutarch and Galen. See C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 464-7. Price notes, however, that Galen reports that it was Posidonius who kept pressing the question of the cause of the passions. See A.W. Price, ‘Zeno and Chrysippus at Odds?’ (2005), 483. Sedly, also on the basis of Galen, argues that Chrysippus openly opposed ‘at least one feature of Plato’s psychology, namely, the tripartition of the soul’, thus placing the issue of soul complexity early in the debate. See D. Sedley, ‘Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality’ (1993), 313. If Nussbaum is correct in asserting that the Stoic insistence on a monistic conception of the soul came as a conclusion of arguments in moral psychology, rather than as an unargued principle of departure, then Gill’s proposal might follow. See M.C. Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire* (1994), 373-81. Early philosophical disputes would have centred on the arguments that led to the conclusion of a single, rational part as source of all thought and emotion. Only later did disputes about the conclusion arise. See also Brennan’s objections to Nussbaum’s proposal. T. Brennan, ‘Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’ (1998), 52-4.


where he explicitly resorted to Plato’s tripartite psychology, Philo also exhibited significant Stoic reliance in his treatment of the relation of the mind to the ‘irrational’ parts in humans, in his account of the irrational soul in animals, and in his characterization of the irrationality of the passions themselves.31 Greater clarity regarding how and why he used these alternative approaches would provide further insight into Philo’s own approach as well as assist in situating Philo’s account of the soul and its passions within the wider context of Hellenistic philosophy.

The question posed in this study is: as a follower of Moses and a philosophically oriented exegete, where does Philo overlap with the Platonists, where with the Stoics, and where does he stand in isolation in regard to either school on the matter of the soul and its passions?

History of research

When one reflects on Philo’s varied use of these two incompatible approaches to the nature of the soul and its passions, commentators have sought how best to assess the relative influence of the various philosophical and religious elements in his conception of the soul in general, and in his conception of the passions in particular. There is no doubt and it is widely accepted that this Jewish philosopher was substantially influenced in varying degrees by Stoic, Platonic and Jewish-Biblical traditions,32 and even to a lesser degree by the sceptical New Academy.33 Scholarly debate on how exactly to position Philo as a philosopher extends back to Lipsus in

31 Svebakken, by contrast, argues that Philo rejected Stoic principles and followed the Middle Platonic psychological model of Eudorus. For Svebakken’s evidence and arguments, see H. Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition (2009), 60-99.

32 While A. Terian acknowledged that ‘Platonism and Stoicism have long been regarded as being of major importance in moulding Philo’s thought’, he nevertheless cautioned the reader not to overlook the ‘religious tone’ and ‘Jewish outlook’ of his thinking. A. Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus (1981), 49. Runia adds, ‘that Philo is first and foremost an exegete of scripture, which has gained almost universal acceptance in Philonic studies over the past three decades’, should always be borne in mind when interpreting Philo. Runia credits Valentin Nikiprowetzky for this ‘paradigm shift’ away from the ‘unitarian approach’ that characterized Philo studies before the 1970s. See D.T. Runia, ‘Rehabilitation of the Jackdaw’ (2007), 489-94. In this vein, Warnes asserts, ‘for all his use of philosophical terminology and conceptuality, Philo’s primary concern remains distinctly theological. His objective, it seems, is to contextualize Jewish theology in the Hellenistic environment of Alexandria.’ See G.J. Warne, Philo and Paul (1995), 11.

33 C. Lévy, ‘Concept de Doxa’ (1993), 251. Lévy points out, for instance, that Philo’s De ebrietate contains a version of the sceptical Modes of Aenesidmus as well as an integration of neo-Academic concepts such as ‘suspension of judgment’ (ἐποχή) or what is ‘plausible’ (πιθανός or εὔλογος) into a fideist perspective in which scepticism expresses the nothing of human reason before the divine vision. See C. Lévy, New Academy (2006), 459; Philo, Fug. 135-6.
the early 17th century. Philo demonstrated first hand knowledge of, above all, Moses and Plato, but also the Stoics, as well as second hand knowledge of Aristotle. Philosophically, Dillon adds that Philo was above all ‘steeped in Plato’. The Timaeus and Phaedrus were his favourites, two texts that will also repeatedly feature in this study, as well as key portions of the Theaetetus, Symposium, Republic, and the Laws.

Assessments of the relative influence of Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelianism have varied among scholars. In the mid-twentieth century, Goodenough and Sandmel saw Philo’s distinction between a ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ mind as broadly Aristotelian. Others emphasize the Platonist thread in Philo’s psychology. Wolfson proposes that Philo was a Platonist, who constructed his entire religious philosophy as ‘a criticism of Stoicism’. More recently, Radice, for instance, argued that though Philo everywhere utilizes Stoic terminology and concepts, the Platonic influence is more fundamental. Lévy likewise sees in Philo a psychological dualism that is fundamentally contrary to a Stoic perspective. Others emphasize the Stoic elements. Dillon, for instance, argues that Philo’s overall philosophy resembles the ‘Stoicized Platonism’ of Antiochus or Eudorus, but with a ‘distinctive streak of Jewish piety’ and the superimposition of Pythagorean ideals.
Philo specialist David Winston shares Dillon’s overall perspective, but recently suggests rather Posidonius as the proper antecedent, an approach previously proposed by Lévy and Pohlenz. Assessing Philo’s wider psychology from the perspective of Philo’s approach of the passions, Winston sees ‘Philo’s theory of the passions’ as ‘essentially that of the Stoics with occasional modifications’, but argues that the Middle Stoic Posidonius is the closest parallel to Philo’s approach to the passions. Posidonius reportedly adopted features of the Platonic tripartite approach to the soul in his revised Stoic philosophy, with its implicit dualism between two sources of movement or impulse in a corporeal soul – namely, the mind and ‘the affective part’ (τὸ παθητικὸν), the latter of which experienced various spatial movements that Posidonius termed ‘emotional movements’ (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις).

Given Philo’s use of Plato’s tripartite psychology and the charioteer metaphor of the Phaedrus, and given his otherwise wide embrace of Platonism in his religious philosophy, Winston concluded that Philo had followed an approach similar to Posidonius in positing multiple impulsive centres in the soul. Winston nevertheless also recognizes an incongruity between Philo’s approach and that of.

‘Philo and Hellenistic Platonism’ (2008), 231. Berchman, in a similar vein, sees Philo’s philosophical project as ‘an attempt to harmonize the two divergent theoretical positions proposed by Antiochus and Eudorus’. See R.M. Berchman, From Philo to Origen (1984), 2, 27-8; É. Bréhier, Philon d’Alexandrie (1950), 257-61. Svebakken argues that Philo followed the prevailing trends of contemporary Platonism reflected especially in Eudorus. Though he acknowledges that Middle Platonists like Eudorus adopted Stoic technical terms and definitions, Svebakken argues that they nevertheless applied ‘distinctively Platonic understandings’ to the Stoic philosophical language, especially in the field of ethics. See H. Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition (2009), 41.


47 É. Bréhier, History of Philosophy (1961), 135; R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 95; R. Sorabji, ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, Seneca’ (1998), 149-65. For a detailed defence of Posidonius’ departure from Chrysippus, see R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 95-108. Cooper argues that Posidonius differed from Chrysippus not by returning to Plato’s tripartition, but rather by suggesting that some of the force of impulse derives from an independent non-rational source, though he still maintained the orthodox Stoic position that the passions themselves are expressions of the agent’s decisive opinion, dependent upon the ascent of the rational faculty. If this account is accurate, Posidonius may have pointed the way toward what later become known as the pre-emotions or ‘propatheia’ (προπάθεια). See J.M. Cooper, ‘Posidoniou on Emotions’ (1998), 72-3, 99.

48 Winston also builds his argument upon Philo’s use of the controversial phrase ‘our judgment’ (ἡ κρίσις ἡ µετέτροπη) found at Philo, Leg. 3.116. D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 208-9. We will discuss this later in relation to Philo’s understanding of the passions as opinions and judgments. In any case, this passage is not important for the supposition that Philo embraced Platonic tripartition.
Posidonius as he understood him, when he acknowledges that Philo felt ‘an affinity’ for the Old Stoic monistic view of the soul, expounded above all by Chrysippus, that ‘constrained’ him in his use of the Posidonian paradigm, but ‘the incongruity’ went further than Winston thought.

Philo’s approach to the passions, however, does not correspond to that of a Middle Stoic such as Posidonius as neatly as suggested by Winston. Philo never used the terms ‘affective part’ (τὸ παθητικὸν), ‘emotional movements’ (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις), collective terms that Posidonius had apparently coined for Plato’s two lower parts of the soul. Similarly, Philo seldom utilized Posidonius’ technical term for the reasoning part (τὸ λογιστικὸν), and it is possible that he derived this from Plato rather than Posidonius. Moreover, while Posidonius insisted in Aristotelian fashion on calling the threefold division in the soul ‘powers’ (δυνάµεις) rather than ‘parts’ (μέρα) or ‘forms’ (εἶδη), Philo often used each of the terms interchangeably, though he was aware of the Posidonian position. Philo also explicitly rejected Posidonius’ putative suggestion that animals have emotions, in favour of the Old Stoic view that animals do not have emotions because they lack reason.

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49 D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 202. If Gill and Tieleman are correct that Posidonius was in fact translating Platonic ideas such as the charioteer-horse image or the tripartite psyche into a Stoic form, however, Winston might, ironically, be a closer paradigm after all. This alternative interpretation rests on the assumption that Galen got it backwards. See C. Gill, ‘Did Galen Understand?’ (1998), 130-7; C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 463-4; C. Gill, Naturalistic Psychology (2010), 198; C. Gill, Structured Self (2006), 282-90. Tieleman argues that Posidonius remained within Chrysippian monism, but reappropriated Plato and Aristotle to show that they originated a trend in philosophical reflection on the soul and its activities that culminated in the Stoic teaching. See T. Tieleman, Chrysippus’ On Affections (2003), 284-7.

50 Galen, Plac. V 5.26. According to Aspasius, the Peripatetic school also called the irrational part of the soul ‘affective’ (παθητικὸν) as an alternative to their usual appellation, ‘the appetitive portion of the soul’ (τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς). See Asp., In Eth. Nic. 44. Gill represents this notion as introduced by Posidonius. See C. Gill, Naturalistic Psychology (2010), 197.

51 Both uses occur at Philo, Leg. 3.115-6, in connection with his discussion of Plato’s tripartite soul. Plato used λογιστικὸν as a technical term in Book four of the Republic for the reasoning part of the soul. See Plato, Resp. 4.339d, 440e, 442c.

52 For Posidonius, see Galen, Plac. VI 2.5. For Aristotle, see Arist., An. 2.3 414a-b, 2.4 415a, 2.5 417a; Arist., Sens. 437a; G.J. Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology’ (2002, repr. 2008), 186.

53 Philo, Leg. 3.115.

54 For Posidonius on emotions in animals, see R. Sorabji, ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, Seneca’ (1998), 158-9. For Philo, see especially Philo, Anim. 71-100. For the orthodox Stoic view, see J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (1992), 90. Svebakken argues that Philo rejected the Stoic account of impulse in animals and humans in preference for a Middle Platonist one. At issue is the question of whether or not passionate impulses in humans are ever ‘natural’. I will argue in section two that Philo flatly denied legitimacy to passions in all circumstances. Svebakken is right in portraying Philo as a Middle Platonist, but misses the degree of Stoic influence in Philo’s moral
Increasingly, there is a growing recognition among scholars that what mattered most for Philo was a fundamental dichotomy between the ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’. Reydams-Schils suggested that what was most important was Socrates’ body-soul division as outlined in Plato’s *Phaedo*. In her view, Philo balanced the Platonic and Stoic threads in his psychology, because since both Platonists and Stoics were heirs of Socrates, he felt free to draw from each as he pursued his own larger purposes as an expositor of Moses.55

Most scholars, however, locate the division rather between the rational and the irrational elements in the soul. This assessment finds recent support in Bonazzi, Dillon, Lévy, Long, and Runia.56 This should not come as a surprise, since ‘throughout the long tradition of Greek anthropological speculation the principles of popular and philosophical psychology were based, virtually without exception, upon the dichotomy between rational and irrational forces in the human soul’,57 and were possibly adopted even by some of the later Stoa.58 According to Vander Waerdt,
Plato had made the most radical attempt to modify this bipartite division so fundamental to Greek ethics by elevating the status of a third, ‘spirited part’ (θυμοειδές) of the soul, but Plato’s radical attempt was almost immediately re-interpreted in terms of the principles of Aristotelian bipartition as early as the first generation of the Peripatos, and later by the Middle Platonic writers and in the doxographical tradition. Hence, for both traditions the bipartite division had become virtually ‘canonical’. Winston agrees that Philo followed this Aristotelian, bipartite reading of Plato’s tripartition, although key Aristotelian/Peripatetic terms with reference to the soul and its parts, such as ‘τὸ ἄλογον’ and ‘τὸ λόγον ἔχον’, do not appear in Philo.

Given Philo’s use of terms, ideas, and similes from a wide variety of competing philosophical traditions, whether Socratic, Platonic-Pythagorean, Stoic, or Peripatetic, some have charged him with philosophical incoherence. Vander Waerdt, for instance, argues that ‘Philo’s usage was determined largely by the needs of his immediate argument’, but that ultimately he made ‘no effort to reconcile these different divisions [of the soul]’. Similarly, Goodenough saw in Philo the amalgamation of a wide variety of conflicting Greek and Jewish conceptions of soul and God in the service of an Orphic-Platonic ‘mysticism’ toward the One that never ultimately reconciled all of the competing elements of this thought. Vander Waerdt is certainly correct in recognizing that Philo’s choice of psychological terms or images was often shaped by the biblical context upon which he was commenting. As Runia has shown, Philo’s pronouncements on a subject nearly always came in the

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60 The closest Philo ever came to this Peripatetic formula is when he juxtaposed the λογικὸν and ἄλογον parts as a fundamental division of the soul. See Philo, Her. 132; Fug. 90. Note, in these two instances Philo retains Plato’s terminology (λογικὸν) for the reasoning part. Alternatively, he could also juxtapose the ἄλογον part with the Stoic ἱγμενον. See for instance, Philo, Leg. 2.6.

61 P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 380; Dillon concurs that Philo freely utilized numerous conceptions of the soul as it suited him, but immediately rejected characterizing his approach as ‘chaotic eclecticism’, since the basic division between rational and irrational is what really counted for Philo. See J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 174-5. Svebakken similarly argued that this apparent eclecticism reflects Philo’s Middle Platonism, with its bipartite division of soul into rational and irrational parts. See H. Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition (2009), 22. Baer also concludes that as a philosopher ‘Philo is rightly called an eclectic’, but then adds that he did not follow other philosophies ‘arbitrarily’. Instead, Philo was seeking to present scriptural truth in terms of the best philosophical thought of this day, since he presumed that both have their source in God. Moses, however, is the more fundamental between the two. See, R. Baer, Categories Male and Female (1970), 5-6.

context of a problem that he was wrestling with as an exegete of Mosaic scripture. Hence, ‘the path to understanding Philo’s thought must go through his biblical exegesis’, which is ‘his primary mode of discourse’. Goodenough is also certainly correct in identifying Philo’s Platonist-Orphic vision of the soul’s moral migration to God, but as to the question of coherence, we will show that Philo displays a greater degree of consistency than either Vander Waerdt or Goodenough admit.

In summary, there is a general consensus among scholars that Philo would have classified himself as a disciple of Moses, not Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, or any other philosopher; in his view, all other Greek philosophy imperfectly refracts true, Mosaic philosophy. Modern scholars also broadly agree that we can classify Philo as a Middle Platonist. When it comes to his conception of the soul and especially of the passions, however, the relative influence and importance of Plato’s tripartite soul, of the ‘Socratic’ body-soul dualism of the Pheadeo, of the Post-Aristotelian bifurcation of the soul between rational and irrational elements, and of the Stoic monistic approach to the passions and ideal of apatheia upon Philo’s own philosophy remain in dispute.

Plan of the dissertation

In order to identify more precisely how Philo, as a follower of Mosaic philosophy, related to his Stoic, Platonic, and to a lesser extent, Peripatetic sources in his account of the soul and its passions, we will compare three sets of evidence: the surviving materials from the works of 1) Plato, 2), the Stoics, and 3) Philo of Alexandria. Additional attention will be given to Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition in the context of discussions of Philo’s relation to the Stoics and Plato since Hellenistic philosophers often interpreted Plato through the prism of Aristotle’s critiques and because Aristotle also served as an important background figure for later Stoic philosophical developments.

In chapters one and two we will begin by examining in detail Philo’s Stoic definition of a passion as a species of impulse and type of judgment that is irrational, excessive, unnatural, and blameworthy. Each key term in his definition will be

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63 D.T. Runia, ‘Rehabilitation of the Jackdaw’ (2007), 489-95
explored to see where Philo follows the Stoic tradition, where he deviates, and in those instances when there was disagreement within Stoicism, where he was most closely aligned. Since, as Lévy rightly notes, ‘every conception of passion goes back, directly or indirectly, to a conception of soul’, 66 attention will also be given to any Stoic or Platonic influences on Philo’s conception of the soul, especially in relation to the soul’s internal structure and its relation to the body, to provide further context for the discussion. 67

In chapter three we will compare Philo’s use of Plato’s tripartite soul in the three key Platonic texts in which it appears, namely, the Republic, the Phaedrus, and the Timaeus. After noting similarities, we will highlight Philo’s deviations and explore his rationale for both. In chapter four, we will next examine Philo’s use of Plato’s charioteer simile, which both Philo and Plato related to the tripartite soul. After again noting similarities and differences, we will explore Philo’s transformations of the metaphor into other related, but distinct, similes under the influence of the biblical text and Stoic ideals. We will conclude by comparing his use of these similes in relation to his typology of biblical soul-types in an effort to relate his conception of the soul and its passions to his wider narrative of spiritual progress.

By so doing, we will aim to identify in what ways Philo draws on Platonic and Stoic themes in his account of the soul and its passions and what organizing principle, if any, underscores his choices.

67 Brennan points out that this movement from psychology to ethics, implicit in the structure of Philo’s thought, reflects a wider practice in antiquity in general and among the Stoics in particular. See T. Brennan, ‘Stoic Moral Psychology’ (2003), 258-9, 269.
Section 1: Stoic passions

Introduction

Pohlenz once observed that ‘no part of Greek philosophy appears so frequently in Philo as the Stoic doctrine of the passions’.¹ Even a casual reading of Philo would confirm that the theme of moral psychology, with its focus on virtue, vice, and the passions, was central to his oeuvre. Philo apparently even intended an entire treatise dedicated to the subject, although we are not certain if he ever wrote it.² Yet, as Lévy observes, the problem of the definition of passion in Philo has not yet been fully elucidated.³

More so than his psychology, Philo’s conception of the passions assumed a particularly strong Stoic tint. This is evident, as we will see, in the manner that Philo defined passion as an impulse of a wretched mind, and in his description of passion as irrational, excessive, unnatural, fluttering, and blameworthy. Nevertheless, we will also find that just as in the case of the soul, in his otherwise orthodox Stoic exposition of the passions, the influence of Plato can be felt. This is especially evident in his continual reference to the body-soul anthropology outlined in the Phaedo. It is also felt on the few occasions when Philo opted to use Plato’s tripartite scheme for the soul, which doubled as a way to describe the passions since he more or less identified the appetitive part with desire and pleasure and the spirited part with anger. Philo generally conceived of the passions in opposition to Aristotle, though he did make use of Aristotle’s depiction of the passions as a mean or metriopatheia in connection with the intermediate stage of the soul’s progress toward the apatheia and perfection of the Stoic sage. Nevertheless, on the question of the passions, the Stoic approach proves the dominate factor.

¹ M. Pohlenz, Philon von Alexandrien (1942), 457.
² Philo, Leg. 3.139.
Chapter 1: What is a passion?

Philo’s definition of ‘passion’

Philo’s formal definition of ‘passion’ (πάθος) was Stoic. In De specialibus legibus, Philo introduces his discussion of the final Mosaic commandment against ‘covetousness’ (ἐπιθυμία) by reinterpreting it philosophically as a censure of every passion. He thus begins his discussion of desire with a formal definition and description of passion in general:

Every passion (πᾶν πάθος) is blameworthy (ἐπίληπτον). This follows from the censure (ὑπαίτιος) due to every inordinate and excessive impulse (ἄμετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή) and to irrational and unnatural movement (τῆς ψυχῆς ἁλογὸς καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις) of the soul, for both of these are nothing else than the opening out of a long-standing passion (παλαιὸν πάθος ἐξηπλωμένον).

In this passage, Philo begins his exposition of Moses’ censure of desire by immediately shifting to a discussion of ‘every passion’. For Philo, desire was but one instance of an entire family of passions. He later argues that Moses singled out this one passion – desire – to condemn in the Decalogue, rather than passion in general, because he deemed it to be the most difficult of all of the passions to deal with and the source of myriad evil deeds, and also to be concise. Moses focused on desire so that, having learned to master this passion, the soul can then apply the knowledge and skill gained to master all the remaining passions. Hence, when Philo begins his explanation of Moses’ injunction against desire in the Decalogue, he immediately shifts back from the particular to the ultimate goal at which the abridged lessons aim, namely, the censure of ‘every passion’. Thus for Philo, Moses’ condemnation of desire was in fact a shorthand and strategic way of reproving passion of every sort.

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4 For further discussion of the Stoic character of Philo’s definition above, see H.A. Wolfson, Philo (1962), 231.
5 Philo, Spec. 4.79; see also Philo, Leg. 3.185. For an alternative reading of this passage, see H. Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition (2009), 154-6. All translations of Philo are F.H. Colson’s unless otherwise indicated.
6 Philo, Spec. 4.80, 84.
7 Ibid., 4.96.
Philo next explains that the reason why every passion is inherently blameworthy is that each passion is by definition ‘an inordinate and excessive impulse’ or ‘an irrational and unnatural movement of the soul’. Both these phrases closely match the definitions of passions reportedly laid down by the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium, who had likewise defined passion as ‘an irrational and unnatural movement of the soul’ (ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις) or again as ‘excessive impulse’ (ὁρμή πλεονάζουσα). This immediately places Philo’s treatment of the passions within the sphere of Stoicism. Nearly all the terminology in this passage is of the technical sort found in Stoicism. Moreover, his definition includes all its key elements. Passion is a certain type of impulse or psychic movement that is characterized by excessiveness, irrationality, and unnaturalness, and as a consequence is deserving of censure. We will return to each of these features to discuss in greater detail below.

Philo adds that ‘the impulse’ and ‘movement’ of the soul in the preceding clause are nothing else than the opening out of ‘a longstanding passion’. He does not explicitly identify what this ‘ancient passion’ is, though one might initially presume that it refers to desire, since that is the particular passion under consideration in this passage. Since Philo does not refer to ‘an ancient passion’ anywhere else in his entire corpus, we are offered no clues from elsewhere in his writings. Furthermore, not once does this notion of ‘ancient passion’ appear anywhere in Stoic, Platonic, or Aristotelian writings. If Philo had used the phrase with reference to his Jewish view of the history of the world and the origins of passions, then the likely candidate would be rather pleasure, since he had allegorically identified ‘the serpent’ in Gen. 3

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8 For passion as ‘impulse’ (ὁρμή), see Andronic., Pass. I 1.1; Asp., In Eth. Nic. 44; Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.110; Cic., Tusc. IV 6.11 (the Latin translation of impulse = appetitus or appetition); Galen, Plac. IV 2.4, 2.8, 5.10; Stob., Anth. II 7.1. Inwood offers further evidence of Cicero’s translation of ὀρμή as appetitus or appetition. See B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 263n30. For passion as ‘psychic movement’ (ψυχῆς κίνησις), see Andronic., Pass. I 1.1; Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.110; Galen, Plac. IV 2.8, 5.10, V 2.2. Aspasius reported that the Stoics described passion’s impulse as ‘vehement’ (φοινύχθος) rather than ‘excessive’ (πλεονάζουσα). See Asp., In Eth. Nic. 44. We should note that Stoic impulse is defined in Stobaeus as a motion of the mind ‘toward something in the field of action’ (ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν) at Stob., Anth. 2.7.9. The four primary passions are a special kind of impulse. Desire and fear are directed toward pursuing (ὄρεξις) or avoiding (ἔκκλησις) something in the future. See Stob., Anth. 2.7.10b. Grief and pleasure, by contrast, are directed at contraction (συστολή) or expansion (ἐπάρτισις) of the soul’s pneuma itself in response to something that is at hand. Hence, in the case of grief and pleasure, the soul assents to the proposition that 1) a good or evil is present and that 2) ‘it is appropriate’ (καθήκει) for the soul to contract or expand, which is the field of action for these impulses. See Stob., Anth. 2.7.10b; Galen, Plac. IV 17.4; Cic., Tusc. IV 6.14. For further discussion of the four primary passions in relation to the movements of psychic impulse, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 143-65.
with pleasure, not desire. When discussing God’s curse of pleasure, he argued that pleasure/the serpent was cursed beyond all the other wild beasts, which he identified with the passions, because it was both logically and temporally prior to the rest of the passions. Logically, the other passions ‘depend’ (ἐφορέω) on pleasure. Philo even called it ‘the starting point’ (ἀρχή) and ‘foundation’ (θεμέλιος) at the bottom (ὑποβάλλω) of all of the other passions – lust is begotten through the love of pleasure, pain through its withdrawal, and fear at the prospect of its absence. He then suggested that pleasure is also temporally prior to the other passions. He argued, ‘these [the passions of desire, grief, and fear] would perchance never have taken shape at all, if first there had not been deposited that which is ‘productive’ (οἰστικός) of them, pleasure’. Hence, if we were to look for a likely candidate for ‘the ancient passion’ mentioned above, we would expect it to be pleasure, not desire.

Perhaps Philo did not intend the term ‘passion’ in this phrase to refer to any particular passion such as pleasure or desire, but rather to any of the passions in general, since he did not utilize the definite article. This possibility is further supported by the fact that the preceding sentence refers to ‘every passion’ rather than any one in particular. Since Philo was expositing Moses’ legislation for a nation whose biblical story included a long history of expressions of passion, his modification of ‘passion’ with ‘ancient’ perhaps simply meant to indicate that the passions of whatever sort have long plagued humankind, ever since the first empirical human was tempted by the serpent, pleasure. Alternatively, Philo might have been referring to the infirmities associated with a warped mind. In this case, the passions arise from the more ‘ancient’ infirmity of ‘a wretched mind’ (ἄθλιος νοῦς) that has misjudged the true good or evil. Any new expression of an excessive impulse or irrational and unnatural movement of the soul is yet another instance of this longstanding problem, however understood, a problem for which Torah offered a curative therapy. Since Moses was quite aware of this problem, however understood, he detested ‘passion’ (τὸ πάθος) in general as something that is ‘most vile’ (ὡς αἴσχιστον), and introduced the tenth commandment in the abridged form of the censure of desire to help a person learn how to set bounds to his impulses.

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10 Ibid., 3.113.
11 Philo, *Conf.* 106; *Migr.* 99; *Leg.* 2.102, 3.230. See pages 73-4 for further discussion.
Philo was arguing that ‘each of these’ – ‘the impulse’ and ‘movement’ of the soul in the preceding clause – are nothing else than ‘the breaking out’ or ‘unfolding’ (ἐξαπλόω) of longstanding passion. By so doing, he equated passion with the inappropriate impulses and movements of soul. In other words, the unfolding or rolling out of passion, to which humans have been subject since the dawn of history, is an excessive impulse or unnatural movement of the soul. This gains further confirmation if we look at other instances where Philo described passion in terms of impulses or movements of the soul. For example, he used nearly the same language as our definition at the outset of the section when he spoke of ‘the unreasoning (ἄλογος) and exuberant (πλεονάζουσα) impulses of the passions’. In this case, impulse clearly belongs to passion, and two of the four modifiers in his formal definition above reappear. In relation to ‘impulse’, he parenthetically defined passion as ‘irrational impulse’ (ἡ ἄλογος ὁρµή) on three occasions in the Legum allegoricae, while elsewhere he described the passion associated with the biblical figure of Lamech as a child of ‘irrational impulse’. In this case, passion belongs to impulse that has been perverted, rather than impulse to passion. Similarly, he could also speak of ‘the unmeasured impulses of the passions’ (αἱ ἄµετροι τῶν παθῶν ὁρµαί), or in a slight variation, ‘the unreasoning and unmeasured impulse of passion’ (ἡ ἄλογος καὶ ἄµετρος ὁρµή). Again, in each of these instances, Philo clearly identified ‘inordinate impulse’ as something that belongs to passion.

Finally, with reference to ‘movement of the soul’, just as in the definition above, Philo described ‘all of the passions’ as ‘moving and shaking the soul contrary to nature’ (πάντα...tà ψυχῆς πάθη...κινοῦντα καὶ σείοντα αὐτὴν παρὰ φύσιν). Hence, in all these instances, Philo treated this unnatural movement or inordinate and excessive impulse as a basic characteristic of the passions, though he once appeared to make passion a characteristic of impulse. Moreover, Philo was careful to follow Stoic precedence regarding how ‘impulse’ and ‘movement of soul’ were

14 Philo, Spec. 4.79.
15 Philo, Conf. 90.
16 Philo, Leg. 3.185, 248-9.
17 Philo, Post. 74.
18 Philo, Opif. 81; Spec. 1.305. See also Philo, Congr. 60.
19 Philo, Congr. 55.
20 Philo, Decal. 142. See also Philo, Decal. 150; Prov. 2.18. At Mos. 2.139. Philo did not use the term ‘movement’. Instead, he described the movements themselves as related to each of the four canonical passions. Pleasure expands (ἐξαίρω) the soul, desire stretches it forward (ἀποτείνω), grief contracts it (στέλλω), and fear diverts and turns it back (ἀποστρέφω and ἀποκλίνω). We will discuss this in greater detail when we explore the four cardinal passions. See also Philo, Abr. 26.
When he used the prepositional phrase ‘contrary to nature’, he always connected it to the term ‘movement’, not ‘impulse’. Alternatively, throughout his corpus Philo consistently modified impulse with ‘inordinate’ and ‘excessive’. However, he did apply the modifier ‘irrational’ to both ‘impulse’ and ‘movement’. This appears to be related to his common description of passion as ‘irrational’ (ἄλογος πάθος), but not as ‘inordinate’, ‘excessive’, or ‘unnatural’. Irrationality thus functioned as a sort of global characteristic for passion in a way that the other adjectives did not. What is important to recognize is that Philo clearly and consistently made ‘impulse’ and ‘movement of soul’ the fundamental constituents of passion. Both were described as irrational, since passion as a whole was treated as such, and this irrationality shows itself precisely in the tumultuous, conflicting, and unstable character of its psychic movements, and the assent to impressions of objects that are not genuinely good or evil as if they were.

This identification of passion as a kind of impulse or movement of the soul was common to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. However, several features of Philo’s conception of impulse display more Stoic influence than Platonic or Peripatetic. These include his further identification of the passionate impulse with a movement of the mind, to which we will return to in a moment, as well as the specific combination of descriptors that he used to characterize passion – blameworthy, excessive, irrational, and unnatural. Though Plato and Aristotle could describe passion as excessive and irrational, neither would have considered it to be inherently unnatural and blameworthy. Thus, while attribution of irrationality or excessiveness to the passions is not necessarily Stoic, since other philosophical traditions also used this exact terminology, the specific combination of all four of these terms is. We will explore these characterizations of passion in Philo in greater detail in the sections that follow.

The passions as a species of impulse

Philo, like Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, conceived of passion or emotion as a type of ‘impulse’ (ὁρμή) or event in the soul that gives rise to intentional action. The key difference between the three traditions was the way in which each viewed the

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21 See my discussion below of Philo’s conception of the soul’s ‘movement’ in relation to the ‘movement’ associated with plant growth.

22 Philo, Sacr. 81; Mos. 2.139; Leg. 3.116; Her. 192; Det. 46.
structure or composition of the soul. As noted in previously, the Stoics considered
the soul to be simple, with a single centre, namely the mind or hegemon, whereas
both Plato and Aristotle treated the soul as a complex entity with two or more
centres that can come into conflict with one another. In the Republic, Plato’s three
parts of the soul functioned as three centres, each of which originated its own
distinct impulse (ὁρμή or ὁρέγω).23 The appetitive part was responsible for
impulses toward the attainment of bodily desires such as food, drink, and sex, and
social desires such as the accumulation of wealth in business. The spirited part
sought to avenge injustice and to protect one’s honour. In the soul, it normally
served as an ally to the mind in opposing the impulses of the appetitive part, though
it could align itself with the appetitive part when corrupted. Socially, Plato identified
it with the military spirit that provided protection for the Greek city-state. Finally,
Plato treated the mind or reason as a third source of impulse. He tended to treat
reason quite optimistically inasmuch as he believed that it was of divine origin. As
such, it was most ‘at home’ contemplating the incorporeal ideas far away from the
more base concerns of the two lower parts of the soul. In the Republic, Plato
associated the rational part of the soul with the social role of his philosopher-kings.24

Toward the end of the Republic, in his proposal to ban poetry and comedy, Plato
then overlaid this tripartition of the soul with a bipartition that pitted what he termed
‘the best part’ (τὸ βέλτιστον) against unnumbered inferior (φαῦλοι) parts.25 Though
he implied that more than one inferior part exists by his use of a plural adjective,
what matters most in this section is the soul-division into two elements. Rule by the
better, rational part leads to ‘deliberation’ (τῷ βουλεύεσθαι)26 or ‘calculation’
(λογίσμω), while the inferior, irrational (ἀνόητος) part, which the poets appeal to
and seek to arouse, results in ‘mourning’ (πενθέω), ‘baoioenery’ (βιομολογία), ‘sex’
(υφροδίστη), ‘wrath’ (θυμός), ‘desires’ (οἱ ἐπιθυμητικοί), ‘pleasures’ (οἱ ἠδεῖς), and
‘pains’ (οἱ λυπηροί) in the soul.27 Plato here opposed reasoning to the various

23 Plato, Resp. 4.436b, 439a. Plato does not use the term ‘impulse’ (ὁρμή) in the technical sense
that it later came to possess in Stoicism. As Inwood has shown, Plato used the term to refer efforts by
the soul or one of its constituent parts to acquire or achieve something. See Plato, Resp. 4.439d. Plato
seems to use the notion as a general term to cover ‘what drives and drag’s a person to act as a result of
one’s emotions. For further discussion of impulse in Plato, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action
24 Plato, Resp. 9.580d, 586d.
25 Plato, Resp. 10.603a, 604b, 606a-d.
26 Plato, Resp. 10.604c-d, 605d-e.
27 Plato, Resp. 10.606a-d.
emotions of the soul and suggested that the reasoning part should rule in such a manner that it ‘moderates’ (μετριάζω) the emotional responses of the inferior parts. He nevertheless presumed their ongoing existence as the source of an opposing ‘inclination’ (ἀγωγή) to that of the mind that ultimately terminates in action.28

Aristotle accepted the basic thrust of Plato’s complex psychology, but revised it in a number of ways. First, he rejected Plato’s soul-body dualism, opting instead for a ‘hylomorphic’ theory in which the soul and its powers are related to the body as ‘form’ (μορφή) is related to ‘matter’ (ὕλη).29 Accordingly, the ‘soul’ is the structure whereby bodily matter is so ordered as to form a living animal or plant.30 As such, he conceived of bodily matter and its psychic form as two ‘complementary aspects of a single entity, the whole complex living creature’.31 Hence, while Plato made the body contingent to the soul, Aristotle considered it to be necessary and inseparable.32 In so doing, he rejected Plato’s body-soul ‘substance dualism’33 associated with his Orphic-styled theories of prenatal existence, transmigration, and immortality.34 As a result, Aristotle insisted that all psychological acts, emotions included, involve a corresponding or concurrent (ἅµα) physiological process,35 as opposed to Plato’s vision of non-incarnate chariot-soul led by spirited and appetitive horses in the heavens.

Second, Aristotle rejected Plato’s tripartism, opting instead for a bipartite division in his moral psychology that turned on a distinction between ‘appetite’ (δρεξις) and ‘reason’ (λόγος).36 As a result, for the Peripatetic tradition that followed, the division that counted most for moral psychology in general and for the passions in particular was between the rational mind and the irrational powers.37 He divided the mind into two – the scientific and deliberative – but subsumed the

28 Plato, Resp. 10.603d, 604b.
29 Arist., An. 2.1 412a-b.
31 D. Gallop, ‘Aristotle’ (1999), 92-3. Caston points out that Aristotle’s hylomorphism represents a sort of ‘middle course’ between dualism and materialism, which we might roughly associate with Platonism and Stoicism respectively. Nevertheless, Caston goes on to point out that scholars differ on whether to characterize Aristotle’s hylomorphism as functionalist, psychophysical supervenience, or as emergentist. See V. Caston, ‘Aristotle’s Psychology’ (2006), 318-26.
37 Arist., Mag. mor. 1.5 1185b.
appetitive and spirited elements into a single ‘desiderative and wholly appetitive part’ (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ δόλως ὀρεκτικὸν) of the soul. Further, he acknowledged three species of ‘appetition’ (ὁρέξις): ‘wrath’ (θυμός) ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμία) and ‘wish’ (βουλητικός). In On the Soul, he assigned wrath and desire to the appetitive part of the soul, but wish to the mind. In both Politics and Movement of Animals, by contrast, Aristotle placed wrath, desire, and wish in the alogical half of a bipartite soul. The first case reflects his ‘biological’ division, but the second, his ‘ethical’ and ‘political’ division. An impulse (ὁρμάω or ὀρέγω) to animal movement occurs when one of the faculties of ‘appetition’ (ὁρέξις) are actualized (ἐνέργεια) by one of the informational components of the ‘mind’ (νοῦς). Aristotle preferred to call the combination of the two, when it followed deliberation, ‘choice’ (προαίρεσις), but ‘appetition’ (ὁρέξις) when voluntary, but originating in the irrational part of the soul alone. As Inwood has shown, Aristotle did not use impulse (ὁρμή) in a technical sense as the Stoics would later. Rather, he commonly treated it as a synonym to ‘appetition’ (ὁρέξις), ‘emotion’ (πάθος), ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμία), and ‘choice’ (προαίρεσις). He nevertheless sometimes distinguished it as the activated impulses of either the rational or irrational parts of the soul, foreshadowing Stoic impulse. Elsewhere, Aristotle made a similar point by observing that passions such as anger ought to be regarded as ‘movements’ (κίνησις) that originate ‘from the soul’ (ἀπ’ ἐκείνης [ψυχή]) and result in the boiling of the blood surrounding the heart. These originating movements of the soul that result in action corresponds to Aristotle’s activated impulses noted above.

38 Arist., Eth. Nic. 1102b; An. 2.3 414b, 3.9 432b; Motu an. 700b, 701b; Pol. 7.15 1334b; Eth. Eud. 2.7 1223a, 2.10 1225b; Mag. mor. 1.12.2; Pr. 956b.
39 Arist., An. 2.3 414b; Motu an 700b; Pol. 7.15 1334b. Vander Waerdt shows that this collapse of the spirited and appetitive parts into a single irrational, desiderative part became widely adopted in the Peripatetic tradition, as shown in the Magna moralia, in later doxographers such as Arius Didymus, and in the Middle Platonic movement. See P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 286-7, 294-301; id., ‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 373-382. Note also that Plato does not make the distinction between ‘wish’ and ‘desire’ made later by Aristotle, and following him, the Stoics. For instance, see his use of ‘wish’ in his famous argument for the tripartite soul in the Republic. Plato, Resp. 4.439a; A.W. Price, ‘Emotions in Plato and Aristotle’ (2009), 125.
40 Arist., An. 3.9 432b.
41 Arist., Motu an 700b; Pol. 7.15 1334b.
43 Arist., Motu an 700b-701a; Eth. Nic. 1113a, 1139a-b. For further discussion, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 9-17, 245-9.
44 Arist., Eth. Nic. 1147a-b.
46 Arist., Eth. Nic. 1149a (of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός); 1180a (of ἐχθαίρω).
47 Arist., An. 1.1 403a, 1.4 408b.
Given Aristotle’s bipartite division of the soul, the appetites could come into conflict with one another or with the informational faculties of the mind, since their ‘irrationality’ did not exclude what Nussbaum calls an ‘intentional awareness’ in the appetitive part, that is, ‘beliefs’ directed at or toward objects. This, Aristotle argued, accounts for one’s experience of incontinence or akrasia. He integrated all these elements relating to his moral psychology within a wider theoretical psychology that included biological, non-rational psychic elements or powers drawn from his scala naturae, including the so-called ‘nutritive element’ (τὸ θρεπτικὸν) and the ‘perceptive element’ (αἰσθητικὸν) with its related power of ‘imagination’ (ἡ φαντασία). He did not assign any impulse to the nutritive element, since this part is responsible for the powers of growth, nourishment, and reproduction, shared by sentient and non-sentient living things alike. Like a fire, it digests and nourishes if one gives it food, but if one does not, it remains passive. In the same way, while the perceptive power aids in an animal’s apprehension of ‘the sensible forms without the matter’, and imagination recalls past sensations, it too has no direct share in human moral conduct, since it passively receives the sensible form. Aristotle’s introduction of these non-rational nutritive and perceptive elements foreshadowed to some extent the manner in which the Stoics would treat the seven lower parts of the soul as sharing in ‘soul’ (ψυχή), conceived of rather as an organic principle of life distinct from Plato’s Orphic-styled soul ‘true self’, without being a source of impulse or activity. Philo, by contrast, diverged from both Plato and Aristotle’s acceptance of multiple sources of impulse in his basic psychology, though he retained Plato’s Orphic-styled soul-body dualism, drawn especially from the

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50 Aristotle elsewhere called this ‘the vegetative part’ (τὸ φυτικὸν) at Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 1.13 1102b; *Eth. Eud.* 2.1 1219b, or ‘the growing part’ (τὸ αὐξητικὸν) at Arist., *Eth. Eud.* 2.1 1219b. See also P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Aristotle’s Criticism of Soul-Division’ (1987), 635. Long rightly points out that Aristotle in fact utilized a bottom-up approach that begins with the vegetative elements common to plants and animals and ascends through sensory perception, appetite, imagination, and finally to mind, whereas Plato utilized a top-down approach. See A.A. Long, ‘Platonic Souls as Person’ (2005), 185-6. The Stoics would follow Aristotle in a bottom-up approach. Philo drew on both strategies, depending on the context.
52 Arist., *An.* 2.4 415a.
55 D. Gallop, ‘Aristotle’ (1999), 91-2; Arist., *An.* 1.4 408b
Pheado, and occasionally utilized Plato’s tripartite soul metaphor of the Republic and Timaeus. We will return to discuss these further in later chapters.

Philo instead normally conceived of the soul as simple with a single source of impulse originating in the mind or hegeomon. Though the Stoic approach proved to be the more important source of inspiration for the passions themselves, as we will discuss below, he accommodated it to the psychological monism implicit in Plato’s Phaedo as well as its strong ‘body’ (σῶμα) and ‘soul’ (ψυχή) dualism. In this alternative scheme, the passions and senses are somehow connected to the body, while the soul admits of no composition at all. Throughout the Phaedo, the ‘soul’ (ψυχή) seems to have been inexactly connected with ‘the mind’ (διάνοια) on the one hand, and the life or animation of all animals (ζῷον) and plants (φυτός) on the other, whereas the senses and passions were closely associated with the body.

Philo could likewise opt for a strong body-soul opposition by treating body and soul as in conflict with one another, by describing the body as a burden to or prison of the soul, by externalizing pleasure and other passions as belonging to or closely related to the body, or by aligning sense-perception with the ‘earth’ (γῆ).

Repeatedly, the Phaedo pitted ‘the soul’ against the ‘the affections of the body’ (τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα παθήματα), which included not only hunger or thirst, but also the ‘senses’ (αἰσθήσεις) as well as passions such as ‘pleasures’ (ἡδοναί), ‘desires’ (ἐπιθυμίαι), ‘fits of anger’ (ὀργαί), and ‘fears’ (φόβοι). Plato even went so far as to personify the body, with its senses and passions, by describing it as speaking (φημί).

56 Plato, Phd. 64c-e, 66b-e, 78c, 79c, 81a-d, 83a-c. Plato could similarly closely connect the senses to the body, calling them ‘bodily powers’ (αἱ τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεις) at Th. 185e. Again their precise relation to the body and soul is unclear. He describes them as ‘instruments’ (ὄργανα) through which external experiences reach the soul as a sort of gateway. Plato, Th. 184c-d, 185e, 186c.

57 Plato, Phd. 70d, 71d. We should note that Sorabji has shown, however, that for Plato, animals do seem to at least possess beliefs and perhaps also a latent reason, given his supposition that animals are reincarnated humans. See R. Sorabji, Animal Minds (2000), 9-12; Plato, Resp. 4.430b.

58 Plato, Phd. 82c, 82e-83d. Plato’s description of the senses and passions as elements in the ‘another kind of soul’ (ἄλλο…εἶδος…ψυχῆς) that is ‘mortal’ (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θνητόν γένος) at Tim. 69d-e perhaps represents a mediating position that connected the Phaedo and the Republic for Philo.

59 Plato, Phd. 107.

60 Plato, Leg. 1.108; 3.42, 69, 71, 72 (includes an allusion to Plato’s Phaedo), 74; Sacr. 95; Gig. 15; Deus 2, 150; Agr. 25; Migr. 8-9, 16, 21; Her. 68, 85; Somn. 1.139, 148; 2.237; Spec. 4.188.

61 Plato, Leg. 2.71-4; 3.158-9; Sacr. 49; Det. 9; Migr. 203; Spec. 1.148; 2.163-4.

62 Plato, Leg. 1.1. Philo was commenting on Gen. 2.1 LXX.

63 Plato, Phd. 80a-b. Plato similarly spoke once of the ‘desires according to the body’ (αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμίαι), Phd. 82c.

64 Plato, Phd. 65c.

65 Plato, Phd. 64c-d, 66b-c, 81b, 83d, 94.b-e.
to the soul. He attributed sinister motivations to the body, describing it as attempting to ‘deceive’ (γοητεύω, ἐξαπατάω) the soul in an effort to coax it to ‘surrender’ (παραδίδομι) itself to the body. Sometimes the deception works and soul falls under the body’s power. At other times, body and soul engage in a kind of ‘fight’ (μάχη), ‘rebellion’ (στάσις), or ‘war’ (πόλεμος), in an effort to ‘rule’ (ἀρχω, δεσπόζω) over its opponent. The soul’s defeat results in its imprisonment in the body. If it is victorious, the soul is able to escape or withdraw from the body, senses, and passions. Philo could similarly describe the mind in conflict with the body, senses, pleasure, or externals, though he usually argued that the body and externals where able to tempt the mind through the medium of the senses as a sort of gateway. Furthermore, like Plato, he often characterized the objects of the senses as inflicting harm on the mind or soul by means of deception. This was especially true of ‘pleasure’ (ἡδονή), which he identified with the cursed serpent of Gen. 3, a theme reminiscent of Plato’s treatment of ‘pleasure’ (ἡδονή) in the Laws as personified, persuading (πείθω) the rest of the soul ‘by forcible deception’ (μετὰ ἀπάτης βιαίου) to its ‘wish’ (βούλησις). Finally, Philo could similarly argue for a strategy of withdrawing from the body and sense perception as a means of avoiding falling prey to passionate impulses.

Though the Phaedo clearly did not reflect the later Stoic position of making the passions an impulse of the mind, in contrast to the Republic, Pheadrus, or Timaeus, it located the opposition between the soul and things external to it, rather than within the soul. As such, Philo creatively could creatively accommodate its psychological monism, which equates the mind with the soul and locates the ‘cause’ of passion in bodily externalities, with an approach to the passions that located their origin in the

67 Plato, Phd. 83d.
68 Plato, Phd. 65b, 81b, 83a; Compare also Leg. 9.863b.
69 Plato, Phd. 83c.
70 Plato, Phd. 66c
71 Plato, Phd. 94b-e.
72 Plato, Phd. 62b, 67d, 81e, 82e, 92a.
73 Plato, Phd. 64e, 66a, 67c-e, 81a, 82e, 83a.
74 Philo, Leg. 3.69, 73; Post. 123; Gig. 31; Migr. 16.
75 Philo, Sacr. 105; Det. 109.
76 Philo, Leg. 3.76; Agr. 24.
77 Philo, Leg. 3.20; Sacr. 49; Det. 9; Post. 123.
78 Philo, Leg. 3.109-110, 220-1, 234; Deus 15; Det. 99; Spec. 4.188; Legat. 12.
79 Philo, Opif. 155-7; Leg. 2.107-8; 3.61, 64, 66, 76; Agr. 24, 97; Mut. 112-3.
80 Philo, Opif. 157; Leg. 2.73. 105; 3.66, 68, 76, 246; Agr. 97.
81 Plato, Leg. 9.863b.
82 Philo, Leg. 2.80; 3.41-2, 239; Gig. 61; Agr. 65; Her. 69; Spec. 1.206.
mind by treating the lower parts of the soul as continuous extensions of the mind and by glossing the bodily or external sources as antecedent causes. Psychic conflict is thus removed from within the soul as in the complex psychology of Plato’s tripartite soul or Aristotle’s bipartite division to a struggle between a unitary soul and elements external to it such as the body and objects of the senses.

The Stoic approach to impulse, nevertheless, was the more important influence in Philo’s biblical exegesis regarding the passions. In order to show how this was the case, we have to proceed in two stages. First we will briefly examine how Philo could explicitly draw upon the Stoic monistic and intellectualist model of the soul for inspiration. Then, we will next look at how the Stoic concept of impulse itself significantly informed his thought. To state the conclusion in advance, both sets of evidence, especially given their frequency throughout Philo’s corpus, suggest that with regard to his approach to the passions, the Stoic influence proved normative, though couched in a body-soul dichotomy drawn from the Phaedo. Passages where Philo drew upon Plato’s tripartite soul, where he made a hard distinction between the rational and irrational parts of the soul, or where he posited conflict between the mind and passions must be interpreted in this light. We will return to discuss Philo’s use of these alternative approaches in detail in chapters three and four.

To begin with, we find evidence that Stoic monistic model of the soul appealed to Philo. In his biblical commentary, Philo often resorted to utilizing elements from Stoic psychology when it suited his exegetical purposes, including his use of Stoic metaphors for the soul, their eightfold division, the four faculties of the soul, and pneumatic tension as a way to describe its constitution. We will briefly look at each of these below.

First, throughout his corpus Philo commonly utilized a number of metaphors that closely match the basic shape of the Stoic conception of the soul as a single ‘centre’ that extends from the mind outward through a subordinate and instrumental part to the body’s sensory, reproductive and speech organs. Each of the images and metaphors in the list below calls to mind this same monistic, generative, and intellectualist psychology. For Philo, the soul is like:

- a plant and its branches
- a puppeteer and a puppet as in a marionette show

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83 Philo, Agr. 30-4.
• a fountain or spring and the water that cascades from it\textsuperscript{85}
• a heart with the rest of the body forming from it while in the womb\textsuperscript{86}
• a father and the children that he begets\textsuperscript{87}
• the formation of Eve (sense perception) from Adam’s (the mind) side,\textsuperscript{88}
which was his favourite biblical metaphor.

When we compare these metaphors with the stock images that the Stoics used for the soul, we discover a substantial correspondence between the two. For example, the ancient handbooks on Stoicism reported the following:

Chrysippus says: ‘…the soul’s parts flow from their seat in the heart, as if from the source of a spring (fontis), and spread through the whole body. They continually fill all the limbs with vital breath (vitalis spiritus), and rule and control them with countless different powers (virtutes) – nutrition, growth, locomotion, sensation, impulse to action. The soul as a whole dispatches the senses (which are its proper functions) like branches from the trunk-like commanding faculty to be reporters of what they sense, while itself like a monarch (rex) passes judgment on their reports.’\textsuperscript{89}

A second example:

The Stoics say that the commanding faculty (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν) is the soul’s highest part, which produces impressions, assents, perceptions and impulses (φαντασίας, συγκαταθέσεις, αἰσθήσεις, ὀρμάς). They also called it the reasoning faculty (τὸ λογισμὸν). From the commanding

\textsuperscript{84} Philo, \textit{Abr.} 72-3; \textit{Opif.} 117. The image of the puppet is also of Platonic provenance. See Plato, \textit{Leg.} 644d. In Plato, however, the emotions are strings or cords handled by the gods that ’pull’ (σπάω) or ’drag’ (ἀνθέλκω) a person to and fro across the line between virtue and vice. Plato there exhorts his readers to hold on to the golden cord of ’calculation’ (λογισμός), which will drag one on toward virtue. In Philo, by contrast, all of the strings or cords are passive instruments in the hands of the ruling part (ἡγεμονικόν), which is much closer to the Stoic monistic conception of the soul’s lower parts as subordinated intermediaries and extensions of the hegemon itself.
\textsuperscript{85} Philo, \textit{Leg.} 2.41, 44-6, 3.185; \textit{Det.} 40, 83-4; \textit{Post.} 127; \textit{Migr.} 71; \textit{Congr.} 33; \textit{Fug.} 177-82, 188-93; \textit{Anim.} 12.
\textsuperscript{86} Philo, \textit{Leg.} 2.6, 8.
\textsuperscript{87} Philo, \textit{Migr.} 3.
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Gen.} 2:18, 21-3 (LXX); Philo, \textit{Cher.} 58-60; \textit{Leg.} 2.7-9, 14, 19-25, 35-9, 44-6, 73. Whittaker notes that this metaphor is related to one of Philo’s favorite triad of νοῦς/λόγος/ἀίσθησις or the simplified duad of νοῦς/ἀίσθησις. See J. Whittaker, ‘How to Define the Rational Soul’ (1998), 249-53.
\textsuperscript{89} Arnim, \textit{SVF} (1903-5), 2.879.
faculty there are seven parts of the soul, which grow out and stretch out into the body like the tentacles of an octopus (πολύποδος). The soul is like:

- a heart and vital breath
- a spring (and stream)
- a tree and branches
- a monarch and reporters
- an octopus and tentacles

When we compare the list of metaphors that the Stoics utilized with Philo’s, we find that nearly all the images overlap, with the exception of the octopus and tentacles. While the Torah never explicitly mentions the octopus, it does identify as unclean, and prohibit Jews from eating, anything that lives in the water and does not have ‘fins and scales’ (πτερύγια καὶ λεπίδες). The octopus would thus have been treated as a food taboo. Philo knew of this prohibition and though he offered an allegorical interpretation of its meaning, much as he did with the rest of the Law, that did not preclude him from practicing its regulations literally. So, it comes as no surprise that Philo never once makes use of the octopus metaphor in his entire corpus, which indicates the selective power of his Jewish background in his choice of and reliance on Greek philosophical references. The animal is unclean to him, hence excluded from metaphorical comparisons. Nevertheless, though he often employed these Stoic metaphors on the basis of the particular images available in the passages of Torah upon which he was commenting, he also employed them to emphasize a understanding of the soul that revolved around the Stoic metaphor of a single centre with one or more subordinate, substantially linked elements.

Second, Philo’s embrace of the Stoic unitary metaphor for the soul was not limited merely to the basic metaphor, but also extended to the ‘structure’ and

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90 Ibid., 2.836. See also Aët., Plac. 390.6-14.
91 Lev. 11:9-12, 14:10 (LXX).
92 Philo, Spec. 4.110.
93 Following Gill, we use the term ‘structure’ in the more technical sense of characterizing the part-whole relationship as more holistically conceived. In contrast to the idea of ‘composition’, where the parts are identifiable independently of the whole, the ‘structure’ pattern focuses on the whole, where the parts are identifiable only in the context of the whole. Broadly speaking, the Platonic approach evidences a ‘composition’ pattern, whereas the Stoic approach displays a ‘structure’
taxonomy of the various parts and functions of the soul. On many occasions Philo, like the Stoics, described the soul as divided into eight parts.⁹⁴ For instance, Philo described the soul as follows:

Our mind is indivisible (ἄτμητος) in its nature. For the irrational part (μέρος) of the soul received a sixfold division from its Maker who thus formed seven parts (μοίρας), sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch, voice and reproductive faculty (ὁρασίς, ἀκοή, γεῦσις, δόξισις, ἀφή, φωνή, γόνιμος). But the rational part (τὸ λογικόν), which was named mind (νοῦς), he left undivided (ἄσχιστος).⁹⁵

We can compare this with the quotation from Aëtius above, where in his summarizing of Stoic psychology he described the structure of the soul as consisting of a commanding faculty together with seven parts that grow out from it into the body like the tentacles of an octopus.⁹⁶ Similarly, Diogenes Laertius offered the following description of the Stoic view of the soul in Vitae philosophorum:

They [the Stoics] say there are eight parts (μέρη) of the soul: the five senses (αἱ πέντε αἰσθήσεις), the generative principle (σπέρματικούς λόγους), the faculty of speech (τὸ φωνητικόν), and the reasoning faculty (τὸ λογιστικόν).⁹⁷

Finally, Galen reported that Chrysippus divided the soul into eight parts, with the heart serving as seat of the soul like a spring and extending throughout the body.⁹⁸ Chrysippus wrote:

The soul exists as pneuma (ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα ἔστι) connate with us, extending as a continuum through the whole body (συνεχῆς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον) as long as the free-flowing breath of life is present in the body. Now of the parts (μέρα) of the soul that have been assigned to the several parts [of the body] (μόρια), that of them which extends (τὸ

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⁹⁴ See also Philo, Opif. 117; Leg. 2.74; Det. 168; Her. 232; Agr. 30; Conf. 123, 194-5; Fug. 182, 190-1; Mut. 111; QG 1.75. Philo lists six faculties and the hegemon at Abr. 29, but excludes reproduction.
⁹⁵ Philo, Her. 232.
⁹⁶ Aët., Plac. 399.3-5.
⁹⁷ Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 157.
⁹⁸ Compare also Galen, Plac. V 3.7.
διῆκον) to the trachea is the voice (φωνή); that to the eyes, sight (δύψις); that to the ears, hearing (άκοή); that to the nostrils, smell (δόσφρησις); that to the tongue, taste (γεῦσις); that to the entire flesh, touch (άφη); and that which extends to the testicles, possessing another such logos, is seminal (τὸ σπερματικόν). That part where all these meet is in the heart, being the governing part (τὸ ἱγμονικόν) of the soul.99

When we compare the Stoic terminology and taxonomy of the soul quoted above with Philo’s, we find that Philo’s description of the soul commonly closely matched that of the Stoics in a number of ways. Philo likewise often divided the soul into eight ‘parts’, including the governing part (τὸ ἱγμονικόν), sight (δύψις), hearing (άκοή), smell (δόσφρησις), taste (γεῦσις), touch (άφη), speech (φωνή), and the seminal part (τὸ σπερματικόν). Philo and the Stoics always placed the mind in the centre and made the other seven parts peripheral and subordinate to it. In one place, Philo likened the mind to a stream that divides in many directions and then flows through a number of different conduits to the appropriate terminus in one of the senses.100 This corresponds to the clear connection between the lower parts and the sense organs as outlined in our quotation from Galen above. Conversely, Philo described the mind as indivisible and undivided. By so doing, he sought to indicate that each of the lower parts is similar to the others, but distinct from the mind. This points to the special status of the mind as the seat of reason, something that sets it apart qualitatively from the rest of the soul. Unlike animals, which possess ‘soul’, but not reason, humans are able to grasp abstract concepts such as the perception of the transcendent God, laws and state affairs, skills, practices, and knowledge.101 For this reason, both Philo and the Stoics could call the mind ‘the soul of the soul’.102 Additionally, this use of the Stoic concept may indicate Philo’s opposition to Aristotle’s conception of the mind, since Aristotle divided the mind into a contemplative and a deliberative part.103

Philo generally described each of these as ‘a part’ (µέρος or µόριον) of the soul, though sometimes he could also call all of the soul’s parts excepting the mind

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99 Galen, Plac. III 1.10-11.
100 Philo, Post. 127.
101 Philo, Anim. 85.
102 For the two senses of ‘soul’ among the Stoics, see J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (1992), 54-5.
103 Arist., Ar. 2.2 413b.
‘faculties’ (δυνάμεις), or ‘seven growths’ (ἐπτὰ φύσεις) of the mind, or even ‘organs’ (ὁργανον/ὁργανα). Philo’s biological description of the seven lower parts as ‘a growth’ or ‘an organ’ is not unlike Chrysippus’ explicit connection between the senses that extend from the heart, which houses the mind, and the several organs or ‘parts’ of the body connected to the senses, voice and reproduction.

Thirdly, Philo followed the Stoics in generally distinguishing between the soul’s ‘parts’ and its ‘faculties’. For the Stoics, whereas ‘the parts’ were distinguished according to mind’s pneumatic currents associated with the various bodily organs, ‘the faculties’ were identified with the differing ‘qualities’ (ποιότητες) or ‘modes of operation’ of the same substrate, the single, commanding faculty itself. The Stoics likened this difference among the various faculties of the mind to the distinction between the qualities of fragrance and taste in an apple. In this example, the apple possesses a single body, but two different qualities – fragrance and taste. In the same way, the Stoics generally recognized four ‘faculties’ of the ‘commanding part of the soul’ or ‘rational soul’:

- impression (φαντασία)
- impulse (ὁρµή)
- assent (συγκατάθεσις)
- reason (λόγος)

Philo commonly recognized all of these Stoic faculties of the mind as ‘faculties’. First, like the Stoics, he characterized ‘impression’ as the ability to

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104 Philo, Abr. 29; Cher. 59; Mut. 110; Plant. 83; Somn. 1.45; Leg. 2.22, 24, 35, 37, 44-5.
105 Philo, Agr. 30.
106 For examples of ‘the five senses’ as ‘organs’, see Philo, Abr. 147; Cher. 57, 66; Migr. 195; Mut. 7; Plant. 83; Post. 127; Somn. 1.42, 45, 55; Leg. 3.41; Det. 173. For the faculty of speech as ‘an organ’, see Philo, Opif. 117; Leg. 1.11, 104, 3.119; Det. 38, 68, 102, 127; Post. 103; Cher. 105; Conf. 123, 150; Her. 4, 266; Congr. 33; Mut. 56, 69, 139; Somn. 2.278, 280; Abr. 29, 83; Mos. 2.274; Spec. 1.272; Anim. 73, 98-9. For the generative faculty as ‘an organ’, see Philo, Agr. 30-8; Spec. 1.6, 9.
107 Ibid.
108 Long argues that since all activities of the hegemon are rationalized in humans, it would be more accurate to say that the human mind possesses three faculties: rational impression, rational impulse, and rational assent. See A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Psychology’ (1999), 573-5. Annas points out that scholars have differed on whether or not the Stoic hegemonikon actually possessed permanently differentiated powers to produce certain mental events. For further discussion, see J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (1992), 655.
109 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.74, 826, 836, 839; Stob., Anth. I 49.33. Since the Stoics viewed reason as one of four faculties of the hegemonikon or ‘ruling part’ of the soul, as Boeri correctly notes, they consequently did not identify the hegemonikon with ‘the rational part’ as Galen had suggested. See M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 399.
110 Philo, Cher. 59, 63; Leg. 1.28; Deus 41; Congr. 98. Drummond enumerates a list of various faculties assigned to the rational part of the soul by Philo, without classifying them. See J. Drummond, Philo Judaeus (1888), I 343-4.
perceive one’s own body and things external to the body via the senses. Or, to put it in material terms, for Philo an external object ‘stamps’ (τυπόω) the mind through the senses.\(^\text{111}\) As such, anything with ‘soul’ is subject to suffering pain or experiencing pleasure through impression.\(^\text{112}\) Moreover, each impression is utterly unique, so that an impression of the same object will differ between two recipients or to the same person at different times.\(^\text{113}\) Second, similar to the Stoics, Philo understood ‘impulse’\(^\text{114}\) as the self-extension of the mind toward external sense objects that it has become aware of through an impression.\(^\text{115}\) Third, though Philo seldom explicitly employed the specific term for ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις),\(^\text{116}\) he nevertheless everywhere recognized the power of the mind to grasp an object of sense, which results in ‘a cognition’ (κατάληψις) or ‘apprehension’ (ἀντίληψις) of the objects of sense.\(^\text{117}\) Moreover, he sided with the Stoics against the sceptical Academics in arguing that the human soul can receive impressions made by external objects ‘in their sheer reality’ (ἀκραιφνέστατη).\(^\text{118}\) Finally, Philo could likewise refer to reason as a faculty of the soul.\(^\text{119}\)

Fourthly, Philo utilized the Stoic notion of pneumatic tension more than once to describe the powers of the mind. In his discussion of the origin of the soul in *Legum allegoriae* and in his excursus in *Quod Deus sit immutabilis*, where he described the constitution of the soul and its impulses, Philo differentiated among different types of ‘pneumatic cohesion’ (ἕξις) found in different bodies.\(^\text{120}\)

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\(^\text{111}\) This is not to deny the likely Platonic provenance of the analysis of ‘impression’ as a literal printing on the soul, as in wax. Sedley points out that the origin of the Stoic use of the notion arises from Plato’s *Theaetetus* 191a-d. See D. Sedley, ‘Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality’ (1993), 329.

\(^\text{112}\) Philo, *Anim.* 90.

\(^\text{113}\) Ibid., 99.

\(^\text{114}\) Gill suggests that ὁρµή may perhaps be better translated as ‘motive’. See C. Gill, ‘Stoicism and Epicureanism’ (2009), 145. I too like this translation, especially in a Stoic context where psychic motion and rationale intent are so closely linked. Nevertheless, I will continue to use the traditional translation of ‘impulse’, because it better indicates the sense of corporeal psychic movement implicit in the Greek term than ‘motive’ does.


\(^\text{116}\) Philo, *Post.* 175; *Congr.* 98; *Mos.* 2.228.


\(^\text{118}\) Philo, *Opif.* 150; *Plant.* 94; *Spec.* 4.108; *Leg.* 3.61; *Deus* 93.

\(^\text{119}\) Philo, *Leg.* 1.28, 2.23. We should note also that Philo frequently described the senses as ‘faculties’ of the soul or mind. See Philo, *Abr.* 29; *Cher.* 59; *Mut.* 110; *Plant.* 83; *Post.* 127; *Somn.* 1.45; *Leg.* 2.22, 24, 35, 37, 44-5. The Stoics could likewise describe the senses and sense perception as powers. See Arnim, *SVF* (1903-5), 1.149; 2.860.

\(^\text{120}\) Philo, *Leg.* 2.22-3; *Deus* 35-46.
The mind (νοῦς) possesses many powers (δυνάμεις) – the power of cohesion, of nature, of conscious life, and of thought (ἔκτικήν φυτικὴν ψυχικὴν λογικὴν διανοητικήν) – and countless other powers, varying both in species and genus. Lifeless things, like stones and blocks of wood, share with others the power of cohesion (ἕξις), of which the bones in us partake...Nature (φύσις) extends to plants (τὰ φυτά), and there are parts in us, such as our nails and hair, resembling plants; nature (φύσις) is coherence (ἕξις) capable of moving itself. Soul or conscious life (ψυχή) is the power to grow (φύσις) with the additional power of receiving impressions (φαντασία) and being subject to impulses (ὁρμή). This is shared also by creatures without reason (ἄλογος). Indeed our mind (νοῦς) contains a part that is analogous to the conscious life (ψυχή) of a creature without reason. Once more, the power of thinking (ἡ διανοητικὴ δύναμις) is peculiar to the mind (νοῦς), and while shared it may be by beings more akin to God, is, so far as mortal beings are concerned, peculiar (ἰδιός) to humans.121

In the passage above, he outlined the same four types of pneuma as the Stoics, namely, ‘cohesion’ (ἕξις), ‘nature (φύσις), ‘soul (ψυχή), and ‘mind’ (νοῦς). He described each type of pneumatic tension as connected to the rest in a sort of continuous ‘scale of being’ or scala naturae,122 in which each level constitutes a higher degree of organizational and functional complexity than the previous. Like the Stoics, he described cohesion (ἕξις) as the type of pneumatic tension that sustains or gives unity to physical objects.123 We see this in Philo’s reference to the role of cohesion in lifeless things such as stones and bones.124 Next, he described ‘nature’ (φύσις), as referring to the next higher degree of pneumatic tension, designated as the principle of biological life found in plants and animals. This followed the Stoics who likewise included the principles of nutrition and growth in the tenor of nature as opposed to that of soul.125 Indeed, he even followed their more restricted, technical use of the term as opposed to its more common alternative as a

121 Philo, Leg. 2.22-3.
123 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.714, 716; Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.139.
125 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.710-2, 714-6, 718, 787.
term for God or the active principle in the universe. Ascending yet higher, the Stoics had identified a third type of pneuma called ‘soul’ (ψυχή) that designated a warmer, dryer, more rarefied and subtle state than nature, which was cooler and moister. This is the tenor of pneuma that accounts for the principle of perceptive life in animals, including the faculties of the senses, utterance, and reproduction. In the passage above, Philo attributed this power to unreasoning creatures and associated it with the ability to receive impressions or be subject to impulses. Finally, the Stoics identified a fourth and highest type of pneumatic tension termed ‘the commanding faculty’ (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), ‘mind’ (νοῦς/διάνοια), or ‘power of reasoning’ (τὸ λογιστικόν). This faculty is found only in rational beings, whether in the human soul, the stars, or God. Philo similarly mentioned this fourth power, referring to it as ‘mind’ (νοῦς), and made it the sole possession of humans or beings more akin to God.

Philo thus shared the Stoic and Aristotelian emphasis on the continuity between all forms of life, with each higher organism comprehending within itself the properties of all lower organisms, but followed the Stoics by defining soul more narrowly. Whereas Aristotle and Plato had argued that humans, irrational animals, and plants all possess ‘soul’, since he conceived of it as more or less synonymous with the generic, pre-cognitive ‘life’ common to both vegetation and animals, Philo and the Stoics treated ‘soul’ as something possessed only by life forms higher in the biological hierarchy. Hence, humans and irrational animals, birds, reptiles and so forth all possess ‘soul’, while plants, vegetation, and embryos do not. Conversely, both acknowledged that humans and irrational animals do share with

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126 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.148, 156.
127 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.715, 780, 785, 787; Plut., Stoic. rep. 1052f.
128 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.459.
129 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.139; J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 91, 105; Sext. Emp., Pyr. 3.188.
130 See for example Hierocles’ description of the transition from the physique (φύσις) of the embryo to the soul in the newborn baby in Hierocl., Eth. Stoic. 1.5-35. The emphasis throughout is on the chronological and biological continuity of the embryo and newborn.
131 See Philo, Agr. 139, where he elaborated what Terian described as ‘the elaborate structure, which constitutes the metaphysical pyramid of his understanding of the universe’. In this passage, we see that ‘corporeals (σώματα) proceed from inanimates (ἄψυχα) to animates (ψυχην ἔχοντα or ἐµψυχα), from irrationals (ἄλογα) to rationals (λογικά), from mortals (θνητά) to divine existences (θεῖα) or immortals (ἀθάνατα). A. Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus (1981), 36.
132 Arist., An. 1.1 402a, 2.1 413a; Plato, Phd. 70d, 71d; Tim. 77b; S. Goetz and C. Taliaferro, Brief History of the Soul (2011), 19.
133 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.716, 718; Hierocl., Eth. Stoic. 1.31-35; Plut., Stoic. rep. 1052F; Philo, Deus 41. At Congr. 136-8, Philo in his allegorical treatment of Ex. 21.22-3, which discusses the fines for the miscarriage that results when striking a pregnant woman, referred to the embryo (ἔµβρυος) as a ‘plant’ (τὸ φυτόν).
plants ‘various processes of a vegetative kind’ (τινα φυτοειδῶς γίνεται), which sustain their lives.\textsuperscript{134} Philo, moreover, had argued with the Stoics that ‘soul’ differs from ‘growth’ in three principle ways: ‘sense perception’ (αἴσθησις), ‘impression’ (φαντασία), and ‘impulse’ (ὁρµή).\textsuperscript{135} The difference between plants and animals then, is that with the addition of ‘soul’, irrational animals are both aware of and capable of pursuing what is ‘appropriate’ (οἰκεῖος) to their own constitution, which implies at least some sort of non-linguistic cognitive mental processes that animals exploit during locomotion,\textsuperscript{136} whereas plants cannot: their biological processes run automatically by nature.\textsuperscript{137} As such, the ‘movement’ associated with ‘soul’ differs from that of inanimate plants. Whereas Philo characterized ‘cohesion’ (ἕξις) by its lack of motion (ἀκίνητος),\textsuperscript{138} the ‘growth’ (φύσις) of crops and trees ‘moves by expansion’ (αὐξητικῶς κινούµενα), ‘without changing its position’ (οὐ µεταβατικῆς κινήσεως),\textsuperscript{139} and the movement associated with impulse is connected to the ability to move the body or experience and react to presentations.\textsuperscript{140}

In common with Aristotle and the Stoics, Philo differentiated humans from irrational animals by their additional possession of ‘reason’ (λόγος).\textsuperscript{141} All sides differentiated ‘soul’ in humans from that in beasts by adding the adjective ‘rational’, so that they described humans as possessing ‘rational soul’ (λογικὴ ψυχὴ) rather than merely ‘soul’. With the Stoics, however, Philo argued that while the soul in both beasts and humans comprises the powers of sense perception, impression, and impulse, in the more highly developed humans, reason supervenes upon these powers, with the result that mind comes to direct and guide them.\textsuperscript{142} While they described ‘impression’ for all animals as an imprint upon the soul by an external

\textsuperscript{134} Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.86; Philo, Leg. 2.22.
\textsuperscript{135} Philo, Leg. 1.29-30, 2.22-25; Deus 41; Mut. 223, 257; Anim. 94. Hence, Philo conversely described plants as ‘without perception’ (ἀφάνταστος) at Philo, Opif. 73; Deus 41; Plant. 13; Her. 136; Virt. 160; as ‘without impulse’ (ἀόρητος) at Philo, Deus 41; as ‘unable to move from one place to another’ (µεταβατικῆς κινήσεως ἀµέτοχος), which is an alternative way of denying ‘impulse’ in plants, Plant. 13; or as ‘not participating in perception’ (ἀτιθήµενος ἀµέτοχος), at Philo, Deus 41.
\textsuperscript{136} M. Rescorla, ‘Chrysippus’ Dog’ (2009), 53. Chrysippus famously showed that a dog displays genuine cognitive capabilities when it arrives at a spot where three ways meet; after sniffing at two by which the quarry did not pass, it immediately rushes off at once by the third without sniffing.
\textsuperscript{137} Philo, Mut. 197.
\textsuperscript{138} Philo, Somn. 136.
\textsuperscript{139} Philo, Her. 137.
\textsuperscript{140} Philo, Deus 41-4.
\textsuperscript{141} Philo, Opif. 62, 66-7, 73; Leg. 1.30, 2.2-23; Deus 35-45; Plant. 13; Her. 137-8; Somn. 1.136; Aet. 75.
\textsuperscript{142} Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.86.
image introduced through ‘sense perception’, in humans, sense perception and impression are both related to ‘the mind’ (ὁ νοῦς). As such, sense perception is an active extension of the mind’s pneuma toward what is external, and impression is the stamp on the mind of an object of impression. In the same way, whereas in animals impulse is an unthinking movement of the soul toward something, in humans it is exercised ‘according to the mind’s power of self-extension’ (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ τοινκήν δύναμιν) toward an object it deems appropriate to pursue.

The monistic psychological elements show that Philo could often resort to the Stoics as a resource for commenting on Moses, but when we examine his treatment of impulse, we find particular dependence upon Stoic theory. Several lines of evidence support this claim: Philo’s treatment of impulse within the Stoic disposition of ‘first impulse’, his location of moral blame or praise in one’s use of impulse, his ascription of the cause of impulse to the mind, his treatment of the senses as an ‘antecedent cause’, and his division of impulse into the three Stoic classes of passion, selection, and eupatheia. We will discuss each of these in turn below.

Philo defined impulse within the broader Stoic notion of ‘first impulse’. In Quod Deus sit immutabilis, he described ‘the condition’ (τὸ πάθος) out of which impulse arises in response to the mental presentation of sense perception in both rational and irrational creatures as ‘the first movement of the soul’ (πρώτη ψυχῆς κίνησις), a phrase nearly identical with the Stoic notion of ‘first impulse’ (πρῶτη ὁρµή). Philo described this ‘first impulse’, whether in humans or animals, as the hormetic

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143 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 1.58; Philo, Deus 43.
144 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.51; Philo, Opif. 166; Leg. 2.40, 44-5.
145 Philo, Plant. 45; Leg. 1.29-30; Det. 127; Stob., Anth. II 7.9.
146 Philo, Deus 44. See also Philo, Mut. 257; Mos. 1.26. Terian equates ‘impression’ (φαντασία) and ‘impulse’ (ὁρµή) with ‘the soul’s first movement’ (πρώτη ψυχῆς κίνησις) at A. Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus (1981), 36.
147 Philo here seems to be referring to the disposition of Stoic first impulse, which regulates and determines the kinds of impulse a soul may have rather than a pre-emotion or propatheia (προπαθεία), though he elsewhere showed familiarity with Stoic ‘first movements’ or ‘propatheia’ as our earliest certain Greek witness. See Philo, QG 1.55, 76, 79, 3.56, 4.15-7, 73; M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπαθείαι’ (1999) 302-3, 316-8; B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 184-94. Regarding Stoic pre-emotion, Sorabji points out that Seneca sought to defend against Posidonius’ objections to Stoic intellectualism by distinguishing three stages of emotion. First, an appearance of harm or benefit could arouse a ‘first movement’ or initial shock in the soul. This is not yet an emotion since it lacks assent. Next follows a second movement of the soul, that is, the mistaken judgment or assent, which in turn leads to a third movement, where the soul is carried away and overthrows reason and so is out of control. See R. Sorabji, ‘Emotion in Stoicism after 100 BC’ (2007), 166-70; R. Sorabji, ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, Seneca’ (1998), 153-5; C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 447-8.
disposition that determines the effect of an impression of an object upon the soul, depending on the pain or pleasure it causes, in terms of either ‘an affinity’ (οἰκείωσις) toward the object or ‘an aversion’ (ἄλλοτριώσις). In this way, he followed the Stoics in treating the soul’s impulse as always seeking those things that are most ‘suitable’, ‘fitting’ or ‘appropriate’ (τὰ οἰκεῖα) for its welfare, but avoiding those things that are a threat to it.

For the Stoics, Nature/God uses immanent, teleologically-oriented natural processes to direct humans and animals toward their proper end. They taught that in both rational and irrational animals, ‘first impulse’ is initially directed ‘toward its own self-preservation’ (ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτό). As a result, when seeking what is ‘appropriate’ (οἰκεῖος) to their own survival, animals live in accordance with nature. Further, because humans are sociable creatures by nature according to the Stoic account, in them ‘first impulse’ also came to include a concern for others or an impulse toward sociability. Additionally, the Stoics argued that humans are distinguished from other animals by virtue of their possession of reason at maturity. In animals and children, a presentation of something in accord with nature automatically produces an impulse to pursuit behaviour, since they do not have the faculty of assent to evaluate the presentations rationally. As infant humans grow, their natural constitutions develop, their instinctive impulses are transformed into a faculty of reason itself, and as a result, they acquire the faculty of ‘assent’

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148 Philo, Deus 44; Her. 154.
149 B. Inwood, ‘Stoicism’ (1999), 240-1.
150 Cic., Fin. 3.16; Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.85. For further discussion on ‘first impulse’ and orientation, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 184-201.
151 Inwood and Gerson point out that this term is ‘difficult to translate’. Other terms or phrases proposed include: ‘affiliation’, ‘orientation’, ‘recognition and appreciation of something as belonging to one’. See B. Inwood and P. Donini, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (1999), 677.
152 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.88; Inwood points out that the Stoic school was most associated with the concept of ‘Nature’ in antiquity, though it was a common feature in nearly all of the schools to some extent. The Stoics defined ‘Nature’ as ‘a craftsman-like fire, proceeding methodically to creation’, which is equivalent to a ‘fiery, fashioning pneuma or breath’. As such, it was identified with the God who works immanently within creation as ‘the rational plan controlling the organization and development of the world’, but also the ‘godlike rationality’ that serves as a central feature of human nature. See Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.85-6, 156; B. Inwood, ‘Stoicism’ (1999), 224. ‘Nature’ thus entailed living in accordance with our own human nature and also with the nature of the universe of which we are a part. See R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (1996), 101.
(συγκατάθεσις), which precedes any ‘impulse’ (ῴρμη) to act in a given way.\footnote{155} Hence, mature humans come to recognize that while it is ‘natural’ under normal circumstances to ‘select’ (ἐκλογή) that which is related to one’s self-preservation, such as health and wealth, and to care for and assist other humans,\footnote{156} they ought to value order and harmony of conduct above all else and to consider moral virtue as the only truly noble or good object worth pursuing for its own sake; preservation of one’s rationality trumps self-preservation or sociability.\footnote{157} Hence, ‘first impulse’ served as the starting point for their account of human action and emotion, while living ‘in accordance with nature’ (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν) served as its ‘end’.\footnote{158}

It is true that, on the one hand, Philo’s ethics denied the kernel of the Stoic theory of appropriation. As Lévy has rightly pointed out, Philo’s Middle Platonist and Jewish commitments to the transcendence of God imposed a strong discontinuity between God and the sensible cosmos, where Stoic immanentist theology rather posited fundamental continuity,\footnote{159} since nature is identical with god or cosmic reason.\footnote{160} In other words, the Platonist/Philonic emphasis on ‘likeness to God’ or homoiosis (ὁμοιώσις) introduced a ‘detachment between physis and theos’, whereas Stoic ‘appropriation’ or oikeiosis (οἰκείωσις) assumed the identification of the two.\footnote{161} This detachment led to a Platonic disparagement of the body as a foreign place where the soul, and especially the mind, sojourns as an alien. Though Philo

could think of the soul’s first impulse in terms of self-preservation, he argued that
the fully rational sage would ‘alienate’ (ἀλλοτρίωσις) himself from the body and its
needs, and instead seek to return to the heavenly realms, its true home, where it can
once again fully enjoy the vision of God and his Logos.\(^{162}\) Philo could even treat
‘appropriation’ as synonymous with ‘kinship’ (συγγένεια) or ‘likeness to God’
(ὁμοίωσις),\(^{163}\) another strongly Middle Stoic theme.\(^{164}\) The wise soul, in seeking true
goodness, soars upward away from the earth and near to God, where the truly good
things exist, that is, the virtues, with a soul characterized by the love of God.\(^{165}\)

On the other hand, Philo could also think of the life of the embodied mind, as
well as that of irrational animals, in terms of Stoic ‘appropriation’, utilizing what
Bonazzi described as a strategy of ‘subordination and appropriation’, as noted
above. Rather than reject Stoic oikeiosis, he subordinated it to the Platonic-
Pythagorean telos of homoiosis, which further serves to ‘bring out Philo’s
autonomy’.\(^{166}\) The Stoics too could speak of following God, though they placed it
after following nature, which should serve as a caution against making too much of
a homoiosis-oikeiosis antithesis.\(^{167}\) Without denying the fundamentally Platonic
character of Philo’s favourite image in his moral psychology, of the ascending soul
journeying back to God,\(^{168}\) the differences with Stoicism may not be as drastic as
one might first imagine. For, in a similar way, the Stoic sage too dismissed the body
and all externals as ‘preferred indifferents’ (προηγητένα);\(^{169}\) only the soul truly
matters.\(^{170}\) Further, in the Stoic view, the sage might act against self-preservation in
order to retain his full rationality.\(^{171}\) This gave rise to the Stoic insistence that the

\(^{162}\) Philo, Gig. 23-9; Conf. 78-82.
\(^{163}\) Philo, Fug. 62-3; Plato, Tht. 176a-b.
\(^{165}\) Philo, Fug. 62-3, 79-81.
\(^{167}\) R. Radice, ‘Philo and Stoic Ethics’ (2008), 143.
\(^{168}\) The ‘journey’ theme is especially central to Plato’s Phaedo, an important source of inspiration
for both Philo. See Plato, Phd. 67b-68b, 69b-d, 80d-81b, 82c, 84a107c-d, 114c.
\(^{169}\) Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.105-7; Stob., Anth. II 7.7b, 7g.
\(^{170}\) Though early Stoics abstained from adopting the body-soul opposition, the Roman Stoic
Seneca, for instance, did not hesitate to invoke it. Like Plato and Philo, he too described physical
pleasure as a source of moral weakness, could count the body as a prison, and invoked a variation of
a journey motif of the soul’s ascension. See Sen. Lucil. 65.16, 21; 71.16, 27; 76.25; 78.10; 92.10;
114.23, 25; 120-15-18. For further discussion, see G.J. Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo on Stoic and Platonist
\(^{171}\) Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.130.
sage might choose suicide in accordance with reason.\textsuperscript{172} As Winston points out, ‘heaping pejoratives’ on the body was not an exclusively Platonic preserve; it was equally characteristic of later Stoic references to the body, though their dualism was ethical rather than metaphysical as in the case of Plato.\textsuperscript{173} As such, it is probably an overstatement to say that Philo rejected the grounding of ethics on the Stoic dogma of ‘appropriation’ as Lévy does.\textsuperscript{174} Instead, it is closer to the truth to say that Philo sought to integrate a Stoic ethic within a wider Middle Platonic physics and Jewish piety, in which the sage’s self-sufficiency is equated with an utter recognition that all things are a ‘grace of God’,\textsuperscript{175} and the sage’s zeal for following God is identified with the seeking of moral virtue alone as the one ‘good’,\textsuperscript{176} even if from our perspective such a ‘good’ is in fact a bifurcated one.\textsuperscript{177}

The Stoic character of Philo’s use of the notion of first impulse is especially clear in his discussion of Moses’ moral development to sagehood. At the beginning of \textit{De vita Mosis}, Philo outlines how Moses showed great natural ability in his progress toward sagehood from an early age. Moses’ progress included learning how to restrain and direct his impulses, which reflected his growth in the virtue of ‘temperance’ (σωφροσύνη). For, in Stoic parlance, temperance is precisely ‘the


\textsuperscript{174} C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 146.


\textsuperscript{176} For instance, Philo described the philosophic life as rejecting all bodily and external things as insecure, while walking along the secure path of virtue toward God as the one, sure, and infallible good. See Philo, \textit{Deus}, 143-4; Abr. 268-72. On the Stoic narrowing of virtue to moral virtue, see J. Rist, \textit{Stoic Philosophy} (1969), 11. Drummond likewise notices these two directions in Philo, but does not bring them together. See J. Drummond, \textit{Philo Judaeus} (1888), II 285-8. Roskam also finds Philo’s end as both moral virtue and likeness to God, but fails to show how they are related to one another. See G. Roskam, \textit{Path to Virtue} (2005), 198-201. Zeller states the situation aptly: ‘Philo hardly perceives any contradiction between his philosophical background and the religious and moral impulses he receives from scripture.’ See D. Zeller, ‘Life and Death of the Soul in Philo’ (1995), 38. Bréhier sees Philo’s orientation as fundamentally religious; moral activity is not valued for its own sake. Though Bréhier is no doubt correct, Philo did not see a divide between piety and holiness. See É. Bréhier, \textit{Philon d’Alexandrie} (1950), 251, 270-1. Bonazzi shows that the identification of assimilation to God and perfect virtue was already circulating among Pythagoreanizing Platonists in Alexandria. See M. Bonazzi, ‘Towards Transcendence’ (2008), 246-7.

\textsuperscript{177} Dillon suggests that Philo, in his ethics, may have followed a strategy similar to the ‘Stoicizing synthesis’ of Antiochus, ‘duly modified in a transcendental direction’. See J.M. Dillon, ‘Philo and Hellenistic Platonism’ (2008), 224-7.
stability of one’s impulses’ (ἡ τῶν ὀρμῶν εὐστάθεια), with the result that ‘one conducts oneself unerringly in one’s impulses’ (ἐνεκα τοι ἀδιαπτῶτος ἐν ταῖς ὀρμαῖς ἀναστρέφουσα). Hence, Philo points out, while still a youth Moses ‘watched the first directions and impulses of the soul’ (τὰς πρῶτας τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιβολὰς τε καὶ ὀρμαῖς … ἐπετήρει) lest they should run away with reason. He then observes:

For it is these impulses [ὄρμα] which cause both good and bad (αἱ ἀγαθῶν αἴτιαι καὶ κακῶν) – good when they obey the guidance of reason (ἡγεμόνει λόγῳ πειθάρχον), bad when they turn from their regular course into anarchy (εἰς ἀναρχίαν ἐκδιαιτῶν). In this passage, Philo clearly connects the origin of ‘first impulse’ with the origin of passion or virtue in the soul. He introduces his discussion by utilizing both the notion of the Stoic ‘impulse’ and the related term ‘inclination’ (ἐπιβολή), another technical Stoic term, which they had categorized as a species of ‘impulsion’ (ὄρους) and defined as ‘an impulse before an impulse’. Thus, in this passage, Philo is saying that Moses wisely watched over both the impulses themselves and the impulses that come before the impulses. Such was his great oversight of the motions of his soul.

Oddly, Philo also described the soul’s movement away from an object unsuitable to it as ‘impulse’. This deviated from the strict Stoic terminology, since they would have normally called this movement ‘aversion’ (ἀφορμή). This difference, however,

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178 Stob., Anth. II 7.5b3, 5b5.
179 Philo’s portrayal of Moses contrasts sharply with the manner with which ‘our’ souls, that is, we who are Stoic fools, handle these early impulses. In ‘us’, these impulses nearly always end up as ‘passions’ because ‘our’ reasoning part is not yet able to form an accurate judgment between good and bad. ‘We’ mistake the true value of pleasures and pains while in Egypt, the place of bodily sense. See Philo, Congr. 81-4. Lévy takes this passage as evidence of Philo’s anti-Stoic conception of childhood as corrupt from the start rather than innocent. See C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 158-9. To suggest that the Stoics understood children as ‘innocent’ because all initial impulses are ‘natural’ does not quite represent the Stoic position. It is true that, strictly speaking, children cannot have ‘passions’ in the Stoic account because reason has not yet fully formed in them, something that Philo likewise hints by describing reason at this stage as ‘asleep’. That does not mean that children’s impulses cannot be violent and chaotic in the way that a bear displays a violent impulse similar to rage. The Stoics too saw a mis-valuation of sensible objects from experience (especially pleasure), beginning right from birth, as well as by corruption through social convention, most of which is imbibed in childhood, as the source of passion and vice in the adult. See Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.89; E. Bréhier, History of Philosophy (1961), 58; C. Gill, ‘Did Galen Understand’ (1998), 120; id., Naturalistic Psychology (2010), 160-1, 163, 207; B. Inwood and P. Donini, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (1999), 708-9. We should add, further, that in this passage Philo may be describing this stage anachronistically from the standpoint of ‘our’ experience as adults.

180 Philo, Mos. 1.26-7.
181 Stob., Anth. II 7.9a.
is only superficial; Philo’s account here still fits within a broadly Stoic framework. The Stoics had divided ‘impulse’ in rational animals into several species, including ‘pursuit’ (ὄρεξις), ‘aversion’ (ἀφορµή), and ‘impulsion’ (ὄρουσις).\(^{182}\) ‘Pursuit’ and ‘aversion’ differed from generic Stoic impulse in rational animals in that ‘the object’ the mind is moving toward or away from is ‘something in the field of action’ (ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν) in the present, rather than simply ‘something’ (ἐπί τι) as in the case of generic impulse, while ‘impulsion’ differed from ‘pursuit’ in that the mind is moving toward something in the field of action that is in the future. Hence, while in this passage Philo does not use the term ‘aversion’ to describe the soul’s movement away from that which might threaten its existence, his use of the generic term ‘impulse’ to describe both movements fits within the wider Stoic system, since ‘pursuit’, ‘aversion’, and ‘impulsion’ are all forms of impulse.

Additionally, though Philo normally used the term ‘aversion’ in the non-technical sense of ‘opportunity’ or ‘starting point’, he did once use it in the Stoic sense, showing that he had knowledge of the term.\(^{183}\) Further, elsewhere in his oeuvre Philo used each of the other technical Stoic terms for the various species of ‘impulse’ outlined above. He consistently used ‘pursuit’ in relation to his definition of the cardinal passion of ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία) – exactly as the Stoics had done. He once even used the highly technical Stoic ‘impulsion’, defining it in Stoic manner as ‘an impulse preluding another impulse’ (ἐρµή τις πρὸ ἐρµής). He then noted that the term came from those who practice word coining, which of course was something for which the Stoics were quite famous.\(^{184}\) Hence, we see that Philo demonstrated knowledge of the Stoics’ highly technical language for various types of impulse.

Philo next observes that these impulses and inclinations are ‘the cause’ (αἴτιος) of either good or bad in the soul, depending on their relation to governing reason. This too reflects a distinctly Stoic orientation. For, as discussed above, the Stoics had argued that Nature had added reason to the natural endowments of impulse and perception in rational creatures. The life that ‘accords with nature’ thus consists of the mind overseeing and commanding impression and impulse. When the mind functions as it should, reason offers ‘a more perfect management’ (κατὰ τελειοτέραν

\(^{182}\) Stob., Anth. II 7.9.

\(^{183}\) Philo, QG 1.55c. Graver denies that this was in accord with a ‘regular use in Stoicism’, suggesting that it may be better interpreted rather as a type of ‘propatheia’. See M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθεια’ (1999), 310.\(^{19}\)

προστασίαν) of impulse by supervening to ‘scientifically’ (τεχνίτης) guide or shape the rational creature’s first impulse in its quest to live in accordance with nature. Reason thus does not fundamentally change the direction of the soul’s first impulse. Rather, it oversees what the first impulse would do naturally and instinctually and ensures that it attains its proper ‘end’ (τέλος), namely, ‘the morally good and beautiful’ (τὸ καλὸν). When it oversees the soul’s first impulse consistently, expertly, and with a firm disposition, then the soul acts with ‘moral virtue’ (ἀρετή). Hence, the Stoics treated virtue as a ‘craft’ or ‘skill’ (τέχνη) concerned with the selection of things according to nature. For, in the Stoic view, virtue is nothing other than the natural perfection of a rational being ‘qua rational’ (ὁς λογικοῦ), which includes reason preserving its own rationality without error. It is only when the mind is ‘perverted’ (διαστρέφεσθαι) from its right function by assenting to the wrong ends through ignorance or opinion that it is led into passion and vice.

In the same way, Philo notes in this passage that the soul’s impulses and inclinations can be the cause of either the good or the bad, that is to say, they are in themselves morally neutral. Philo further underscores the neutrality of these first impulses and inclinations when he describes their deviation into the anarchy of the passions using the term ‘depart from’ (ἐκδιαιτάω) in the middle voice. This term conveys the notion of departure from a normal habit or pattern. Since first impulse is always naturally oriented toward what is appropriate to the soul, Philo is suggesting that a turn of these impulses or inclinations toward passion is an unnatural deviation in the soul away from its normal orientation toward self-preservation. The origin of

185 Compare with Philo, Leg. 1.29.
186 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.86; Origen, Princ. III 1.3.
187 G. Striker, ‘Following Nature’ (1996), 241. Inwood and Gerson state that living ‘according to nature’ meant two things in Stoic ethics: (1) to make choices that accord with one’s own well-being, all things being equal, and (2) to make choices that accord with the larger plan of cosmic Nature as one’s ultimate framework. See B. Inwood and P. Donini, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (1999), 686, 694-7.
188 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.90, 94.
189 Ibid., 85-7; Stob., Anth. II 7.5b3. For further discussion, see T. Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 154-6.
190 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.89. Compare also with Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7. 93, 110; B. Inwood, ‘Stoicism’ (1999), 245. Sellars rightly observes that the ‘first movement’ does not become a passion until the mind wrongly assents to it. Sudden involuntary, psycho-physical reactions, as such, do not constitute a passion. See J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 16. See also M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 319; G. Striker, ‘Following Nature’ (1996), 272; R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 66-75. By contrast, Peripatetics like Aspasius could insist that the movements of the irrational part of the soul, which he identified with the emotions, could occur without supposition (ὑπόληψις) at the ‘appearance’ (φαντασία) of something good or evil. Asp., In Eth. Nic. 44-5.
passion thus lies precisely in this perversion of first impulse, when reason ceases ‘to
guide’ (ἡνιοχέω) the soul’s first impulses and permits them to become like beasts
without a herdsman.191 This contrasts strongly with the Platonic and Peripatetic
position, which considered the natural course of the impulses of the irrational parts
of the soul to be oriented toward the bad, unless reined in by reason.

Philo normally argued for the Stoic single source of impulse originating in the
mind rather than from multiple sources as argued by the proponents of the Platonic
and Peripatetic positions.192 When Philo outlined in detail his foundational
psychology in the *Legum allegoriae*, he argued for the Stoic notion of the mind as
the single source or ‘spring’ (πηγή) whence impulse originates. This was the case
not only for good and proper impulses, as one could likewise argue from a Platonic
or Peripatetic perspective, but also for the irrational impulses of the passions
themselves. He thus argued with the Stoics that irrational impulse ‘issues forth’
(ἐξέρχοµαι) ‘from our reasonings and from a mind that corrupts the truth’ (ἀφ’
ἐκατέρων τῶν τε λογισµῶν καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ διαφθείροντος τὴν ἀλήθειαν).193 Passion
takes its start in the mind, not in an alternative source like Plato’s appetitive part of
the soul. Thus, Philo invoked the husbandry metaphor of the passions as
‘superfluous growths’ (αἱ περιττεύουσαι φύσεις) of the hegemon that need to be
pruned away.194 His insistence that the passions are ‘superfluous’ and may be
‘pruned’ again underscores that they are not necessary to the soul, as was the case
for Plato’s spirited and appetitive parts of the soul. Further, he viewed the irrational
impulses as arising as a result of ‘a corruption’ of the truth by the mind itself. This
corresponds to the Stoic notion of passion as the mind’s perversion of impulse.195 In
the same way, Philo elsewhere described passion as ‘an ugly spot’ (τι…αἶσχος) on
‘the mind’ (ὁ νοῦς),196 again treating passion in the context of reason and mind
itself, not a second source outside the mind. The one exception, as discussed in
detail in chapters two and three of section one, occurs in those places where Philo
made explicit use of Plato’s tripartite theory of the soul. In those instances, we see
Philo appearing to treat the impulses of the passions of desire and anger outside the

192 Arnim, *SVF* (1903-5), 2.823; Galen, *Plac.* V 5.38-9; Plut., *Virt. mor.* 447a; Stob., *Anth.* II
7.10; B. Inwood, ‘Stoicism’ (1999), 245.
194 Philo, *Spec.* 1.305.
195 Arnim, *SVF* (1903-5), 208; Plut., *Virt. mor.* 441d, 447a; Stob., *Anth.* II 7.10a.
196 Philo, *Mos.* 2.139.
mind in accordance with the metaphor, though he sought to revise these in the
direction of Stoicism, as we have already shown.\textsuperscript{197}

On one occasion, Philo described sense perception as ‘the cause of the passions’
(ἡ παθῶν αἰτία).\textsuperscript{198} Although at first glance, this might appear to contradict Philo’s
assumption that passion originates as a perversion of the impulse of the mind, this
instance still fits within a wider Stoic psychology inasmuch as the senses provide the
fodder for the mind to inappropriately pursue objects of sense; the origin of the
impulse toward those objects still remains with mind. This corresponded to the
technical Stoic distinction between perceptual and other appearances as ‘antecedent
causes’ (causae antecedentes) and assent as the ‘sufficient and principal cause’
(causa perfecta et principalis) of an impulse.\textsuperscript{199} The two causes differed in terms of
their relative proximity to the impulse and whether or not they are within one’s
power. If someone perceives something and receives an impression, it still depends
on their willingness to give assent to this impression before the impulse occurs,
which in turn underscores their responsibility for the action. Though the external
impression actuates (commoveo) the assent to action as the ‘antecedent cause’, it
cannot by itself necessitate the action without the mind’s assent.\textsuperscript{200} We should first
note that Philo was arguing in this section of the \textit{Legum allegoriae} for a monistic
psychology. Indeed, in this passage he framed his entire discussion of the origin and
nature of the soul after the manner of the Stoics by arguing that ‘the cohesive’,
‘growing’, ‘conscious’, ‘rational’ and ‘thinking powers’ (ἐκτική, φυτική, ψυχική,
λογική, διανοητική δυνάμεις) of the soul all belong to the mind.\textsuperscript{201} Consequently,
the mind likewise serves as ‘the font’ (πηγή) or ‘origin’ (ἀρχή) of sense
perception.\textsuperscript{202} Hence, when Philo attributed the cause of passion to sense perception,
he was in no way contradicting the idea that passion has its origin in the mind, since
he understood sense perception itself to be nothing other than the activation of a
faculty and condition already dormant in the mind.\textsuperscript{203} When activated and set into
motion, the power of sense perception extends out from the mind to reach the
surface of the flesh and the perceptive organs, which enable the mind to make

\textsuperscript{197}Philo, \textit{Conf.} 21-2; \textit{Leg.} 1.73, 3.118.
\textsuperscript{198}Philo, \textit{Leg.} 2.50. Compare also \textit{Leg.} 2.6; \textit{Congr.} 81; \textit{Abr.} 236-9; \textit{Her.} 186.
\textsuperscript{199}Cic., \textit{Fat.} 41-4.
\textsuperscript{200}Cic., \textit{Fat.} 42.
\textsuperscript{201}Ibid., 2.22-4, 37, 40-1, 45.
\textsuperscript{202}Ibid., 3.185, 188.
\textsuperscript{203}Ibid., 2.37, 40, 45.
contact with the flesh and external objects. In this way, sense perception, which is neutral in itself, becomes the gateway for the mind to experience bodily pleasure or pain. The way things look to the agent in turn tempts the mind to count these bodily objects as goods or evils worthy of impulse or repulsion, which gives rise to the passions. In this way, Philo married a Stoic conception of the passions as perverted turns of the mind with the Socratic body-soul dualism that pervades his moral psychology.

Philo closely connected the occurrence of the passions to objects furnished by the senses. He often used the image of ‘the nine kings’ vanquished by Abraham on the plain of the Jordon when he rescued Lot as an allegory of the powers of the four passions and five senses within us. Philo pointed out that the five kings of the senses are often subject to the four kings of the Stoic cardinal passions because they pay tribute to the passions by furnishing them with the objects of sense:

Griefs and pleasures and fears and desires (λύπαι, ἡδοναί, φόβοι, ἐπιθυµίασ) arise (συνίστηµι) out of what (ἐξ ǒν) we see or hear or smell or taste or touch, and none of the passions would have any strength of itself (µηδεµός τῶν παθῶν καθ’ αὑτὸ σθένοντος) if it were not furnished (χορηγέω) with the senses supply.

In this passage, Philo connects the existence of the passions to the perceptual objects that the senses supply. The senses convey to the soul bodily and external objects, which is in itself a neutral process. However, once these objects are present to the

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204 Ibid., 2, 37-9, 3.49.
205 Ibid., 2.16. Note that in perfect sage Philo envisioned a ‘purified’ (κεκαθαρµένη) sense perception, whom he allegorically identified with the biblical figure of Miriam. See Philo, Agr. 80; Ex. 15.1, 20. Sense perception, now cleansed, functions alongside the perfect mind in its hymning of God. As such, it now longer serves as a means of temptation for the mind.
206 As Zeller suggests that sense perception’s role as ‘gateway’ accounts for those passages in Philo that make sense perception or body the cause of the death of the soul. See D. Zeller, ‘Life and Death of the Soul in Philo’ (1995), 23. When placed properly within Philo’s Adam-Eve-serpent conception of the process by which the mind encounters objects of sense, and its response to them, it becomes clear that sense perception is a ‘cause’ inasmuch as it is the only means for the soul to encounter the temptation of the serpent, pleasure. Ultimate responsibility for the soul’s perverse impulses, however, remains with the mind. For the Cynic background to this theme, see É. Bréhier, Philon d’Alexandrie (1950), 261-4. Note also the possible Platonic background for this theme as well at Phd. 65b, 66a, 79c, 81b, 83a where Plato describes the bodily senses as deceiving and confusing the soul (= mind), but in the Laws, he makes it personified pleasure at Leg. 9.863b.
208 Philo, Abr. 236-44. See also Philo, Congr. 92; Ebr. 105; Det. 14-6. Bréhier rightly notes that in connection with one’s use of necessary pleasures, Philo assigned the guilt not to the body, but to the mind that attaches to it a wrong valuation as a good. É. Bréhier, Philon d’Alexandrie (1950), 254.
209 Philo, Abr. 238.
soul, this gives occasion for the passions to ‘arise’ or ‘be constituted’ (συνίστηµι). Without sense perception and the objects that it furnishes to the mind, there would be no opportunity for the passions to come into existence. The mind would only be able to contemplate the noetic forms proper to itself, since it would be cut off from the body and external world, which are full of objects subject to contingencies beyond the mind’s control. However, when the senses begin to furnish the mind with objects of sense, it is then that the passions ‘arise’ (συνίστηµι). Hence, Philo argues in Platonic manner\(^\text{210}\) that the senses and passions both serve as ‘sources of corruption’ (φθορᾶς αἴτιαι), since they tempt the mind away from the contemplation of the immortal, divine realm to focus instead on the body and external, which are by nature mortal, changing, and contingent. As such, they are necessarily bound up with the passions and vices, since they take their start in what is unstable and uncertain.\(^\text{211}\) Although Philo does not spell out in detail how the objects furnished by sense perception give rise to the passions in the soul, aside from the fact that they take their start from the mortal and corruptible sphere of the senses, he made it clear elsewhere that it had to do with how the mind welcomes each of the objects of sense, whether in addition to attributing truthfulness or falsehood to the sensory data it also ascribes value to the object as a good, an evil, or something indifferent.\(^\text{212}\) Thus, the senses are ‘the cause’ of the passions in that they present to the mind indifferent objects such as pleasure or wealth, which it mistakenly pursues as the highest good. If the mind had never been extended to the flesh through the senses, it would never have been tempted by mortal existence to mistake the indifferent for the good.\(^\text{213}\)

This identification of the origin of the passions in the senses, moreover, provided Philo with a way to overlay the alternative Platonic tripartite approach onto his otherwise monistic moral psychology. While he could account for the origin of the passions on the basis of the mind’s valuation of the objects of the senses as worthy of pursuit or avoidance, he could simultaneously account for their origin in created objects outside of the mind and reason. As discussed previously, Plato had located the appetitive part of the soul in the region near the navel. In its more base forms, its objects were especially associated with food, drink, and sex, while in its more

\(^{210}\) Plato, \textit{Phd.} 67a, 81b.

\(^{211}\) Philo, \textit{Leg.} 2.16, 33-4.

\(^{212}\) Ibid., 2.16-8.

\(^{213}\) While a thought or memory could likewise give rise to a passion, they too are dependent on previous engagement with sensory experience.
refined forms, it would seek wealth and the life associated with acquisition. In the same way, Philo argued that the senses of touch and taste descend to the lowest recesses of the body. By inference, taste corresponds to food and drink, which find their way to the stomach, while touch corresponds especially to the sexual organs. Hence, Philo located these two senses, not in their obvious locations of throughout the body for touch, and the mouth for taste, but in the same general region of the body as Plato’s appetitive part. Philo did not extend this process of correspondence to Plato’s spirited part. However, he did elsewhere relate Plato’s spirited part to the senses, through his connection between the senses and pleasure. He observed that since each of the five senses and their objects occasion various pleasures, the mind is tempted by their allure. While the good mind ‘cleanses’ itself by turning away from the objects of the senses altogether, lovers of pleasure come to desire through their love of pleasure, but grow bitter and angry when deprived of their pleasures. Philo then added that pleasure thus makes its abode in breast and belly, the same two regions as Plato’s spirited and appetitive parts. Thus, his identification of the senses as ‘a cause of the passions’ provided Philo with an avenue to broadly identify Plato’s appetitive part of the soul with the senses of touch and taste and the lower regions of the body, and the spirited part with the pleasure-loving mind’s frustration at being unable to attain its desired pleasures. While this correlation between Stoic monism, the senses, and Plato’s psychic tripartism was at best inexact and only hinted at, it did afford Philo room to make use of the Platonic alternative when the biblical text or terminology seemed to require the metaphor.

Philo followed the Stoics in dividing impulse into three classes, depending on the end toward which it is oriented: ‘the passions’ or ‘bad emotions’ (τὰ πάθη), ‘the eupatheia’ or ‘proper feelings’ (αἱ εὐπαθείαι), and ‘selections’ or ‘rejection’ (ἐκλογή/ἀπεκλογή). Each of the basic types of impulse corresponds to one of the three ethical classes outlined above. The eupatheia refers to those rational, smooth and measured impulses that are directed toward the morally good and genuinely true, or away from vice, rather than toward indifferenters, and are possessed by the

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214 Philo, Abr. 241.
215 Philo, Her. 183-5.
216 Philo, Leg. 3.113-4.
sage alone. Philo consistently recognized this category of virtuous impulse, likewise locating it in the sage alone. The passions, by contrast, correspond not only to those irrational impulses that are directed toward what is morally bad or false, but also to those that result from treating something as a good or an evil that is in fact an indifferent. Again, as we will show in detail in the chapters that follow, Philo closely followed the Stoic approach to passionate impulse. Selections, finally, correspond to those impulses toward or away from an object that the mind accurately judges to be indifferent and considers it appropriate to pursue or avoid, whether in the fool or in the sage. Philo likewise implicitly recognized this category of impulse, though it did not feature prominently in his writings in the same way that the passions or even the eupatheia did.

Philo thus sided with the Stoics against the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions. In accordance with their twin doctrines of the triple good, and metriopatheia or moderation of the passions, the Peripatetic and Platonic traditions argued that certain moderate forms of passion were in fact appropriate evaluative responses to good or

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219 For Philo’s explicit use of the three cardinal eupatheia, see Philo, *Leg.* 3.43; *Det.* 60, 123-4, 134, *Cher.* 8, 106; *Mut.* 131; *Abr.* 201-2; *Praem.* 31-2; *QG* 2.57. Philo discussed ‘joy’ more than the other eupatheia by far. Scholars have regularly recognized the first two divisions of impulse into ‘passions’ and ‘eupatheia’ in Philo. See J.M. Dillon and A. Terian, ‘Philo and Stoic Eupatheiai’ (1978), 17; J. Drummond, *Philo Judaeus* (1888), II 303; M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 312. Philo could sometimes deviate from orthodox Stoicism as well. For instance, at *QG* 2.57, he opposed ‘conscience’ or ‘biting’ (ὁγγυς) to grief, though it might have been a mistake as Sorabji suggests. See R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind* (2000), 51. Compare also Philo, *Det.* 110. Similarly, he seems to have treated Abraham’s ‘mourning’ (τενός) of Sarah at *Gen.* 23.2 as an instance of eupatheia as well. See Philo, *Abr.* 255-61.
219 For Philo’s explicit use of the three cardinal eupatheia, see Philo, *Leg.* 3.43; *Det.* 60, 123-4, 134, *Cher.* 8, 106; *Mut.* 131; *Abr.* 201-2; *Praem.* 31-2; *QG* 2.57. Philo discussed ‘joy’ more than the other eupatheia by far. Scholars have regularly recognized the first two divisions of impulse into ‘passions’ and ‘eupatheia’ in Philo. See J.M. Dillon and A. Terian, ‘Philo and Stoic Eupatheiai’ (1978), 17; J. Drummond, *Philo Judaeus* (1888), II 303; M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 312. Philo could sometimes deviate from orthodox Stoicism as well. For instance, at *QG* 2.57, he opposed ‘conscience’ or ‘biting’ (ὁγγυς) to grief, though it might have been a mistake as Sorabji suggests. See R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind* (2000), 51. Compare also Philo, *Det.* 110. Similarly, he seems to have treated Abraham’s ‘mourning’ (τενός) of Sarah at *Gen.* 23.2 as an instance of eupatheia as well. See Philo, *Abr.* 255-61.
220 For the Stoics, see for instance, Diog. Laert., *Vit. phil.* 7.95, 110; Stob., *Anth.* II 7.9b.
222 See for instance, Philo, *Det.* 122; *Her.* 252-3; *Spec.* 2.46; *Prob.* 60-1, 83. Philo never makes the additional Stoic distinction between ‘preferred’ (προηγμένα) and ‘dispreferred’ (ἀποπροηγμένα) indifferents in his corpus, nor does he accordingly argue that the one should vigorously pursue preferred indifferents so long as circumstances permit. He does, however, demonstrate awareness of the Stoic notion of reservation when he states that the sage never ‘surrenders’ (ἐνδίδωµι) to indifferents as ‘attractive’ (ὁλκόν), that is, as a genuine good worthy of unreserved pursuit. See Philo, *Prob.* 60-1. Compare Philo’s description of the soul’s ‘surrendering itself’ (permittere se) to the propatheia or first movement that follows when the mind (and body) is involuntarily jolted by an impression. Sen., *Ira* II 3.1. For further discussion of Stoic preferred and dispreferred indifferents and the practice of reservation, see R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind* (2000), 53-4, 169-71, 185-6.
223 This too corresponds to Stoic precedent. As Brennan notes, since the average ethical agent in the Stoic account is a fool, and since they treated their philosophy as a form of therapy for vicious motivations, we have significantly more evidence for the passions than for either the eupatheia or selections. See T. Brennan, ‘Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’ (1998), 36-7; id., ‘Stoic Moral Psychology’ (2003), 264.
evil bodily and external circumstances. As constituent elements of the soul, the passions were thus construed as natural. When appropriately exercised, they were by definition not excessive as such, but rather liable to excess when not directed by right reason. Though irrational, the passions could be construed as in accord with reason, when tamed and trained by the charioteer reason. In keeping with his adherence to the Stoic doctrine of virtue as the only good, Philo rejected all forms of passion as wrong, by reference not so much to their outcomes or effect, if they have any, but to both the basic character of their movement and the object in view at their inception. Hence, as we will discuss further below, Philo followed the Stoics in treating all forms of passion as essentially blameworthy in themselves, always worthy of censure, universally excessive, and unnatural movements of the soul.

In keeping with his fundamental Stoic psychological monism, Philo argued that in rational animals impulse finds its origin in the mind alone. By making reason the source and guide of all other powers of the soul, Philo thus followed the Stoics in making the mind responsible both for its rejection of or assent to presentations as good, bad, or indifferent, and for its consequent impulsive response. Depending on the character of the mind’s judgments, the impulse that followed could be a passion, a eupatheia, or a selection. If the mind moves the soul toward an object with knowledge, as exemplified in the sage, the soul experiences eupatheia. If the mind itself has been corrupted and malfunctions, and so erroneously evaluates an indifferent as good or bad, then excessive, irrational, and unnatural impulses of the passions will necessarily follow. If a mind of either a sage or a fool correctly recognizes something to be indifferent, but accurately judges that there is something about the object and its circumstance that still provides some reason to move toward or away from it, then it will make a selection. In this study, we will focus on Philo’s treatment of the passions.

**The passions as opinions or judgments**

Given Philo’s overall preference for the Stoic monistic and intellectualist account of the soul’s impulse, it comes as no surprise that he closely correlated the origin of the passions to the mind’s judgments, assents, and opinions. As we have shown in the

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225 Stob., *Anth.*, II 7.1; R.W. Sharples, ‘Peripatetic School’ (1999), 166.
226 Cic., *Fin.* 3.32.
previous section, for Philo, the mind serves as the sufficient cause for an impulse of the soul. This impulse is natural and appropriate so long as assent accords with nature and follows right reason, but when it deviates, impulse becomes a passion. Hence, the origin of the passions depend on the character of the mind and its judgments about what is good, since the orientation of the mind is what determines the direction of its impulses.

In this respect, Philo again sided with the Stoics against the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions, which argued that passion’s origin lies outside the mind. To be sure, in the Platonic and Peripatetic account a sick or vicious mind will allow the passions to run riot and disturb the soul, whereas the healthy and virtuous mind will moderate and control them. Nevertheless, just as the two horses in Plato’s charioteer metaphor are necessary to the composition of the chariot-team, so the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions viewed the passions as fundamental to the soul. Wrong thinking and poor judgments will exaggerate or misdirect the soul’s passionate movements, but they do not ultimately account for their origin. The passions arise instead as expressions of alternative parts that are natural to the soul.

While we can characterize Philo’s conception of the relation of the passions to the mind’s judgments or opinions as Stoic, from what we can gather from the extant sources, there appears to have been disagreement among the early Stoics as to the precise nature of this relation. According to Galen, the early Stoics – namely, Zeno and Chrysippus – understood the nature of passion in two distinct ways.

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229 The Stoic analysis of passions as opinions, using the metrics of pleasure and pain, present and future, may go back to Socrates’ efforts to discuss emotions in relation to opinion. See Plato, *Phlb*. 36c-38b. Socrates even proposed the distinction of emotion as ‘following’ (ἐποχαί) true or false opinion, at Plato, *Phlb*. 38b. The Stoics, of course, would not have accepted the notion of ‘right opinion’. See also W.W. Fortenbaugh, ‘Aristotle and Theophrastus on the Emotions’ (2008), 30-1.
Galen claimed that Chrysippus identified the passions with judgments or opinions themselves,\(^{231}\) whereas, though Zeno rooted the passions in mental error, he nevertheless equated the passions themselves rather with the movements in the soul that follow from opinion or judgment as a matter of temporal sequencing:

Chrysippus attempted to show that the passions are judgments of the rational part (κρίσεις τινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη), but Zeno considered the passions to be, not the judgments themselves (οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς), but the supervening contractions, dispersions, risings, and dejections of the soul (τὰς ἐπιγιγνοµένας αὐτὰς συστολᾶς καὶ χύσεις ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ ταπεινώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς).\(^{232}\)

Reportedly, then, two leading Stoics disagreed as to whether a passion is ‘a judgment’ (κρίσις) or the supervening movement that ‘follows upon the judgment’ (ἐπιγιγνοµένη κρίσις).\(^{233}\) Galen described these supervening psycho-physical movements as ‘contractions, dispersions, risings, dejections of the soul’, which as we will discuss in greater detail below, as the four psychic changes associated with the four Stoic cardinal passions of desire’ (ἐπιθυµία), ‘pleasure’ (ἡδονή), ‘fear’ (φόβος), and ‘grief’ (λύπη).\(^{234}\)

Diogenes Laertius indirectly alluded to the disparity between Zeno and Chrysippus, though he did not actually say that they diverged from one another. In line with Galen above, he explicitly identified Chrysippus with the view of the passions as judgments:

They [the Stoics] hold (δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς) the passions to be judgments (τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι), as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice (φιλαργυρία) being a supposition (ὑπόληψις) that

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\(^{231}\) Nussbaum agrees that the crux of the matter turned on Chrysippus’ radical identifying of passion and belief. In an alternative way of thinking about their differences, she points out that both Chrysippus and Zeno held that beliefs are 1) necessary for a passion, 2) a constituent element of a passion, and 3) sufficient for the passion. Chrysippus distinguished his position by going one step further by marking 4) belief identical to passion. Nussbaum adds that all the key Greek traditions (Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Stoic) held (1), and that Aristotle held both (1) and (2). The Stoics went further by adding (3) and (4). See M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire (1994), 370-2. Fortenbaugh likewise argues that for Aristotle cognition is (1) necessary and (2) a constituent element of the emotions. See W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (1975), 11-5.

\(^{232}\) Galen, Plac. V 1.4-5. See also Galen, Plac. IV 3.3. For Chrysippus, see also Galen, Plac. IV 1.17, 3.7. For Zeno, see also Galen, Plac. IV 3.2.

\(^{233}\) Also κρίσειν ὑπόληψια Galen, Plac. IV 3.1.

\(^{234}\) Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.110-1.
money is a good (τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι), while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.\textsuperscript{235}

He likewise explicitly identified Zeno with the conception of the passions as irrational and unnatural movements or excessive impulse:

Passion (πάθος) is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul or again as impulse in excess (ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὀρμὴ πλεονάζουσα).\textsuperscript{236}

According to Diogenes Laertius, Zeno identified the passions with ‘irrational movement’ (ἄλογος κίνησις) and ‘excessive impulse’ (ὁρµὴ πλεονάζουσα), not judgment as did Chrysippus. He did not indicate, as Galen had done, that two leading Stoics were at odds with one another on the question of the definition of a passion. Rather, he sought to conflate or harmonize the two perspectives. Hence, even though he directly quoted Chrysippus when equating the passions with judgments, he introduced the sentence by saying that ‘they’ (αὐτοί), that is, the Stoics in general, hold this view. The same could be said of his quotation of Zeno above. Nevertheless, in the direct allusions themselves, Galen’s putative division is apparent. Chrysippus equated the passions with judgments. Hence, in the case of avarice, Chrysippus identified it with the supposition that money is a good. In Zeno’s account, by contrast, the passions ‘arise’ (βλαστάνειν) from the perversions of the mind brought about by accepting falsehoods. These perversions of mind, in turn, are ‘the cause of instability’ (ἀκαταστασίας αἴτια) in a person’s impulses, but the actual passions themselves are identified with the movements, impulses and feelings that follow the judgment, assent, or opinion.

The difference between Chrysippus’ and Zeno’s conceptions of passion seems to have been rooted in slightly different accounts of the cognitive process that eventuates in an impulse.\textsuperscript{237} Both Stoics recognized that not every ‘impression’ (φαντασία) of ‘an external object’ (αἰσθητός) leads the soul to an action, but only those impressions that the Stoics termed ‘an impulsive impression’ (ὁρµητικὴ

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{235} Ibid., 7.111.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Ibid., 7.110.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Rist argues that the difference was rooted rather in an insistence on the simultaneity of the judgment, movement, and feeling-tones against a Zenonian temporal sequencing of these elements. See J. Rist, \textit{Stoic Philosophy} (1969), 33-5.
\end{itemize}
When the mind receives the sensory data in the impressions, it immediately interprets them in the form of an interpretive statement concerning the meaning of the sense data received called ‘a proposition’ (ἀξίωµα), which the mind must either ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις) to or reject as an accurate representation of reality. The Stoics called this mental event, this assent regarding the veracity or falsehood of the proposition, ‘a judgment’ (κρίσις).

The Stoics classed judgments as either an episode of ‘knowledge’ (ἐπιστήµη) if true, or as ‘an opinion’ (δόξα) if false, or if true but possessed by a fool or progressor. Judgments are ‘opinions’ when the mind assents to unclear impressions, yields to false impressions, or erroneously assents in instances where it ought to have suspended judgment. In these cases, the opinion is a false assent. When the mind assents to what genuinely corresponds to a real object or state of affairs, that is, to a ‘kataleptic impression’, it experiences what the Stoics called a ‘cognition’ or ‘katalepsis’ (κατάληψις). Sages only assent to these ‘kataleptic impressions’ with ‘strong assent’, that is, with the kind of assent that ‘cannot be reversed or overturned by any amount of rational questioning’ or ‘by any amount of emotional or psychological pressure’.

Hence, sages only experience episodes of knowledge. Non-sages can assent both to non-kataleptic true impressions, and to kataleptic impressions. However, their judgments remain ‘opinions’ because they can do so only with ‘weak assent’ or ‘assumption’ (ὑπόληψις), that is to say, their grasp or endorsement of the truth of the impression lacks the stability and irreversibility of the sage. For this reason, the Stoics, following Chrysippus, often equated passion not only with ‘judgment’, but also interchangeably with ‘opinion’, ‘feeble...
assumption’ or ‘weak assent’. Hence, unlike Plato and Aristotle, who associated ‘opinion’ with distinct parts of a complex soul, the Stoics made no room in their epistemology for ‘opinion’ as a normal, even if lower, form of knowing. Rather, in the Stoic view, ‘opinion’ always represents an abnormal deviation of the mind, a malfunction of the mind in its effort to grasp reality.

Impulsive impressions differ from simple impressions in that they contain two distinct, but interrelated propositions. The first proposition contains a value-neutral statement regarding the truthfulness or falsehood of the sensory data in view, while the second contains an additional value-significant proposition that stimulates ‘an impulse’ (όρμης) or ‘an aversion’ (ἀφορμῆς κινητικά) in the soul. This second proposition is thus a mental statement that includes both an ascription of the value/disvalue to the object in view together with its worthiness of pursuit/avoidance, and a description of how to go about accomplishing the proposed action or ‘proper function’ (καθῆκον). So, the first value-neutral proposition might look like, ‘this is x’, but the second, evaluative proposition, ‘this x is a good/bad/valued/disvalued and one ought to pursue/avoid it in such and such a manner’. As a consequence, the Stoics viewed every action in rational creatures as the result of an assent to both propositions contained in the impulsive impression; involuntary psycho-physiological phenomena called ‘first movements’ or ‘propatheia’ (προπάθεια, prima agitation or primus motus) such as tickles, twinges, blushes, pangs that do not involve any assent leading to action do not constitute genuine emotions. The hegemon judges the first to be true or false and the second to be appropriate or inappropriate for the soul to act upon.

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245 Cic., Tusc. III 11.24, IV 14.7; Cic., Fin. 3.35; Plut., Virt. mor. 447a; Stob., Anth. II 7.10. See L.C. Becker, ‘Stoic Emotion’ (2004), 39-40 for further discussion regarding Chrysippus’ definition of passion as a judgment.


247 Stob., Anth. II 7.7c.

248 The Stoics defined καθῆκον as an action which, when it is done, has a defensible reason. See Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.107; Stob., Anth. II 7.8. For discussion, see R. Bett, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (2006), 541; T. Brennan, ‘Stoic Moral Psychology’ (2003), 268-9; A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers (1987), 420.

249 Sen., Ira II 1.3-4.2; M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 400; M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire (1994), 374-8; R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (1996), 68; J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 65-7; R. Sorabji, ‘Emotion in Stoicism after 100 BC’ (2007), 164-6. According to Galen, Posidonius attacked Chrysippus’ theory as insufficient because it was unable to explain how emotions such as distress fade over time, even when both judgments remain intact, or how wordless music can elicit emotion apart from any judgment of the mind. Chrysippus had already argued that the second judgment that the feeling was appropriate had simply faded. See Galen, Plac. IV 7.13, 37, V 6.21-2, 31-2; R. Sorabji, ‘Emotion in Stoicism after 100 BC’ (2007), 164-6; C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 446-7. Seneca would later deny that wordless
This brings us to the differences between Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ accounts of the cognitive process and its relation to impulse and passion. According to Galen, Chrysippus had putatively departed from Zeno by equating a passionate impulse with the mind’s assent whereas Zeno had accounted the impulse to be a by-product of assent. The table below outlines the difference between the two accounts. Each row details each stage of the cognitive process in chronological order. An equal sign (=) indicates when the philosopher treated terms as equivalent to one another and hence occurring at the same juncture of the process. The approximately equals sign (≈) indicates irregular, but simultaneous occurrence:

Table 1: Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ accounts of the passionate cognitive process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zeno’s account</th>
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<tr>
<td>Impulsive impression</td>
<td>Impulsive impression</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak/false assent</td>
<td>Weak/false assent</td>
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Sen., *Ira* II 2.1-4.2; A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *Hellenistic Philosophers* (1987), 65Y 419; R. Sorabji, ‘Emotion in Stoicism after 100 BC’ (2007), 166-70; R.W. Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics* (1996), 68-9. Similarly, Philo assumed that the ‘propatheia’ could be called upon to ‘explain away apparent exceptions to the posited incompatibility of emotion and virtue’ by ‘taking advantage of the theoretical timelag between impression and assent’. Like Seneca, Philo emphasized the involuntary and non-culpable character of the pre-emotions. See M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 304-12. Scholars are divided on the question of whether the doctrine of ‘propatheia’ was a later Stoic innovation or whether it belonged to the old Stoa. For those who suggest that it is a later innovation, possible candidates include Posidonius, Panaetius, Sotian, and Seneca. See M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 3024, 321-3. We should not overlook its origins in Aristotle’s analysis either. Though he did not coin the terminology, in his insistence on the role of beliefs in constituting genuine emotions Aristotle made the distinction between fear and being startled or sexual arousal and erotic love. See Arist., *An.*, 3.9 432b; *Motu an.*, 11; M.C. Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire* (1994), 83-5.

music, theatre, painting, staged executions, etc. give rise to genuine emotions, arguing instead that they arouse only ‘first movements’ or ‘propatheia’ as a part of his three-stage account of emotion. See L.C. Becker, ‘Stoic Emotion’ (2004).

The Stoics had defined ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις) as ‘a sort of motion of the soul toward the proposition contained in an impression’. Zeno, as Galen would have us believe, differentiated between judgment, assent or opinion, and passionate impulse. This accounts for his addition of the adjectives ‘supervening’ (ἐπιγιγνόµενη) or ‘following’ (ἐπόµενον) to the term ‘judgment’ (κρίσις). For Zeno, the judgment or opinion initiates the impulse that follows but is not to be equated with it. Hence, the table above divides his account of the cognitive process that leads to a passion into three distinct stages.

Chrysippus, by contrast, had made the inference that the motion associated with the assent to both propositions in the impulsive impression is equivalent with the passionate impulse itself. Thus, like the Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues, he insisted that all motivations be analysed as forms of belief, a highly intellectualist approach. Chrysippus characterized the passions as mental perversions, rooted in the mistaken judgments or beliefs of the commanding faculty itself and formed as a by-product of the process of the soul’s rational comprehension and response to impressions that gives rise to an impulse. Since Chrysippus reduced the number of phases from three to two when he equated the passionate impulse with assent or opinion, the table above divides his account into two stages.

It is unclear from the extant sources exactly how Zeno conceptualized the details of psychic process from impression to judgment to impulse. Did he envision it as two subsequent impulses, with the mental motion associated with assent culminating in a judgment that in turn initiates a second passionate impulse toward the object in question? Or, did he construe it as different elements of a single impulse, such that the assent or judgment serves as the ground or point of initiation of the same impulse that follows? However one might understand Zeno’s approach, Galen argued that he clearly sought to draw a boundary between the judgment or opinion and the passionate impulse that follows.

252 Stob., Anth. II 7.9b.
253 J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (1992), 75-8; T. Brennan, ‘Stoic Moral Psychology’ (2003), 259-60. See Plato, Prt. 352b-354a, 358d-e. Gill suggests that the Stoics also picked up the ‘strand’ of Platonic thinking in the Republic that sometimes ‘posited two competing sets of beliefs and (correlated emotions or desires’. See C. Gill, ‘Did Galen Understand’ (1998), 114-5. Irwin argues that though ‘assent’ is an activity of the mind, the Stoics still sought to retain some sense of passivity in their conception of passions by suggesting that ‘when we act on passion we fail to interfere with or to question the suggestion that the appearance makes’. See T.H. Irwin, ‘Stoic Inhumanity’ (1998), 222.
In terms of the Stoic definition of the passions, the difference between the two approaches becomes apparent when we look at various components for the passions in the Stoic accounts. For instance, the Stoic definition of the passions could be divided into the following components within the cognitive process that eventuates in an impulse:

(a) an impulsive impression arising from an object
(b) the assent to the proposition that the object is good or bad; because it is incorrect or weak, it is an opinion or wrong judgment
(c) the simultaneous judgment that one ought to pursue or avoid the object, which amounts to the impulse
(d) the supervening irrational appetency or pursuit, which includes a concurrent change in the shape of the soul itself and possible simultaneous physical manifestations or epiphenomena such as a quickening of the heart or flushing of the cheeks.254

According to Galen’s account, then, Chrysippus would have identified a passion with (b) and (c) above, while Zeno would have opted for option (d) alone.255

In the Chrysippian view, the mind first wrongly attributes a good or evil valuation to an object of impression – that is, it makes a judgment that is incorrect about the reality of the object in view, which results in an opinion. Additionally, this opinion includes the subsequent determination that one ought to respond accordingly, regardless of what qualitative feeling-tone one may or may not actually

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254 Price offers a similar outline of the structure of the emotional event as impression-assent-impulse-action, but he does not distinguish the concomitant change in psychic shape that occurs with the impulse, which he later discusses in relation to the assent in any case. See A.W. Price, ‘Zeno and Chrysippus at Odds?’ (2005), 472, 474-7; Gill notes that the concurrent change in the soul’s shape, together with possible bodily feeling-tones, reflects their effort to synthesize elements drawn from each branch of philosophy, including in this case, physics. The concurrent contractions and expansions of the soul, in other words, are the physics flip-side to viewing impulse in terms of Stoic logic. See C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 454-5. Lloyd notes that nearly all of these elements can be viewed as a development of Aristotle’s account of the emotions. As such, both accounts include a number of common features: presentation, an object toward which the emotions are directed, appetition (or its opposite), the necessity of assent to a ‘practical predicate’ to produce action, beliefs about the past or future, physiological conditions. Key differences exist as well: Stoic materialism versus Aristotle’s hylomorphism, Aristotle’s insistence on an irrational source of impulse, his combining pleasure, pain, or desire within a single passion as opposed to the Stoic approach of identifying a passion with just one cardinal state. See A.C. Lloyd, ‘Emotions in Stoic Psychology’ (1978), 235-7. Frede offers an alternative, three part outline of the emotional event as 1) the judgment or belief, which includes an assent to an evaluative proposition implicit in an impression, 2) the corresponding physiological state, 3) one’s awareness of this state and belief. See M. Frede, ‘Stoic Doctrine of Affections’ (1986), 102-3.

255 See also Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.111.
experience. These two judgments are solely sufficient and necessary to constitute a passion. So, by way of illustration, Chrysippus understood the passion of desire to be fully constituted as soon as the soul arrives at the opinion that an impression of some prospective object is a good, when in fact it is not, and then determines to pursue it. Similarly, as soon as the mind assents to the proposition that it is appropriate to contract, the passion of grief is fully constituted. The movement of mind associated with the process of coming to an opinion and making the judgment was adequate for Chrysippus to satisfy the Stoic description of passion as a type of mental impulse or movement. Any feeling of craving or elation or contraction was thus conceived of as an asymmetrical physical-correlate with the passion, either of the pre-emotional, initial impulsive impression or the invariable concomitant physical movement of the mind the follows the judgment. By arguing in this manner, he sought to establish, against the Platonic model of which Galen was so fond, that all of the passions are in our control, underscoring the priority given by Chrysippus’ model to one’s motivation over the phenomenology of emotions.

Alternatively, Zeno had identified desire with the feeling that supervenes upon the belief, opting for option (d) alone. Zeno, then, would have accepted (b) and (c) – the opinion and the simultaneous judgment to act – as causes of the passions, but would have identified the passion itself with the feeling of irrational craving or dejection or elation that supervenes or follows from the mind’s prior judgment. Hence, the passion itself is not in our control, insofar as it comes about reflexively, consequent upon the prior judgment of the mind concerning the goodness or badness of the object in question and the appropriateness to react. Nevertheless, Zeno still ultimately held the individual responsible for his or her feelings because though a person may not be able to control the consequent contractions or elations of the soul (d), one can make right judgments about what is good or evil (b) and what one

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258 Stob., Anth. 2.7.10b; Galen, Plac. IV 17.4; Cic., Tusc. IV 6.14.
260 For further discussion, see R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 34-41.
261 Brennan asserts this to be the case for all Stoic emotional theory, dismissing Galen’s distinction between Chrysippus’ and Zeno’s approach. He argues that the Stoic identification of reality with causal efficacy plays a role in this context. The proper signification of the term ‘passion’ is the causal agent, not the effects that follow. See T. Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 91-3.
262 But see Them., In Ar. de an. 107.17. Themistius appears to contradict Galen by stating that ‘those of Zeno’ identified the passions with the mistaken judgments of reason. Of course, Themistius may not be referring particularly to Zeno so much as to his party, i.e. the Stoics in general.
should pursue (c), out of which either feeling-tones arise or continue from the pre-emotional initial impulsive impression now assented to.\textsuperscript{263} And, just as importantly, both Stoics attributed this entire process to a single part of the soul, not multiple centres as in the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts.

Just as it was axiomatic for both Stoics that the passions ‘arise’ (βλαστάνω) out of ‘a perversion of the mind’ (διαστροφὴ ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν),\textsuperscript{264} so Philo traced the soul’s generation of the passions back to what he referred to as ‘a wretched mind’ (ἀθλιος νοῦς).\textsuperscript{265} He linked this sort of mind with that of the fool, whose contours reflected a Stoic conception as detailed previously.\textsuperscript{266} However, as we have outlined above, the two leading Stoics differed in their accounts of what constituted the passion itself.\textsuperscript{267} Chrysippus opted for a more intellectualist understanding of passion as identical with the mind’s wrong judgments, but Zeno treated the mind’s judgments and opinions as the causes of the passions, while identifying the passions themselves with the subsequent psychic movements. Philo consistently refrained from outright identification of the passions with judgments themselves, though he clearly knew of the Chrysippian position. Rather, in practice he opted for choice (d) above, that is, Zeno’s identification of the passions with the psychic movements that result from the mind’s judgments.

Though Philo’s psychology was essentially Stoic, his explanation for how the passions arise in the mind reflected a mixture of Stoic, Platonic, and New Academic/Sceptic influences. Philo denigrated the value of bodily and external things on Platonic or Socratic grounds,\textsuperscript{268} since in his view both only participate in the sensible realm of shadowy, transitory existence.\textsuperscript{269} For this reason, he argued that the man of worth purifies his soul of its passions and sicknesses precisely when he sets up a wall between it and any opinion that things external to the soul are genuine goods.\textsuperscript{270} The changing character of the sensible realm, moreover, led Philo

\textsuperscript{263} Boeri draws the same conclusion. See M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 402-4.
\textsuperscript{264} Diog. Laert., \textit{Vit. phil.} 7.110.
\textsuperscript{265} Philo, \textit{Conf.} 106; \textit{Migr.} 99; \textit{Leg.} 2.102, 3.230.
\textsuperscript{266} Philo, \textit{Leg.} 2.103, \textit{Migr.} 99-100. At the same time, this image could conveniently double as one of his variations of Plato’s charioteer metaphor. Philo thus likened ‘the wretched mind’ to a horseman, who sits on the four passions as upon a four-legged horse. See Philo, \textit{Leg.} 2.102.
\textsuperscript{268} Plato, \textit{Phd.} 64e, 65d, 67c-d, 68c-d, 80e, 82c.
\textsuperscript{269} J.C. Malone, \textit{Psychology} (2009), 56.
\textsuperscript{270} Philo, \textit{Abr.} 217-24. See also Philo, \textit{Ios.} 258; \textit{Sacr.} 43. Compare with Plato, \textit{Phd.} 65b-66c, 82e-83c. As is so often the case with Philo, he did once join the Peripatetics, however, in allowing
to draw upon the Sceptic notion of the uncertainty of the mind’s comprehension of and reasoning about the universe, arguing instead that the soul should only trust in God, the font of its existence and source of its virtue. To trust in anything else, including its own reasoning, inevitably leads the soul into opinion, conjecture, wrong judgments, and the passions that follow. Finally, from an ethical point of view, Philo argued that the passions take their start from ‘a wretched mind’ that makes a wrong moral valuation concerning what is in fact good or evil. The mind counts as worthy of pursuit or avoidance things that in reality are not. For this reason, Philo argued that passions such as grief are caused by ‘our own hands’, that is, by a voluntary movement of our minds toward ‘what is inferior’ (πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον).271 While the inferiority of sensible and noetic objects was due to their contingent character as created things, Philo also argued with the Stoics from the first principle that virtue is ‘the only good’, which entailed the attendant notion that bodily and most external realities are not true goods.272 In each of these cases, passions arise in the mind when it counts as good or evil what is in fact not, and responds accordingly. We will look at each of these elements in greater detail below.

While Philo was at one with the Stoics in deriving the passions from a mind that misconstrues what is true and good, he diverged from them with regard to the ontological and epistemological grounds for his conclusion. The Stoics had argued that the sensible world was a realm of real objects that the mind is naturally able to grasp by means of sense impression. They guaranteed the veracity and certainty of the mind’s apprehension by posing a controversial ‘criterion of truth’ (κριτήριον ἀλήθείας), which they called ‘a cognitive impression’ (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία).273 The Stoics argued that, under normal circumstances, real objects give to the natural mind impressions that are ‘of such a kind as could not arise from what is not’.274 As such, a cognitive impression is a type of automatic, self-authenticating impression that genuinely corresponds to a real object or state of affairs.275 It includes three

that bodily and external goods can in some manner contribute to one’s happiness in some way at QG 3.16.

271 Philo, Det. 122.
272 Note also that Philo’s body-soul dualism, inspired especially from Plato’s Phaedo, could also lead to a similar conclusion. Compare Plato, Phd. 82c-d.
273 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.46; Sext. Emp., Math. 7.151; for further explanation, see J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 68-9. Note, later Stoics emphasized cognitive impressions less after Panaetius shifted the conversation away from a focus on the sage to ordinary people. See Cic., Off. 1.6-7, 46.
274 Cic., Acad. post. 2.18, 33, 77, 103, 112; Sext. Emp., Math. 7.154, 248, 402.
275 Cic., Acad. post. 2.18; Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.46; Sext. Emp., Math. 7.257.
elements – the reality of the object or state of affairs in view, the impression or stamp on the soul itself that correctly corresponds to the object, and the inimitable manner of the impression that guarantees its truth. By contrast, the Stoics characterized ‘an incognito impression’ (ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία) as imprecise, obscure, internally contradicted, and false. Consequently, for the Stoics, the sensible world is a source of the truly real that the mind can genuinely grasp through cognitive impressions. This focus on the material and sensible as the locus of reality proceeded from their materialistic physics, which ascribed corporeality not only to the cosmos, but also to the soul and to God.

Philo, in contrast, opted for a ‘Platonically inspired’ conception of the universe that entailed an uncertainty in the mind’s comprehension of the sensible realm. He deemed the sensible realm to be a region of uncertainty since it is a mortal and changing copy, while the noetic world of the ideas, forms, souls, and the divine is the archetypal, eternal and unchanging place of certainty, and truly real. He argued that the soul grasps real existences when it is most disassociated from the body and its senses, since no created thing is ever firm, immutable, fixed, or permanent; only God is. Consequently, Philo could adopt the Stoic notion of ‘cognitive impressions’, though he could likewise insist with the Sceptic tradition on ‘the indiscriminability’ (ἀπαραλλαξία) of cognitive and incognitive impressions. The earlier proponents of scepticism, namely, the New Academics, had done so on a dogmatic basis, whereas the later Sceptics refused to be dogmatic about even the doctrine of indiscriminability. The resulting uncertainty about human apprehensions led to the New Academy’s assertion that one could only affirm ‘the probability’ (πιθανός) of one’s judgment that a thing is good or evil and the Middle Academic and Sceptic ideal of the philosopher’s ‘suspension of judgment’ (ἡ ἐποχή). They argued that there is no impression from something true in the sensible world that could not also be exactly identical to another impression.

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276 Cic., Acad. xx, xxi; Cic., Acad. post. 2.18.
277 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.46.
279 Philo, Conf. 105-6.
283 Ibid., 1.226-8.
284 Ibid., 1.8, 10, 232.
that comes from something false. Moreover, they marshalled a number of arguments to demonstrate how the mind might mistake a false impression for a true one or vice versa. For instance, it might mistake identical twins, confuse the impressions of vivid dreams with reality, or be unable to distinguish two identical statues, even though they are metaphysically dissimilar in some way. In similar fashion, Philo could argue that the soul ought ‘to suspend judgment’ (τὸ ἐπεχειν) because of the uncertainty of its comprehension. Indeed, he even invoked and summarized the Sceptic ten ‘modes of suspension’ in support of his contention that the mind ought not to trust its own judgments, whether concerning sensible things or objects of thoughts.

Philo nevertheless diverged from both the Academics and Sceptics in asserting both that the soul can possess ‘knowledge’ (ἐπιστήµη) and that it must fully trust in God, underscoring the presence of his Jewish and religious commitments. While Philo conceded the Sceptic insistence on the uncertainty of the knowledge derived from our senses, he nevertheless still held out the possibility that the soul can come to possess genuine, secure knowledge. After arguing, for instance, that the lower school course or encyclical education served as a proper preparation for philosophy, he held out the possibility that the soul can come to possess knowledge, which he defined in Stoic manner as ‘a sure and certain apprehension, which cannot be shaken by argument’. Like the Stoics, he then asserted that both philosophy and the virtues are forms of knowledge. His definition of knowledge, equation with virtue and identification with the study of philosophy touched on the two sides of the Stoic conception of ‘knowledge’. On the one hand, his definition and equation with virtue treated ‘knowledge’ as ‘an event’ or ‘episode of knowing’. On the other hand, his identification of knowledge with the study of philosophy highlighted its

285 Cic., Acad. xxii-iii; Cic., Acad. post. 2.77, 84.
286 For the Academic arguments, see Cic., Acad. post. 2.54-8, 84-8; Sext. Emp., Math. 7.408-10. For the Sceptic modes of suspension, see Sext. Emp., Pyr. 1.36-163.
287 Philo, Ebr. 166-9, 192, 200, 205; Fug. 136.
288 Sext. Emp., Pyr. 1.36-163.
290 Philo, Congr. 141. Compare with Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 1.68; Dillon noted that Philo had also just given the technical Stoic definition of ‘an art’ (τέχνη) as ‘a system of conceptions co-ordinated to work for some useful end’. See J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 145; Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 1.73.
291 Philo, Congr. 142.
292 T. Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 70.
comprehensive and systematic character. Hence, one of the central characteristics of his sage, as a true philosopher, was the possession of Stoic knowledge, not Sceptic suspension of judgment. Philo considered the soul possessed of ‘a wretched mind’ to be fundamentally foolish and atheistic. He described it as the sort of mind that trusts in its own empty ‘reasonings’ (λογισμοί), rather than in God. Since the mind cannot know for certain if its thoughts and impressions are ultimately true, Philo argued that its calculations are consequently full of ‘uncertainty’ (ἀσάφεια), ‘guesswork’ (αἰνίγμα), and ‘conjecture’ (εἰκασία). For example, he pointed out that a doctor can prescribe a regimen for recovery, but the program often proves unhelpful. Similarly, a farmer may draw up a schedule for planting and harvesting a crop, only to be frustrated by unforeseen changes in the weather. For Philo, the only true dogma is to trust in God, the First Cause, and not in one’s own insecure reasonings.

Philo went on to point out that the passions arise precisely from this ‘wretched mind’ that trusts in its own reasonings and conjectures, rather than God:

An irrational impulse (ἄλογος ὀρμή) issues forth (ἐξέρχομαι) and goes its rounds (φοιτάω) both from our reasonings (λογισμοί) and from mind that corrupts the truth (ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ διαφθείροντος τὴν ἀλήθειαν) … in this way, it is irrational to trust in plausible reasonings or in mind corrupting that which is true (ἄλογον τὸ πιστεύειν ἢ λογισμοῖς πιθανοῖς ἢ νῦ διαφθείροντι τὸ ἀληθές). As we have already shown, Philo had everywhere equated ‘irrational impulse’ with passion. In this passage, he sought to show how the irrationality of a passionate impulse is grounded in the fundamentally irrational character of a mind that trusts in its own deliberations and assents rather than in the truly Existent One. The source of the impulses is not the Platonic or Peripatetic alternative parts of the soul exterior to the mind, but rather the reasoning and mind that corrupt the truth. This corruption of truth arises precisely when the mind trusts in its own apprehensions, rather than in God. When mind trusts in its own perceptions and reasonings, it loses touch with ultimate reality, which is identical with the truly existent God in whom the

293 J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 70-1.
294 Philo, Gig. 22; Migr. 57-8, 197; Her. 313-5.
295 For ‘foolish’, see Philo, Ebr. 162, 197. For ‘atheistic’, see Philo, Leg. 3.228-9.
296 Philo, Ebr. 167; Leg. 3.226-7, 31.
297 Philo, Leg. 3.229.
governing reason of the universe abides. As a result, the mind falls into unreason and corruption of truth and its impulses likewise begin to move in an irrational manner.

For Philo, the reasonings, conjectures, and guesswork that ‘the wretched mind’ takes to be true, are in fact ‘false opinion’ (ἡ ψευδὴς δόξα). It can take many forms, but at bottom, Philo argued that ‘the wretched mind’ counts as a good or as an evil something that is in fact not. Such a mind thus mistakenly reckons as true, good, or evil many things that come to it through the senses, but which in reality are only mortal and mutable created objects. As a result, the fool’s perverted mind, kindled by these objects of sense, is set on fire, which in turn ignites its passions.

Though Philo consistently anchored the passions in the mind’s erroneous moral valuations, he did not follow Chrysippus in identifying the passions with its judgments or opinions. Philo never once identified passion with ‘opinion’ (δόξα), ‘weak assumption’ (ὑπόληψις), or ‘assumption’ (ὑπόληψις). Instead, like Zeno, he pictured the passions as following opinion. In the one instance where he did closely link opinion and the passions, when reflecting on the song of Moses in Exodus 15:1-21, which praises the Lord for his destruction of Pharaoh and his army, Philo described the Pharaoh as ‘the imperial opinion of the passions’ (ἡγεµονὶς τῶν παθῶν δόξα). In this text, he thus allegorically identified Pharaoh with godless opinion, but the passions, by inference, with the army the followed.

Philo never unambiguously identified the passions with judgment either. Though he did closely relate passion and judgment in several texts, the question of Chrysippian equation is open to dispute. Winston suggests that Philo is noncommittal at Legum allegoriae 2.6 about Chrysippus’ view that the passions are judgments. In his discussion of the creation of the soul, Philo suggested that the mind is older than the irrational parts of the soul, which include the senses and their ‘offspring’ the passions. He defended this thesis by adding that it is unquestionably the case ‘if they are not the result of any choice of our own’ (εἰ μὴ κρίσεως εἰσίν ἡµέτεραι). In this instance Philo signalled his unwillingness to commit to Chrysippus’ proposition by his use of the conditional particle ‘if’ (εἰ). In Legum

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298 Philo, Leg. 3.230.
299 Philo, Conf. 106.
300 Philo, Mig. 100.
301 Philo, Leg. 3.13; compare with Ex. 15:4 and 19 (LXX).
302 Philo, Abr. 223; Spec. 2.89; Leg. 2.6, 3.116; Prob. 23.
allegoriae 3:116 Philo likewise spoke of ‘our faculty of judgment’ and the passion being found in the irrational part of the soul.304 As in 2.6 above, Philo envisioned the mind going out from the purely intellectual realm, which is ‘proper to it’ (οἰκεῖος) and giving itself over to what is inferior. In 2.6, what is ‘inferior’ refers to irrational sense, whereas in 3:116-7 it refers to the breast and belly, where pleasure dwells. Nevertheless, Philo did not explicitly equate passion and judgment, nor did he outline in detail the relation of the two. The notion of the mind giving itself up to what is inferior as both a poor judgment and cause of the passions could certainly fit within a Zenonian perspective.

In De specialibus legibus 2.89, Philo described ‘painful feelings’ (τὰ ὀδυνηρὰ) caused by the harsh burdens placed on slaves by masters as ‘stamped’ (ἐντυπόω) ‘with more vivid impressions’ (τρανοτέραις φαντασίαις) on reason than ‘sense perception’ (αἴσθησις).305 Pohlenz cited this text as another candidate for identifying passion with judgment.306 Again, Philo did not explicitly identify the vivid mental impressions that are stamped on the mind as judgments. It highlights the corporeal character of the soul, basic to Stoic psychology, when Philo describes the painful feelings as ‘vivid impressions’ stamped on the mind. The mind is passive here in that the painful feelings have impressed themselves on it from outside without the mind’s power. If anything, these painful feelings rather exhibit the character of Stoic propatheiai, which reflect an impact of an impression on the physical soul as well as the body before the mind assents. This description, however, would hold true for both Zeno and Chrysippus. Neither do the two remaining passages offer anything definitive. In his philosophical reflection on the Stoic theme that ‘only the wise man is free’, Philo argued that the evils of vice and passion find their source within the soul and its judgments.307 Similarly, in De Abrahamo Philo argued that our passions prevail depending on one’s decision about what constitutes the soul’s true good.308 In neither passage did Philo explicitly identify passion and

304 Philo, Leg. 3.116. Winston suggested that ‘our’ may refer to ‘our own inferior brutish part rather than the Daemon with us, which we share with the world-governing daemon’. D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 218-9. This would thus see Platonic provenance for the notion. Plato, Tim. 47b-c, 90a-d.
305 Philo, Spec. 2.89.
307 Philo, Prob. 23, 159.
308 Philo, Abr. 223.
judgment. Instead, he argued only that the passions are grounded in one’s judgments and, as such, are voluntary movements originating in the mind.

By contrast, Philo did repeatedly and explicitly identify the passions with impulse and movement. We see this, above all, in his formal definition of passion in *De specialibus legibus* 4:79 quoted at the beginning of the chapter. There, he defined passion as ‘inordinate and excessive impulse’ and as ‘an irrational and unnatural movement’ of the soul. Moreover, he repeatedly equated the passions with impulse or movement of the soul throughout his corpus. On numerous occasions he treated passion and ‘impulse’ (ὁρμή) interchangeably or in apposition to one another. He often modified impulse in keeping with his formal definition of passion as well. Hence, he described passion(s) as ‘irrational impulse’ (ἄλογος ὁρμή), ‘random impulse’ (ἄκριτος ὁρμή), ‘inordinate and excessive impulse’ (ἀμετρὸς καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή), ‘unmeasured impulses’ (αἱ ἄμετροι ὀρμαί), and ‘violent and irresistible’ (ὀξύς and ἀνεπίσχετος) impulse. Finally, he also identified the passions with ‘the movement’ (κίνησις) of the soul.

**Conclusion**

Philo followed the Stoics in treating passion as a type of impulse or psychic movement. He located the source of passionate impulses in the mind insofar as the perversion of the impulse arises from its erroneous moral valuations of sensible pleasure and pain as worthy of pursuit or avoidance and from its internal weakness and instability. Regarding the appropriate telos of impulse, he followed the Stoics in treating virtue as the only good, the body-soul dualism of especially Plato’s *Phaedo* in assigning an inferior ontological status to the changing realm of body and sense, and his Jewish religious conviction in insisting upon the soul’s dependence on God. Within the intra-Stoic debate regarding the exact character of the passions, Philo appears to have sided with Zeno’s putative identification of passion with the psychic impulse or movement that follows from opinion and false judgment, against

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309 Philo, *Opif.* 81; *Leg.* 1.73, 3.118, 128, 185, 229, 248-9; *Sacr.* 81; *Post.* 74; *Congr.* 55; *Deus* 44; *Ebr.* 98, 111; *Conf.* 55, 90; *Mut.* 174; *Somn.* 2.276; *Spec.* 1.305, 4.79, 99.
310 Philo, *Leg.* 3.185, 229, 248-9; *Post.* 74; *Ebr.* 98, 111; *Conf.* 55, 90; *Spec.* 4.79.
312 Philo, *Conf.* 90; *Her.* 245; *Somn.* 2.276; *Abr.* 243; *Spec.* 1.305, 4.79; *Mos.* 2.139.
313 Philo, *Opif.* 81; *Congr.* 55 (singular), 61.
314 Philo, *Spec.* 2.11.
315 Philo, *Decal.* 142; *Spec.* 4.79.
Chrysippus’ identification of passion with opinion itself. While we have overwhelming evidence for Philo’s equation of the passions with excessive impulse and unnatural psychic movement, he never once explicitly identified passion with opinion.
Chapter 2: The characteristics of passion

Having discussed passion as a type of impulse in the previous chapter, we now turn to how Philo modified the concept of this impulse. For the sake of convenience, let us recall Philo’s formal definition of a passion:

Every passion (πάθος) is blameworthy (ἐπίληπτον). This follows from the censure due to every inordinate and excessive impulse (ἴμετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή) and to irrational and unnatural movements (ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις) of the soul, for both these are nothing else than the opening out of a longstanding passion (παλαιὸν πάθος ἐξηπλωμένον).1

In this definition, as we briefly noted at the beginning of the previous chapter, Philo uses four key descriptors to characterize passion. This impulse is inordinate and excessive, irrational, contrary to nature, and blameworthy. We will now explore each of these modifiers in detail.

When we compare these four elements of Philo’s characterization of the passions to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, we find that although he did draw on Plato and Aristotle, he remained fundamentally Stoic. While Plato and Aristotle had discussed the passions in terms of these four descriptors, this particular make up was Stoic. Moreover, as we will see in this chapter, when we investigate further what Philo meant by each of these terms, we find that his understanding remained broadly Stoic. We do, however, have to view the irrationality and excessiveness of the passionate impulse in the light of the latter two elements – its unnatural and blameworthy character – because on their own merits, it is difficult to make a conclusive judgment. This ambiguity arises from the fact that all parties described passion as irrational and excessive. The difference in their understanding of these terms depended firstly, on their portrayal of the soul as either complex, as was the case for the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions, or simple, as was the case for the Stoa. Secondly, it depended on how they handled the question of whether or not a passion is natural and, to a lesser degree, blameworthy.

In this chapter, we will begin by outlining how each philosophical school understood the irrationality and excessiveness of passion, and briefly show how

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1 Philo, Spec. 4.79; compare also Philo, Leg. 3.185.
Philo compares with each. Since these first two descriptors are inconclusive on their own inasmuch as all parties described passion as irrational and excessive, we will explore them together. We will then look at the naturalness and blameworthiness of passion separately. These two latter descriptions will help us evaluate Philo’s own understanding of passion, since in both cases the Stoics diverged widely from the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions. Again, we will first review how each of the three philosophical traditions handled these two descriptions and then conclude each section by situating Philo among them, before concluding the chapter with a summary evaluation of Philo’s conception of the passions.

**Irrational and excessive**

Philo, the Stoics, Plato and Aristotle *all* characterized the passions as ‘irrational’ and ‘excessive’. All parties ascribed a similar overall outcome to the notion of irrationality; that is, that irrational passions are impulses that move against right reason in relation to things external and beyond our control. The differences among the parties came rather as a result of how they treated passion’s irrationality in relation to the other elements and to the composition of the soul itself. Here the Stoics diverged significantly from Plato and Aristotle, given their distinct psychic monism. The Stoics conceived of the irrationality of the passions paradoxically as a perversity in reason itself, whereby it either assents to impressions as good or bad when they are in reality indifferent, or it assents from a weak and unstable disposition.² By contrast, both the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions understood the irrationality of the passions as the variable, disorderly, and natural working of a separate part of the soul that is inherently resistant to modification by teaching and oriented toward an inadequate view of things, although such irrationality did not exclude a certain awareness and inadequate or false beliefs about the worth of the objects of emotion.³ Since this other part of the soul cannot be expunged, it needs reason to direct, check, and guide it toward right reason.⁴

Similarly, all parties could describe the passions as excessive with more or less the same sense, namely, that an impulse is too strong. Again, each tradition’s treatment of passion’s excessiveness depended on other principles. For Plato, the

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⁴ Plut., *Virt. mor.* 442a-c.
passions are inherently irrational and chaotic. Like irrational animals, their irrationality will often result in wild and excessive movements, unless trained and tamed by reason. Aristotle accepted Plato’s basic characterization, but modified it with his doctrine of the mean. Passions can be excessive, but are not necessarily so. They can also be too weak. Neither type of impulse is ideal. Instead, the virtuous soul must aim for the mean in her expression of the passions. While Plato’s doctrine was subject to such an interpretation, this was nevertheless an innovation unique to Aristotle. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics considered all passions to be excessive. Moreover, they rejected the notion of taming the passions or seeking moderation in their expression. Their impulse should be neither excessive, nor deficient, nor moderate. Instead, passion should not exist in the soul at all! The question before us is where to situate Philo among these traditions, even as we recognize that he did not see himself as an adherent of any of these schools, but rather of Moses. Let us first look more closely at how the schools handled the irrationality and excessiveness of the passions, before attempting to situate Philo among them.

With regard to the irrationality of the passions, it is important to remember that both Plato and Aristotle treated the soul as fundamentally complex, although in the details they did divide the irrational parts or functions of the soul differently. For Plato, as we will discuss in greater detail in chapters three and four of section two, the soul is divided into three parts. For Plato, the mind is by nature rational, divine, immortal and orderly, housed in the head as in a citadel, while the ‘spirited’ (τὸ θυμοειδές, θυμικόν) and ‘appetitive’ (τὸ ἔπιθυμητικόν) parts are of a different quality – mortal, irrational, and disorderly. Both are housed in the trunk of the body, separated from the mind by the neck as a sort of isthmus, with the spirited part lodged in the heart and the appetitive in the region of the stomach.5

Additionally, Plato closely linked the two lower parts to ‘sense perception’ (αἴσθησις). He did not treat sense perception as a part of the soul, but rather as an affection of the soul alongside and coextensive with the two irrational parts, and closely linked to the body. For him, both sense perception and the irrational parts of the soul were added ‘later’ as a consequence of the pre-existent mind or soul’s

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5 Plato, *Tim.* 69c-72d, 89e-90d.
embodiment. As such, he described sense perception as ‘fused’ or ‘mixed’ (συγκεράννυµι) with the lower parts of the soul. By sense perception then, the disorderly, random and irrational external commotions of the six motions are conducted through the body to the soul and ‘strike against’ (προσπίπτω) it, producing disorder or ‘disturbances’ (παθήµατα), pleasures or pains within the soul itself.

Plato associated the spirited part especially with anger and courage, making it out to be a natural ally to reason, though it is susceptible to corruption by bad education and outside influences so that it can become a collaborator with the appetitive part. Finally, he linked the appetitive part especially to the desire for the manifold kinds of bodily pleasures. As such, he characterized it as the most unruly part of the soul, the least receptive to reason, multiform due to the wide variety of pleasures that it seeks, and the largest part of the soul. Consequently, we see that Plato made a close correlation between the spatial composition of the tripartite soul, the location of the psychic parts in the body, and the passions. Indeed, he essentially identified the two lower parts, the spirited and appetitive, with the passions of anger and desire. One is hardly able logically to distinguish the two.

Aristotle preferred to conceive of the soul’s ‘parts’ (µόρια) as several ‘faculties’ or ‘powers’ (δυνάµεις), though he retained elements of Plato’s putative homunculi

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6 Ibid., 42a.
7 Ibid., 42a, 69d, 77b.
8 For Plato, the six motions referred to motions in any of six directions. The first and second motions are those that go forwards or backwards, the third and fourth are those that move to the right and the left, and the fifth and sixth motions are those that travel up and down. Plato associated these motions with chaos, disorder and wandering. See Plato, Tim. 34b. Plato equated the seventh motion, that of a sphere turning continuously in the same place, with understanding and intelligence (περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν). See Plato, Tim. 34a. For Aristotle’s criticism, see Arist., An. 1.3 407a.
9 Plato, Tim. 43c, 44a, 64b, 65a.
10 See Sedley’s discussion on the spirited part’s role in the soul in Resp. 4.439e-441 as an ‘internal police force’ akin to what philosophy later identified as the will. D. Sedley, ‘Commentary on Mansfeld’ (1991), 147-8.
11 Plato, Resp. 4.440b-d, 442c, 9.580d.
12 Ibid., 4.436a, 439d, 442a, 9.580d; Plato, Tim. 69d-e, 77b.
13 Arist., An. 2.4 415a, 416a; 3.9 431a-b. Aristotle was aware of Plato’s tripartite division, but found this division of the soul into ‘parts’ (µόρια) unsatisfactory. See Arist., An. 3.9 432a-b; J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 154. Treatment of the parts of the soul would continue as ‘orthodox Aristotelianism’ thereafter. Stob., Anth. I 49.37; R.W. Sharples, ‘Peripatetics on Soul and Intellect’ (2007), 615. Nevertheless, Aristotle continued to call these faculties ‘parts’ (µόρια) or ‘principles’ (ἀρχή), but redefined as distinct psychic powers. For Aristotle’s use of ‘parts’ (µόρια), see Arist., An. 1.2 406b, 1.5 411b, 2.2 431b, 3.4 429a. His use of ‘principle’ (ἀρχή), see Arist., An. 1.5 411b. The Peripatetic tradition too continued to conceive of the soul’s divisions as ‘parts’ (µόρια) or (µόρια), though the writer of the Magna moralia also makes a bipartite division of those elements of the soul that account for human conduct, into τὸ λόγον ἑgamma and τὸ ἀλογον. As such, it does not try to account for those non-rational elements or powers such as nutrition, sensation,
theory, as we will show below. These included the nutritive, the perceptive – which accounts for touch, sight, smell, taste, and hearing, the appetitive, imagination, and the mind, which he divided into contemplative and deliberative faculties. Though he distinguished these parts, principles, or faculties from one another, he eschewed associating them with a specific region of the body as Plato did. Further, Aristotle formally assigned Plato’s spirited part to ‘the desiderative part’ (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) of the soul on the ground that ‘wrath’ (θυμός) is a sort of ‘appetition’ (ὄρεξις) along with ‘wish’ (βούλησις) and ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμία), although in practice he often continued to recognize Plato’s distinction between the two. Hence, Aristotle (and the Peripatetic tradition that followed) rejected the independent status of the ‘spirited part’, together with ‘the distribution of desiderative elements among the three soul parts’ of Plato’s tripartite psychology.

Additionally, in his ‘hylomorphic’ and non-personalist account of ‘the soul’, Aristotle rejected Plato’s treatment of the emotions or passions as activities of the soul as a separable inner agent, which can have experiences independently of the body. For Aristotle, to attribute emotional phenomena to the soul alone disregards the bodily apparatus or matter as instrument or tool through which the relevant capacities must be displayed. Hence, the passion of anger can be viewed physiologically in terms of its ‘matter’ as ‘a boiling of the blood and warm substance surrounding the heart’, but philosophically in terms of its ‘form’ as ‘the appetite for returning pain for pain’. In order to fully understand a passion, one must take into account both the feeling and its bodily responses as an overall pattern.

or imagination. See Arist., *Mag. mor.* 1.1 1182a, 1.4 1185a, 1.5 1185b, 1.34 1196b, 2.7 1204b, 2.7 1206b, 2.10 1208a, 2.11 1211a; Asp., *In Eth. Nic.* 44. Provenance for Peripatetic terminology for the bipartite division can be found in Aristotle. See Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 1.1 1102a-1.13 1103a; *An.* 3.9 432a; *Pol.* 7.15 1334b; P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Aristotle’s Criticism of Soul-Division’ (1987), 628, 630. Vander Waerdt argues that a bipartite division of the soul was well established in the Academy in Plato’s lifetime. See id., ‘Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 283.


15 Arist., *An.* 1.3 407b, 1.5 411b, 2.2 413b.

16 Ibid., 2.3 414b; Vander Waerdt shows that this collapse of the spirited and appetitive parts into a single, irrational, desiderative part became fixed in the Peripatetic tradition, as shown in the *Magna moralia*, in later doxographers such as Arius Didymus, and in the Middle Platonic movement. See P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 286-7, 294-301; id., ‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 373-82.

17 See for example, Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 7.6 1149a-b; Arist., *Rh.* 1.10 1369a.


20 Arist., *An.* 1.1 403a.
In spite of his ‘hylomorphism’,\(^{21}\) Aristotle, like Plato, made ‘agent intellect’ (ὁ νοῦς) to be qualitatively different from the other psychic powers inasmuch as it alone is eternal and separable from the body, pure form without the need of matter.\(^{22}\)

Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle further divided reason into two elements – ‘the scientific’ (τὸ ἐπιστηµονικὸν) faculty, which he also called ‘the contemplative’ (τὸ θεωρητικὸν), and ‘the deliberative’ (τὸ βουλευτικὸν) faculty, which he also referred to as ‘the calculative’ (τὸ λογιστικὸν) or ‘practical’ (πρακτικός) faculty of the mind.\(^{23}\)

For Aristotle, the mind’s scientific faculty contemplates unchanging principles (αἱ ἀρχαὶ µὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν) or ‘objects of thought’ (τὸ νοητόν) and is thus oriented exclusively toward ‘knowledge’ (ἐπιστήµη) of what is true or false, while the calculative deliberates about those things that can be ‘otherwise’ (τὰ ἐνδεχόµενα), that is, ‘objects of perception’ (τὸ αἰσθητόν), forms opinions and is oriented toward truth that is in agreement with right desire.\(^{24}\)

In spite of their differences regarding how to characterize the soul’s ‘parts’ or faculties, and in their enumeration of the divisions in the soul, Plato and Aristotle both made the same dualistic division between rational and irrational elements, which further underscored the soul’s basic complexity.\(^{25}\)

For both Plato and Aristotle, the mind served as the rational part of the soul. Whereas Plato identified the ‘spirited’ (τὸ θυµοειδὲς, θυµικόν) and the ‘appetitive’ (τὸ ἐπιθυµητικὸν) parts as irrational, Aristotle counted only a single ‘desiderative part’ (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) as irrational, comprehending within itself the parts associated with ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία) and ‘wrath’ (θυµός) that Philo had divided into two separate parts. In a manner reminiscent of Plato, Aristotle viewed perception and desire as intimately and


\(^{22}\) Arist., An. 1.4 408b; 2.2 413b, 3.4 429a, 3.5 430a. Caston points out that the identity of this ‘agent intellect’ has occasioned significant controversy over the last 2,300 years. Interpretations include assigning an ‘agent intellect’ to each individual soul, thus ensuring some form of personal immortality; assigning it only to souls more generally by connecting it to one or more of the higher intelligences or to God Himself; or characterizing it as a non-literal way of speaking of a higher kind of understanding shorn of any dualistic innuendos. See V. Caston, ‘Aristotle’s Psychology’ (2006), 238-41.

\(^{23}\) Vander Waerdt points out that the writer of the Magna moralia used λογιστικὸν as a general term for the rational part of the soul, a term that has no parallel in Aristotle. Rather, it shows a conflation of Plato’s tripartism with his own bipartite doctrine and terminology, since λογιστικὸν was Plato’s term for the rational part of the soul as a whole. See P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 289-90.

\(^{24}\) Arist., Eth. Nic. 6.1-2 1139a-b, 6.5 1140b; Arist., Mag. mor. 1.34 1196b.

\(^{25}\) Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.1 1219b; Arist., Mag. mor. 1.5 1185b; 1.1 1182a; Arist., Pol. 1.5 1254b, 1.13 1260a, 7.14 1333a, 7.15 1334b.
‘necessarily’ (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) connected with one another, though distinct. He argued that all animals must have at least the sense of touch, which includes at the minimum the capacity for pleasure and pain. Whatever possesses these capacities will in turn have objects that are pleasant or painful to it, and whenever there exists a capacity for pleasure, desire will also be present. For, Aristotle concluded, ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία) is ‘the appetite’ (ὄρεξις) for what is pleasant.  

Aristotle made an additional distinction between irrational and non-rational elements in the soul. By incorporating his moral psychology into the framework of his scala naturae, in addition to the irrational appetite and perception he introduced ‘the nutritive’ (τὸ θρεπτικόν) or ‘vegetative’ (τὸ φυτικόν) and ‘the perceptive’ (αἴσθησις) ‘parts’ or ‘powers’ of the soul as non-rational. The difference is that while the irrational faculties participate in reason inasmuch as they can obey or disobey reason and possess certain beliefs, even if they are by nature unruly, the nutritive element does not participate in either reason or moral virtue at all. The non-rational, nutritive portion instead functions in an automatic, unthinking manner as the principle of growth, nourishment, and reproduction in both animals and plants. For this reason, Aristotle identified the nutritive part as the only kind of soul found in plants. 

For both Plato and Aristotle, the parts of the soul are hierarchically organized with the rational elements at the top and the irrational at the bottom. For Plato, this is reflected in the dwelling place of each of the parts of the soul in the upright body. Situated at the apex of the body, the mind is thus its most sovereign part, overseeing and directing the rest of the soul. The two lower parts of the soul – the spirited and appetitive – are housed below the head and mind in the trunk of the body. But, of the two, the spirited part is superior to the appetitive since it is housed in the chest rather than in the abdominal region. 

Aristotle conceived of the hierarchy of the soul’s parts or powers more in terms of biological complexity, by relating the ‘forms’ of the soul to those functionalities

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26 Arist., An. 2.2 413b, 2.3 414b. 
27 Ibid., 2.3 414b. 
29 Arist., An. 1.5 411b, 2.2 413a, 2.5 416b-417a, 3.12 434a-b. 
30 Plato, Tim. 69c. 
31 Ibid., 69e.
of the body, which served as their ‘matter’.

Like Plato, Aristotle argued that the mind and reason is a different kind of soul from the lower parts. As such, only the most complex, rational creatures such as humans and gods fully share in reason and thought. Irrational animals and ‘beasts’ (θηρίον) share with humans in the irrational parts of the soul. This applies especially to sensation and its necessary derivative, appetite. Finally, at the bottom of the biological chain as the most primitive and widely distributed power of soul, humans, irrational animals and plants share in the non-rational nutritive part. Hence, we see Aristotle could continue to follow Plato in identifying the passions of desire and anger with the appetitive (and sometimes spirited) part of the soul, though he added significantly more complexity and detail to the soul by dividing reason into several elements, formalizing perception as a distinct element alongside the others, structuring the entire discussion around the entelechistic orientation of his psychology, adding a non-rational nutritive part to the soul, and rejecting Plato’s assertion in the Timaeus that plants share in ‘sense perception’ (αἴσθησις) and desires (ἐπιθυµία).

For both Plato and Aristotle, the irrationality of the lower parts of the soul was further reflected in their intimate connection with and orientation toward that which is bodily and earthly. The rational part of the soul – the mind – is directed toward heaven and the divine, while the lower parts are directed toward the earth and what is mortal. For Plato, as the divine root in us that is born of ‘heaven’ (οὐράνιος), the mind actually ‘raises [us] up’ (αἴρειν) toward its origin and ‘suspends’ (ἀνακεράννυµι) our heads above the earth. By so doing, the mind keeps our entire body erect. While both of the mortal parts of the soul – the spirited and appetitive – are irrational, the appetitive is more so, since in Plato’s scheme, as each part comes nearer the ground, its orientation is increasingly earthly and bodily and simultaneously less rational. Indeed, since the appetitive part is so near to the ground, Plato theorized that it is devoid of understanding and thus barely able to comprehend the directives of reason. As a consequence, the gods constructed and

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32 Arist., An. 2.1 412a-413a, 3.1 242b-425b.
33 Ibid., 4.3 414b.
34 For further discussion, see R. Sorabji, Animal Minds (2000), 12-6; Arist., An. 2.1 4.2 413b. For further discussion, see R. Sorabji, Animal Minds (2000), 97-98.
35 Arist., 4.2 413b.
36 Ibid., 4.3 414b, 4.4 415a.
37 Plato, Tim. 77a-b.
38 Plato, Tim. 90a.
39 Ibid., 71a, 77b.
placed the liver (ἡπαρ) near the appetitive part, constructing the liver in such a manner that the mind can control it by using the liver’s natural capacities for bitterness and sweetness to threaten and soothe it into compliance.40

Aristotle made the same distinction as Plato between the divine and theoretical orientation of the mind and the earthly and base orientation of the ‘desiderative part’ (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) of the soul. Indeed, Aristotle stressed the close nexus between the irrational, desiderative part of the soul and bodily pleasure. In a manner that recalls Plato,41 Aristotle argued that the desiderative part is especially directed toward the primary brute, bodily pleasures associated with touch, which he identified as food, drink and sexual intercourse. This is why Aristotle identified ‘self-indulgence’ or ‘intemperance’ (ἀκολασία) as the slavish exercise of the desiderative part of the soul with reference to these pleasures.42

In spite of Aristotle’s greater orientation toward a faculty psychology, like Plato he could attribute agent-like characteristics to the irrational parts by describing them as able to heed and obey the discourses of the reasoning faculty, which implies at least a limited participation in reason. Aristotle argued that the irrational and desiderative part of the soul ‘shares’ (µετέχει πως) in reason insofar as it is able to listen to and obey reason, and has the ability to possess beliefs.43 He likened ‘the possession of reason’ (ἔχειν λόγον) by the irrational parts of the soul to the manner in which we speak of someone when he listens to a father or friend, but not after the manner in which we speak of ‘the rational’ in mathematics. As a consequence, the irrational parts, while unruly, are capable of being persuaded, as is indicated by the power of admonition, censure, and exhortation to check the desires of the desiderative element.44 This is reminiscent of the ‘psychologically sophisticated rhetoric’ that Plato envisioned the reasoning part employing to convince the other parts to obey its directives.45 It was on this basis, too, that Aristotle argued at length in the Rhetoric for the manipulation of an audience’s emotions. Emotions, though they usually involve factual or evaluative thought, goal-directed behaviour, feelings,
and even bodily change as a necessary and constituent condition for their existence, both precede a judgment and can change it.\(^{46}\)

Both Plato and Aristotle thus portrayed the irrationality of the passions as a natural aspect of the separate, irrational element in the soul. As such, the irrationality of the passions was conceived as none other than the functioning of the irrational element of the soul, which is disorderly by nature. Additionally, this irrationality was characterized as unruly inasmuch as the irrational part of the soul is able to obey reason, but instead follows its disorderly nature. This, in turn, gives rise to an internal conflict between the rational and irrational parts, with the irrational part disobedient to and fighting against the part that possesses reason. Consequently, Plato and Aristotle characterized the irrationality of the passions as the disorderly, unruly and disobedient working of the irrational parts of the soul.

The Stoics, in contrast, treated the soul as fundamentally simple, though they did recognize several distinct, but indivisible, elements of the soul. As we may recall from our discussion earlier in the previous chapter, the Stoics divided the soul into eight parts. The hegemon or mind served as the rational centre of the soul and was located in the heart. The other seven, lower parts, comprising the five senses and the powers of utterance and reproduction, were all considered ‘irrational’. Additionally, like Aristotle, the Stoics recognized a power of growth and nutrition shared by plants and animals alike. But in contrast to Aristotle, the Stoics did not count this as a part or power of the soul because they ascribed these functions instead to ‘nature’ (φύσις).

Though one might be tempted to say that the Stoics likewise divided the soul into rational and irrational elements, this would be incorrect. Given the Stoic commitment to a monistic conception of the soul, they rejected the Platonic and Peripatetic notion of opposing centres of impulse, one rational and the other irrational.\(^{47}\) Rather, the Stoics construed the irrationality of the lower parts of the soul as non-rational in a manner that was more akin to Aristotle’s nutritive element.


\(^{47}\) Sedly argues that the Stoics looked to Socrates, not Plato, as the revered absolute authority for their psychology. He adds that while figures like Chrysippus openly opposed Plato’s tripartite psychology developed in the Republic, Phaedrus, and Timaeus, they were nevertheless sympathetic to the ‘Socratic’ psychology found elsewhere in Plato’s dialogues, such as that developed in the Protagoras, Phaedo and possibly the Theaetetus. See D. Sedley, ‘Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality’ (1993), 313-4. For further discussion of the ‘Socratic psychology of action’, see T. Penner, ‘Plato’s Ethics’ (2006), 154-5; G.J. Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology’ (2002, repr. 2008), 171.
inasmuch as the seven lower parts of the soul possess no share in reason at all. Additionally, the seven lower parts do not contain any irrational element within themselves that is disorderly and unruly by nature as separate spheres of ‘appetition’ (ὄρεξις).\textsuperscript{48} Instead, they function instrumentally as extensions of the mind itself, like the legs of the octopus. As such, in the Stoic system the mind had complete control over every part of the soul. The seven lower parts were viewed as morally neutral in themselves since they were not responsible for the soul’s movements. Instead, moral accountability accrued to the mind alone as the sole governing part of the soul and source of impulse.

The Stoics thus paradoxically understood the irrationality of the passions to be a function of a perverted and intemperate reason that is disobedient to nature. This logically followed from the Stoic insistence upon the unitary constitution of the soul. Impulse originates, not in a separate, unruly, and disobedient part of the soul as is the case with Plato and Aristotle, but in the assent of the mind to an incognitive impression, which results in a perverse judgment of an opinion,\textsuperscript{49} where the mind causes itself to go beyond its own powers of recovery.\textsuperscript{50} Even more paradoxically, the Stoics could describe the irrationality of the passions as the equivalent of being ‘disobedient to reason’ (ἀπειθὴς τῷ λόγῳ).\textsuperscript{51} How can reason be ‘disobedient’ to itself?!\textsuperscript{52} The phrase had two implied connotations for the Stoics. More narrowly, it meant that the mind is acting in a way that is ‘inconsistent with correct and natural reasoning’ (παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν κατὰ φύσιν λόγον), as one would expect for instance in a sage.\textsuperscript{53} It is not that the mind does not evaluate an impression and assent accordingly, but that it does so in a manner that a truly knowledgeable mind would not. In a wider, normative sense,\textsuperscript{54} it also implied that by accounting objects to be good or bad which are in reality indifferent, the hegemon of an individual fool is making choices that are not in keeping with the Reason that guides the universe.

\textsuperscript{48} Plut., \textit{Virt. mor.} 441c.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 441d, 446e-447a. Although the genuineness of this passage in Plutarch is questioned, Boeri rightly points out that the depiction of a passionate person in terms of a ‘vacillating mind’ is properly Stoic. See M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 395\textsuperscript{34}.
\textsuperscript{50} B. Inwood, ‘Why do Fools Fall in Love?’ (1997), 66.
\textsuperscript{51} Stob., \textit{Anth.} I 7.10a. For further discussion, see G. Striker, ‘Following Nature’ (1996), 273-4.
\textsuperscript{52} Long suggests that it was precisely this issue that accounted for Posidonius’ revision or restatement of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions. See A.A. Long, \textit{Hellenistic Philosophy} (1974, repr. 1986), 219-20.
\textsuperscript{54} J. Annas, \textit{Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind} (1992), 105.
Hence this could be construed as another way of saying that the fool is making assents that are ‘contrary to nature’ (παρὰ φύσιν). Arius Didymus suggested as much when he equated the soul’s irrationality, disobedience to reason, and disagreement with nature.55

Like both Plato and Aristotle, Stoic authors sometimes illustrated passion’s irrational impulse using the familiar Platonic metaphor of the disobedient horse(s). While Plato and Aristotle used the metaphor of irrationality as ‘disobedience’ to illustrate a conflict between the mind and the lower parts of the soul, which pose as alternative centres or sources of impulse to the mind,56 the Stoics used the image to describe how the mind itself has strayed in its own beliefs, judgments, and impulses. Arius Didymus described the Stoic experience of passion in relation to the disobedient horse simile as follows:

… every passion is overpowering (βιαστικόν), just as when those in the grips of passion often see that it would be useful not to do this, but carried away by its violence (ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφεροµένους), as if by some disobedient horse (καθάπερ ὑπὸ τινος ἀπειθοῦς ἵππου), are led (ἀνάγεσθαι) to doing this. As a result, often people even confess to this, uttering this commonly repeated line: ‘Although I have (better) resolution (γνώµη), nature (φύσις) forces me to do this.’57

One might assume that the disobedient horse simile of passion would necessarily imply some sort of psychological dualism similar to the Platonic conception of the soul, where the rational part of the soul is unable to control the appetitive part with its own, separate impulses.58 Nevertheless, as we can see in the quotation from Stobaeus above, the Stoics could utilize the disobedient horse image in a manner consistent with their principles. Whereas Plato, Aristotle, and Posidonius had treated the horse as an alternate source of impulse that has overpowered the rational part of the soul, the Stoics rather considered passion to be a competing opinion or mistaken judgment about an impression that goes against what the mind already knows to be

55 Stob., Anth. II 7.10a.
56 See my discussion of Philo’s use of the Platonic image of reason as the charioteer above.
57 Stob., Anth. II 7.10a.
Arius Didymus was quick to point out that this conflict was between two competing judgments in the mind. He added that it is different from simple deception. When someone is simply mistaken, once they have been shown the truth they will often immediately abandon the erroneous judgment. In the case of the passions, by contrast, the mind switches back and forth between two opposing judgments, each of which will result in an impulse once settled upon. If the mind assents to a judgment that something is good or evil and worthwhile to act upon, when it should not, it makes an error. Yet, the mind may either know that it should not count it as a good or evil, or that it should only make a selection ‘with reservation’ (μεθ’ ὑπεξαιρέσεως), but instead assents anyway because its grasp of right reason is still weak. Unlike the Stoic sage, whose convictions are settled and firm, the fool may know the good, but be unable to hold on to these principles because he is still grasping false convictions. As such, the horse simile highlighted the second characteristic of the Stoic notion of irrationality of the passions – the weak and vacillating character of the foolish mind’s assents that often take it in the wrong direction.

For this reason the Stoics rejected Aristotle’s description of incontinence or akrasia as the experience of the internal conflict between a desiderative part (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) of the soul and reason. The Stoics instead insisted that the experience that Aristotle described as a conflict between two parts of the soul, was in fact ‘a fluttering’ (πτοία) of the same part – the mind – as it rapidly switches back and forth between two alternating opinions or judgments, that of ‘right reason’ and some sort of erroneous opinion, with its concurrent irregular physical movements of the

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59 Sen., Ira II 3.1-4.2.
60 Stob., Anth. II 7.2.11s. For further discussion, see especially T. Brennan, ‘Reservation’ (2000), 149-77.
61 Gill argues that the Stoics’ idea of passion as a ‘mistaken judgment’ and a ‘rejection of reason’ or ‘disobedient to reason’ are ‘two aspects of the same mental process, paradoxical though this may seem’. He points out that in the case of Medea, a paradigmatic case put forward by Chrysippus, she knew that revenge on her husband by murdering her children was wrong, but decided to do it anyway. Thus, each passion is, at some level, a conscious mistake. See C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 456-7; id., ‘Did Galen Understand’ (1998), 117-21.
In other words, what feels like internal conflict of psychic parts is in fact indecision on the part of the hegemon, since their monistic psychology precluded ‘the possibility of any conflict between two antagonistic parts of the soul’. Hence, in the Stoic view, as Gill rightly observes, ‘all cases of pathos involve a certain type of akrasia’. This akratic fluttering of the foolish mind reflects both its inherit lack of stable pneumatic tension and lack of a consistent plan of action in life, on the one hand, and its oscillation between an erroneous judgment and right reason, which it knows, but disregards, on the other hand.

This discussion of the Stoic conception of the irrationality of the passions leads next to the essentially excessive character of the passions. For the Stoics, once the mind assents to the passionate judgment, the violence (βία) of the impulse is such that it becomes very difficult to halt. According to Galen, Chrysippus thus defined ‘excessive impulse’ (ὁ πλεονασμὸς τῆς ὀρμῆς) as ‘a runaway movement’ (ἐκφόρου κινήσεως) of the mind, or movement that ‘exceeds the measure that accords with [itself] and with nature’ (τὸ τῆν καθ’ αὐτοὺς καὶ φυσικὴν τῶν ὀρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν). Chrysippus illustrated the idea using his famous simile of a person who is running hard (ὁ τρέχοντες φοδρῶς) and is unable to stop. When the movement of the legs is in accord with reason, the runner can stop or change his pace whenever he wishes. On the other hand, when the movement of the legs exceeds the impulse, they are carried away and do not obediently (µὴ εὐπειθῶς) change their pace. Consequently, Chryssipus could even liken an excessive impulse as disobedient, but only metaphorically as in the manner of the fast-moving legs to the mind’s directives.

Platonists like Galen, on the other hand, similarly described the passions as ‘runaway movements’ (κίνησις ἐκφορὸς) or ‘violent motions’ (κίνησις σφοδρά), but

65 T. Tieleman, Chrysippus’ On Affections (2003), 104-5.
67 Stobaeus states the matter this way: ‘…every fluttering is a passion and again every passion is a fluttering’ (πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν πὰν πάθος πτοίαν). See Stob., Anth. II 7.10. For further discussion, see C. Gill, ‘Did Galen Understand’ (1998), 119. The italics are Gill’s.
68 Sen., Ira II 3.4.
70 Galen, Plac. IV 5.13-15. Compare also Sen., Ira II 3.4.
71 Ibid., IV 2.14.
72 Ibid., IV 2.8, 15-18. For further discussion, see M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 401; C. Gill, Naturalistic Psychology (2010), 210-1; id., Structured Self (2006), 255-60.
73 Ibid., IV 2.8, 17.
of the irrational parts of the soul, not of the mind.74 Galen argued in defence of his Platonic account of the soul that the appetitive and spirited parts should be likened to the weight of the runner as he runs down a hill, and the movement of the legs to the impulses of the mind. Hence, there are two sources for the movement forward: the impulse of the mind to set the legs into motion and the gravitational pull on the runner’s body. On this account, ‘the excess’ in the runner’s movement comes from the weight of the runner, which in turn renders the runner unable to stop, not the impulse that causes the legs to move.75 As was the case with the passion’s irrationality, in his rebuttal to Chrysippus’ running metaphor, Galen sought to emphasize that the excess comes from a source other than the mind.

The Stoics also characterized the excessive or inordinate movements of the soul as a loss of proper tension in the soul. This related to their conception of the soul as corporeal, in contrast to Plato and Aristotle, for whom it was incorporeal. For the Stoics, the psychic pneuma, centred in the region around the heart that constitutes the mind or commanding faculty, could be viewed in physical or materialist terms as ‘shrinking or rising up’, or experiencing ‘contractions or expansions’ (αἱ µειώσεις καὶ αἱ ἐπάρσεις καὶ αἱ συστολαί καὶ αἱ διαχύσεις) as it pursues an object that it desires or moves away from something unwanted or rejected.76 These ‘psychophysical’ movements were understood to be either equivalent with or supervening upon the mind’s judgment.77 In itself, this could be quite orderly and appropriate. However, in the case of a passion, the tension of the soul’s pneuma slips into a state of disequilibrium as it pursues or avoids something that it ought not pursue or avoid.78

Aristotle, in contrast to both the Stoic and Platonic accounts above, approached the excessiveness of the passions from a completely different perspective. For Aristotle, the passions are natural expressions of the desiderative part (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) of the soul. However, they can be experienced with too much strength, or too feebly, depending on the circumstance. Aristotle then argued that the passions could be

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74 Galen, Plac. IV 1,16.
75 Ibid., IV 2.28-38.
76 Ibid., IV 2.6.
78 Sedley points out that in the Stoic psychology, it was the pneuma’s tensile ‘strength’ that enabled wise souls like Socrates to remain confident that they would survive death intact and not disperse like a puff of wind. See D. Sedley, ‘Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality’ (1993), 326, 328.
exercised virtuously, so long as a person aims at ‘the mean’ (μεσότητας) in their expression. Hence, the virtuous exercise of the passions would be to feel the passions at ‘the necessary times’ (τὸ ... ὅτε δεῖ), ‘with reference to the right objects’ (ἐπὶ ὁποῖας) or ‘toward the right things’ (πρὸς ὅντα), ‘to the right extent’ (τὸ ... ὅσον), ‘with the right aim’ (οὗ ἔνεκα) and ‘in the appropriate way’ (ὡς δεῖ). For this reason, Aristotle acknowledged that it is quite difficult to attain to excellence in one’s actions and passions, since hitting the mean in each of these ways leaves little room for error.

Conversely, the vicious exercise of the passions can come about in myriad ways. One can feel the passions at the wrong time, with reference to the wrong object or for the wrong purposes. Alternatively, one might feel a passion with reference to the right objects, toward the right things, or with the right aim, but still fail in that one may feel it more violently and swiftly or more weakly and slothfully than the case demands. Thus, for instance, in the case of the appetite for pleasure, when a person moderately desires those things that make for health and wellbeing, or moderately desires pleasant things that are in no way contrary to what is ‘noble and good’ (τὸ κυκλόν), and does not feel pain or craving when those pleasant things are absent, he hits the mark with regard to desire and possesses the virtue of ‘temperance’ (σωφροσύνη). ‘The temperate person’ (ὁ σώφρων) thus ‘craves’ (ἐπιθύμει) for the things ‘that he ought, as he ought and when he ought’ (ὁν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε) – something that is hard to do well. When a person engages in excessive indulgence in pleasure, takes pleasure in the wrong things or is pained when he fails to obtain the pleasurable objects of his craving, he suffers the vice of ‘intemperance’ (ἀκολασία). On the other hand, the person who shuns every pleasure and admits of no desire for even the things that are necessary, which one would naturally crave – such as food or drink – suffers from the vice of ‘insensibility’ (ἀναισθησία).

Philo likewise repeatedly described passion as irrational. This in itself tells us little since we have already shown above that Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics had each done this in their respective ways. When we look more closely at how Philo

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79 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.6 1106b, 2.9 1109a, 4.5 1126a.
80 Ibid., 2.6 1106b.
81 Plut., Virt. mor. 444b.
82 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.11 1119a.
83 Ibid., 3.12 1119b.
84 Ibid., 2.2 1104a-b, 2.6 1107b, 2.8 1109a, 3.10 1117b-3.12 1119b.
85 Philo, Migr. 210, 212-213; Spec. 3.28; Mos. 2.13; Leg. 3.116; Her. 192; Det. 46.
described the irrationality of the passions, the evidence is still inconclusive. Like the Stoics, Philo recognized the distinction between irrational and non-rational elements in the soul. Like both Plato and the Stoics, he identified the disobedience of the passions with the simile of the horse or beast. He even argued in Platonic manner that the passions must be guided by reason just as a charioteer might direct stiff-necked and restive horses, a helmsman a ship, or a governor a city. We discussed this previously in relation to his use of Plato’s charioteer metaphor. He could also characterize the relation of the passions to reason as a sort of internecine war between the lower parts, after the manner of Plato. Yet, when he formally defined passion, he clearly opted for orthodox Stoic definitions. Likewise, he generally preferred terminology redolent of Stoicism with reference to passion’s irrationality. He commonly described passion as ‘irrational impulse’ (ἄλογος ὁρμή). Sometimes, he sought to emphasize the irrationality by calling it ‘irrational passion’ (ἄλογος πάθος), another Stoic phrase. Finally, Philo also found biblical witness to the irrational character of passion by allegorically interpreting Nod as ‘tossing’ (σάλος). For Philo, this referred to ‘the wavering and unsettled’ (ἀστατοὶ καὶ ἀνίδρυτοι ὁρμαί) impulses reminiscent of the ‘oscillation theory’ of psychic conflict of the Stoic fool, where the Stoics offered ‘a diachronic model of turning’ in which the mind, due to its weaknesses and instability, rapidly wavers between competing judgments. This tossing of the soul no doubt accounted for that ‘random’ (ἀκριτὸς) and ‘disordered’ (ἀκοσμέω) character of the irrational impulses of a passion, rather than it moving in a smooth and straight moral direction as would be the case for the Stoic sage. This, in turn, also accounts for the undisciplined and chaotic life of the

86 Philo, Sacr. 47-48.
87 Ibid., 45, 49; Philo, Spec. 79; Virt. 13; Leg. 3.118, 123, 127-128, 136, 138, 223.
88 Philo, Leg. 3.222-224.
89 Most notably, see Philo, Leg. 3.116-7; compare also Philo, Ebr. 98-9.
90 Philo, Spec. 4.79; see also Philo, Leg. 3.185.
91 Philo, Conf. 90; Post. 74; Sacr. 81; Spec. 4.79; Leg. 3.185, 248-9.
92 Philo, Mos. 2.139; Leg. 3.116; Her. 192; Det. 46.
93 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 3.462; Galen, Plac. IV 2.19. Again, we cannot make too much of this since the phrase was by no means limited to the Stoics. Aristotle, for instance, used the phrase once at Arist., Eth. Eud. 1111b. I could find no evidence of this phrase in Plato.
94 Philo, Post. 22.
95 M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 396
97 Philo, Migr. 60; Leg. 3.128.
fool as a whole. Of course, it also calls to mind Plato’s depiction in the Timaeus of
the unstable and chaotic movements associated with the lower, mortal parts of the
soul, which were imperfectly constructed by the subordinate gods, though Plato had
located these precisely outside of the mind.

Similarly, Philo everywhere and consistently portrayed passion as an excessive
movement of the soul.98 As evidenced in his definition quoted at the outset of the
chapter, Philo often portrayed passion as ‘an inordinate and excessive impulse’
(ἀμετρός καὶ πλεονάζουσα όρμή),99 or more simply, as ‘unmeasured impulses’ (αἱ
ἀμετροὶ όρμαι).100 He illustrated this excessiveness on two occasions by likening it
to a fire raging out of control and consuming everything in its wake, an apt way of
portraying ‘the runaway’ character of a passionate impulse.101 Philo’s definition and
phraseology is Stoic and so are both terms, though the Stoics seemed to have
preferred to modify impulse with the term ‘excessive’ (πλεονάζουσα) rather than
’inordinate’ (ἀμετρός), judging from their much greater use of the former compared
to the latter. The Peripatetic tradition could also use almost the exact same language,
but with one crucial difference. Unlike the Stoics, the Peripatetics argued that the
passionate impulse could also be ‘deficient’ (ἐλλείπω).102 On this score, Philo
clearly sided with the Stoics, if we wish to use an argument from silence, inasmuch
as he never once described a passion as wanting. We might add, finally, that Philo
could speak of the passionate impulse ‘shaking’ (σείω) the soul.103 This metaphor
was a particularly apt way of describing the impact of passion’s irrationality and
excessiveness. The chaos and ‘tossing’ introduced by the irrationality of the
impulse, coupled with the violence and force of the passion once unleashed, would
thus shake the soul.

None of these facts in themselves tell us definitively whether Philo conceived of
the irrationality of the passions in a Platonic or Stoic manner. As we have shown
above, the idea of passion as an irrational, unbridled impulse could fit into any of the
Platonic, Peripatetic or Stoic schemes, depending on how he used the metaphor. The
question must be settled by whether he viewed excessive, irrational passion as

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98 Philo, Sacr. 49, 106; Spec. 2.163, 4.79; Mos. 25-6; Leg. 1.73, 3.138, 155.
99 Philo, Conf. 90; Her. 245; Abr. 243; Spec. 4.79
100 Philo, Opif. 81.
101 Philo, Spec. 4.79; Leg. 3.248-9.
102 Stob., Anth. II 7.1.
103 Philo, Dec. 142.
natural or unnatural, or as fundamentally blameworthy or not. It is to this that we turn next.

**Unnatural**

Whereas in the previous section we were unable to definitively locate Philo’s philosophical position among Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, in this section we are able to differentiate his allegiance. Plato and Aristotle considered the passions to be natural and useful, but Philo sided with the Stoics in treating them as contrary to nature and always destructive. This serves as a second, key line of demarcation between the Stoic and Platonist-Peripatetic conceptions of the passions. For both Plato and Aristotle, the passions were closely connected with the lower, irrational parts of the soul as natural expressions of their normal function from birth. This is yet another consequence of their conception of the soul as a fundamentally complex entity. The Stoics, in contrast, treated all passions as unnatural perversions or deviations of the impulses that originate in the hegemon. This followed as a consequence of their monistic psychology, with its rejection of the notion of an alternative and irrational source of impulse in the soul in preference for ‘a doctrine of temporal complexity’ of the soul’s processes, which were divided into the sequence: presentation-assent-impulse-action. When we examine Philo, we will find that he consistently adhered to the Stoic conception of the passions as unnatural.

We have already discussed in detail Plato’s depiction of the soul and need not repeat that material here except to briefly summarize his understanding of the passions as innate to the soul. For Plato, the passions are essentially natural, even if they can often run riot. Plato even went so far as to more or less identify the two lower parts of the soul with two passions, that is, the appetitive part with desire and the spirited with anger. We should add, however, that Plato also stressed the close connection between pleasure and the appetitive part. The appetitive part’s basic orientation is the satisfaction of its lust for the more bodily and base pleasures.

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104 Armstrong points out that the Epicureans likewise taught that emotions, such as anger and fear, can be useful and are natural. See D. Armstrong, ‘Be Angry and Sin Not’ (2008), 79-83. Philo, however, despised the Epicurean philosophy. Whatever connections one may find between ‘the Garden’ and Philo would have been accidental. Philo’s primary partners for philosophical engagement were the Stoics, Platonists, and, to a lesser extent, the Peripatetics. For more on Philo’s anti-Epicurean polemics, see G. Ranocchia, ‘Moses against the Egyptian’ (2008), 75-102.


associated with food, drink, and sex. He also stressed the division among the parts of
the soul by locating each in different parts of the body: the reason inhabits the head,
anger the breast, and desire the abdominal region. While he assigned construction of
the different parts to different architects, all three are fundamental elements of the
human soul. In the Timaeus, he argued that the Demiurge directly created the mind,
stamping it with a divine and immortal character. However, the Demiurge handed
over the job of constructing the mortal elements of the cosmos to the subordinate
gods, who were responsible for the creation of not only the body, but also the lower
parts of the soul. Since the lower parts were created by the subordinate gods, who
had been instructed to copy the Demiurge’s own work, they were imperfectly
created and consequently mortal, irrational, and prone to chaotic movements. For
this reason, Plato believed that the mind must govern the other parts of the soul if it
is to experience harmony and live virtuously. His moral psychology was predicated
on the innate and continued existence of the spirited and appetitive parts in the soul
at least until the death of the body.

Aristotle similarly argued that there exists in the soul ‘another natural element
beside reason’ (ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός), that fights against reason and
resists it so that its impulses move ‘in a contrary direction’ (ἐπὶ τἀναντία) to
reason. Aristotle identified this other constituent element with the desiderative
part of the soul in general and with ‘desire’ or ‘appetite’ (ἐπιθυμία) in particular.
Though he treated both anger and desire as passions of the desiderative part of the
soul, in contrast to Plato who treated them separately, he did continue to utilize
Plato’s distinctions between the two. Thus while both passions are irrational,
appetite is the more irrational since anger obeys reason ‘in a sense’ (πως) as a sort of
ally, while desire does not.

According to Aristotle, humans possess both reason and desire ‘by nature’
(φύσει), but these elements are also subject to growth and maturation. In the case
of animals, all their constituent psychic powers exist by nature from birth. Rational
creatures share the irrational psychic elements, but only an embryonic
reasoning capability subject to a natural growth process. Hence, for Aristotle both

108 Ibid., 7.6 1149a-b.
109 Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.8 1224b.
110 Arist., Ph. 2.1 192b.
111 Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.8 1224b.
appetite and reason are present from birth in the human soul, reason requires more grooming in order to fully mature. For this reason, Aristotle argued that we see appetite present in children from the outset, but full rationality only later when they have reached adulthood.  

Aristotle, moreover, distinguished between passions, capacities, and dispositions. He understood 'the passions' (πάθη) to be those feelings in the soul that are accompanied by pleasure and pain, such as desire, anger, and fear. One cannot assign a ‘quality’ (ποιότης) to someone merely on the basis of knowing that they are undergoing a passion, unless one also knows the manner in which they are feeling it. ‘Capacities’ (δυνάμεις) refer to that in the soul by virtue of which we are capable of experiencing the passions in the first place. This ‘capacity for passion’ (τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ δύναμιν) serves as the starting point or basis for the passions. ‘Dispositions’ (ἕξεις), on the other hand, refer to the settled tendency of the soul to exercise the passions too violently, too weakly or moderately. They result from the habitual exercise of the passions over time.

A sort of circularity holds among the relations of the soul’s passions, capacities and dispositions. While the capacity for passion is natural, it can be shaped by the manner in which one exercises the passions. If habitually exercised in a certain manner, the capacities will come to have a certain ‘quality’ (ποιότης). The soul might become for instance irascible, amorous, or bashful. These capacities, when hardened, thus become dispositions; that is to say, dispositions are capacities for passion that have come to take on a certain settled character in a specific direction, whether of excess, deficiency or moderation, with regard to a given passion. Aristotle identified these settled capacities or dispositions with virtue and vice. These dispositions then in turn affect how the soul normally exercises its passions, which further shapes its capacities. As such, capacities and dispositions mutually affect and mould one another.

112 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.12 1119b; Pol. 1.13 1260a.
113 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.15 1105b; Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.2 1220b. See also Plut., Virt. mor. 443d.
114 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.5 1105b-1106a; Arist., Mag. mor. 1.7 1186a. See also Plut., Virt. mor. 443c-d; Stob., Anth. II 7.20.
115 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.5 1105b.
117 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.5 1106a.
118 Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.2 1220b.
119 Plut., Virt. mor. 443d.
120 Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.5 1222a-b.
For Aristotle, the difference between the capacity for passion and the passions themselves refers to the distinction between their inactivity in the case of the capacities versus their activation or exercise in the case of the passions themselves. Aristotle argued that we must first acquire the potentiality for something before we can exhibit the activity that follows. For instance, in the case of the senses it is not by often seeing or by often hearing that we come to possess sight or hearing, but rather we see and hear because we first possess the abilities to do so. Similary, the capacity for passion might be described as an ability of the soul to become angry, feel desire or be afraid in the first place, while the passions are the stirring of these capacities in the form of anger, desire, fear and so forth. Consequently, in Aristotle’s view, the soul must first possess a capacity for the passions before it can exercise them.

The soul thus possesses capacities and passions by nature, while dispositions come about only ‘by choice’ (προαίρεσις) and ‘by habit’ (ἐξ ἔθους). For Aristotle it was axiomatic that we possess anything natural first as a potentiality and only later do we exhibit it as an activity. In the case of the passions, the soul possesses the capacity for passion from birth, and then later exercises that capacity as some form of a passion in response to various circumstances. Since capacities and passions are natural, their existence is not a matter of choice. Rather, the soul is constructed in such a manner that it will automatically be moved toward a passion when it encounters a circumstance that calls for such movement. The mind in adults only has control of the manner in which the passions are exercised, but not that they are exercised. Hence, the soul is called neither good nor evil on account of its simply feeling anger, desire, or fear, or for its capacity for passion. Finally, for Aristotle, since both the capacity for passion and the consequent passions are innate, they cannot be removed from the soul. In his view, the irrational passions of anger and appetite are ‘no less human’ (οὐχ ἦττον ἀνθρωπικά) than reason. Consequently, for Aristotle, humans cannot live an apatheiac life as the Stoics later proposed in their ideal of the sage. Instead, he regarded the emotions as ‘essential constituents of the

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121 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.1 1103a-b.
122 Ibid., 2.5 1105b.
123 Ibid., 2.6 1107a, 3.2 1111b-3.3 1113a.
124 Ibid., 2.1 1103a.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., 2.5 1106a.
127 Ibid.
good life’, which must be educated through proper moral instruction and habituation.128

Dispositions, by contrast, are a matter of choice. As such they are concerned with virtue since virtue is concerned with the proper exercise of both actions and passions. For Aristotle, virtue comes about by the observance of what he called ‘the mean’ (μεσότης), that is, what is proportionate, ‘fitting’ or ‘exactly suitable’ (σώμμετρος) for a passion or for an action in a given situation. As the mean, virtue is thus situated between a vice of ‘excess’ (ὑπερβολή), on the one hand, and a vice of ‘deficiency’ (ἔλλειψις) on the other.129 And since the passions are natural to the soul, they too can be exercised either virtuously or viciously, depending on the circumstances. As such, Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is not a doctrine of moderation in all situations. For instance, one’s angry response will vary according to circumstances. In the case of a mild slight, mere crossness might be appropriate, whereas absolute fury might be appropriate in an instance of terrible injustice.130

Aristotle’s more positive assessment of the passions is made clear especially by his doctrine of virtue as the mean, in which he characterizes the passions not only as natural, but also as necessary and useful. Rather than advocate the removal of passions from the soul, as did the Stoics, he argued instead for the elimination of defects and excess in the passions.131 By thus moderating and limiting the movements of the passions, reason trains and educates them by practice until a firm disposition or state is established in the irrational part of the soul, which is precisely what he understood moral virtue to be.

For Aristotle, then, and the Peripatetic tradition that followed, the right exercise of the passions and irrational part of the soul is necessary for virtue.132 There can be no virtue of temperance without the passion of desire for pleasure. For, he defined temperance precisely as the moderation of the appetites for food, drink and sex found in the irrational parts of the soul.133 Similarly, to be ‘gentle’ (πράωτης) is a virtuous disposition relative to the passion of anger. Aristotle could define ‘gentleness’ (πράυνσις) as the opposite of anger inasmuch as he could view it as the calming or cessation of anger in those cases when we believe someone has slighted

129 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.2 1107a, 2.8 1108b, 2.9 1109a.
131 Plut., Virt. mor. 444b, 445a.
132 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.12 1119b; Arist., Mag. mor. 1.5 1185b.
133 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.10-12 1117b-1119b.
us involuntarily, when the offender is apologetic, when time has passed, or when we have taken vengeance on the person. In these instances, calm and gentle people no longer feel anger, but ‘freedom from pain’ (ἀλυπία) and ‘inoffensive pleasure’ (ἡδονή ὑβριστική). However, a gentle person is precisely also one who is angry at the right things or right people ‘as he ought, when he ought and as long as he ought’ (ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον). Similarly, Aristotle argued that there could be no virtue of ‘courage’ (ἀνδρεία) without ‘fear’ (φόβος) and ‘confidence’ (θάρσος) since it is the virtue relative to each. So, for Aristotle, humans not only cannot live out the Stoic ideal of the apatheiac sage, but they ought not even to try, since the virtues themselves depend on the moderate exercise of the passions of anger, desire, fear and so forth.

Aristotle also argued that moderated passions are morally useful in that they often aid reason in acting virtuously. In a manner redolent of Plato’s description of the spirited part of the soul as ‘an ally’ (σώματος or ἐπίκουρος) to reason, Aristotle similarly described ‘wrath’ (θυμός) as ‘assisting’ (συνεργεῖ) reason in acting courageously. In this same vein, Peripatetics like Plutarch later conceived ‘righteous indignation’ (νέμεσις) as helping the soul rise up and oppose those who have gained prosperity through illegitimate means, or pity as aiding a person in treating others with humanity. Thus, while it is true that excessive or defective passions lead the soul into moral destruction, Aristotle argued conversely that the moderate passions are not only a necessary ingredient to many of the virtues, but that they can also help the mind to act virtuously.

For the Stoics, in contrast to the Peripatetics, all passions, without exception, are unnatural. As discussed earlier, the Stoics understood ‘first impulse’ to be in itself a natural and appropriate expression of the soul. It is, in part, what distinguishes ‘soul’ (ψυχή) from ‘cohesion’ (ἕξις) or ‘growth’ (φύσις), and animals, whether rational or irrational, from plants. Moreover, the Stoics considered psychic

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134 Arist., Rh. 2.3 1380a-b.
135 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.7 1108a, 4.5 1125b-1126b.
136 Ibid., 2.7 1107a-1108a, 3.6-9 1115a-1117b.
137 Plato, Resp. 4.440b, 441a.
138 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.8 1116b.
139 Plut., Virt. mor. 451e.
140 For the Old Stoa in general, see Andronic., Pass. I 1.1; Stob., Anth. II 7.10, 10a. For Zeno, see Cic., Tusc. IV 6.11, 4.21.47; Galen, Plac. IV 2.8, 11; Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.110. For specifically Chrysippus, see Galen, Plac. IV 2.18, IV 4.16, 32, V 2.2. For a general discussion of the ethical basis of the unnaturalness of the passions, see E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (1870), 240-4.
141 See pages 48-56 above for further discussion of ‘first impulse’ in Philo and the Stoics.
movement or impulse to be a constitutive power of the mind, along with ‘impression’ (φαντασία), ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις), and ‘reason’ (λόγος). The Stoics did envision rational impulses that result in action in their ideal sage, but these good impulses, as noted previously, were called eupatheia rather than ‘passions’. Eupatheia, as rational psychic impulses, are ‘natural’ in the sense that they represent the sort of affections that the perfect rational human being, fully developed as intended by nature, would experience. Eupatheia thus reflect the ‘natural’ working of the sage’s hegemonikon, untainted by excess, which results when it is properly oriented toward the true good of moral virtue.

When the soul moves in a manner that is ‘contrary to nature’ (παρὰ φύσιν), that movement or impulse is by definition a passion. For, when the soul’s impulse is ‘contrary to nature’ – meaning in the case of the Stoics not what is given at birth, but what accords or does not accord with Nature or Reason or god in a mature human – the movement itself becomes perverted and the object of the movement no longer accords with the soul’s proper ‘end’ (τέλος). Hence, passionate psychic movements come to be characterized by irrationality, chaos, excessiveness and violence, and are directed toward or away from something it mistakenly counts as a good or evil or worthy of selection. As perversions of the mind, these movements arise ‘contrary to correct and natural reasoning’ (παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν λόγον). The inappropriateness of their object and the excessive and irrational character of their motion also meant that for the Stoics the passions were never useful or expedient under any circumstance. Since the goal of the philosophical life is to live according to nature, which necessarily leads to ‘a smooth flow of life’ (εὔροια βίου), the passions, as irrational and excessive movements of the soul that are contrary to nature, are necessarily harmful to the soul.

Zeno insisted that these excessive impulses of the soul are best characterized as ‘activities’ (ἐνέργεια) of the soul rather than a natural ‘faculty’ (δύναμις). The passions are activities inasmuch as they reflect ‘movements’ (κίνησις) of the soul, which have gone awry, but they are not capacities since such movements represent a

143 See pages 43-4 above.
145 Ibid., II 7.10a.
146 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.88; Stob., Anth. II 7.6e.
147 Sext. Emp., Math. 11.30; Stob., Anth. II 7.1.
perversion of the otherwise natural and appropriate impulses of the mind. This ran counter to Aristotle’s contention that ‘a capacity for passion’ resides in the lower parts of the soul as a basic element of its constitution as outlined above.

Later Platonic and Peripatetic writers recognized this fundamental difference between their respective traditions and that of the Stoics by treating the passions as capacities that can be useful when under the control of reason. Plutarch, for instance, argued against the Stoics and for Aristotle’s notion of an innate capacity for the passions in the soul, describing it as ‘the starting point’ (ἀρχή) and ‘raw material’ (ὕλη) of passion. He punctuated his insistence on the innate character of this capacity for passion in the irrational parts of the soul by referring to them as ‘emotional faculties’ (παθητικαὶ δυνάμεις). He argued that Aristotle first introduced the notion of ‘an emotional faculty’ as a single, distinct power of the soul when he subordinated and redefined anger as a type of desire, an ordering that the Old Stoa later incorporated into their system. By treating anger as a type of desire, according to Plutarch, Aristotle effectively identified a single faculty of the soul responsible for all the passions that was simultaneously distinct from the rational, perceptive, nutritive, and vegetative parts of the soul. None of these other parts in Aristotle’s purported revised taxonomy of the soul served as a cause of any of the passions. Whether or not Aristotle was in fact responsible for this revision as outlined by Plutarch, this approach became common property of both the Peripatetic and Platonic traditions. While the Peripatetics might speak simply of the emotional faculty, so too could the Academy, even as they continued to recognize the further division of the emotional part into Plato’s appetitive and spirited parts. Hence, we find Middle Platonists such as Plutarch, Galen, and Albinus all referring to Plato’s spirited and appetitive parts in common as ‘the emotional part’ (τὸ παθητικὸν) of the soul. Indeed, according to Galen, even the putatively unorthodox Stoic Posidonius, in recognition of his rejection of Chrysippus’ psychic monism for Plato’s tripartite division of the soul, customarily called anger and desire ‘the passionate part’ (τὸ παθητικόν) of the soul. By identifying ‘an emotional faculty’

148 Plut., Virt. mor. 443d.
149 Ibid., 443d, 451f.
150 Ibid., 442b-c.
151 Albinus, Epit. 5.2, 17.4, 24.1-2, 4, 30.3; Plut., Virt. mor. 442a.
152 Galen, Plac. V 5.21, 26, 6.37.
in the soul, all these authors sought to underscore the innate character of the passions and their source in a part of the soul alternative to the mind.

Moreover, since the passions are fundamental capacities of the soul and not merely perverted psychic activities, Plutarch argued that it is ‘neither possible nor expedient’ (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν οὔτε ἀμεινον) for reason to ‘completely eradicate passion’ (τὸ πάθος ἔξωμεν πανταπασιν). In defence of his contention, he noted the usefulness of anger for combat. This line of argumentation was a commonplace in the Peripatetic and Platonist traditions. Anger was frequently cited as an aide to soldiers to fight bravely in battle. The Stoics, by contrast, never envisioned a circumstance in which fear or anger or any other passion would serve to help the soul in some manner, as the Peripatetics and Platonists characteristically argued.

Like the Stoics, Philo treated the passions as unnatural, both in the narrow sense of the quality of the psychic movement itself and in the general sense that they oppose the life that accords with nature. In his formal definition of passion quoted at the beginning of the chapter, Philo followed the Stoics in referring to ‘an unnatural movement of the soul’ (παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις). In this passage, Philo emphasized the character of the psychic movement itself. He situated the phrase among several descriptors that underscored his contention that all passions are blameworthy and that desire in particular threatens the soul. He described the passionate impulse as ‘inordinate’ (ἄμετρος) and ‘excessive’ (πλεονάζουσα).

Additionally, he invoked Plato’s chariot-team metaphor and likened their motion to that of ‘rebellious horses’ (ἀφηνιασταὶ ἵπποι) careening out of control with the result that they carry the entire chariot team to its destruction. Elsewhere, Philo similarly described the psychic movement associated with pleasure as uplifting the soul in a manner that is ‘contrary to nature’. In this context, he argued that pleasure’s uplifting motion distorts the soul in such a way that it becomes ‘ugly’ (αἶσχος). By connecting unnatural psychic motion to the notion of ‘beauty’ (κάλλος)/ugliness, he...

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153 Plut., Virt. mor. 443d.
154 Ibid., 452b-c.
155 Albinus, Epit. 29.1, 32.4; Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.8 1116b; Plato, Resp. 4.440c, 442c.
156 For instance, see Seneca’s extended discussion on the question of whether or not anger is ever ‘useful’ or an aide, especially as it relates to war and the punishment of wrongdoers. Sen., Ira I 7-19.
157 Philo, Ebr. 105; Mos. 2.139; Decal. 142, 150; Spec. 4.79.
158 Philo, Spec. 4.79-80.
emphasized its character as exceeding the bounds of propriety and proportion. Philo did not reject the idea that the mind ought to be uplifted *per se*, since he likewise conceived of the *eupatheia* of joy as the rational uplifting of the soul experienced by the sage. The ugliness resides in the soul expanding overmuch or too quickly, rather than in a smooth and controlled manner. In both of these passages, Philo emphasized the bad character of the passionate movement itself.

Against Plato and Aristotle, consequently, Philo never treated the passions as natural to the soul. He acknowledged that the soul does indeed have ‘a capacity’ for passion inasmuch as a fundamental characteristic of soul is its capacity for impulse, of which passion is a species. A rock, by contrast, has no capacity for passion, since it possesses no ‘soul’ (ψυχή) or ‘physic’ (φύσις). Hence, it never evinces growth, impulse, or impression. Unlike other Middle Platonists and Peripatetics of his era, however, Philo never described the lower parts of the soul together as ‘the emotional part’ (τὸ παθητικόν), whether the Stoic five senses and faculties of speech and generation, or Plato’s appetitive and spirited parts. Instead, Philo described the passions as ‘bastards’ (νόθα) and ‘foreigners’ (ξένα) to the mind. Both metaphors emphasized their unnatural status in the soul.

Philo also correlated the unnatural character of passionate psychic motions with an unnatural orientation of the soul in general that runs counter to ‘the smooth movement of life’ associated with the Stoic sage. In *De ebrietate* Philo pointed out that the sage Abraham’s routing the nine kings not only highlighted the unnatural character of passion’s motion, but also showed that the cause of such passions is found in an improper and impure orientation of the mind. Philo allegorically identified the nine kings in the *Gen. 14* account with the four cardinal passions of desire, pleasure, fear, and grief, and the five senses. By extending unnatural

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159 Philo, *Mos.* 2.139.
160 Wolfson suggests that Philo equated the *eupatheia* with virtue, which goes further than the Stoics, who treated them as supervening upon virtue on the basis of Philo, *Mut.* 167. See H.A. Wolfson, *Philo* (1962), 275-6. Compare with Diog. Laert., *Vit. phil.* 7.94. Though this passage certainly goes beyond the Stoics, the characteristics that Philo ascribes to the cardinal *eupatheia* and their species (joy, caution, wish, and so forth) conforms to Stoic theory. He sets the *eupatheia* opposite to the passions, not vice (*Her.* 77; *Conf.* 91; *Det.* 120; *QG* 2.57), treats them as a result of virtue (*Leg.* 1.45), as impulses to what is truly good (*Mig.* 67), as reasonable and voluntary (*Her.* 192), as judgments (*Abr.* 222), as indifferent to external goods (*Her.* 253; *Spec.* 2.46) and as belonging only to his biblical sages or God (*Abr.* 203-4).
161 Philo, *Leg.* 2.23.
162 Ibid., 2.22-3.
164 Philo, *Ebr.* 105.
movement to the senses, Philo connected the prompting of the passions with the kind of mind that lives for the body and things external to the body. He argued that bodily existence is full of all sorts of mortal and created voices that summon and arouse passions in the foolish soul by means of the senses.\(^{165}\) The mind of a fool impiously deifies mortal existence and exchanges honouring the Existent God for idols, polytheism, and ultimately, atheism.\(^{166}\) This fundamental religious and philosophical failure accounts for the rise of the passions of the soul, because it mistakenly looks to created order for its good rather than to the Cause of all things. The mind of the sage, by contrast, leaves behind the camp of the body in order to embark on the contemplation of the incorporeal ideas in the presence of the Existent Himself.\(^{167}\) The sage understands and acknowledges that God alone is the true source of all things, while the senses are mere instruments.\(^{168}\) By ignoring the cries associated with the mortal life of the body and fixing its hopes on God alone, the sage Abraham came to experience quietness and peace of soul, untroubled by the confusions of mortal existence that introduce chaotic motions in senses and mind when accepted.\(^{169}\) As a consequence, Philo characterized the Abraham sage as ‘a reasonable and happy soul’ (λογικὴ καὶ εὐδαιμον ὕμη) with ‘a pure’ (καθαρώτατος), ‘unalloyed’ (εἱλικρινέστατος), and pious mind.\(^{170}\) By representing the sage as the model soul that lives according to nature, but the fool as fundamentally misdirected, Philo thus anchored the unnatural psychic motions of the passions within the general orientation of the fool, whose life does not accord with nature.

Philo argued that the unnatural motions of the passions also result in both a distorted character and vicious deeds. In *De decalogo*, after noting again that all passions shake and stir the soul in a manner that is contrary to nature, he added that they also ‘do not permit [the soul] to continue in health’ (ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ ἐῶντα).\(^{171}\) Here, Philo correlated the passions to the Stoic moral maladies of ‘soul-sickness’ (νόσημα) or ‘soul-infirmity’ (ἀρρώστημα).\(^{172}\) Although he never explicitly

\(^{165}\) Ibid., 98.
\(^{166}\) Ibid., 108-10.
\(^{167}\) Ibid., 99.
\(^{168}\) Ibid., 107.
\(^{169}\) Ibid., 104.
\(^{170}\) Ibid., 100-1.
\(^{171}\) Philo, *Decal.* 142.
acknowledged the Stoic distinction between psychic sickness, on the one hand, and psychic infirmity as an extra-weak form of soul-sickness on the other, he nevertheless throughout his corpus did commonly use both terms in conjunction with the passions. Like the Stoics, he treated both psychic sickness and infirmity, which he likened to ‘harsh mistresses’ (δέσποινα), as a settled or ingrained weakness of soul (ἐξετος) that results from long-term participation in particular passions, although he sometimes identified the diseases with the passions, a confusion apparent also in the Stoic sources. As a result, such persons become defined by that particular psychic and moral weakness. Many of the names for the various kinds of soul-sickness or infirmity derive from objects of desire, though one could also cast them in terms of an adjective to describe the person stricken by the malady rather than as a noun to name each disease state. For instance, he argued elsewhere that the passion of desire ‘produces a change for the worse’ (µεταβολὴν ἀπεργάζεται τὴν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον) in the soul such that, if it is directed toward money, it makes a person a thief or fraud; if toward reputation, proud or inconsistent; if toward office, factious or tyrannical; if toward bodily beauty, an adulterer or pederast, or if toward the belly, insatiable and gluttonous. ‘Avarice’ or ‘the love of money’ (φιλαργυρία) could be construed either as a passion or as a sickness, depending on the context, but if a person becomes defined by the passion over time, he or she becomes ‘a lover of money’ (φιλάργυρος) and, as such, sick and infirm. Consequently, Philo argued that the various sicknesses or infirmities of the soul are

173 Philo mentioned sickness and infirmity together at Philo, Post. 46, 72, 74. He mentioned sickness and infirmity in conjunction with passion at Philo, Abr. 223; Isos. 10; Migr. 155; Post. 46; Praem. 145; Prov. 2.18; Spec. 1.167, 257; Virt. 162; Her. 284; Det. 43; Deus 67-8.

174 Philo, Spec. 4.82-3.

175 Philo, Post. 46-7, 74; Decal. 150; Spec., 4.83; Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 3.104. Compare, for instance, with Cicero’s distinction between the passion of anger and the disease of irascibility at Cic., Tusc. IV 12.27; 4.13.29-30. Additionally, we should not overlook the Aristotelian roots of this distinction as outlined above. See also, R.J. Rabel, ‘Diseases of Soul’ (1981), 386-7.

176 Philo, Sacr. 32; Spec. 1.24.

177 Cic., Tusc. III 4.9, 6.13; Fin. 3.10, 35; Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.115; Rabel attempts to solve the apparent conflict in our extant Stoic sources by positing, on the basis of Aristotle’s distinction between the categories of quality and affection, a Stoic distinction between what he called ‘occurrent passions’, which would not have been classified as a ‘disease’ by the Stoics, and ‘dispositional passions’, which could have been. For instance, if Smith is angry with Brown, this could refer either to a) Smith’s outburst of anger at this very moment (an occurrent passion) or b) Smith’s longstanding anger with Brown, though he is not even thinking about him at this moment (a dispositional passion). Such ‘dispositional anger’ is different from the ‘disposition’ of irascibility, wherein a person is easily angered in general, in that Smith can be dispositionally angry with Brown, yet otherwise a gentle-minded soul. If Rabel is correct, the Stoics categorized some passions at least as both passions and diseases, depending on the type of passion in view (occurrent versus dispositional). See R.J. Rabel, ‘Diseases of Soul’ (1981), 385, 391-3.

178 Philo, Spec. 4.86-91. For an extensive list of ‘sicknesses’, see Philo, Sacr. 32.
produced from the passions. Such sicknesses, if untreated by philosophical reason, spell the soul’s death.

Later in his discussion of desire in *De decalogo*, Philo argued that the passions not only generate sickness of soul, but often result in evil actions. Since one would expect that the unnatural character of the soul’s motions should culminate in vicious actions that likewise defy nature, it comes as no surprise that Philo would make this claim. Indeed, Philo elsewhere explicitly asserted that vicious actions are inherently chaotic and contrary to nature. In *De decalogo*, he argued that philosophical reasoning must check the passion of desire; otherwise it will, of necessity, ‘distort all of life’s affairs’ (πάντ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ τοῦ βίου πράγματα κινηθήσεται παρὰ φύσιν). In other words, the unnatural movements of the soul, if not controlled and made natural, will ultimately result in unnatural movements of the body, namely, deeds and vicious actions. To support his contention, he cited how the love of women, glory, and pleasure, all of which he counted as forms of desire, had caused estrangement between kinsmen, war among Greeks and Barbarians alike, and ultimately disaster to the human race. As discussed above, this connection between the unnatural character of passionate impulses and the unnatural life overall was a common Stoic theme.

Finally, in light of the unnatural character of all the passions, Philo likewise joined the Stoics in describing the passions as necessarily harmful at all times. As noted above, the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions had affirmed that, when under the control of reason, the passions could actually help the soul. Anger, for instance, might goad a soldier to meet the danger of battle with boldness. Against this, Philo affirmed their essential harmfulness. In *Legum allegoriae*, he noted that Moses described the beasts of the field, which Philo allegorically identified with the passions, as ‘helpers’ (βοηθοί) of the mind. He initially acknowledged that the passions could help the soul in a certain sense:

… pleasure (ἡδονή) and desire (ἐπιθυμία) contribute to the permanence of our kind (πρὸς διαμονήν τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν): pain (λύπη) and fear

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180 Ibid., 73-4.
182 Philo, *Decal.* 150.
183 Ibid., 151-3.
(φόβος), biting the soul (δάκνοντα τὴν ψυχήν) turn it to treating nothing carelessly: anger (ὀργή) is a weapon of defence, which has conferred great benefits on many (μεγάλα πολλοὺς ὀφέλησε): and so with the other passions.185

Philo listed a number of benefits that arise from the soul. The connection of pleasure and desire to ‘the permanence’ (πρὸς διαμονήν) of the human species relates especially to the desires for food, drink and procreation. Fear and pain protect the species from death and destruction, and anger evokes the audacity to fight in combat. Philo’s connection between anger and battle recalled both the standard Peripatetic argument that anger serves as ‘a goad’ to battle and Plato’s connection of anger to the ally to the mind – the spirited part of the soul. In all of these instances, Philo suggested that the passions contribute to the permanence of the species, but not toward virtue as the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions had argued.

Philo observed that Moses next corrected any real positive assessment of the passions by adding that these ‘helpers’ (βοηθοί) were not suitable to the soul.186 For this reason, Moses stated that God created a second ‘helper’ (βοηθός) and ‘ally’ (σύμμαχος) to the mind that is ‘suitable’ (βοηθὸς κατ’ αὐτόν),187 that is, woman or sense perception.188 On this basis, Philo argued that while one could describe the passions as ‘helpers’ in a sense, one could only do so ‘by a straining of language’ (καταχρηστικῶς). In fact, the passions are ‘actual foes’ (πρὸς ἀλήθειαν πολέμουι) to the soul in the manner that allies of the state sometimes turn out to be traitors or deserters, or in friendships flatterers prove to be enemies rather than comrades.189 Thus, although Philo initially conceded that the passions could be construed to be ‘useful’ as the Peripatetic tradition taught,190 he was only able to say as much by way of ‘a straining of language’. Like the Stoics, he viewed the passions to be ‘in reality’ harmful and destructive to the soul, but approved the selection of food, drink, or sex by the sage as matters of indifference.191 Nevertheless, Philo could also ascribe a strong ascetic orientation to his sage in a manner reminiscent of the ideal

185 Philo, Leg. 2.8.
186 Oddly, both Lévy and Baer appear to have missed Philo’s rejection of passions as genuine ‘helpers’. See, R. Baer, Categories Male and Female (1970), 90-1; C. Lévy, ‘Philon et les Passions’ (2006), 37.
187 Note that the LXX has βοηθός ὀμοίως αὐτῷ at Gen. 2:20.
188 Philo, Leg. 2.14, 24.
189 Ibid., 2.10.
191 Philo, Leg. 2.16-7, 3.157; Mos. 1.28.
philosopher in Plato’s *Phaedo* when Philo argued that the sage counts as ‘disdainful’ (καταφρονητικός) and even ‘disregards’ (ἀμελέω) if possible ‘bodily necessities’ (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα) in order to contemplate the divine.\(^{192}\)

Philo’s preference for the Stoic treatment of the passions as fundamentally harmful was further underscored by regular treatment of the passions as such elsewhere in his corpus. To begin with, he never once qualified the passions as ‘useful’ (χρήσιμος) or ‘serviceable’ (εὔχρηστος) in his writings. Rather, he consistently depicted the passions as ‘harmful’ (βλάβος), a favourite Stoic term to describe what is evil.\(^{193}\) Moreover, he argued that it is ‘always’ (ἀεί) profitable to ‘lag behind’ (ὑστερίζω) in vice and passion;\(^{194}\) that is to say, Philo did not admit of any circumstance in which the passions would be good, useful, or profitable to the soul. Finally, he described the sage’s removal or cutting off of the passions as ‘expedient’ (συμφέρον) and ‘profitable’ (λυσιτελής) to the soul.\(^{195}\) Taken altogether, Philo clearly and consistently insisted on the harmful character of the passions, even in those instances where their presence might be construed as somehow helping the human species. This in turn further emphasized the Stoic manner of his treatment of the passions as unnatural to the soul.

**Blameworthy**

When we come to the last element in Philo’s description of passion – its culpability – we find that Philo again followed the trajectory of the Stoic account against both Plato and Aristotle.

For Aristotle, the passions can be ‘blameworthy’ (ψεκτός), but not in the Stoic sense. While for the Stoics the passions are *always* blameworthy in all circumstances, for Aristotle the passions *can be* blameworthy, but are not necessarily so.\(^{196}\) The fact that for both Plato and Aristotle the passions of the irrational parts of the soul are natural, as discussed above, does not necessarily rule out the possibility that they are inherently blameworthy. Like Plato, who characterized the appetitive faculty as naturally disobedient and unruly, Aristotle also portrayed the desiderative part of the soul as oriented toward the irrational and

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\(^{193}\) Philo, *Leg.* 5.25, 27, 131; *Det.* 105.
\(^{195}\) Philo, *Abr.* 256-7; *Leg.* 3.19.
\(^{196}\) Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 2.5 1106a, 5.8 1135b.
bodily, especially towards food, drink and sexual activity. In Plato’s case, this portrayal corresponded well with his broader conception of the formation of the world-soul out of primordial chaotic material – all of which is ‘natural’ *per se*. Aristotle likewise saw the passions as unruly and erratic by nature. Nonetheless, both Plato and Aristotle also characterized the lower part(s) as naturally capable of obedience to reason.197 This dual characterization of the appetitive or desiderative part of the soul as both unruly and obedient thus meant that its passions are not inherently blameworthy since they can be obedient to reason, though they can be blameworthy since they are also capable of unruly, disobedient, chaotic movements.

For Aristotle, the culpability of the passions turned on the questions of whether or not they are ‘voluntary’ (ἐκούσιος) and the manner in which they are exercised, even if they are unavoidable because natural.198 Aristotle identified what is accounted as ‘voluntary’ with the principle that the action or psychic movement is ‘up to us’ (ἐπ’ ἡμῖν).199 Aristotle suggested that it would be odd to describe the things that we ought to desire or be angry at as somehow involuntary, since such the ‘cause’ (ἀρχή) and ‘source’ (ἀρχή) of the movements originate from within the soul.200 For this reason, Aristotle was willing to extend the voluntary to children and animals.201 Moreover, since what is voluntary did not require the contribution of reason, only its origin within the soul, Aristotle was willing to also extend the attribution of emotions to irrational animals,202 which lack reason and belief.203 Nevertheless, the culpability for or praise of the exercise of the passions in humans, as noted above, derived from their adherence to his doctrine of the mean.

The Stoics accepted Aristotle’s assertion that only voluntary movements are worthy of blame or praise, but differed from him on how to determine what is voluntary. The Stoics agreed with Aristotle that any movement compelled by an external source is involuntary. Since all passions are impulses that originate in the mind, they would not be categorized as involuntary. As discussed earlier, Stoic monistic psychology, with its assertion of a hegemon or mind as the single centre of

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198 Cic., *Tusc.* IV 38.
199 Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 3.1 1110α, 1111α; 3.5 1113b.
200 Ibid., 3.1 1111α; Arist., *Eth. Eud.* 2.7 1223a.
201 Ibid., 3.2 1111b.
202 Arist., *An.* 1.1 403b.
203 Ibid., 3.1 1111a-b; An. 3.3 114b. For further discussion, see R. Sorabji, *Animal Minds* (2000), 55-8.
the soul, precluded Aristotle’s suggestion that the passions arise out of the lower parts of the soul apart from reason. For the Stoics, this is impossible since no second centre of psychic movement exists in the soul: all passions, without exception, are voluntary.204

For the Stoics, however, voluntary movements are accompanied with ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις) of the mind. Cicero, for instance, described the Stoic conception of the passion of grief as a ‘judgment’ (iudicium) and ‘belief’ (opinio) that does not originate in nature, but is rather ‘wholly an act of will or impulse’ (totum voluntarium).205 In so doing, he sought to show that the passion does not find its origin in nature, as proponents from the old Academy such as Crantor had argued, when they put forward a complex psychology in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle.206 Rather, he sought to show with the Stoics that this passion is the product of the mind alone, and underscored this by connecting judgment, belief, and will. In the wider context of book three of Disputationes Tusculanae, moreover, Cicero was exploring the various remedies proposed to address grief by the philosophical schools. While he acknowledged that one must employ a number of remedies to deal with the passion, he believed that Chrysippus’ remedy of removing the judgment that a dispreferred indifferent is genuinely bad is the most reliable, even if rather difficult to accomplish in the moment of distress.207 Chrysippus’ treatment, however, is only intelligible on the assumption that it is an assent of the mind and voluntary. Cicero made this assumption explicit in the following book of Disputationes Tusculanae, when he stated flatly that ‘the whole train of reasoning which is concerned with disorder of the soul turns upon the one fact that all passions are ‘within our control (in nostra potestate), are all acts of judgment, are all voluntary’.208 Against the Peripatetic and Platonic assertion that the passions are natural and voluntary, but not necessarily under the control of reason, the Stoics argued that the passions are, rather, entirely within the control of the mind. Seneca summarized the Stoic position nicely when he quipped, ‘anything that the mind

204 E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (1870), 248.
205 Cic., Tusc. III 81, 83, IV 82-3. Cicero here, as Seneca did later in relation to anger at Ira 2.4.1, uses voluntas in the broader sense to refer to Stoic impulse, not will. For further discussion of voluntas in Seneca, see R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 328-9.
206 Ibid., III 71, 74.
207 Ibid., III 71, 76, 79, IV 59-61.
208 Ibid., IV 65.
commands itself, it can do. This paved the way for their ideal of the Stoic sage, impervious to circumstance, self-sufficient, living free from all passions or apatheia.

The Stoics rejected Aristotle’s idea that the soul can act voluntarily without the mind’s assent. Since they asserted that all human moral action originates in the ruling part of the soul by means of assent and impulse, they did not envision any moral action existing apart from the mind’s rational activity. As discussed earlier, their ethics turned on the question of properly distinguishing what is good, evil, or indifferent. The good is always ‘worth choosing’ (αἱρετός), the bad ‘worth avoiding’ (φευκτός), and the indifferent is worthy of neither choice nor avoidance in itself, but may have ‘selective value’ (ἀξία ἐκλεκτική) or ‘disselective disvalue’ (ἀπαξία ἀπεκλεκτική) and accordingly is ‘worth acquiring’ (ληπτός) or ‘worth shunning’ (ἄληπτος), depending on whether or not the soul judges the object in question to be ‘preferred’ (προηγµένα), or ‘dispreferred’ (ἀποπροηγµένα) or utterly indifferent. Both what is worth choosing and what is worthy of selection stimulate impulse and their opposites, ‘repulsion’ (ἀφορµή). Accordingly, the sage is distinguished from the fool in part by his knowledge and ability to distinguish what is worth choosing, what is worth avoiding, and what is neither, so that he is able to conduct himself unerringly in his impulses. The fool, by contrast, likewise makes judgments and choices, but does so erringly. The fool’s mind still functions, even though it operates from ignorance, but it has been perverted by its own turning (τρέπω) and changing (µεταβάλλω) with the result that its choices and selections with regard to what it regards to be good, evil, or indifferent, and the impulses that follow, likewise fall into error. The Stoics, consequently, regarded the passions to be voluntary movements of the mind that result from mistaken judgments. For this reason, the Stoics regarded passion to be ‘an error’ (ἁµαρτία) of a certain kind. Since these assents are always movements of the mind and since, moreover, the Stoics envisioned the passions as always moving in an unnatural or excessive manner, unlike the Peripatetic and Platonic ideal of the moderation of passion’s

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210 Stob., *Anth.* II 7.5h-i.
211 Ibid., II 7.7, 7e.
212 Ibid., II 7.7-7b.
213 Ibid., II 7.5o, 7c, 7e.
214 Ibid., II 7.5b1, 5b5.
215 Plut., *Virt. mor.* 441b.
movements, the Stoics consequently considered the passions to be *always* culpable in *all* circumstances.

Finally, the Stoics emphasized the voluntary character of the passions by describing them as morally vile and abominable in themselves. Such a designation only applied to those motions that are within the mind’s control and thus susceptible to blame or praise, which of course included all passions. The Stoic practice of condemning the passions as fundamentally vile not only emphasized the moral degradation of the passions, but also served as a remedy for them. If the Stoic preacher could convince the hearer that the good or evil objects in view are not as supposed, but also that they are in themselves vile movements of the soul, then a person would be more likely to set himself on the Stoic path toward rooting out the passions in their entirety. While Cicero explicitly approved of this approach in *Disputationes Tusculanae*, it was best illustrated by Seneca in his *Ad Novitus de ira*, one of the few Stoic pamphlets on an individual passion that we possess. Throughout the book Seneca made every effort to depict the passion of anger in the absolute worst light as something fundamentally ugly and abhorrent, with the aim of engendering in the reader such distaste for the passion that he would flee even its very germ. Seneca described anger as a savage, ruinous fault, vile, inhuman, mad, and deserving of chastisement. He likened its hideousness to the manner in which gout or malignant sores are abject, foul, and low conditions. He depicted its foulness as similar to wild animals dripping with slaughter, the monsters of hell wreathed in serpents and breathing fire, or the ghastliest goddesses of the underworld riding out to raise war. He even noted that its essential ugliness expresses itself physically – the loveliest face becomes grim, hairs stands on end, veins swell, breathing becomes rapid, limbs tremble, eyes become aflame, and the voice hisses, bellows or groans. Against the Peripatetics, he sarcastically conceded that the passion of anger may prove beneficial in some circumstances, in the same manner that poison, a fall, or a shipwreck might. Hence, though Seneca offered a number of pieces of advice to remedy the passion of anger, the overall

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219 Ibid., II 1.1.2.  
220 Ibid., II 35.5.  
221 Ibid., II 35.3-5.  
222 Ibid., I 11.2, 12.6, 31.6, III 4.4.
impression of the book was that anger is in itself something to be avoided at all costs. His advice offered guidance on how to expunge the soul of the passion.

Stoic ethics emphasized the responsibility of the soul for its passions, since in their system all impulses, including passionate impulses, derive from the mind and are under its control.223 Their notion of apatheia or freedom from all passions depended on the ability of the agent to control their emotions in their entirety. The Peripatetic and Platonic traditions similarly made the mind responsible for its passion, but not entirely so, inasmuch as they posited an alternative source of impulse that often moves contrary to its judgments. Indeed, it was precisely this assumption of conflict among reason, anger, and appetite that served as the basis for Plato’s partitioning of the soul into three parts in the Republic and in the charioteer myth of the Phaedrus – Annas’ principle of opposites.224 This conflict likewise served as the assumption behind Plato and Aristotle’s notion of akrasia where a soul fails to do what it believes is best. Rather than focus primarily on an individual moment when the soul experiences the conflict, Aristotle expanded the notion into a habitual category akin to virtue and vice, where a soul comes to be characterized as consistently wishing to do one thing, but ends up doing another. Again, as in the case of Plato, the source of the conflict arises from psychic elements outside the mind. The mind, as the agent’s centre, is responsible to assert control over these chaotic elements, but is not ultimately responsible for their existence in the first place.

As was the case with the other characteristics of passion, Philo’s conception of their blameworthiness aligned most closely to that of the Stoics. Philo too underscored the voluntary character of the passions together with the soul’s responsibility for their impulse by describing ‘every passion’ as ‘blameworthy’, a claim that fits well with the Stoic conviction concerning the voluntary character of all the passions as judgments.225 On this score, Philo was even more Stoic than the Stoics! While the blameworthy character of the passions was implicit in the Stoic assertion of the soul’s complete accountability for its passionate impulses, the Stoics in fact seldom made explicit mention of it. We find very few occurrences of any

223 This focus on one’s responsibility for one’s emotions, which was directly correlated with the quest for self-sufficiency and inner tranquillity, was perhaps the central insight carried forward from the Old Stoa into later, middle Stoic ethics. See E.M. Krentz, ‘ΠΑΘΗ and ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑ’ (2008), 125, 128-9.
224 Plato, Resp. 4.436b, 439b; J. Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic (1981), 137.
225 A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers (1987), 421.
description of the passions as blameworthy, vile, or cursed among our extant sources for ancient Stoicism. Ironically, the primary source for such descriptors is none other than Philo!

Philo was unique among Stoic theorists in the degree to which he stressed the passions’ blameworthiness and guilt. He was the only author to describe passion as ‘blameworthy’ (ἐπιληπτος) in his formal definition.226 Nor was that an isolated occurrence. Philo elsewhere found fault with the passions on several occasions in his writings, describing them as ‘blameworthy’ (ἐπιληπτος),227 ‘guilty’ (ὑπαίτιος),228 ‘base’ (αἰσχρός),229 and ‘vile’ (μοχθηρός).230 In the case of the latter two terms, like the Roman Stoics Seneca and Cicero discussed above, Philo described the passions as vile and base to underscore their immoral character as well as to prod the soul to seek to eradicate them, just as it ought in the case of the vices. Nevertheless, favourite among these characterizations was his description of passion as ‘blameworthy’ (ἐπιληπτος) and ‘guilty’ (ὑπαίτιος). He commonly used both terms in connection with one another and always in relation to the fool or vicious soul.231

Indeed, he appears to have used these two terms in preference to other options when discussing the passions. Though he used the synonyms ‘accursed’ (κατάρατος or ἐπάρατος)232 and ‘blameworthy’ (ψεκτός)233 in other contexts, he never used them to describe the passions. Similarly, he never described the passions as ‘worthy of censure’ (ἐπίθομφος or κατάμοφος) or ‘reprehensible’ (ἐπιλήψιος).

Curiously, Philo appears to have been the first to describe the passions as ‘blameworthy’ (ἐπιληπτος) and ‘guilty’ (ὑπαίτιος) in the history of Greek thought. I have found no evidence that the Old Stoa, Plato, or Aristotle used either term in connection to the passions. Musonius Rufus used it once in relation to passion among the later Roman Stoics, but he post-dates Philo. I found no evidence that the later Stoics used the term ‘guilty’ in connection with the passions at all. Frankly, it is unclear what sources Philo may have drawn this description from, or whether he made the connection himself for the first time. It does not appear to derive from

226 Philo, Spec. 4.79.
227 Ibid., 4.79; Philo, Deus 71.
228 Philo, Opif. 80; Spec. 2.31; Deus 71.
229 Philo, Agr. 123; Spec. 4.95.
230 Philo, Leg. 3.68, 257.
231 Philo, Ebr. 28; Leg. 3.75, 247; Deus 71, 135; Somn. 2.274; Spec. 3.177, 4.79; Virt. 206, 211.
232 Philo, Leg. 3.68, 104, 247, Abr. 41.
233 Philo, Spec. 4.41-2.
Moses, since the Septuagint never uses either term. Nor is there any evidence of its use in the various philosophical traditions that precede Philo. Whatever his source of inspiration, Philo’s purpose in describing the passions as worthy of blame and censure is clear enough, namely, to underscore their voluntary character and the soul’s responsibility for their expression.

This connection between the blameworthiness of the passions and the moral responsibility of the soul is best illustrated in his reflections in Quod Deus sit immutabilis upon the Lawgiver’s attribution of ‘wrath’ (θυμόω) to God in Gen. 6:6-7.234 In his exposition, Philo distanced God from any ‘real’ attribution of anger, arguing that scripture attributed this emotion to God metaphorically as a way of speaking of God’s judgment of sin and evil deeds. Instead, he sought to show that humans alone experience anger in reality. Moreover, wrath, as well as all the other passions, is actually a source of sin and vice. As such, it is liable to God’s judgment since it is a voluntary expression of the freedom of creatures made in the likeness of God. Let us explore his argument in greater detail.

Philo supported this linking of anger and judgment by first establishing humans’ moral freedom on the basis of their possession of mind and reason. He observed that unlike the irrational animals and plants, God had supplied humans with ‘mind’ (νους or διάνοια), which endowed them with ‘liberty’ (ἐλευθερία). For mind ‘alone’ (μόνος), he observed, possesses freedom and is able to ‘range as it lists’ (ἄφετος), having been liberated from the fetters of necessity. He argued that this moral liberty of mind is ultimately rooted in its ‘voluntary’ (ἐκούσιος) character, by which humans are able to act ‘willingly’ (ἐκόνιον), from ‘spontaneous and self-determined’ (ἐθελομενός καὶ ἀυτοκέλευσσι) 'intention' (γνώμη), with ‘deliberate choice’ (προαιρετικός). Unlike plants and other animals, whose movements and psychic changes arise ‘without deliberate choice’ (ἀπροαίρετος) of their own and from ‘involuntary’ (ἄκούσιος) movements,235 humans have a great degree of moral freedom that subjects them to ‘blame’ (ψόγος) or ‘praise’ (ἔπαινος).236 In this way, Philo repudiated Aristotle’s insistence that animals can act voluntarily (ἐκούσιως).237

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234 Gen. 6:6-7 (LXX); Philo, Deus 33-73. We should note that Philo’s version of the LXX apparently read ‘ἐθυμώθην’ for ‘ἐνεθυμήθη’ at Gen. 6:7.
235 Philo, Anim. 80-1, 96.
236 See Philo, Deus 33-50; Det. 11.
237 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.1 1111a; 3.2 1111b; Motu an. 11 703b.
and thus are liable to praise or blame, and instead sided with the Stoic denial of voluntary movement in animals. Ironically, he invoked the Aristotelian notion of ‘deliberate choice’ (προαιρετικός) – a choice of means that reason has determined to be conducive to an end in humans alone – in support of his Stoic claim, rather than advance the Stoic argument that animals lack the ability to without assent.

Philo elsewhere argued that in the case of animals, what passes for skill and design, for instance a spider’s weaving of a web, the making of the honeycomb by bees, the flight of birds, or the tunnelling of a mouse; what passes for vice, such as the story of Aristogiton’s horse who limped without an injured leg, the ostentation of peacocks or the rage of the elephant; what passes for virtue, such as the devotion of animals to their offspring, the craftiness of a fox, or the household management of ants, are all only apparent. Against the view that animals possess skill, virtue and vice, espoused especially by the New Academy against the Stoics, Philo flatly asserted their lack of the reasoning faculty. He argued with the Stoics, on the contrary, that animals and plants do whatever they do spontaneously or instinctively through the particularity of their design. Similarly, Philo excused little children from blame for their actions until they have reached an age of accountability, since the reasoning faculty within them has yet to develop.

After arguing that the gift of mind and reason sets humans apart from plants and other animals by making them morally free, Philo next asserted that Moses only ‘metaphorically’ ascribed anger to God in this passage. His argument essentially amounts to this: just as Moses had attributed to God hands, feet, eyes, the use of weapons such as the sword, and passions such as jealousy or

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238 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.1 1109b; 5.8 1135a. For further discussion, see R. Sorabji, Animal Minds (2000), 108-15.
239 Origen, Princ. III.1.2-4.
240 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.2 1111b-3.3 1113a; 6.2 1139a-b.
241 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.2 1111b; Eth. Eud. 2.10 1226b.
243 Philo, Anim. 77-97.
245 Philo, Anim. 85, 96.
246 Ibid., 78, 80. Compare with Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.107; Cic., Fin. 3.58.
247 Philo, Leg. 2.53; Congr. 81-2; Praem. 62. Philo argued that a child reaches the age of accountability during its first seven years of life, and full maturity at fourteen. See Philo, Leg. 1.10. For Stoic precedence for Philo’s intervals of seven and fourteen years for the full development of humans, see Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 1.149; 2.83, 87, 764, 835. For further discussion, see also A. Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus (1981), 201-2.
248 Philo, Spec. 3.109-111, 118; Anim. 96. Note that for this reason Philo condemned killing the unborn, and infanticide, on the basis that both possess the potentiality of existence as rational creatures. See Philo, Spec. 3.109-11, 117-8; Virt. 137-8.
anger elsewhere in the scriptures, so in this passage he was doing the same with regard to wrath.\textsuperscript{249} Philo sought to ground his rejection of any attribution of anthropomorphic images to God on the basis of God’s simple, incorporeal existence outside of and above creation. Since He is not composed of parts, He does not need any bodily organs to serve as instruments to engage the cosmos. Further, as the Creator, He stands outside of and above creation. As a consequence, He is everywhere and nowhere at once, whereas corporeal existence supposes some sort of special limit. Further, He is likewise unencumbered by time. What is future and past to us is always present to God. This freedom with respect to body, space, and time renders any attribution of anthropomorphisms such as eyes or weapons of war or passions metaphorical by definition.

Philo next argued that Moses’ purpose in using anthropomorphisms to describe God was to train ‘the fool’ (ὁ ἄφρων) to pursue virtue and avoid vice by means of fear (φόβος),\textsuperscript{250} a strategy similarly employed by the Stoics.\textsuperscript{251} The use of metaphor is a necessary first step in reforming fools since they are lovers of the body and otherwise unable to draw a right conception of God, though the Lawgiver’s ultimate pedagogical goal was nothing less than to entirely ‘cut off’ (ἐκτένω) ‘the diseases of the mind’ (αἱ τῆς διανοίας νοῦσοι) from the soul. Thus, we find Philo paradoxically arguing that the Lawgiver advocated the use of fear as a remedy for eradicating vice and passion in the soul of the fool, which presumably included the passion of fear! While on the surface this may appear to be incoherent, it is reminiscent of Philo’s concession in \textit{Legum allegoriae} that Moses had described the four Stoic cardinal passions as ‘helpers’ (βοηθοί) of the soul by way of ‘a straining of language’ (καταχρηστικῶς) inasmuch as they sometimes do contribute to the permanence of the race or as a weapon of defence in the case of secondary passions such as anger.\textsuperscript{252} The difference is that while the passions in general might provide some unintended benefits for the maintenance of the human race, Philo here was calling for the therapeutic use of fear to aid the soul in its progress. Thus, the physician of the soul utilizes fear as a means of excising other vices and passions from the soul \textit{in the fool}. So long as the soul is burdened with an anthropomorphic conception of the Existent, the doctor is forced to resort to placing before the fool

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{249} Philo, \textit{Deus} 52, 57-60.
\item \textsuperscript{250} Ibid., 51-68, 71.
\item \textsuperscript{251} For further discussion, see R. Sorabji, \textit{Emotion and Peace of Mind} (2000), 51-2.
\item \textsuperscript{252} Philo, \textit{Leg.} 2.7-10.
\end{itemize}
representations of God as dealing in threats and showing indignation and implacable anger. ‘For’, Philo concluded, ‘this is the only way in which the fool can be admonished’ (μόνος γὰρ οὗτος ὁ ᾠδρον νουθετεῖται). In this way, the passion of fear can serve a role in the spiritual progress of the fool, at least for a time. Ultimately, however, in order for the fool to pass over into sagacity and arrive at the complete excision of all ‘diseases of the mind’, including fear, the fool must come to conceive God without any human attributes at all and be motivated only by ‘love’ (ἀγάπη), which Philo elsewhere identified as a species of the proper feeling ‘wish’ (βούλησις). Though the Stoic, Epictetus, could advocate the temporary use by the novice of passions such as distress or shame, or the possible improper use of caution, Philo’s proposal to use fear may represent a small expansion on their approach.

Having established the pedagogical utility of the passions for fools, who cannot but experience otherwise, Philo next asserted, rather incoherently, that the text ‘I was wroth in that I made them’ should be understood not only metaphorically of God, but also as an injunction against the passions themselves in humans. He summarized his interpretation of this text succinctly in the following doctrine:

Wrath (θυμός) is the source of misdeeds (ἁμάρτημα), but the reasoning faculty (λογισμός) of right actions (κατόρθωμα). To this summary he added that ‘by general consent’ (ὁ μολονόμως) every ‘action’ (πράγμα) done on account of fear, anger, grief, pleasure or any other passion is ‘worthy of blame and censure’ (ὑπαίτια καὶ ἐπίληπτα), but if done through ‘rectitude of reason and knowledge’ (ετος ὀρθότητος λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης) then it is ‘worthy of praise’ (ἐπαινετός).

In this passage Philo offered several contrasts, including ‘blameworthy’ or ‘censurable’ versus ‘praiseworthy’, the passions of fear, anger, grief, or pleasure versus ‘rectitude of reason’ or ‘knowledge’, ‘wrath’ versus ‘the reasoning faculty’, and ‘misdeeds’ versus ‘right actions’. If one were to draw up a moral ledger, each set of contrasts would be placed in one of two opposing columns. On one side would

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253 Philo, Migr. 169.
254 Epic., Diatr. 3.23.30, 37.
255 Epic., Diatr. 3.7.27; Ench. 33.16.
256 Epic., Diatr. 2.12.12; 3.16.3.
257 Philo, Deus 72.
258 Philo, Deus 71-3.
be morally positive attributes such as praiseworthiness, right reason, knowledge, the
reasoning faculty and right actions, while on the other, morally negative attributes
such as blameworthiness, censure, the passions, wrath, and misdeeds. Each set of
terms represented an entire constellation of interrelated elements that turned on the
manner with which the mind uses its innate gifts of freedom, voluntary movement,
and deliberate choice. Significantly, Philo included wrath, anger, fear, grief,
pleasure, and the other passions unequivocally within the column of morally bad
attributes.

This series of contrasts also suggested a process of moral progress or regress for
the soul. On the one hand, the reasoning faculty functions in accordance with right
reason and knowledge to execute right actions that are worthy of praise. On the
other hand, passions such as wrath serve as a font of misdeeds in accordance with
the soul’s implied ignorance, which in turn leads to blame and censure. In this
schema, one can draw a direct line from passions to vicious deeds to censure. Thus,
while Philo faulted the passions on the basis of their origin as free and voluntary
movements of the mind, he also took pains to condemn them for the vicious deeds
that often result as their fruit.

Though one might be tempted to understand Philo’s contrast between ‘wrath’
(θυμός) and ‘the reasoning faculty’ (λογισμός) in a Platonic manner, such an
interpretation would be misguided. In a Platonic reading, the two terms are
understood as opposed to one another as separate sources of virtue or vice, from
different places in the soul. This is precisely the line of argument that Plato had used
for anger as a distinct part of the soul apart from reason, though he had treated anger
and wrath normally as allies to the mind against the appetitive part of the soul.
Philo’s description of the reasoning faculty ‘as an incorruptible judge’ (ὡς περὶ τις
δικαστής ἀδωροδόκητος) that will accept whatever ‘right reason’ suggests might
appear to further support this, since the Stoic understanding of anger is precisely the
corruption or perversion of the reasoning faculty or process.259

The context, however, does not support this reading for several reasons. Firstly,
all the terms mentioned above from this passage were Stoic. Secondly, there is no
mention of the appetitive part of the soul anywhere. The disparaging treatment that
Philo accorded to anger and wrath in this passage would, in a Platonic framework,

259 Ibid., 50.
have been reserved for desire; anger was normally reason’s ally. Thirdly, against a threefold treatment of the passions, the entire tone of this passage was instead dualistic, as witnessed to by the series of contrasts noted above, which better fits a Stoic moral sensibility, though it could also reflect developments in the Peripatetic and Middle Platonist traditions, and in Posidonius, where Plato’s tripartite soul was interpreted in a bipartite manner with ‘the spirited part’ of the soul rather aligned with ‘the appetitive part’ against reason. Fourthly, Philo observed that these passions are judged blameworthy by ‘common consent’ (ὁμολογομένως). Such a doctrine was ‘common’ only to the Stoics, while both the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions explicitly rejected a universal condemnation of the passions. Aristotle’s doctrine of the means made room for an appropriate use of most of the passions, and Plato’s treatment of anger as an auxiliary to reason certainly placed it in a more positive light. Fifthly, Philo had already indicated that his goal was the eradication of the passions altogether, since all were nothing less than ‘diseases of the mind’, which was another way of speaking of the Stoic ideal of apatheia. Hence Philo’s closing remarks that the emotional goal of the wise soul was to love God, not to fear Him or be angry. Finally, this particular use of the term ‘reasoning faculty’ (λογισμός) in the doctrine quoted above, should be understood to mean not the faculty itself, but rather the process of reasoning. Philo had already indicated that this was his intention a few lines previously, when he described actions as praiseworthy when done with ‘rectitude of reason and knowledge’, but blameworthy when done from wrath. As such, Philo emphasized the kind of reasoning employed, not the fact of its employment. A simple employment of the faculty does not ensure praiseworthy actions unless done ‘with correctness’ (μετ’ ὀρθότητος) of reason and knowledge. If they are perverted through fear, anger, grief, or pleasure, the actions will result in vicious deeds worthy of blame or censure.

Consequently, Philo described passions, as well as the vicious or wrong deeds that arise from them, as ‘blameworthy’ and ‘censurable’ on the basis of their voluntary character as free movements of the mind. This, as we have argued, corresponded to the Stoic conception of the passions as perverse movements of the mind. Nevertheless, Philo differed from the Stoics in that he placed more stress on

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261 Philo, Deus 71.
262 Ibid., 72.
their blameworthiness. This emphasis certainly served to further underscore their voluntary character against involuntary theories of emotion found in the other philosophical traditions, most notably the Platonic and Peripatetic. Though we do not have space to develop it here, we should note that his emphasis on the voluntary and culpable character of the passions also fit his Jewish and religious legal instinct, which insisted on God’s praise of those creatures who obey His ‘command’ (πειθαρχία), but punishment through His Powers of those who do not.263

**Conclusion**

Philo characterized passion as excessive, irrational, unnatural, and voluntary, and as a consequence, deserving of censure and blame. While the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions could describe passion as an impulse that is irrational and or excessive, both considered passion’s irrationality to be natural. Similarly, although both traditions could condemn some passions as excessive, not all were worthy of censure. In their view, only when the lower parts of the soul disobediently move against reason and beyond the mean should they receive censure. A passion in itself, however, is inherently natural, and is often useful or appropriate.

Philo, by contrast, consistently drew upon the Stoics’ depiction of *all* passions as irrational, excessive, unnatural, and consequently worthy of censure and extirpation—not moderation. In his view, passion’s irrationality results from the mind’s instability and false orientation and its excess results from the soul’s loss of control. Since passion is an unnatural psychic movement and harmful to the soul, Philo everywhere argued for its removal. The Platonic and Aristotelian accounts, by contrast, considered passion’s elimination impossible. Further, like the Stoics, Philo considered all passions to result from voluntary movements of the hegemon and hence to be morally vile per se. Indeed, he highlighted passion’s blameworthiness more than the Stoics did. This again contrasted with the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions, which recognized many emotions to be involuntary movements of the soul. Taken altogether, Philo’s depiction of the passions represented a Stoic approach to the passions.

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263 Ibid., 34.
Section 2: Platonic features and alternatives

Chapter 3: The Platonic tripartite model for the soul

Plato’s tripartite metaphor in Philo

As detailed in the previous section, Philo drew heavily upon the the Stoic approach to the passions associated with Zeno, which identified a passion as a type of impulse that follows from a wretched mind’s assent to a false judgment regarding what is good or evil to pursue or avoid, though he sought to adapt it to a Platonic body-soul dualism associated with the Phaedo. With the Stoics, moreover, Philo characterized the passions as irrational, excessive, unnatural, fluttering, and, to a degree unique to Philo, worthy of censure. On a few occasions, in his exposition of scripture Philo could instead utilize the Platonic tripartite model outlined in the Republic and Timaeus and the myth of the charioteer recounted in the Phaedrus, the philosophical alternative and competitor to the Stoic approach. We will discuss Philo’s use of Plato’s tripartite model of the soul, as he understood it, in this chapter, and his employment of the charioteer myth in the next.

Philo employed the tripartite Platonic alternative in two ways. In a few instances, he opted for a wholesale use of Plato’s tripartite metaphor of the soul. More often, as we have already hinted at several times in the preceding section, Philo chose rather to modify the Stoic elements of his psychology in subtle ways. Hence, we see a dual approach. In his efforts to provide an account of Moses’ moral psychology in his exposition of Torah, Philo felt free to modify the Stoic psychology he found in scripture to make it better fit within his overall Platonic outlook, even as he

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simultaneously modified the Platonic psychological elements in a Stoic direction to make them better correspond with the tenets of his Stoic moral psychology.²

Philo employed Plato’s tripartite psychology as his leading metaphor for the soul on a number of occasions throughout his corpus.³ Indeed, he twice explicitly endorsed Plato’s tripartite description of the soul without repudiating the Stoic monistic alternative in any way.⁴ For instance, in *Legum allegoriae* Philo argued:

Our soul consists of three parts (τριμερή), and has one part (μέρος … ἕν) given to reasoning (τὸ λογιστικόν), a second to the spirited part (τὸ θυμικόν), a third to the desiring part (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). Some philosophers (μερι… τῶν φιλοσόφων) have distinguished these parts (τὰ μέρη) from one another in regard to function (δυνάμει), some in regard also to the places (τόποι), which they occupy. These have gone on to assign to the reasoning part the region (χώρος) of the head (κεφαλή), saying that, where the king is, there are also his bodyguards (δορυφόρος), and that the senses (αἱ αἰσθήσεις) which are in the region of the head are bodyguards of the mind (νοῦς), and that it follows that the king must be there too, having had it allotted to him, like a castle in a city, for his dwelling. To the spirited part they assign the breast (στέρνα) ... to the desiring part of the soul they assign the quarter about the abdomen (ντρον) and the belly (κοιλίαν), for there it is that lust (ἐπιθυμία), irrational appetite (ὀρέξις άλογος), has its abode.⁵

This description represents a *conflation* of Plato’s portrayal of ‘the soul’⁶ in the *Republic* and *Timaeus* and, as we will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter,

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² As we will discuss in the last section of this chapter, this is not necessarily evidence of ‘eclecticism’ in Philo. As Dillon observed, such a variation in the use of different schemes of the soul by the same writer were quite permissible within contemporary Platonism so long as a polemical controversy was not being conducted. The broad division of the soul into a higher (rational) part and a lower (irrational) part was the main thing. See J.M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (1977), 144.

³ Philo, *Leg.* 1.68-73, 3.113-49; *Agr.* 67-123; *Conf.* 21-5, 112; *Migr.* 64-8; *Her.* 132, 225; *Sobr.* 14; *Spec.* 1.146-8, 192, 4.79-99; *Virt.* 13; *Praem.* 59.

⁴ Philo, *Leg.* 1.70, 3.115.

⁵ Philo, *Leg.* 3.115. See also Philo, *Virt.* 13; *Leg.* 1.71.

⁶ A number of difficulties surround Plato’s generic conception of psyche or soul. Depending on the context, Plato could make soul ‘responsible for the life of plants, the orderly movements of the heavenly bodies, the immortal feature of human beings, and everything mental’. This accounts for various difficulties that scholars have had in reconciling Plato’s doctrines of soul, including the ‘personalist and non-personalist functions in his concept of psyche’, the soul’s unity versus tripartition, and its partial versus complete immortality. A.A. Long, ‘Platonic Souls as Person’
the *Phaedrus*, a tendency common among Middle Platonists. In contrast to his early dialogues, Plato sought to establish a ‘positive’ account of justice in the *Republic* by adopting a method of investigation of examining the larger, namely the polity, first, before proceeding to the smaller, that is, the individual soul, on the analogy of reading small, distant letters with the benefit of having read large ones first, establishing what Moline called a ‘structural and functional isomorphism’ between the two. Utilizing what Woods called the ‘principle of univocity’, Plato’s analogy thus rested upon the recognition of the same ‘natural tendency or capacity’ in both the individual and the community. Within this wider discussion regarding justice, in book four he argued that just as his city is divided into three classes – ‘the money-making’, ‘auxiliary’, and ‘guardian classes’ (χρηματιστικός, ἐπικουρικός, φυλακικός γένος) – so likewise the embodied human soul is divided into three natural or basic parts, namely, ‘the rational’, ‘appetitive’, and ‘spirited’ (τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμιστικόν). Later, in books eight and nine, Plato outlined how the varying relations of each of these three parts of the soul result in five types of character, just as the varying relations of each of his three classes of citizen lead in turn to five forms of constitution (aristocratic or kingly, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical). Throughout the *Republic*, Plato characterized the three parts of the soul in the manner described in the following passage:

The first, we say, is the part with which a person learns (τὸ... ἄνθος), and the second the part with which he gets angry (τὸ... θυμὸν). As for the third, we had no one special name for it, since it is

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7 A consequence, the development in Plato’s psychology over his lifetime, together with the related question of the ordering of his writing, while important for a comprehensive study of Plato, has little bearing on this study.
10 Plato, Resp. 2.368d-369a, 4.434d-435b, 441a, 8.545b; Socrates’ fundamental presupposition appears to be that justice is one thing, but it manifests itself in many different ways. In this case, Plato is arguing that justice in the soul and justice in the polis can be taken as two manifestations of justice proper. See I.D. Evrigenis, ‘Psychology of Politics’ (2002), 593; B. Williams, ‘Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic’ (1997), 49.
13 Plato, Resp. 4.441c.
15 Plato, Resp. 8.544e-545c, 9.580b, 587c.
multiform (πολυειδία), so we named it after the biggest and strongest thing (ὁ μέγιστον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον) in it. Hence we called it the appetitive part (ἐπιθυμητικόν), because of the intensity of its appetites (ὅπως σφοδρότητα τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν) for food, drink, sex, and all the things associated with them …

In the Timaeus, Plato outlined a mythical account of the construction of this cosmos in which ‘soul’ features as a central element in the narrative. This was true at the cosmic level where Plato conceived of the universe as ‘a single living animal’ (ζῶον ἐν), endowed with ‘soul and intelligence’ (ἐμψυχον ἔννουν τε), which contains within itself all living things, and is immortal. It was also true at the level of anthropology, where the parallel between ‘World Soul and individual soul is a remarkably close one’. In the last section of the Timaeus, Plato argued that the Demiurge first fashioned the divine progeny and then assigned to them the task of imitating him in making mortal elements of the cosmos, including the lower parts of the human soul and body:

…having taken the immortal origin of the soul, they proceeded next to encase it within a round mortal body [the head], and to give it the entire body as its vehicle. Within this body they built another kind of soul as well, the mortal kind (τὸ θνητὸν), which contains within itself those dreadful but necessary disturbances [pleasure, pain, boldness and fear, anger (ἡδονή, λύπη, θάρσος, φόβος, θυμός)] … Now the part of the mortal soul that exhibits manliness and spirit (ἀνδρεία, θυμός), the ambitious part (φιλόνεικος), they settled nearer the head, between the midriff (φρήν) and neck (αὐχήν), so that it might listen to reason (τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον) and together with it restrain by force (βίᾳ) the part consisting of appetites (τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν γένος), should the latter at any time refuse outright to obey (πείθω) the dictates of reason coming down from the citadel.

A little later, Plato added this concerning the appetitive part of the soul:

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16 Ibid., 9.580d-e.
17 Plato, Tim. 30c-d, 69c.
19 Plato, Tim. 69c-d, 70a.
The part of the soul that has appetites for food and drink (τὸ... σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν ἐπιθυμητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς) and whatever else it feels a need for, given the body’s nature, they settled in the area between the midriff (φρήν) and the boundary toward the navel (πρὸς τὸν ὀμφαλὸν). In the whole of this region, they constructed something like a trough (φάτνη) for the body’s nourishment. Here they tied this part of the soul down like a wild beast (ὡς θρέμμα ἄγριον), but one they could not avoid sustaining along with the others if a mortal race were ever to be … They knew that this part of the soul was not going to understand (οὔτε συνήσει ἐμελεῖν) the deliverances of reason (λόγος) and that even if it were in one way or another to have some awareness of them, it would not have an innate regard for any of them (οὐκ ἐμφυτὸν αὐτῷ τὸ μέλειν τινῶν ἔσοιτο λόγων)…

When we compare these texts drawn from both Philo and Plato, we see that although Philo does not identify ‘the philosophers’, his description of their opinions closely matches those of Plato, both in terms of his terminology and in his characterization of each part of the soul. The fact that Philo refers to ‘philosophers’ in the plural need not trouble us, given the wide popularity of Plato’s psychology in antiquity.

To begin with, Philo and Plato schematized the tripartite soul in the same manner. They organized the soul hierarchically into what amounted to the shape of a pyramid:

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20 Ibid., 70d-71a.
21 Philo’s reference to the three parts as ‘functions’ could point instead to Posidonius as Lévy suggests. See C. Lévy, ‘Philon et les Passions’ (2006), 28.
22 Warne makes the Platonic tripartite division Philo’s primary structure of the soul. G.J. Warne, Philo and Paul (1995), 139-41. Though he recognizes Philo’s description of sense-perception in terms of ‘seven senses’, surprisingly, he completely misses the Stoic connotations of this image as discussed in chapter 1, as well as the strongly monist character of Philo’s treatment of the mind as the ‘ruling part’, which again is Stoic.
As this illustration shows, both Philo and Plato divided the soul into the same three parts, namely, the rational, appetitive, and spirited, and simultaneously stressed the bipartite division between mortal and immortal elements. They placed the rational part at the top nearest the divine and the appetitive at the base closest to the mortal and earthly, while the spirited part was sandwiched between them. Further, both treated the rational part and mind as ‘divine’ and ‘immortal’, but the two lower parts as mortal, irrational and earthly. Their mutual description of the mind as ‘a king’ further reinforced its superiority over the other parts of the soul. Hence, they both always placed each of these respective parts in the same hierarchical order – the rational first, the spirited second, and the appetitive third. Finally, they treated the rational part as the smallest and the appetitive as the largest, with the spirited in the middle. As we will see in a moment, this related in part to their spatial relations to the human body, but it also had to do with the number of desires associated with each part. In contrast to the rational and spirited parts, which were each associated primarily with a single function – reasoning and anger – the appetitive part is filled with a host of bodily desires for food, drink, sex and so forth, that all clamour for satisfaction.
Philo and Plato used nearly identical terminology for the three parts of the soul. Both described the divisions as ‘parts’ (µέρει), ‘classes’ (εἴδη) or sometime ‘kinds’ (γένη). Both called the part of the soul that reasons or calculates ‘rational’ (λογιστικόν). Both associated the second part especially with ‘spirit’ or ‘anger’ (θυμός). As such, both used various cognates of anger to name the second part. Philo normally used ‘high spirit’ or ‘spirited’ (θυμικός or θυμικόν), but never ‘spirited part’ (τὸ θυμικόν), a change in terminology that reflects a Peripatetic and later Middle Platonic reading of Plato, as Vander Waerdt notes. Plato in contrast normally preferred ‘spirited part’ (τὸ θυμικόν) in the Republic, but ‘high spirit’ (θυμός) throughout his corpus. Both philosophers connected the third part of the soul with ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμία) for the pleasures of food, drink, and sex. Hence, both called the third part that embraces the wide assortment of desires connected to the sphere of the abdomen ‘the appetitive’ (ἐπιθυμητικόν). The respective names of each part indicated their basic activities. As such, both philosophers distinguished among the three parts by their basic functions.

The division of the soul into parts also possessed strong spatial overtones for Philo and Plato. Philo noted in the passage above that some ‘philosophers’ distinguished the parts of the soul ‘by function’ (δυνάμει), while other did so ‘by places’ (τόποις). Philo himself opted to appropriate both approaches, just as Plato had done. We have already noted how they connected each of the parts to specific functions. With regard to ‘place’, in the Timaeus Plato had originally assigned the

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25 Moline observed that scholars have proposed a number of English terms for the ‘parts’ of Plato’s tripartite division of the soul, including ‘faculties’, ‘principles’, ‘activities’, ‘aspects’, ‘instances’, and ‘levels’. See J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 1. For instance, for ‘parts’ (µέρει), see Plato, Resp. 4.442b, c, 444b, 9.577d, 583a, 586c; Philo, Leg. 1.70-1, 3.115; for ‘classes’ (εἴδη), see Plato, Resp. 4.435c, 439e, 440e, 6.504a, 9.580d; Tim. 89e-90a; Philo, Mut. 119; for ‘kinds’ (γένη), see Plato, Resp. 4.441c; Tim. 70a, c; Philo, QG 179. In terms of his overall usage, Philo clearly preferred to think of the tripartite soul in terms of ‘parts’ (µέρος). Robinson points out that Plato tended to associate ‘kinds’ (γένη) with the divisions of the city or when using the city analogy of the divisions of the soul, but ‘parts’ (µέρει) and ‘classes’ (εἴδη) with the divisions of the soul, though not exclusively so. To see this subtle distinction in practice, see for instance, Plato, Resp. 4.435b-c; R. Robinson, ‘Plato’s Separation of Reason and Desire’ (1971), 44-55. Moline argues that εἴδη implies that each part is characterized by a certain paradigmatic kind of ‘purity’ corresponding to their respective names in keeping with Plato’s notion of εἴδος as ‘forms’ elsewhere. See for instance, Plato, Phd. 79a-d. This protects against the danger of an infinite regress of parts-within-parts. See J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 24-5. For the Peripatetic and Academic terminology for the divisions of the soul, see P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 286.


27 Scholars debate whether or not Plato envisioned specific bodily locations for each part of the soul in the Republic as he clearly did in the Timaeus. See D.A. Rees, ‘Bipartition of the Soul in the
reasoning part and senses to the head or brain. This contrasted with the Stoics, who had located the commanding part in the heart, as we may recall from our discussion in the previous section. Instead, Plato located the spirited part in ‘the breast’ (στέρνα) – that is, the region between ‘the midriff’ (φρήν) and neck where the heart is located. In a manner not unlike the commanding part of the soul for the Stoics, the spirited part of the soul uses the blood vessels that emanate from the heart as channels to communicate ‘exhortations’ (παρακελεύσεις) and ‘threats’ (ἀπειλαί) to other bodily parts.

Plato assigned the appetitive part to ‘the area’ (τόπος) between the midriff (φρήν) and navel (ὀμφαλός) near the organs of nourishment. As such, he primarily associated it with the desires for food and drink. He never explicitly connected the appetitive part to sexual desire in the Timaeus. Indeed, throughout the Timaeus he tended to treat sexual desire separately from the appetitive, although he never called it a fourth part, nor did he connect it with either the spirited or reasoning parts. In the Republic, however, Plato did make the connection clear in that he explicitly included ‘sex’ (αφροδίσια) or left-handed ‘erotic love’ (ἔρως) among the desires of the appetitive part. Indeed, he went so far as to treat erotic desire as the leader of the appetites, especially in the tyrannical type of soul in whom the appetitive part of the soul has gone out of control. With Robinson, we should note that Plato’s confinement of the three psychic parts to certain regions of the soul was qualified to an extent in the Timaeus when he added that the marrow of the bones contains some soul and intelligence and so extends throughout the body as a sort of ‘life principle’ and anchor.

Philo located each part of the soul in the same ‘regions’ (χῶροι) of the body as Plato. He assigned the reasoning part and the senses to ‘the head’ (κεφαλή) or

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29 For the brain, see Plato, Tim. 73d, 76a-d.
30 For the brain, see Plato, Tim. 70a-b.
31 Ibid., 70c.
32 Ibid., 70e, 88b.
33 Plato, Resp. 3.402e-403b, 4.436a, 4.439d, 9.572e, 9.573d, 9.575a, 9.580e. See my comments in the next chapter regarding Plato’s distinction between a left-handed and right-handed form of ‘erotic love’ in the Phaedrus. Moreover, Plato also depicted the desire of the rational part for knowledge of the good and beautiful as associated with his philosopher-king as a type of ‘erotic love’. See Plato, Resp. 5.474b-e, 5.475b-c, 6.485a-e; L.D. Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’ (2001), 348.
34 Plato, Resp. 9.573e.
35 Plato, Tim. 73b-d, 75a; T.M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (1995), 106-7.
‘brain’ (ἐγκέφαλος), though he allowed for the possibility that the rational part might be located in ‘the heart’. Like Plato, he also assigned high spirit to ‘the chest’ (στέρνα) or ‘breast’ (στῆθος). He derived the second term, ‘breast’, from biblical texts upon which he was commenting. Additionally, in his sevenfold division of the body into its external parts Philo had identified the head and chest as the two top parts. Finally, Philo assigned desire to the same basic region of the body as Plato, though he used different terminology. He located the appetitive part in ‘the belly’ (κοιλία), ‘maw’ (ήνυστρον), or ‘abdomen’ (ἡτρον). For instance, in the passage from the Legum allegoriae quoted above, Philo opted for the term ‘belly’. His choice of terminology here clearly derived from the passage upon which he was commenting, namely, Gen. 3:14 of the LXX. It reads: ‘On your “breast” (στῆθος) and “belly” (κοιλία) you shall go.’ For Philo, the terms ‘breast’ and ‘belly’ recalled Plato’s location of the two lower parts of the soul in these regions of the body, while the biblical text controlled the exact terminology in those passages.

Philo elsewhere used only the terms ‘abdomen’ (ἡτρον) or ‘maw’ (ήνυστρον) for the location of the appetitive part of the soul. The three terms – belly, abdomen, and maw – refer to adjacent regions of the body that house the two key sets of desires that both he and Plato associated with the appetitive part of the soul – the desire for food or drink and sexual desire. In his delineation of the external members of the body, Philo listed ‘the belly’ (κοιλία or γαστήρ) after the head and breast, but he placed the abdomen below the belly nearer to the feet. As such, the belly would be more associated with Plato’s ‘trough’ for food and drink, while the abdomen would be closer to the sexual organs. Philo explicitly associated the appetitive part of the soul and the belly and maw, which referred to the fourth stomach of ruminating animals, with the passions of ‘wine bibbing’ (οἰνοφλυγία) and ‘gluttony’ (ὀψοφαγία or λαμμαργία). He treated these passions as desires for drink and food.

Philo, Leg. 1.70, 3.115; Conf. 21; Migr. 66-67; Spec. 1.146, 4.92-4; QG 1.5; QE 2.100, 124; compare with Plato, Tim. 69e-70a.

Philo, Leg. 1.59, 2.6; Spec. 4.69.

Philo, Spec. 1.146. For further discussion, see D.T. Runia, Philo and the Timaeus of Plato (1986), 302-3.

For ‘breast’ (στήθος), see Gen. 3:14 (LXX); for the diminutive form (στηθύνιον), see Lev. 7.31-4 (LXX).

Philo, Opif. 118.

Philo, Leg. 3.115-6. See also Philo, Migr. 66.

Gen. 3:14 (LXX).

Philo, Leg. 1.70-1.

Philo, Spec. 1.148.

Philo, Leg. 1.12.
respectively. Philo even invoked Plato’s imagery of the belly as ‘a manger’ (φάτνη) from which ‘the irrational animal’ (ἄλογος θρέμμα) of desire eats. Hence, Philo connected the appetitive part of the soul to both parts of the external body – the desires for food and drink to the belly, but sexual desire to the abdomen.

**Plato’s three parts of the soul as distinct ‘agent-like’ elements**

Plato’s tripartism envisioned a soul that is fundamentally complex, but in what sense? Plato had initially proposed his division of the individual soul into three parts as analogous to his threefold separation of the political and social classes in his hypothetical city-state as the basis for the interlocutors’ definition of justice, whatever its inconsistencies. Plato’s analogy of the tripartite soul with the tripartite class ‘composition’ of his city-state, together with his akratic language of different parts usurping or obeying, corrupting or bettering one another imply that we ought to think of the soul’s parts in some sense as an internal community of agents. Yet, Plato’s insistence that the soul acts as a single, unified person, that it is ‘non-composite’ (ἀσύνθετος), that it is perhaps unitary in its true and purified nature after all, on the ‘co-consciousness of each of the parts’, and on the Orphic-style pre/post-existence of the soul identified with what Robinson calls the ‘counter-person’ or ‘true person’, cautions us against overstressing the independent

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47 Ibid., 1.148; Plato, *Tim.* 70c. Note that Plato in this passage described the appetitive animal as ‘wild’ (ὡς θρέμμα ἄγριον) rather than ‘irrational’ (ἄλογος) as in Philo’s case.
48 Plato, Resp. 4.434d-435b. See also Plato, Resp. 2.368d-e, 4.441a, 8.545b. I.D. Evrigenis, ‘Psychology of Politics’ (2002), 590.
50 ‘Composition’ is used here in Gill’s sense of an atomistic conception of the part-whole relationship. See C. Gill, *Naturalistic Psychology* (2010), 14-5, 78-80, 180, 182.
52 Plato, *Phd.* 78c.
55 T.M. Robinson, *Plato’s Psychology* (1995), 20, 25, 37, 46. Robinson points out that in this strain of Platonic thought, the soul is described as a sort of ‘duplicate self’ with all of the characteristics which we normally attribute to standard human beings, but quite apart from the body. This ‘soul-as-the-real-person’, moreover, is complex, composed of at least ‘reason and impulse’. Warne adds that Plato attributed ‘the soul with a new status, with an ontological order of its own’, which he identified, following Socrates, with what he called the ‘inner person’ as distinct from the body. It is immaterial, incorporeal, and intelligible, belonging to the highest order of reality where God and the Forms dwell, and, as such, has a natural kinship with this reality. See G.J. Warne, *Philo and Paul* (1995), 105-10.
subjectivity of each part. As a consequence, scholars differ on how best to interpret Plato. Price called the emphasis on the parts as three distinct psychological subjects a ‘strong reading’ of Plato’s argument in book four of the *Republic*, as opposed to his own interpretation of the parts as ‘aspects of ourselves’, identified by characteristic mental states, as a ‘weak reading’. The more one stresses the agent-like character of the three parts, the more one emphasizes cognitive and evaluative elements in the so-called ‘irrational’ parts. Both perspectives, however, underscore a cognitive element in the emotions themselves, since they assume that emotions have a ‘propositional core: one is angry, say, that so-and-so has acted unjustly’.

Similarly, in the case of ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμία), Plato argued that when someone wishes something be given him that he wants, his ‘soul’ (ψυχή) nods assent (ἐπινεύω) as ‘if answering a question’ (ὁσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος). Though Plato does not detail the exact cognitive process at work, he clearly envisions emotions such as anger or desire including some sort of proposition – ‘so-and-so acted unjustly’ or ‘a question’ – as part of their basic constitution.

Whatever the best reading may be, this ambiguity surrounding how to understand Plato reappears in Philo’s own treatment of the tripartite soul. The main drift of Philo’s appropriation of Plato’s psychic tripartism was in the direction of an instrumental conception of the parts, which is in keeping with Price’s ‘weak reading’, as one would expect of a moral psychology that viewed Plato through Aristotle and shaped by Stoicism. For, in the Stoic monistic model, the mind alone possesses the power of reasoning, motivation and impulse, and in the Peripatetic model, psychic complexity consists of conflicting functionalities shorn of most of

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57 A.W. Price, ‘Emotions in Plato and Aristotle’ (2009), 122-6. Price argues later that emotions involve an interaction between perception, imagination, involving both memory and expectation, and belief. A.W. Price, ‘Emotions in Plato and Aristotle’ (2009), 133-40. Their precise relations to one another and to emotion in Aristotle are unclear. Knuuttila divides Aristotle’s theory of emotion into the following components: 1) an evaluation that something positive or negative is happening, 2) a pleasant or unpleasant feeling about the content of the evaluation, 3) a behaviour suggestion or impulse toward action, and 4) bodily changes. See S. Knuuttila, *Emotions* (2004), 32-42. For further bibliographic references, see note 3255. We see here most of the key components that would later go into the Stoic theory of the emotions, but with much less clarity with regard to their exact relations.

58 Plato, Resp.
Plato’s agent-like characteristics, both of which are closer to Price’s ‘weak reading’. Yet Philo also appeared to be aware of a possible stronger reading, so that he sometimes drew upon those elements in Plato that account for the depiction of the parts as agents. This was exemplified above all in his extensive utilization of Plato’s charioteer metaphor from the Phaedrus, which we will explore further in the next chapter, as well as his occasional personification of the parts in his biblical commentaries.

As proponents of the ‘strong reading’ point out, Plato often treated the three parts as if they were three different agents. In this view, the reasoning, spirited, and appetitive parts each possesses its own ‘psychic states, activities and capacities normally attributed to the whole person’. Bobonich summarized the agent-like character of each part by noting that each has its own ‘pleasures and desires’ (ἡδοναί and ἔπιθυμίαι), and its own ‘cognitive and linguistic capacities’, including the ability of each part ‘to want and wish’ (βούλεσθαι and ἐθέλειν), to possess separate beliefs, and to engage in forms of communication, persuasion, and reasoning.

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59 This tendency toward functionalism in Aristotle must not be overstated. In his explication of incontinence or akratic conflict in the soul, for instance, he could still attribute some participation in reason by the appetitive parts of the soul such that they are able to obey or resist reason and be persuaded by reason through advice, reproof, and exhortation. See Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.13 1102b-1103a. In this regard, Posidonius likewise took over Plato’s tripartite structure, but treated the ‘parts’ as functions devoid of the agent-like characteristics, if he had in fact returned to Platonic tripartism. See C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 155.

60 C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 4. Knuuttila notes that this has given rise to the so-called ‘homuncular theory’ with regard to the status of Plato’s parts of the soul. Proponents of this theory argue that Plato’s parts all essentially act as ‘little people’ (homunculae), with the result that the soul ceases to be a true unity. See S. Knuuttila, Emotions (2004), 9.


62 Plato, Resp. 4.437b-c, 439a-d.

63 Ibid., 4.442b-d, 9.574d-575a. Sim suggests that the beliefs of each of the respective parts correspond to some extent with the four states of knowing (knowledge, thought, belief, and conjecture) in the simile of the divided line in Book 6 of the Republic. See M. Sim, ‘Divided Line and United Psychê in Plato’s Republic’ (2008), 98-9; Plato, Resp. 6.509-11.

64 C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 4; J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 14-22. For instances of persuasion and agreement, see Plato, Resp. 4.442b-d, 9.554c-e, 589a-b. We should note that Plato’s metaphors in Book 4 of the Republic do not consistently support this strong social understanding of the soul. For instance, Plato offers the images of the archer pulling and pushing the same string, the spinning top, and the case of a person moving his head and arms while standing still, all of which point to a single subject or unifying centre over and above the parts, which are treated instrumentally. By contrast, his images of the conflicting desires in Book 9, for instance, treating the desire of the appetitive part as a drone, better support the social interpretation of the parts of the soul.
Plato argued for the agent-like distinction among the parts of the soul on the basis of the akratic experience of acting against one's better judgement. At the beginning of his discussion of the tripartite soul in the *Republic* Plato explicitly raised the question as to whether we learn, feel anger and desire food, drink and sex with ‘the same part’ (τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ) or ‘with three parts’ (τρισίν). He opted for the second option and then argued that our soul is composed of multiple parts on the basis of what Annas calls ‘the principle of conflict’, which holds that two opposed states cannot hold of the same entity at the same time. While Plato did not state what exactly this ‘same entity’ is, the immediate context implies that he equated it with the parts of the soul, but without ever stating what exactly they are either. He next sought to distinguish the reasoning and appetitive parts by citing a special case of a morbid, akratic craving where the human soul is affected in opposite ways. Utilizing the example of thirst for drink, he argued that the ‘same entity’ cannot impel and restrain, bid and forbid, act and be acted upon, with regard to the same, in relation to the same object and at the same time. The conflict is akratic because it is ‘between two fundamentally opposed impulses that cannot be traced to a common source’: one impulse has its origin in the rational calculation of the good, the other

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66 Plato, Resp. 4.436a.

67 J. Annas, *Introduction to Plato’s Republic* (1981), 137. Plato stated the principle of conflict as follows: ‘It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time, so that if we find these things happening we shall know that it is not the same object at the same time, but more than one’ (Δῆλον ὅτι ταύτων τάνυντα ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταύτων γε καὶ πρὸς ταύτων οὐκ ἐξέλησε ἡμι, ὡστε ἂν ποιοῖς ἄνω ἄνω τετραγῶνα, εὐσώμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταύτων ἦν ἄλλα πλεῖον). Plato, Resp. 4.436b; R.F. Stalley, ‘Plato’s Argument’ (1975), 115. Scholars have proposed various names for the principle. Robinson called it ‘the principle of opposites’. See R. Robinson, ‘Plato’s Separation of Reason and Desire’ (1971), 38-9; R.F. Stalley, ‘Plato’s Argument’ (1975), 110-7; Price called it ‘the principle of non-contrariety’ or ‘PNC’. See A.W. Price, ‘Are Plato’s Soul-Parts Psychological Subjects?’ (2009), 2. Sim called it the ‘principle of non-contradiction’ or ‘PNC’. See M. Sim, ‘Divided Line and United Psyche in Plato’s Republic’ (2008), 87. We should note that this occurs only in the *Republic*. Bobonich points out that Plato did not invoke the principle of conflict as a rationale for partitioning the soul in either the *Phaedrus* or the *Timaeus*. C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 234. Sorabji points out, however, that Plato’s theory does not adequately address the possibility of simultaneous potentialities or capacities; opposite desires might be more akin to opposite readinesses or capacities than opposite activities. See R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind* (2000), 304-5.


in the pursuit of an alternative object irrespective of its value.\textsuperscript{70} It is \textit{morbid} because the agent does not view its indulgence as a good in the slightest degree.\textsuperscript{71}

To establish the existence of the appetitive part, Plato described the case of a thirsty person who does not wish to drink. He argued that if the same soul can simultaneously desire and reject drink, then there must be at least two parts of the soul. The appetitive part ‘wishes’ (βούλομαι), ‘wants’ (ὀρέγομαι) and is ‘impelled’ (ὀρμάω) toward drink; the rational part ‘draws back’ (ἀνθέλκω) the soul and ‘forbids’ (κωλύω) it to drink.\textsuperscript{72} He next sought to establish the third division in the soul – namely, the spirited part – by citing the story of a morbid craving to see corpses, an appetitive desire, and one’s anger at it. He offered as evidence the story of King Leontius and the executed convicts:\textsuperscript{73}

I once heard a story which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglaion, on his way up from the Peiraeus under the outer side of the northern wall, becoming aware of dead bodies that lay at the place of public execution at the same time felt a desire (ἐπιθυμέω) to see them and a repugnance (δυσχεραίνω) and aversion (ἀποτρέπω), and that for a time he resisted and veiled his head, but overpowered (κρατούμενος) in despite of all by his desire (ἐπιθυμία), with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses and cried, ‘There, you wretches, take your fill of the fine spectacle!’

Plato concluded:

… surely, this anecdote signifies that the principle of anger (ὀργή) sometimes fights (πολεμέω) against desires (ἐπιθυμία) as an alien thing against an alien.\textsuperscript{74}

Plato used the story of Leontius to illustrate and posit this third part of the soul, which he designated ‘the spirited part’ (θυμός or τὸ θυμοειδὲς). In the story, the reasoning part of Leontius’ soul did not wish to see the dead bodies and felt ‘a repugnance and aversion’ towards them, perhaps out of a sense of what is right and

\textsuperscript{70} M. Woods, ‘Plato’s Division of the Soul’ (1987), 44. If this interpretation of Plato is correct, he is here opposing the Socratic, and later Stoic principle, that unjust, passionate, or vicious action originates in false opinions about the good.

\textsuperscript{71} M. Woods, ‘Plato’s Division of the Soul’ (1987), 41-5.

\textsuperscript{72} Plato, \textit{Resp}. 4.439a-c.

\textsuperscript{73} As further support for the distinctiveness of the spirited part, Plato also briefly reminded the reader of Homer’s description of Odysseus’ rebuking himself for his anger at the suitors. Plato, \textit{Resp}. 4.441b-c.

\textsuperscript{74} Plato, \textit{Resp}. 4.439b-440a.
decent, yet the appetitive part of his soul continued to long to see the executed criminals. When Leontius did look at the bodies, he became angry with himself for giving into his whims. Once again utilizing Annas’ ‘principle of conflict’, Plato argued that this demonstrated that the soul possesses a third part distinct from both the reasoning and appetitive parts. Since the spirited part ‘fought’ against the appetitive part of the soul as ‘an ally’ of the reasoning part, this signified that the spirited part is ‘alien’ to the appetitive and, as such, is a distinct part of the soul. Just as the fact that some can thirst and yet refuse a drink is evidence of two conflicting parts of the soul, so also Plato argued that the existence of the spirited part of the soul is demonstrated by the fact that Leontius was angry with himself for giving in to the temptation to view the victims of execution. Each of these conflicts of motive distinguishes the various parts of the soul from one another.\(^{75}\)

In such instances of akratic action, Plato suggested that the soul undergoes two distinct, but interrelated experiences. First, the person experiences simultaneously something in his soul that ‘bids’ him to drink and something that ‘forbids’ him to.\(^{76}\) Second, the person experiences something in his soul that ‘impels’ (ὅρμάω) him toward the drink and something that ‘draws him back’ (ἰνθέλκω). Plato likened this ‘push-pull’ experience of internal psychological conflict to an archer who is ‘pushing away’ (ἀπωθέω) the bow with one hand while ‘pulling’ (προσέλκω) it with the other.\(^{77}\) Bobonich termed the first, bid-forbid, description of the conflict the ‘Command Model’ and the second, push-pull, description the ‘Force Model’.\(^{78}\) In the ‘Command Model’, the wisdom-loving part of the soul seeks to ‘persuade’ (πείθω) the other parts of its judgment of the best action for attaining what each part loves, so that they will follow or obey it,\(^{79}\) whereas in the ‘Force Model’, the agent

\(^{75}\) Commentators have observed that the spirited element always stood in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis the other two elements, which perhaps explains why the later Academic and Peripatetic traditions moved toward a bipartite model where reason takes over complete rule of the soul and anger or spirit joins the ranks of appetites and desires. D.A. Rees, ‘Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy’ (1957), 114, 117; F.M. Cornford, ‘Psychology’ (1912), 263.

\(^{76}\) Plato, Resp. 4.4369c. The addressee(s) of the imperatives appear to be the other parts of the soul. See Plato, Resp. 442b-d, 589a-b. C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 11.

\(^{77}\) Plato, Resp. 4.439a-c.


will act in accordance with whatever agent-like part exerts the strongest pull.\textsuperscript{80} Though it is not specifically mentioned in the \emph{Republic}, Sorabji observes that Plato later added deception (\ Armeniap\ άτη) as a third option in the \emph{Laws}.\textsuperscript{81} In the ‘Deception Model’ Plato argued that ‘pleasure’ (\ Armenianη) persuades reason using ‘forcible deception’ (\ Armeniap\ άτη βιαίου). He contrasted this power of pleasure with the ‘brute force’ (\ Armenianη άγιστος βία) sometimes exercised by ‘wrath’ (\ Armenianη θυμός) upon reason.\textsuperscript{82}

By so doing, he seems to associate with the appetitive part. Whatever the distinctions, however, Plato often employed primarily the Command and Force models in conjunction with one another. For instance, in the \emph{Timaeus}, Plato argued that the spirited part is situated closer to the mind and helps it ‘restrain by force’ (\ Armeniap\ βια) the appetitive part, should it at any time ‘refuse outright to obey’ (\ Armenianη πε\ ιθεσθαι ἐκὸν ἔθελω) the dictates of reason coming down from the citadel of the mind.\textsuperscript{83} Here we see the reasoning part persuading the spirited part to combine forces to subjugate the appetitive part, which refuses to obey reason’s dictates, underscoring Plato’s conviction that the appetitive part had at least some understanding, despite his equivocations later in the passage.\textsuperscript{84} Thus, although Plato characterized the two lower parts of the soul as ‘irrational’, this did not exclude some reasoning capability as in Stoicism. Instead, each part can, to varying degrees, possess conflicting opinions about the proper objects of desire. Further, for Plato this akratic experience showed that his tripartite schematization of the soul was not merely a threefold classification of psychic phenomena. Rather, it established each part as a distinct source of moral action.\textsuperscript{85} It also accounted for how reason, which is naturally disposed toward seeing what is truly good, can become corrupted and thus seek that which is not genuinely good,\textsuperscript{86} a state Aristotle later called ‘wickedness’ (\ Armenianη άκολασία).\textsuperscript{87}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} R. Sorabji, \textit{Emotion and Peace of Mind} (2000), 309.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Plato, \textit{Leg.} 9.863b.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Plato, \textit{Tim.} 70a.
\item \textsuperscript{84} For Plato’s later uncertainty regarding the appetitive part’s ability to understand the deliverances of reason, see Plato, \textit{Tim.} 71a. Bobonich denies reasoning capacities to the desiring part in the \textit{Timaeus} on the basis of this passage. Plato, however, had explicitly stated in the previous sections that it could ‘be persuaded’ (\ Armenianη πε\ ιθεσθαι). See Plato, \textit{Tim.} 70a; C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s \emph{Laws} and \emph{Republic}’ (1994), 26.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Plato outlines this process especially in Books 8-9 of the \textit{Republic}.
\item \textsuperscript{87} T. Penner, ‘Plato’s Ethics’ (2006), 156.
\end{itemize}
Nevertheless, although Plato attributed the agent-like cognitive capacities, opinions, desires, and pleasures to each part of the soul, he simultaneously assigned a set of characteristic natural tendencies or capacities to each on the basis of what each part primarily loves, though not exclusively so. When one of these drives predominates in the soul, moreover, Plato correlated them with three ways of life. He identified the mind with the part of the soul that reasons, thinks, decides, believes, seeks the welfare of the entire soul, and pursues truth and knowledge. As such, though the smallest part of the soul, it is the part that is divine, immortal, and naturally sovereign. When this part prevails, Plato linked it with the first and best of the three prominent forms of life of his day, his ideal guardian. The spirited part can ‘learn’ (µαθαίνει) things from reason, can choose ‘to be subject to’ (ὑπηκόου εἶναι) reason, and can ‘be educated’ (παιδευθέντε) by reason to preside with reason over the appetitive part of the soul as its natural ally. As the seat of courage, Plato associated the spirited part of the soul with the emotion anger, especially at what it perceives as an injustice, as well as the quest for honour or public distinction. When it predominates, Plato correlated it with the military or auxiliary class within his imaginary polis. Finally, the appetitive part, as the largest part of the soul, is especially oriented toward the earthly and sensual pleasures of the body or material gain, likened by Plato to irrational ‘beasts’ that live for the trough. Though it shares in reason, it does so to a lesser degree than the other parts inasmuch as it only displays a form of ‘means-end reasoning’ as it seeks after sensual pleasure and gain in wealth. When it takes a lead, Plato connected it with the lowest classes of his ideal polis, which he equated with the artisans.

In the sections that follow, we will look at how Philo appropriated and utilized both the agent-like elements for each part, the leading characteristics for each, and their inter-relations. We will first explore each of the three parts individually before

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89 B. Williams, ‘Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic’ (1997), 598; J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 10-1. See for instance, Plato, Resp. 4.429a. According to Plato, the guardians ‘partake’ (µεταλαμβάνει) of wisdom; it is not theirs exclusively.
90 D.A. Rees, ‘Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy’ (1957), 112.
91 T. Penner, ‘Plato’s Ethics’ (2006), 158.
92 See for instance, Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.5 1095b.
93 Plato, Resp. 4.441e-442a. Aristotle similarly described the irrational element of the soul as capable of learning to obey the rational element of the soul at Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.13 1102b.
94 It is no accident that Plato’s description of this part of the soul as the ‘largest’ is likewise associated with the ‘masses’ of uneducated women, children, and slaves that generally made up the larger, uneducated class of his state.
looking at how they relate among themselves. We will find that when Philo utilized Plato’s tripartite model, he took over most of its leading elements, attributing to each part many of the agent-like characteristics mentioned above as well as the Force and Deception models of inter-relation. Nevertheless, Philo shows a tendency, not only to read Plato’s three accounts of the tripartite soul in the Republic, Timaeus, and Phaedrus synoptically, but also to modify his tripartite accounts in a manner that de-emphasizes the agent-like characteristics of each part, without completely removing them, in preference for a more functional view that better accorded with his Stoic leanings in his own approach to the passions.

‘The rational part’ of the soul

As its name suggests, Plato equated the rational part with that element of our soul that ‘reckons and reasons’, and with it ‘we learn’ (μαθοῦν) the truth of things.\(^95\) For this reason Plato argued that this part of the soul is most suitably designated the element that is ‘fond of learning’ (φιλόμαθος) and ‘philosophical’ (φιλόσοφος) by nature.\(^96\) In its relations with the other parts, the rational part exercises forethought on behalf of the entire soul like the guardians do the city-state, directing the soul toward what is truly good.\(^97\) Philo likewise everywhere assumed that the mind houses that part of the soul that reasons, learns, calculates, and is able to pursue philosophy, though this notion in itself was common to both Platonic and Stoic traditions. What distinguished the two was Plato’s treatment of the lower parts of the soul as alternative sources for impulses that might oppose or ally with the mind. Also, in keeping with his Judaism, Philo emphasized the mind’s capacity ‘to worship the Existent One’ (θεραπεύειν τὸ ὄν) by honouring the Father with hymns, praises, and blessings.\(^98\) Plato, by contrast, had de-emphasized the role of piety in the soul or his ideal polis.\(^99\)

Both Philo and Plato made a bipartite division between the rational part and the two lower parts of the soul.\(^100\) In this division, both highlighted the mind’s fundamental orientation toward contemplation by utilizing the metaphor of

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\(^95\) Plato, Resp. 4.436a, 9.581b.
\(^96\) Ibid., 9.581b-e.
\(^97\) Ibid., 4.441c; M. Sim, ‘Divided Line and United Psychê in Plato’s Republic’ (2008), 98.
\(^98\) Philo, Somn. 1.34-6. See also Philo, Fug. 89-92; Contempl. 2-8.
\(^99\) Plato, Resp. 4. 427b-c, e.
nourishment to describe the sort of objects most proper to each part by nature. For Plato, the rational part partakes, above all, in ‘knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμη), ‘true belief’ (ἀληθῆς δόξα), ‘understanding’ (νόος), and ‘virtue’ (ἄρετή),101 while the appetitive part fills itself with the shadowy and passing pleasures of the mortal body, often grouped under the rubric of food, drink, and sex, and the spirited part seeks the satisfactions of anger, honour and victory with little understanding,102 though it is capable of false opinions. As such, the proper subjects of the mind are those things that are always the same, uniform, immortal, invisible, pure and most real, namely, the intelligible and divine realm of the forms, not the changing, mortal, and impure pleasures, pains and desires connected to the sensible realm of the body.103 It attends to the desires of the appetitive part only to the degree that is necessary to the well-being and health of the body.104 Hence, Plato endorsed contemplative withdrawal from the ordinary concerns of life as the human’s most virtuous activity.105 This opposed the Stoic tradition, which argued that since virtue alone is one’s proper end, is unaffected by external contingency, and is not connected even instrumentally to any particular activity, and that to the extent that humans are naturally political animals, the sage would normally select the pursuit of a political end,106 so the sage would normally participate in ordinary activities. This also opposed the Epicurean tradition, which held that pleasure alone is valuable for its own sake; contemplation as such is merely a reliable instrument toward that end and not a good in itself.107

In like manner, Philo believed that ‘the immaterial’ (ἀσώματος) and ‘intelligible forms’ (τὸν νοητόν) of the intelligible realm are ‘the proper’ (οἰκεῖος) food for the rational part of the soul.108 He argued that the mind should feed on ‘the divine food’

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101 I will follow the traditional translation of ἄρετή as ‘virtue’ throughout this study, though as Crisp observed, ἄρετή in Greek culture extended beyond ethics. It referred to any sort of ‘excellence’, including how fast a horse runs, how well a knife cuts, or how well a person tells jokes. R. Crisp and T.J. Saunders, ‘Aristotle’ (1999), 110.
102 Plato, Resp. 9.585b-586a.
103 Ibid., 10.611e; Plato, Phd. 78c-e, 79d, 83a-84a.
104 Plato, Resp. 8.558d-559c.
105 Note that withdrawal, however, did not extend to suicide for Plato. In the Phaedo, Socrates is made to reject suicide for the wise man since he correctly recognizes that his body is the possession of a god and thus not his own to dispose of as he will. See, Plato, Phd. 61-2.
106 These two Stoic principles provide the philosophical background to Chrysippus’ rejection of the ‘scholastic life’ (σχολαστικὸς βίος) on the grounds that those who live such lives are in fact pursuing a ‘life of pleasure’ (ἡδονικὸς βίος), whether they say it openly, as in the case of the Epicureans, or obscurely, as presumably in the case of the Peripatetics. Plut., Stoic. Rep. 1033d=SVF 702; E. Brown, ‘Contemplative Withdrawal in the Hellenistic Age’ (2008), 81-4; M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire (1994), 359-60.
107 E. Brown, ‘Contemplative Withdrawal in the Hellenistic Age’ (2008), 84-6, 88.
108 Philo, Leg. 3.117-8, 186.
(θειότερα τροφή) of knowledge, but it should ‘disregard’ (ἀμελεῖ) the flesh except to the extent that is necessary for the body’s sustenance.\(^{109}\) Philo cited two texts to support these Platonic claims regarding the mind’s proper orientation in the sphere of the ideas, both from the Torah, not Plato. First, he quoted \textit{Exodus} 16:16: ‘This bread, which the Lord has given us to eat, is this “word” (τὸ ρῆμα), which the Lord has prescribed’, to which he added \textit{Deuteronomy} 8:3: ‘… not on bread alone shall man live, but “on every word” (ἐπὶ παντὶ ρῆματι) that proceeds through the mouth of God.’ Philo equated the term ‘word’ (τὸ ρῆμα) mentioned in both passages with ‘the word of God’ (ὁ θεοῦ λόγος), which he understood to be the first born, eldest brother, and most generic form that encapsulates all other species of ideas in the intelligible realm.\(^{110}\) Like Plato, Philo went on to argue that the philosophical and prudent mind turns away from the sensible and mortal sphere of the body and devotes itself instead to that which is most suitable to it, namely, the noetic sphere. When a person does this perfectly, he ‘cuts off’ (ἀποκόπτω) anger entirely and attends to the cravings of the appetitive part for food and drink only as far as is necessary to nourish the body.\(^{111}\) This movement of the rational part of the soul away from the mortal and corporeal sphere of the senses to the incorporeal and pure sphere of the forms results in a cleansing of the mind that eventually leads to what Philo called a ‘purified reason’ (κεκαθαρμένος λόγος).\(^{112}\) Its purity arises from its Platonic contemplation of that which is truly suitable for it, that is, the truly existent God and the intelligible ideas. As a result, material and sensible concerns do not contaminate it. This notion in turn formed the basis of the theme of the soul’s migration toward the \textit{visio dei} that is threaded through the entirety of Philo’s writings.\(^{113}\) Whether or not Philo successfully integrated his lionization of contemplation with his commitment to the Stoic understanding of virtue as the only good is a different matter.

Along with the basic function of the mind as the part of the soul that reasons, learns, and knows, both Philo and Plato attributed to the mind three key additional properties:

- divinity

\(^{109}\) Ibid., 3.151-2, 161.
\(^{110}\) Ibid., 169, 173, 175; Philo, \textit{Deus} 31.
\(^{111}\) Ibid., 127, 129.
\(^{112}\) Ibid., 127, 129.
- immortality
- sovereignty

**Divinity:** First, Plato described the rational part of the soul as ‘divine’ (θεῖος). For Plato, the Maker and Father of the cosmos directly created both the gods and the individual minds. He argued that the Father first created the gods and stars using the purest ingredients. Then, God formed a number of souls equal to the quantity of stars in the heavens out of ingredients of a lower purity. On the one hand, these pre-existent souls were similar to the gods in that, although they had been created, they were participants in the divine. On the other hand, they differed from the gods in that their divinity was of a lower quality. This in turn ensured that they were subordinate to the gods. In this pre-existent state, these souls consisted only of the rational element. Nevertheless, Plato often referred to them simply as ‘souls’ rather than as ‘minds’.

Philo likewise described the mind as the most God-like element in the soul, whose divinity stands on a continuum with the divine host in the heavenly and intelligible realms, though thrice removed as a copy of a copy. While he insisted that the ultimate cause of the entire universe is the Father and Maker of all things, he likewise argued that God also created a number of divine offspring. These included, first, the various powers of God – namely, the creative, royal, gracious, and legislative powers, justice, and ‘the divine word’ (λόγος θεῖος), the chief among the powers. All of these beings participate in the divine, while remaining subordinate, lieutenants of God. Second, he also included ‘the heavenly bodies’ (οἱ ἄστερες), who dwell in the heavens, and ‘the angels’ (ἄγγελοι), who dwell in the air. Both of these are composed of ‘mind in itself’ (νοῦς αὐτὸς ἑκάστος) and likewise possess a divine and imperishable nature. Hence, at the upper end of the divine hierarchy, both Plato (and Aristotle) and Philo conceived of the stars as divine.

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114 Plato, Resp. 9.590d.
115 Plato, Tim. 41b-42e, 69c-e.
116 This is particularly evident throughout the Phaedo, where Plato does not invoke the tripartite model of the soul. He simply refers to the mind as ‘the soul’ in his efforts to establish its preexistence, post-mortem existence, and incorruptibility. See Plato, Phd. 80d-81e.
118 Philo, Opif. 7, 10, 46, 72, 77, 135.
119 Ibid., 46, 55.
120 Ibid., 73; Philo, Conf. 176; Gig. 7-8; Somn. 1.34, 135; Spec. 1.66.
beings. Moreover, both identified a number of other divine beings beyond the stars. Philo referred to these later as ‘powers’, but Plato referred to them as ‘gods’. These higher divine beings had a hand in the creation of the mortal elements of the cosmos, as we will see below.

At the lower end of the divine hierarchy, Philo spoke of various incorporeal ‘angels’ that at times roughly correspond to Plato’s ‘daemons’ (οἱ δαίμονες). On the one hand, Philo equated the angels with Plato’s pre-existent, disembodied, and blessed souls. He argued that some of them had descended into mortal bodies and become humans. Moreover, he even reflected Plato in saying that the number of souls is equal to the number of stars in heaven. On the other hand, Philo also explicitly equated ‘the angels’ of the LXX with ‘the daemons’ of ‘the philosophers’. Like Plato, Philo identified them with those good men who had loved philosophy in life and, as a result, returned to the higher immortal and incorporeal existence in the afterlife, ranked in closer intimacy with God according to their degree of ethical advancement in this life. This corresponds to Plato’s insistence that the daemons live ‘in between’ the gods and humans, which is the region of ‘air’. For this reason, Philo added that they have their abode in ‘the air’ in contrast to the stars, who reside in the heavens, and to humans, who live on the earth. Finally, both Plato and Philo described those ‘in between’, as beings that carry messages between God/gods and humans.

Like Plato, Philo argued finally that God directly made the human mind, using his Word as ‘the pattern’ (παράδειγμα) for each one that successively comes into

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121 Philo, Gig. 7-8; Plato, Cra. 397d, 408e; R. Radice, ‘Philo’s Theology and Theory of Creation’ (2009), 129.
122 Plato, Ap. 31c-d, 40a; Plato, Cra. 398b-d; Plato, Symp. 202d-e. Dillon shows that Philo’s angelology or demonology corresponded in its essentials with that of Middle Platonism. See J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 173-4, 216-9 (Plutarch), and 317-20 (Apuleius). See also J. Drummond, Philo Judaeus (1888), I 336-8; R. Radice, ‘Philo’s Theology and Theory of Creation’ (2009), 140.
123 Philo, Gig. 12-13; Sacr. 5. Goodenough notes that this notion in Philo could derive rather from Xenocrates by way of Posidonius and the Stoics rather than Plato, though he acknowledges that Plato may well be the source. See E.R. Goodenough, ‘Philo on Immortality’ (1946), 92.
124 Philo, Somn. 137.
125 Philo, Gig. 6, 16.
126 In Philo’s allusion to Plato’s description of the daemons in Cratylus, he appears to take Plato quite literally in spite of Plato’s ironic tone, which makes it difficult to ascertain what he actually believes or does not believe. See Plato, Cra. 398b-d. Compare also Philo, Gig. 14-15.
127 C. Termini, ‘Philo’s Thought within Middle Judaism’ (2009), 109.
128 Philo, Gig. 8-11; Somn. 135; Plato, Symp. 202d-e.
129 Philo, Abr. 115; Plato, Symp. 202d-e.
existence. This follows from his identification of ‘the rational spirit-force’ (λογικὸς πνεῦμα) of the human soul with the pre-existent angels that God had directly created. Philo found biblical support for this, citing Gen. 2:7 (LXX), which states that God ‘breathed’ (ἐνεφύσησε) the breath of life into the face of Adam. Philo then noted that the source of the breath in this passage was none other than the Father and Ruler of all, not one of his subordinates. Inasmuch as this breath had its source in God’s breath, human minds were thus likewise participants in the divine along with the stars and bodiless angels. As a consequence, as Warne rightly observes, this innate relationship between the Mind of the universe and the human mind as its image, copy, fragment, or ray, forms the basis for Philo’s metaphor of the soul’s ascending journey away from the body and back to heaven, the noetic realm of the Logos, and the vision of God.

**Immortality:** Plato had described the soul as immortal in the sense that it had both an ‘Orphic-style’ pre-existence prior to embodiment, that it comprised reasoning and impulsive elements, and that it would continue its existence indefinitely after its departure from a mortal body. As such, he had construed the soul’s immortality using the Orphic scheme of pre-existence, embodiment, reincarnation/transmigration, and return of the soul to the heavenly realm. Hence, after Plato discussed the direct creation of the minds by God as pre-existent souls, as outlined above, he next recounted how the lower divinities took these souls and implanted them into bodies by encasing them in the head. The gods imitated the Father and Maker’s creative activities by fashioning the remaining elements of

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132 Philo, *Opif.* 135, 139. Helleman resists describing the divinity of the human mind in terms of ‘participation’, preferring instead to characterize it as the reflection or imaging of the divine creative and ruling powers by the human mind. Given Philo’s extension of divinity to a wide range of powers and beings beyond the First Cause, and the affirmation of a sharp distinction between the only supreme God and all that follows Him, her cautionary note has merit. The divinity of the mind establishes above all the kinship between the human and cosmic mind, which in turn provides the basis for the soul’s journey back to God. See W.E. Helleman, ‘Philo on Deification’ (1990), 66-7.
creation, at His behest, in order to bring it to completion. They were especially responsible for making those elements in the soul that are mortal. The gods then constructed the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul and housed the spirited part in the breast and the appetitive part in the region of the stomach. If these souls lived justly, then upon the death of the body they would return to their companion star in the heavens and cast off all that is mortal. If they lived unjustly, Plato argued that they would be reborn a second time as a woman or wild animal or insect. Their next reincarnation would reflect the sort of lives they had lived as men. Consequently, these unjust souls are bound once more to the mortal elements of the soul each time they are imprisoned in a body.

Philo everywhere assumed Plato’s basic scheme for the ‘immortality of the soul’ outlined in the *Phaedo*, but deviated by rejecting Plato’s doctrine of reincarnation. Like Plato, Philo argued that God’s subordinate powers fashioned the lower parts of the soul. In support of this claim, Philo cited Gen. 1:26 (LXX): ‘Let us make man after our image and after our likeness.’ Like Plato’s gods whom the Father and Maker had charged with fashioning the mortal body and mortal elements of the soul in the *Timaeus*, Philo argued that the use of the second person plural in this passage pointed to the fact that the Existent One also had ‘co-workers’ (συνεργοί) in the fashioning of humans. In Platonic fashion, he argued that although God did not need help in creating, he utilized these ‘co-workers’ so that he could not be held responsible for making those elements in the soul that are capable of evil or sin. Moreover, likeness to God has nothing to do with human form, since God is incorporeal, for ‘neither is God in human form, nor is the human

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136 Plato, *Tim.* 41b-42e, 69c-e. See also Plato, *Phdr.* 249a-c.
137 Plato, *Phd.* 73a, 80a-b, 95c-d, 105c-107d. Termini asserts that for Philo ‘the nous or rational part of the soul does not possess immortality as an inherent property, but only in as much as it received the vital breath of God’. C. Termini, ‘Philo’s Thought within Middle Judaism’ (2009), 109. She offers no support for this claim.
138 Plato, *Phd.* 81c-82b, 83d.
139 For further discussion, see D.T. Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus of Plato* (1986), 242-9.
140 Plato, *Tim.* 69c; *Resp.* 10.620a-d.
141 Runia suggests that commentators have offered differing explanations regarding who these co-workers are, because Philo deliberately avoided making a concrete identification. See D.T. Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus of Plato* (1986), 248.
body God-like’. Rather, Philo repeatedly identified ‘the mind, the ruling part of the soul’ (ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμόν νοῦς) with that which is divine and immaterial. This mind was made after the pattern of the ‘Mind of the Universe’, namely, the divine Logos, which serves as its ‘archetype’ (ἀρχέτυπον). For, Philo observed, Moses did not say that man is ‘the image of God, but that he is after the image of God’ (ὁν τεικόνα θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατ’ εἰκόνα). God first made an image of Himself – the Logos – then man, referring especially to the mind, after that image, so that man is ‘third hand from the Maker’. This mind is ‘imprisoned’ in the body and wed with the lower part(s) of the soul after embodiment.

Finally, Philo appeared to envision a new or second birth (παλιγγενεσία) into an incorporeal life for the soul after death. This drew upon the theme of the soul’s ‘migration’ toward perfection before death, a Platonic-Pythagorean doctrine outlined in Phaedo’s myth of Er. He nevertheless diverged significantly from Plato in that he seemed to envision a single, permanent post-mortem existence, not a series of reincarnations that evolve away from or toward perfection as in the case of Phaedo’s myth of Er. As such, he never contemplated Plato’s notion of reincarnation or metempsychosis of souls into animals or insects, inasmuch as his account of animals followed that of the Stoics, which expressly excluded any participation of reason in animals. Philo rather explicitly linked the soul’s post-mortem immortality to its return to its source in the breath of God at its creation as

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144 Philo, Opif. 69. Arieti notes that Philo made no distinction between ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ in his corpus, as became a stock distinction subsequently in the Christian tradition. See J.A. Arieti, ‘Man and God in Philo’ (1991), 10.

145 Philo, Opif. 69. See also Philo, Det. 86, 90; Her. 230; Decal. 134; Spec. 3.207. Arieti observed that Philo’s identification of the ‘likeness’ with humankind’s mind was ‘adopted by nearly all the Church Fathers who discuss it, and the verse [Gen. 1:26] is a favorite among them’. He cites specifically Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Cyril of Alexandria, and Eusebius. See J.A. Arieti, ‘Man and God in Philo’ (1991), 715.

146 Philo, Her. 231.


148 Philo, Leg. 1.108; 3.69; Ebr. 99-103; Goodenough connects this notion with the stream of ‘Greek mysticism’ that runs through the Orphics, Pythagoreans, Plato, and others. E.R. Goodenough, ‘Philo on Immortality’ (1946), 91.

149 Plato, Phd. 109-114. Note that Plato explicitly references his reliance upon the ‘ancient theories’ of the Pythagoreans when introducing the notion of the soul’s existence prior to and following embodiment at Phd. 70c.

150 Plato, Phd. 82a-b.

described in *Gen* 2.7, when the wise soul at a minimum, having attained virtue and perfection, once again becomes pure mind. It is unclear, however, what precisely Philo believed happened to souls that have fallen short of perfection in this life, whether they somehow continued to make progress in a disembodied state or were instantly perfected. The question of whether or not the soul retains its individual personality after death or is reabsorbed into its divine source, as such, has been a matter of dispute. Further, Philo explicitly rejected the soul’s ‘extinction’ (σβέσις) following death. By so doing, he firmly rejected the Chrysippian view that the souls of the sages are preserved only until the ‘conflagration’ (ἐκπύρωσις). He also rejected Stoic materialism in preference for Platonic incorporealism inasmuch as he proposed that after death, the soul would be not only disembodied, but also without composition and without quality, a basic characteristic of Stoic bodies. Here again, once removed from the body, any Stoic elements in Philo’s psychology give way to broadly Middle Platonic conceptions. As we will discuss in detail below, throughout his corpus Philo reinforced this vision of the virtuous migration of the soul to the heavens or noetic realm by his near ubiquitous use of Plato’s metaphor of the charioteer.

**Sovereignty:** Given this divine and immortal status, both Philo and Plato argued that ‘the mind and reason’ (νοῦς καὶ λόγος) thus assigned reason to the highest place in the soul. For this reason, in the *Timaeus*, Plato called it ‘the sovereign part of

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157 Wolfson proposed three final locations for immortal souls after death: heaven, where the unembodied angels live, the intelligible world of the ideas, and finally, the presence of God above the intelligible world. Most souls go to the first, Isaac and Enoch to the second, and Moses to the third. See H.A. Wolfson, *Philo* (1962), 1.401-4.
158 At one end of the spectrum, Goodenough argued for the total dissolution of the soul’s individuality, while at the other Wolfson argued for the continuance of the soul’s personality. See E.R. Goodenough, ‘Philo on Immortality’ (1946), 101-7; H.A. Wolfson, *Philo* (1962), 1.396, 404-13. For further discussion, see F.W. Burnett, ‘Philo on Immortality’ (1984), 459-64, 70.
159 Philo, *Abr*. 258.
the soul’ (τὸ κυριωτάτου ψυχῆς εἶδος).\textsuperscript{163} To reinforce its leading status both invoked images that called to mind rule and power. In the *Republic*, Plato likened the role of the mind in the soul to the guardians of his city, while Philo likened the mind to a king sitting in a citadel with a host of *senses* as bodyguards.\textsuperscript{164} As the king or guide, both argued that it should thus exercise forethought for the entirety of the soul.\textsuperscript{165} Consequently, when reason does rule, an individual becomes wise, but when one of the other parts rules, a person becomes a fool.\textsuperscript{166} Whereas Plato argued that one or both of the lower parts could overcome reason’s supremacy using violence (βία) in accordance with the ‘Force Model’,\textsuperscript{167} persuasion in keeping with the ‘Command Model’,\textsuperscript{168} or pleasure’s deception in the ‘Deception Model’,\textsuperscript{169} Philo opted for either the Force or Deception models to account for reason’s failure, but not the Command. In nearly all cases, Philo envisioned reason in the role of ruling the other parts with force, but he could entertain the overthrow of reason by desire and wrath:

Whenever…wrath (θυμός) and desire (ἐπιθυμία) turn restive and get out of hand (ἀφηνιάζω καὶ ἀναχαιτίζω), and by the violence of their impulse (ἡ βία τῆς ὀρμῆς) drag the driver (ἡνίοχος), that is the reason (λογισμός), down (κατασύρω) from his seat and put him under the yoke (ὑποζεύγνυ), and each of these passions (ἑκάτερον πάθος) gets hold of the reins, injustice prevails. For it cannot but be that owing to the badness and inexperience of the driver (ἀπειρία καὶ κακία τοῦ ἡνιόχου), the team is swept down precipices and gullies…\textsuperscript{170}

Here, Philo followed Plato in utilizing the charioteer myth with a driver and two horses, one identified with desire and the other wrath. Like Plato’s account of the fall of the souls from the heavenly circuits, but unlike his description of the two horses in relation to the driver and boy later in the *Pheadrus*, Philo pitted both

\textsuperscript{163} Plato, *Tim.* 90a.


\textsuperscript{165} Plato, *Resp.* 4.442a.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 4.442a.

\textsuperscript{167} Plato, *Resp.* 4.439b-d; 440a, e; 442a; *Phdr.* 248a-b; 254a, e.

\textsuperscript{168} Plato, *Resp.* 4.439c; *Phdr.* 254b-c.

\textsuperscript{169} Plato, *Leg.* 9.863b.

\textsuperscript{170} Philo, *Leg.* 1.73. Philo offers a second, related account at *Agr.* 72-77. Compare also *Spec.* 4.79, where Philo uses a similar image, but in the context of a Stoic account of impulse (ὁρμή).
horses against the driver.\(^{171}\) Though he infused his own account with Stoic language by framing the horses motions in terms of ‘impulse’ (ὁρμή), a post-Plato development, he nevertheless cast the entire story in strongly Platonic lines by making the horses not only lead the entire chariot to destruction by their restiveness, but more fantastically, he made the horses ‘drag down’ (κατασύρω) and ‘yoke’ the mind and the horses take the reins!\(^{172}\) Presumably, the horses then goad and direct the mind toward their mutual destruction over the precipice. Though both attributed reason’s failure to maintain supremacy to the driver’s lack of skill,\(^{173}\) Plato ascribed it to the ‘forgetfulness and wrongdoing’ (λήθη καὶ κακία) that results from the soul’s inability to see the forms and ideas,\(^{174}\) whereas Philo attributed the failure to rebelling and restiveness (ἀφηνιάζω καὶ ἀναχαιτίζω) of the horses in the passage quoted above, but the rider’s ‘foolishness’ (ἀφροσύνη) and ‘lack of learning’ (ἀμαθία), ‘cannot keep hold of the reins’ (κρατεῖν ἄδυνατεῖ τῶν ἡνίων) in the alternative passage.\(^{175}\) While in On Husbandry, ‘the rider’ (ὁ ἀναβάτης) is clearly at fault, in the passage above, however, it is unclear to whom Philo is referring to in the final sentence when he mentioned the ‘inexperienced driver’. While he could be referring to the mind, whose ineptness at handling ‘the violence of [the horses’] impulse’ (βία τῆς ὁρμῆς) allowed them to take over the reins, he could have been alternatively referring to the horses’ own inexperience and badness when they took over as drivers. Whatever the case, Philo nevertheless clearly invoked Plato’s ‘Force Model’ in both of these accounts of reason in relation to wrath and desire. We will return to further examine Philo’s use of the charioteer metaphor in greater detail in the next chapter.

In general, Philo preferred rather to frame the opposition between reason and the deceptive and cunning machinations of ‘pleasure’ (ἡδονή). Though this recalls Plato’s ‘Deception Model’ noted earlier,\(^{176}\) Philo invoked this image instead within

\(^{171}\) See also Philo, Agr. 75-7.

\(^{172}\) In the second account, the driver loses hold of the reins, falls from the chariot, is crushed, and dies. The vehicle, now without a charioteer, is damaged beyond repair by the horses as they run out of control until it too is finally destroyed. The horses themselves, lastly, finally run loose and fall down a deep precipice and perish. In summary, the chariot, rider, and both horses come to ruin when the unskilled rider loses hold of the reins. Philo, Agr. 72-77.

\(^{173}\) ‘the badness and inexperience of the driver’ (ἀπειρία καὶ κακία τοῦ ἡνίοχου), Leg. 1.73; ‘without skill’ (ἄνευ τέχνης), Philo, Agr. 77.

\(^{174}\) Plato, Phdr. 248a-c.

\(^{175}\) Philo, Agr. 74.

\(^{176}\) Plato, Leg. 9.863c.
his widely utilized Adam-Eve-serpent typology. Like Plato, Philo makes pleasure ‘persuade’ (πείθω) and, as a consequence, ‘subjugate’ the mind through ‘deception’ (ἀπάτη). Moreover, both personify pleasure. Plato treats pleasure as ‘wishing’ (βούλησις) things, while Philo sometimes describes pleasure as a ‘serpent’ (ὄφις) and at other times a ‘harlot’ (πόρνη) or ‘coutesan’ (χαµαιτύπη). Philo, though, expands the metaphor to include the senses, which are made to serve as beguiled ‘handmaidens’ (θεραπαινίς) or, more darkly, ‘panders’ (µαστροποί) through whom it seeks to ‘enticé’ (δελεάζω) and enslave the mind. By so doing, Philo is able to place ultimate responsibility upon the mind, when it ‘departs’ (ἐκβαίνω) from the noetic sphere (νοητός), which is proper to it, and instead ‘gives itself up’ (ἐκδίδωµι) to the inferior things offered by pleasure. When it does so, Philo observed, the mind becomes a peaceful ‘prisoner of war’ (δοριάλωτος). This description recalls the deceptive role of pleasure in the body-soul anthropology of Plato’s Pheado discussed earlier where Plato spoke of the deceptive character of bodily pleasure and senses and the mind’s duty to despise the body and seek rather the intellectual and invisible.

‘The appetitive part’ of the soul

Both Plato and Philo often grouped the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul together, differentiating them from and treating them as inferior to the mind. As discussed above, both philosophers located anger and desire in the regions of the chest and stomach, parts of the body lower than the head, in which the mind resides. Secondly, Philo followed Plato as outlined in the Timaeus, in arguing that both of the lower parts came into existence later than the mind. Hence, the mind is the oldest part of the soul and worthy of the honour accorded to elders. Thirdly, in contrast to the mind, the subordinate gods or powers formed the lower parts of the soul imperfectly. Consequently, both Plato and Philo considered the lower part of the

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177 Philo, Opif. 157, 165-6; Leg. 2.106-7; 3.116; Sacr. 21-6, 29.
178 Philo, Opif. 165; Plato, Leg. 9.863c.
179 ὑπηγάγετο, Philo, Opif. 166; Sacr. 26; δυναστεύω, Plato, Leg. 9.863c.
180 Philo, Opif. 165; Leg. 3.61, 66; Sacr. 26; Plato, Leg. 9.863c. At Leg. 3.116, Philo also represents the mind and pleasure elsewhere as seeking to overcome (νικάω) one another.
181 ἰχθύη, µαχλάς, Philo, Opif. 166; πόρνη, χαµαιτύπη Sacr. 21.
182 Philo, Opif. 165-6.
183 Philo, Leg. 3.117.
184 See especially Plato, Phd. 64d-67a; 82c-84b.
soul to be mortal and irrational. For this reason, they both often referred to the two lower parts collectively as the irrational or mortal part of the soul. They then further distinguished the two lower parts from one another not only by their distinctive functions, but also by the manner and degree of irrationality and subordination that characterized each, which recalls their agent-like elements. We now turn to explore Plato and Philo’s characterization of these two, lower, mortal, and irrational parts of the soul in the order outlined in the *Republic*.

At the outset of his discussion concerning the individual soul in the *Republic*, Plato had introduced a second part of the soul, namely, the appetitive, opposite to the rational part. On the one hand, with regard to the parts of the soul, he characterized this part as full of certain ‘desires’ (ἐπιθυµίαι) oriented toward the lower pleasures of nutrition and generation, including love, hunger, thirst and titillation. For this reason, he located this part of the soul in the region of the stomach and sexual organs. On the other hand, with regard to the classes of the city-state, the lowest class are characterized not by the capacity for various desires, since the guardians and auxiliaries also possess their own set of desires, but by the absence of those characteristics most distinctive of the other two classes, namely, reason, courage and honour, and above all, education. Hence, given the orientation of the appetitive part/artisan class to the earthly, sensible, and corporeal, as opposed to the divine and intelligible, Plato treated it as ‘shameful’ (ἀισχρός), ‘savage’ (ἄγριος), ‘the most godless’ (ἀθεώτατος), and ‘the most polluted’ (µιαρώτατος) part of the soul or class of the city.

Philo’s conception of the appetitive part of the soul strongly reflected Plato’s influence. Philo explicitly equated ‘the belly’ (κοιλία) with ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία). Further, like Plato, Philo associated it with food, drink, and sex and located it in the region of the stomach and sexual organs. Like Plato, Philo characterized the appetitive part as that which participates in reason the least, citing the fact that its abode, the belly and parts below it, are most distant from the head and from reason. Finally, Philo also treated the appetitive part as polluted, calling it ‘profane, impure, and unholy’ (βεβηλός καὶ ἀκάθαρτος καὶ ἀνίερος). However, he

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187 Ibid., 9.580d-581e.
189 Plato, *Resp.* 9.588c-589c, 9.590c
191 Ibid., 4.94.
used cultic descriptive terminology drawn from the Torah’s legal regulations upon which he was commenting (Lev. 7, Deut. 18) to describe it. To emphasize just how unseemly and base this part of the soul is, in Jewish fashion he went on to compare desire with ‘a pig’ or ‘sow’ (ὗς), which was numbered among the Jewish food taboos.192

Plato also connected the appetitive part of the soul with a set of more complex desires, describing it as ‘money-loving’ (φιλοχρήματος) and ‘profit-loving’ (φιλοκερδὴς).193 Though he described the appetitive part as irrational, this did not preclude some reasoning capabilities. The appetitive part as he described it does appear capable of means-end reasoning, since it can perform quite sophisticated calculations regarding how to obtain what it wants. Consequently, its irrationality is rooted in its blindness to wider considerations beyond the object of gratification rather than an inability to reason at all.194 Plato connected these more sophisticated types of desire to the simple lusts for nourishment and love by arguing that money is the chief instrument for the gratification of the appetites.195 As such, the appetitive part may participate in ‘right opinion’ (δόξα) like the spirited part, but it differs in that it lacks any sort of paedeia, with the result that it becomes ‘slavish’ (ἀνδραποδώδης).196

Philo also hinted at Plato’s more sophisticated characterization of the appetitive part as gain-loving in that he characterized it as not only ‘gluttonous’ (λαμαργία), but also ‘greedy’ (ἀπληστία). Nevertheless, even in those instances the accent continued to be on the more functional view of greed as insatiate desire, since he used the term in the context of the stomach and its tendency toward ever wanting more. For this reason, he elsewhere called it most ‘insatiable’ (ἀπληστότατον) and ‘incontinent’ (ἀκολαστότατον).197 As such, Philo generally eschewed the more sophisticated, agent-like conception of the appetitive part of the soul as the money-loving part that deliberates how best to secure gain, even in those places where he alluded to it.

192 See Lev. 11:7-8, 14:8 (LXX).
193 Plato, Resp. 9.581b-e.
196 T.J. Saunders, ‘Structure of the Soul and the State in Plato’s Laws’ (1962), 47. See Plato, Resp. 4.430b.
197 Philo, Spec. 4.94. It may be a stretch, but one does wonder whether Philo’s connection of the appetitive part with incontinence or akrasia is not a carry over of the internal factionalism implicit in Plato’s depiction of this part of the soul as a ‘many-headed beast’. 
Finally, to illustrate the character of the appetitive part Plato compared the soul to those creatures composed of several different animals, such as the mythical Chimera, Scylla, or Cerberus. In this illustration, he equated each of the three parts of the soul to a different animal. Plato depicted the appetitive part of the soul as a giant, ‘many-headed beast’ (πολύκέφαλος θρέμμα), the spirited part as a lion, and the mind as a miniature human being. Of these three animals, he portrayed the multiform beast as the largest, the human as the smallest, and the lion in between the two. Plato conjoined the three animals into a single creature and enclosed it inside a human being so that it is not visible to an observer.\textsuperscript{198}

Each of the heads of the beast in this Chimera-like soul has a distinctive character. Plato described some as gentle and others as savage. Nevertheless, he insisted that all the heads are capable of growing and changing. If a person feeds and tends to the miniature human being within, further domesticates the gentler heads of the beast, but checks and starves the savage heads, then he will be able to control and guide the many-headed beast. If he instead feeds the savage heads, but starves the miniature human, the beast will become large and terrible, with the result that reason will be unable to control it. In such cases, the soul becomes licentious.\textsuperscript{199}

Philo never explicitly invoked the Chimera-soul illustration, but he did allude to it by treating the appetitive part of the soul as ‘a beast’ (θρέμμα) after the manner of Plato’s metaphor. Once, Philo explicitly referred to desire as a many-headed beast,\textsuperscript{200} alluding to his awareness of Plato’s Chimera-soul illustration. Similarly, Philo elsewhere alluded to the metaphor when he described the unjust man as ‘a beast in human’ form in contrast to the just Noah-like soul, who is truly ‘a man’.\textsuperscript{201}

This reflected Plato’s contrast between just and unjust souls in his comparison of the soul to a Chimera-like creature. As mentioned above, Plato had argued that in the just soul, the miniature man within is in control and the many-headed beast is domesticated, whereas in the unjust man the many-headed beast grows strong and enslaves the mind. Philo’s contrast between the two types of soul reflects rather the part of the Chimera-like creature that is asserting control. In the case of a soul that is ‘a beast in human form’, the beast-part of the soul rules, whereas in the case of the soul that is truly ‘a man’, the mind rules.

\textsuperscript{198} Plato, Resp. 9.588c-d. See also Plato, Tim. 70c.
\textsuperscript{199} Plato, Resp. 9.589a-b, 591b.
\textsuperscript{200} Philo, QE 1.19.
\textsuperscript{201} Philo, Abr. 32-3. Compare also Philo, Agr. 9.
Nevertheless, in most instances, Philo simply compared desire to ‘an irrational beast’ (ἄλογος θρέμμα) without clearly linking it to Plato’s Chimera-soul metaphor.\(^{202}\) This allowed him greater latitude to treat the image elastically. In some cases, Philo opted to equate the appetitive part of the soul with other kinds of beasts. Sometimes he identified the beasts of the lower part of the soul with the unclean animals of the food taboos of his Jewish and religious background. Hence, as already mentioned above, he expressly identified desire especially with swine. This transference works well because swine were considered ‘unclean’ in Judaism, hence capturing Plato’s characterization of the beasts of the Chimera-like soul as godless and polluted. Additionally, Philo’s identification of the appetitive part of the soul with swine that gorge themselves from ‘a manger’ (φάτνη) also fits nicely with Plato’s description in the *Timaeus* of desire as beasts that feed from the trough of the stomach.\(^{203}\) This represents a Stoicizing tendency in Philo’s thought, which excluded reason in animals and, as a result, rejected Plato’s agent-like conception of the appetitive part of the soul.

On other occasions, Philo’s comparison of the appetitive part of the soul to a beast blended with Plato’s charioteer metaphor. In this metaphor, Plato had described desire as an unruly and ugly horse, which constantly forces its way ahead of the other horse, anger, to gorge at the trough. While Plato had described both anger and desire as ‘horses’, when invoking this metaphor Philo sometimes referred to them rather as beasts, thus allowing the notion to do double-duty. We will discuss Philo’s use of Plato’s metaphor of the charioteer in relation to the parts of the soul in the next chapter.

**‘The spirited part’ of the soul**

As noted above, Plato located the spirited part of the soul in the breast or chest and treated it as at first synonymous with simple ‘anger’ (ὁργή) or ‘rage’ (θυμός),\(^{204}\) but it then ‘takes on the colour of something more morally ambitious’ than mere anger or rage, namely, courage, the quest for honour, and war.\(^{205}\) Unlike Philo, for Plato

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\(^{202}\) Philo, *Abr.* 160; *Spec.* 1.148-50, 4.92-4; *Contempl.* 74.


\(^{204}\) Plato, *Resp.* 4.439e, 440a-c, 441a; *Tim.* 70a; for further discussion, see F.M. Cornford, ‘Psychology’ (1912), 263.

\(^{205}\) B. Williams, ‘Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic’ (1997), 58. Cooper observed that Plato associated spiritedness with a wide range of manifestations, including ‘anger, courage, shame,
anger did not necessarily have a negative connotation. Since the seat of anger often sided with the rational part of the soul as a sort of ‘ally’ (ἐπίκουρον) in the fight against the desires, Plato normally gave a positive evaluation of the spirited part of the soul, though with some exceptions. Like a watchdog, spiritedness is regulated by, and so serves to protect, reason. Hence, it is the part of the soul from which springs the noble wrath or righteous indignation that is necessary to combat injustice. As such, the spirited part is set upon predominance, victory, and good repute. Plato believed that it is best designated ‘the ambitious’ (φιλόνικον) part of the soul that is ‘covetous of honour’ (φιλότιµον) as well as the seat of ‘courage’ and ‘bravery’ (ἀνδρεῖον/ἀνδρεία). All of these attributes were especially necessary to military service. For this reason, Plato connected the spirited part with the auxiliary class of his ideal city.

Plato viewed the spirited part of the soul as a sort of ally to reason, but one that is liable to corruption. Consequently, it is not immune to more base tendencies:

... in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit (τὸ ἑθικοειδές), which is the helper (ἐπίκουρον) of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture (ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῇ). For Plato, the spirited part of the soul can have either a positive or a negative function in the soul. When a person properly educates and trains the spirited part, it will join reason in ruling over the mass of appetitive desires. If it is poorly trained, there are two possible outcomes. First, it might succumb to the appetitive part along with reason in accordance with the ‘Force Model’. Due to poor training, the spirited part becomes lax and soft, which in turn produces cowardice and slavishness in the soul. Second, if someone feeds and strengthens it through his inordinate love of honour and victory without calculation or understanding, anger usurps reason’s rightful rule of the soul and makes a person envious, violent, stubborn, and

reverence, the desire for recognition, pride, vanity, contempt, envy, idealism, and fanaticism’, though he acknowledged that anger is its ‘primary expression’. L.D. Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’ (2001), 36.

206 For instance, see Plato, Resp. 4.440b-c, 441c; Phdr. 253d, 254a, c; Tim. 70a.
207 Plato, Resp. 9.586c-d.
209 Plato, Resp. 4.440b-e.
210 Ibid., 4.429b, 4.442b-c, 9.581b.
211 Ibid., 4.441a.
212 Ibid., 4.442b.
213 Ibid., 9.590b.
irritable, again in keeping with the ‘Force Model’.\textsuperscript{214} Plato offered as evidence the case of young children and animals. In his view, both are full of spirit from birth, yet neither fully participates in reason. As such, we often witness a sort of uncalculating anger motivating violence, aggression, and uncontrolled rage.\textsuperscript{215} Consequently, for Plato anger is in fact a natural ally to the rational part of the soul, since it possesses a greater share in reason.\textsuperscript{216} Nevertheless, if left to its own devices shorn of reason’s guidance, it too can become a tyrant in the soul. This recalls Plato’s description of the spirited part as a lion in his Chimera-soul metaphor discussed above. For all of these reasons, Plato assigned the spirited part to the second place, behind the rational part, but before the appetitive.\textsuperscript{217}

As was the case with the appetitive part of the soul, so also Philo’s account of the spirited part closely followed Plato in those places where he invoked Plato’s tripartite theory of the soul.\textsuperscript{218} Firstly, Philo likewise called the third part ‘the spirited element’ (τὸ θυμικόν) or ‘anger’ (θυμός) and located it in the breast. We have already discussed these details at the beginning of this chapter.

Secondly, Philo could likewise characterize anger in both positive and negative terms. Negatively, it can align with desire as ‘a brother’ (ἀδελφός) and ‘resist’ (ἀντισπάω) the impulses of the mind,\textsuperscript{219} bringing forth instead all sorts of impulses that Philo identified as ‘evil children’ of the spirited part of the soul, such as ‘raging furies’ (λυσσάς).\textsuperscript{220} In such instances, Philo described anger as ‘warlike’ (πολεμικός) since it fights against the bidding of the rational part of the soul.\textsuperscript{221} These examples recall Plato’s ‘Force Model’ above, but against the rational part rather than the appetitive. Positively, Philo also tended to associate the spirited part of the soul with military imagery,\textsuperscript{222} which in turn evoked the notion of ‘courage’ or ‘bravery’ (ἀνδρεία).\textsuperscript{223} Moreover, Philo likewise noted its proximity to the mind and

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid., 9.586d, 9.588e, 9.590a; Leg. 9.863b.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., 4.441b. At Resp. 554c-d, Plato insinuated that the ‘taming’ associated with one’s paideia is connected with a long-term process of persuasion. Consequently, his use of the ‘Force Model’ in the instances cited above presumes one’s failure to properly implement the ‘Command Model’ in one’s training.
\textsuperscript{216} Plato, Resp. 4.441a.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., 9.583a.
\textsuperscript{218} Philo, Agr. 17,72, 78; Conf. 21-2; Migr. 66-67; Spec. 1.146, 4.92-4; Virt. 13; Leg. 1.70-3, 3.115, 118, 130; Her. 64.
\textsuperscript{219} Philo, Migr. 66-7.
\textsuperscript{220} Philo, Conf. 21-2.
\textsuperscript{221} Philo, Leg. 3.130.
\textsuperscript{222} Philo, Migr. 67; Spec. 4.93; Leg. 3.115.
\textsuperscript{223} Philo, Leg. 1.70-1.
suggested that, therefore, the spirited part of the soul shares in reason to an extent, is capable of domestication, and can help the mind.\textsuperscript{224}

Nevertheless, although Philo followed Plato in placing anger midway between reason and desire, he preferred to treat it as a \textit{subordinate class of desire} (ἐπιθυμία) that opposed reason, under Stoic influence, rather than as a subordinate kind of desire (ἐπιθυμία),\textsuperscript{225} alternative to the desires of the appetitive part of the soul and a natural ally to reason as in Plato.\textsuperscript{226 This was due in part to the biblical images or words that called forth his Platonic allegorical reading in the first place. For instance, he identified anger and desire with the breast and belly of the serpent that God cursed in \textit{Gen. 3:14 (LXX)}. The negative portrayal of the serpent and its parts in the text led to his unfavourable characterization of both the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul. His treatment of anger or wrath as both types of desire reflects a Stoic taxonomy of the passions, but could also reflect the wider trend in the Middle Platonists, Peripatetics, or Posidonius to conflate desire and anger under one part of the soul, as Vander Waerdt shows.\textsuperscript{227 The influence of the Stoic ethical ideal of apatheia also accounts for Philo’s tendency to treat the spirited part of the soul negatively. Whereas Plato called for the moderation of anger and desire, which resulted in a subordination of the parts with reason at the helm, Philo called for the extirpation of anger altogether, at least in his ideal sage.\textsuperscript{228 This is a notion that was foreign to the ethics of Plato and, later, his student Aristotle.}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Philo occasionally employed Plato’s complex, tripartite model of the soul outlined in the \textit{Republic}, \textit{Timaeus}, and \textit{Phaedrus} as an alternative to his customary Stoic approach to the passions, usually when the biblical text suggested it to him. Drawing upon Plato, he could likewise divide the soul into rational, spirited, and appetitive parts, but with important modifications. Firstly, Philo’s terminology reflected later

\textsuperscript{224} Philo, \textit{Spec.} 4.93; \textit{Leg.} 3.128.

\textsuperscript{225} Philo was not always consistent on subordinating wrath to desire, as is so often the case in his writings. Philo could sometimes describe wrath as a ‘brother’ (ἀδελφός) to desire, which could suggest coordinate status. See, Philo, \textit{Migr.} 66. Philo elsewhere treated as ‘brothers’ elements that he clearly understood hierarchically such as the body and soul. See, for instance, Philo, \textit{Ebr.} 70, \textit{Fug.} 90.

\textsuperscript{226} Plato, \textit{Resp.} 9.571a-b; 580d-e.

\textsuperscript{227} P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 373, 392. Note also that in spite of Plato’s treatment of desire, anger, and reason as three distinctive parts of the soul, Plato’s description of wrath as a kind of desire in Book 9 of the \textit{Republic} could have lent additional support to Philo’s approach. See Plato, \textit{Resp.} 9.571a-b; 580d-e.

\textsuperscript{228} See Philo, \textit{Leg.} 3.129-37, 147.
Peripatetic and Middle Platonic readings of Plato. While he could follow Plato in locating mind, spirited and appetitive parts in the head, chest, and abdomen respectively, or in attributing characteristics of cognition and desire to each part when personified, he nevertheless showed a tendency to follow Posidonius’ ‘weak reading’ of Plato that emphasized the functions of each part and downplayed the agent-like characteristics of the parts. Moreover, Philo treated the spirited part as the natural ally to the appetitive part, not to the mind as in Plato.

Philo could, like Plato, relate the three parts of the soul to the four virtues, though he preferred the Stoic technical definitions. In this account, internal psychological harmony results when reason rules; when the lower parts usurp reason the result is civil war. Yet, even here, Stoicizing interpretations insert themselves. This is most profoundly the case when Philo makes the mind ultimately responsible for the soul’s passions as their source.

Alongside this tripartite conception, Philo also made a more fundamental bipartite division between rational and irrational parts of the soul. Drawing especially upon Plato’s *Timaeus*, Philo likewise depicted the mind as rational, immortal, and superior, created directly by God as a copy of the Logos. By contrast, he considered the lower parts of the soul to be the work of the subordinate divine powers. As a result, these parts are irrational, mortal, akin to the body, and inferior.

Philo construed the soul’s immortality in terms of the Orphic scheme, outlined especially in the *Phaedo*, of the pre-existence, embodiment, and return of the soul to the heavenly realm, though he rejected Plato’s doctrine of reincarnation, including the metempsychosis of souls into animals. Given its kinship to the divine, he time and again argued that the mind should turn away from the prison of the body and instead contemplate the ideas and powers of the intelligible world. It falls into passion precisely when it willingly leaves its proper orientation toward the intelligible for the pleasures of the body. This scheme formed the basis of Philo’s narrative of the soul’s spiritual journey toward the vision of God.
Chapter 4: Stoic, Platonic, and biblical metaphors

Philo repeatedly invoked Plato’s myth of the charioteer and horses found in the *Phaedrus* to illustrate the internal relations of the tripartite soul, though he utilized it for his own purposes. While Buccioni is certainly correct in cautioning us against too quickly identifying the tripartite soul of the *Republic* with the winged chariot ensemble in the *Phaedrus*, what is important for this study is that Philo essentially conflated the two metaphors. In so doing, he drew upon details from both accounts in his description of the tripartite soul, supplementing these with descriptions in the *Timaeus* as well. In the sections that follow, we will look at the similarities and differences between Philo’s account and Plato’s, before noting important Stoicizing deviations in Philo. Next, we will explore Philo’s use of Plato’s tripartite psychology in relation to his narrative of the progress of the soul on its journey to God. We will show that his extensive use of the charioteer metaphor together with the herdsman and creatures similes further demonstrates both his broad reliance upon elements of Plato’s psychology, on the one hand, and his willingness to intermingle it with biblical, Stoic, and Peripatetic elements, on the other.

**Philo’s use of Plato’s charioteer simile**

*Similarities between Plato and Philo’s portrayals of the chariot metaphor*

Philo retains a number of the key elements in Plato’s charioteer myth in his own exposition of the soul and its parts. For both philosophers, the mind serves as the chariot-driver and the spirited and appetitive parts as the two horses. Each of the horses, moreover, possesses distinct, contrasting characteristics, which we will discuss in detail in a moment. Both authors omit the second person that commonly stood beside the driver in ‘the chariot box’ (παραβάτης), since in neither exposition is there any second element in the soul that assists the mind in its governing capacity. Philo likewise includes in his exposition many of the paraphernalia related to charioteering. Both mention ‘the chariot’ (ἄρμα), though Philo often prefers the

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more generic term, ‘vehicle’ (ὄχημα). Both also reference other accoutrements, including ‘the reins’ (ἡνία), ‘whip’ (μάστιξ), and ‘bit’ or ‘bridle’ (χαλινός). Philo mentions items of equipment that Plato omits in the *Phaedrus*, including ‘the chariot box’ (δίφρος), ‘spurs’ (µύωψ), and ‘chariot team’ (ἄρματα), while Plato refers to ‘a goad’ (κέντρον), something Philo does not mention. Most of these paraphernalia appear to be incidental to the metaphor, used primarily to colour the exposition. However, the bit and reins are closely connected to the charioteer/mind’s management of the two horses and the spiritual status of the soul. Finally, both authors situate the chariot-metaphor within a wider narrative of the mind’s quest to ascend back to a purely intellectual existence, which in turn requires therapy for the soul.

We can note a number of commonalities between Plato’s and Philo’s treatment of the driver. For both, the mind has the same basic role, namely, to ‘drive’ (ἐλαύνω) and to ‘guide’ (ἡνιοχέω) the soul. Both authors also invoke the parallel nautical description of the mind as ‘a steersman’ (κυβερνήτης) to characterize its proper role in guiding the soul-chariot. Their common approach is further reinforced by the fact that both liken the role of the mind/charioteer in the soul to that of God/Zeus in the cosmos. For Plato, Zeus is ‘the great commander in heaven’ ‘who looks after everything and places [all things] in order (διακοσμεῖν πάντα και ἑπιμελεῖνος’), while for Philo, God ‘guides’ (ἄγω, ἡνιοχέω) the entire universe, directing it ‘in safety’ (σωτηρίως).

Philo generally also follows Plato’s characterization of the two horses in the chariot-team, though he draws a different conclusion with regard to the relations of the horses/lower psychological parts and the mind/charioteer. Compare Plato and Philo’s descriptions of the two horses:

- The spirited part of the soul

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6 Philo, *Agr.* 73; *Mos.* 1.25; *Leg.* 1.72, 3.223; Plato, *Phdr.* 254c.
10 Ibid., 71.
12 Plato, *Phdr.* 253e.
14 Philo, *Migr.* 186; *Opif.* 46; *Somm.* 1.157; *Her.* 301.
15 Philo, *Abr.* 70; *Decal.* 60-1; *Praem.* 34.
o Plato: ‘The [good (ἀγαθός)] horse that is on the right, or nobler, side [of the chariot-team] is upright in frame and well jointed, with a high neck (ὑψάυχην) and a regal nose; his coat is white, his eyes are black, and he is a lover of honour (τιμή) with modesty (αἰδώ) and self-control (σωφρόσυνος); companion to true glory, he needs no whip, and is guided by verbal commands alone.’

o Philo: ‘The one [high spirit, θυμός] prances and wants to be free (ἐλεύθερος) and at large (ἄφετος), as you might expect of a male (ἄρρην).’ Elsewhere, however, he describes high spirit as like a ‘restive’ (ἀφηνιαστής) and ‘stiff-necked’ (σκληραύχην) horse.

The appetitive part of the soul

o Plato: ‘The other [bad] horse is a crooked great jumble of limbs with a short bull-neck, a pug nose, black skin, and bloodshot white eyes; companion to wild boasts (ὑβρις) and indecency (ἀλαζονεία), he is shaggy around the ears – deaf as a post – and just barely yields to horsewhip and goad combined.’

o Philo: ‘The other [desire, ἐπιθυμία] is mean (ἀνελεύθερος) and slavish (δουλοπρεπής), up to sly tricks (πανουργία), keeps her nose in the manger and empties it in no time, for she is a female (θῆλυς).’

In the comparisons above, Plato and occasionally Philo place the horse representing the spirited part of the soul in a better light. Both depict it as possessing ‘a high neck’, which was regarded as a desirable characteristic in a horse in antiquity. Philo’s depiction of the better horse prancing about and desiring freedom and Plato’s portrayal of the white horse’s upright and well-built frame, regal nose, and love of honour both further detail what one would expect of a high-necked horse. Plato’s description of the white horse includes other positive moral qualities – love of honour, modesty, and responsiveness to the charioteer – all of which correspond to ‘the right-handed’ features of erotic love in the Phaedrus. Philo, in contrast, does not

16 Plato, Phdr. 253d.
17 Philo, Agr. 73.
18 Philo, Leg. 3.136.
19 Plato, Phdr. 253e.
20 Philo, Agr. 73.
21 For instance, note Xenophon’s positive characterization of a ‘high’ or ‘arched’ neck in a horse. See, Xen., Eq. 1.8; 10.3-4.
mention any of Plato’s positive moral characteristics, but he does portray the horse as male. For Philo, this was not merely a physical characteristic. Rather, throughout his corpus, the masculine quality always possessed positive moral and spiritual connotations, associating the masculine principle with healthy movements in the soul, good affections, and the virtues.22

In contrast, both Plato and Philo portray the horse that symbolizes the appetitive part of the soul in an inferior light to the good/male horse. Physically it is of poorer stock. Each of the poor features that Plato lists corresponds to a good feature in the white horse: a short, bull neck, not a high neck; a pug-shaped nose, not a regal one; black skin, not white; white bloodshot eyes, not black eyes. Similarly, its moral character is degraded. Rather than obedient, it is deaf to the commands of the driver and instead of loving ‘honour’ (τιμή) and ‘modesty’ (αἰδώ), it is given to ‘insolence’ (ὕβρις) and ‘imposture’ (ἀλαζονεία). Finally, possibly alluding to Plato’s description of pleasure as deceptive in the Laws, Philo described the female horse as ‘up to sly tricks’ (πανουργία).23 All of these features correspond to Plato’s ‘left-handed’ portrayal of erotic love in the first speech of the Phaedrus.

Philo likewise contrasts the appetitive horse with the spirited, placing it in a bad light. Physically, rather than possessing a high neck, it is slavish (δουλοπρεπής) and mean (ἀνελεύθερος). Morally, it is given to ‘sly tricks’ (πανουργία). Additionally, Philo’s portrayal draws upon elements from Plato’s description of the appetitive part of the soul outside the charioteer myth. In the Timaeus, Plato had described the appetitive part of the soul as tied down like ‘a wild beast’ near the stomach, ever feeding as at a trough.24 In a similar manner, Philo emphasizes the base orientation of the appetitive horse toward consumption, describing it as ‘a devourer of its own house’ (οἰκόσιτος and οἰκοφθόρος). Finally, Philo reinforces his negative moral characterization of the appetitive horse by depicting it as a female. Throughout his corpus Philo generally associated the feminine principle with those qualities opposite to the male, namely, sickly movements of the soul, the passions, and vice.25

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22 See especially Philo, Leg. 2.97; Sacr. 103, 106; Spec. 1.200-1; QG 4.15. Compare also Philo, Agr. 140; Migr. 140.
23 Plato, Leg. 9.863b.
24 Plato, Tim. 70e.
25 Philo, Leg. 2.97; Sacr. 103,106; ; Spec. 1.200-1; QG 4.15. For further discussion, see R. Baer, Categories Male and Female (1970), 40-44; J.E. Taylor, Jewish Women Philosophers (2003), 251-2; G.J. Warne, Philo and Paul (1995), 142. Note also Philo’s negative portrayal of the female element in his strong censure of the effeminate role of a male partner in homosexual relations, which he based on his reading of Deut. 23:1 (LXX) and Lev. 20:13 (LXX). Philo, Abr. 135-6; Spec. 1.325, 3.37-42;
Differences between Plato and Philo’s portrayals of the chariot metaphor

In spite of the many similarities between the two philosophers’ use of this metaphor, Philo’s description of the horses diverges significantly from Plato’s. Whereas the horses in Plato’s chariot team are both male, Philo’s team is composed of one male and one female horse. Philo’s differentiation between the horses’ gender likely arises from the gender difference of the two terms for the passions, with the masculine term, ‘high spirit’ (ὁ θυμός), bringing to mind a male horse and the feminine word, ‘desire’ (ἡ ἐπιθυμία), the female horse. This in turn permitted Philo to draw upon the symbolic interpretive scheme that he applied to male and female elsewhere in his corpus, as noted above, though with modifications that nearly undo its significance in this particular application, as we will discuss in a moment.

In addition, while both Plato and Philo differentiate the two horses from one another in a similar manner, they diverge in their treatment of the relation of the better horse to the mind. Whereas Plato treats the white horse as a partner and ally to the mind/charioteer, Philo opposes both horses to the mind/charioteer. In so doing, Philo transmutes the high neck of the male horse into a stiff neck, his own terminology, as explained before. For instance, returning to the passage where he discusses the overthrow of reason by desire and wrath, he describes the interaction between both horses and the driver as follows:

> Whenever … high spirit (θυμός) and desire (ἐπιθυμία) turn restive and get out of hand (ἀφηνιάσῃ καὶ ἀναχαιτίσῃ), and by the violence of their impetus drag (τῇ βίᾳ τῆς ὁρμῆς κατασύρω) the driver (ἡνίοχον), that is the reason (λογισμός), down from his seat and put him under the yoke (ὑποζεύγνυ), and each (ἑκάτερος) of these passions gets hold of the reins, injustice prevails. For it cannot be but for the badness and want of skill (ἀπειρίᾳ καὶ κακίᾳ) of the driver, the team is swept down precipices and gullies, just as by experience and skill (ἐπειρίᾳ καὶ ἀρετῇ) it must needs be brought safely through.²⁶

In this passage both horses – high spirit and desire – oppose and overthrow the charioteer. Philo states that ‘high spirit and desire’ turn ‘restive’ in defiance of the

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²⁶ Philo, Leg. 1.73.

driver. He goes on to exaggerate the metaphor such that he poses the fantastical image of the two horses dragging the chariot driver off the chariot and placing him under the yoke. The two horses then climb on to the chariot and ‘each’ (ἕκατερος) horse takes over the reins. By describing both horses in this manner, Philo glosses over the differences between the male and female horses mentioned in the previously quoted passage. Whatever distinctions there might be between them, Philo’s description of their character and actions here is more or less identical. Moreover, the horses work in tandem with one another as close associates. Rather than high spirit siding with the mind as an ally, it conspires with desire to force the mind under the yoke. Consequently, ‘injustice’ results from the two horses joining forces to overthrow the charioteer and take control of the chariot.

In contrast, Plato attributes the source of the difficulty in driving the chariot to the black horse alone, although both authors cite want of skill in the driver to properly control the horse(s) as a contributing factor.27 Early in the chariot story, Plato describes the black horse as ‘heavy’ (βρῖθος μετέχων). As a consequence, it pulls the entire chariot-team downward as they strain to ascend to the huperanion realm when they are processing with the gods.28 These inferior chariots, unable to keep up with the gods, descend into a chaotic competition with one another as they try to reach the upper surface of the heavens. In their clamouring to get ahead, their horses pull violently in different directions, causing injury to the chariot wings.29 Given the consistently violent portrayal of the black horse throughout the story, moreover, Plato’s reference to the horses in the plural probably refers to the various black horses among the competing chariot teams. Finally, in Plato’s further description of the two horses in greater detail later in the narrative, it is again the black horse alone that lunges forward, ‘throwing back’ (ἀναπεσών) the driver and dragging him and the white horse toward the boy.30

Moreover, notwithstanding the relative superiority of the male horse to the female horse as noted above, Philo consistently depicts both horses as violent or excessive in their movements. His favourite way to characterize both horses is to describe them as ‘restive’ (ἀφηνιάζω)31 and ‘rearing up/back’ (ἀναχαιτίζω) in an

27 Plato, Phdr. 246b, 247b; Philo, Leg. 1.73; Agr. 77.
28 Ibid., 247b.
29 Ibid., 248a-b.
30 Ibid., 254e.
31 Philo, Leg. 1.73; 3.136, 223; Agr. 74, 84; Spec. 4.79, 99; Virt. 14; Mos. 1.26.
effort to throw the charioteer or rider. Both of these notions, moreover, carry in their train a constellation of related ideas. Hence, Philo also describes the horses as ‘neighing’ (χρεμεταπτικός), ‘stiff-necked’ (σκληραύχην), ‘disturbed’ (παρακινέω) or ‘maddened’ (οἰστράω), and ‘unruly’ or ‘skittish’ (σκιρτητικός). Plato, in contrast, never describes either horse as restive, stiff-necked, distracted, or maddened, though he does once depict the black horse as rearing up, neighing, and ‘leaping forward violently’ (σκιρτῶν βίᾳ), before it shamelessly ‘drags’ (ἐλκω) the white horse and charioteer toward the beautiful boy. Further, Philo identifies the movements of the male and female horses in the myth with unruly ‘impulses’ in the soul. He describes ‘the impulses’ of both high spirit and desire as ‘strong’ (δύναται ὁρμή) or ‘random’ (ἀκρίτοις ὁρμαῖς), and in need of a charioteer to ‘curb’ or ‘bride’ (ἐπιστομίζει) them. Even in the case of De agricultura 72-77, after initially following Plato in offering a more positive characterization of the male horse, Philo immediately describes both animals (τὰ ζώα), when failed to be properly reined in, as ‘rebelling’ (ἀφηνιάζω), ‘disturbed’ (παρακινέω), ‘mad’ (οἰστράω), ‘erratic’ (πλημμελῆ), and ‘disorderly’ (ἄτακτον). Hence, both Philo’s male and female horses require spur and bridle to keep them under control, whereas Plato’s black horse needs spur and goad, but the white horse does not since it listens to the charioteer.

The differences between Plato’s and Philo’s employment of the chariot metaphor for the soul do not end with divergences in the way they portrayed the horses. Rather, the differences extend to other parts of the metaphor. Firstly, and significantly, Philo nowhere connects the charioteer metaphor to erotic love. This is especially surprising given his near ubiquitous employment of the theme of the journey or migration of the soul back to God, a theme that he closely linked with erotic flight of the soul. In this case, the absence of eros is probably due in large part to the fact that Philo uses the metaphor as a device for characterizing the relations among the parts of the soul, not, as was the case for Plato, in order to discuss how

32 Philo, Agr. 70; Spec. 4.99.
33 Philo, Agr. 67, 72; Plato, Phdr. 254d.
34 Philo, Leg. 3.136.
35 Philo, Agr. 75.
36 Ibid., 68, 83; Philo, Leg. 2.99.
37 Plato, Phdr. 254a.
38 Ibid., 254d.
39 Philo, Leg. 3.118, 128.
40 Philo, Agr. 74-76.
erotic love and philosophical friendship could serve the soul in its quest to contemplate true being or reality, a theme Philo did take up elsewhere in a modified form. As such, his use reflects a simplified appropriation of the metaphor in keeping with the approach of other Platonic philosophers of his day.41

Secondly, Philo never mentions the chariot’s wings in his discussion of the human soul. We know that he knew of the image, because he twice refers to God as riding ‘a winged chariot’ like a charioteer.42 In both cases, he relates this metaphor to the notion of God’s ‘government’ (ἀρχή) of the universe.43 In one instance, he describes the cosmos itself as the winged chariot and the horses as those who set themselves to oppose divine virtue by teaching the creed that nothing exists beyond this world, so that the universe is without guardian, helmsman, or protector. Similar to his description of the chariot horses that represent anger and desire, Philo likewise describes these horses as ‘restive’ (ἀφηνιαστής) and ‘stiff-necked’ (σκληραύχην), always ‘prancing about’ (σκιρτάω). The horses take on anthropomorphic attributes in as much as they also falsely believe that they are ‘independent’ (ἐλεύθερος), ‘a law unto themselves’ (αὐτόνοµος), and ‘rulers of others’ (ἑτέρων ἡγεµόνες).44 Philo does not explicitly specify who ‘the others’ in the metaphor are, and we would be wise not to press the details too far. Based on the context, we can surmise that ‘the others’ refers to other people and creatures, since throughout this passage Philo describes these people as thinking of themselves more than they ought, and as rejecting any sort of deity.

Philo thus sought by this description of the horses as restive and stiff-necked to highlight the pride of such people. This interpretation finds support first in the fact that Philo invoked the chariot metaphor when he was commenting on the phrase, ‘all the earth was one lip’, which begins the tower of Babel story that tells how certain people banded together as one to build a tower that would reach to heaven, and so make a name for themselves.45 Philo consistently reads this as a story about the pride and hubris of fools and the wicked. Interestingly, this portrayal corresponds

41 For instance, like Philo, on several occasions Galen dropped any references to erotic love or to the chariot wings when he utilized the chariot metaphor in his defence of Plato’s psychology. This was the case in every instance where he employed the metaphor casually. See Galen, Plac. III 3.6, 12, 15, V 5.34-5, VI 1.17. He even failed to mention either the wings or erotic love when he explicitly referred to the metaphor in Plato’s Phaedrus. See Galen, Plac. VI 2.4.
42 Philo, Somn. 2.294; Her. 301.
43 Philo, Somn. 2.285, 290.
44 Ibid., 2.277, 283, 291, 293.
45 Gen. 11:1-9 (LXX).
more closely with the insolent character of the black horse in Plato’s *Phaedrus* discussed earlier than it does with Philo’s characterization of the male and female chariot horses that represent anger and desire. In those cases, the horses’ restiveness refers primarily to the violent and excessive character of the passions. This also accounts for Philo’s identification of the bridle, whip, and spur with the punishments that God employs to remind these people of His true status as ruler of the universe and of their inferior position.46

In the second case, Philo compares God’s ‘rule’ (βασιλεία) of ‘the entire universe’ (ὁ οὐλός) after ‘the manner of a charioteer’ (ἡνιόχου τρόπος) or ‘pilot’ (κυβερνητοῦ τρόπος).47 He then associates each driving term with different parts of the cosmos. He uses the boating analogy to describe God’s action in relation to the lower world. Hence, he refers to that world as ‘a boat’ or ‘hull’ (σκάφος). He describes ‘the entire heavens’ (σύμπας οὐράνος) as a winged chariot that God drives with absolute authority and sovereignty. This description of the chariot as ‘winged’ follows from the elevated position of the heavens above the earth. In this second case, he makes no effort to fill out the details of the metaphor. If God is the charioteer or pilot, and one part of the cosmos is a ship and the other a winged chariot, both of which combine to form ‘the whole’, what do the horses symbolize? Philo does not say.

Given Plato’s connection between the wings and erotic love, it is not surprising that Philo eschewed any reference to the wings when he utilized the chariot metaphor to describe the soul, since in his use of the myth he removed any direction associated with erotic love. This impression is reinforced by the fact that Philo makes no connection between God’s chariot wings and erotic love in the two instances discussed above either. Nevertheless, one might wonder why he did not include the chariot wings, but perhaps in an alternative non-sexual manner. He had already demonstrated that he was quite happy to creatively employ other elements of the metaphor for his own purposes! Aside from Philo’s tendency to simplify the metaphor in general, the best explanation for the omission resides in the fact that the biblical contexts upon which he was commenting failed to provide an image or term that he might associate with the chariot wings of Plato’s original narrative, hence, he modified it for his own purposes.

47 Philo, *Her.* 301.
As long as the chariot metaphor contained the image of ruling and subordinate, rational and irrational elements in the soul, Philo could treat most of its other facets rather elastically. This contrasted with Plato in a couple of ways. On the one hand, the chariot functions as the central metaphor in the *Phaedrus*, comprehending the entirety of Socrates’ second speech in which he seeks to offer to Phaedrus a right-handed account of erotic love. Hence, each detail plays an important role in bringing out the nuances and subtleties of Plato’s overall argument about how the madness of erotic love can serve the philosopher’s quest to return to a true knowledge of what is most real. As a consequence, the details of the myth’s narrative are much less flexible, since they carry more freight. On the other hand, Plato did not use the chariot metaphor at all in his other discussions of the tripartite soul, in the *Timaeus* and in the *Republic*. Instead, he utilized other analogies that were completely unrelated to the notion of charioteering, such as likening the mind, spirited, and appetitive parts to a man, lion, and many-headed beast respectively, as discussed above. Thus, while the chariot metaphor is indispensable to the *Phaedrus*, as a key element in a larger, central myth, in the *Republic* and *Timaeus* it is unimportant.

We can observe Philo’s flexible treatment of the chariot metaphor in his creative extension of it in a number of directions throughout his corpus. For instance, instead of Plato’s two horses that represent the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul, Philo could refer rather to a single horse of ‘sense perception’ (*αἴσθησις*).\(^{48}\)

Philo often coupled the chariot metaphor with other analogies, treating them as interchangeable. Hence, in a number of instances he paired it with that of ‘a pilot’ (*κυβερνήτης*) and his boat,\(^{49}\) and on one occasion with the image of ‘a monitor’ (*βραβευτής*) and desire and anger.\(^{50}\) Each of these analogies highlight the mind’s guiding role in the soul. He also correlated it with the metaphor of a king and his country, or ‘a ruler’ (*ἡγεµόν*) and his city, to underscore the mind’s ruling function in the soul.\(^{51}\) In all these cases, with the exception of the monitor analogy, the inferior elements – boat, city, and country – lacked detail. Philo aimed at the basic analogy and no more.

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\(^{50}\) Philo, *Migr.* 67.
\(^{51}\) Philo, *Leg.* 3.224; *Sacr.* 49.
At other times, Philo extended the metaphors in new directions as a result of the words or imagery found in the biblical texts upon which he was commenting. For instance, in the De agricultura, Philo relates the soul to images drawn from agriculture, in this exposition of Gen. 9:20 (LXX): ‘Noah began to be a husbandman, and he planted a vineyard.’ Taking his start from Moses’ identification of ‘righteous Noah’ as a husbandman, Philo goes on to contrast the righteous sage’s care of the soul with that of the wicked fool under three separate headings, each of which denote the same underlying comparison: a husbandman and plants, various types of herdsman and animals, and a horseman and horse(s). He introduces the chariot metaphor under the third of those headings. As such, the chariot is not the controlling metaphor for Philo in the De agricultura, but this makes sense in light of the fact that he was seeking to expound the underlying meaning of a particular biblical text under the first heading of husbandman – Gen. 9:20. Philo’s identification of the two subsequent headings – the herdsman and horseman – was a result of ‘a careful search’ of scripture. Accordingly, the biblical text served as the reservoir of images from which Philo took his start. He introduced additional similes and figures, including the chariot metaphor, when he set about unpacking the underlying meaning of each of the three comparisons.

In all three of the comparisons in De agricultura, moreover, Philo uses two variant terms for each figure to contrast, in Stoic fashion, the sage versus the fool. Hence, for the first simile, he calls the sage ‘a husbandman’ (γεωργός), but the fool ‘a worker of the soil’ (γῆς ἐργασία); in the second simile, he identifies the sage with ‘a shepherd’ (ποιμήν) or more generally, ‘a herdsman’ (νομέως), but the fool with ‘a cattle rearer’ (κτηνοτρόφος), while in the final simile, he calls the sage ‘a horseman/chariotman’ (ἱππεύς) or ‘a charioteer’ (ἡνίοχος), but the fool ‘a rider’ (ἀναβάτης).

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52 Philo, Agr. 26, 67, 124.
53 Ibid., 1-25 (husbandman), 26-66 (herdsman), 67-119 (horseman).
54 Ibid., 26.
55 Ibid., 2.
56 Ibid., 48.
57 Ibid., 27.
58 Ibid., 67.
59 Ibid., 72.
Transformation #1: The horseman/rider metaphor

Philo treats the metaphor of the charioteer/rider and two horses, and the figure of the horseman/rider and a single horse, in a coordinated manner. We see this in the seamless shift from his use of the first figure to the second in the course of his exposition. Philo introduces his third heading by observing that the lawgiver (Moses) distinguishes the horseman and rider, not only with regard to the actual practice, but also in relation to ‘the reasoning process’ (λογισµός) that they signify.60

He then discusses the difference between a horseman and a rider. The horseman is ‘skilled in horsemanship’ (ἱππικὴ τέχνη), hence ‘an expert’ (ἐπιστήµων). As such, he places a bit into the mouth of the horse to force it to go the way he wishes and uses a whip and spur to discipline it when it is unruly.61 The rider, conversely, is unskilled. He is unable to guide the beast, but rather has ‘given himself over’ (ἐκδέδωκε ἑαυτόν) to ‘the irrational and capricious beast’ and is carried wherever it goes. Ultimately, the irrational beast will end up carrying him to their mutual destruction.62 Next, Philo moves from the material example to the soul, explicitly comparing the constitution of the soul to a charioteer and two horses. After describing the horses, he again reminds the reader that the unskilled charioteering of a foolish driver eventually results in the destruction of the entire team. In the following section, Philo quotes a selection of biblical texts, each of which invokes the imagery of a horse and rider.63 Holding fast to the language of the text, he then subtly shifts from the figure of one charioteer and two horses, which he had used to introduce this section on horsemanship generally, to that of one horseman and one horse. For instance, Philo quotes Deuteronomy 20:1:

If you go out to war against your enemies and see horse and rider and many people (ἐὰν … ἵππον καὶ ἀναβάτην καὶ λαὸν πλείον), you shall not be afraid, because the Lord your God is with thee.

He then explains its allegorical meaning:

For high spirit (θυµός) and desire (ἐπιθυµία) and all passions generally (συνόλως ἀπαντα πάθη), and the whole array of reasoning faculties seated upon each of them as upon horses (ἐποχούµενοι ὑσπερ ἵπποις

61 Philo, Agr. 67-71; Leg. 2.103-4.
63 Gen. 49:17 (LXX); Deut. 17:15f, 20:1 (LXX); Ex. 15:1, 21 (LXX).
... may be disregarded by those who have the power of the great God acting ... as their shield and champion.\textsuperscript{64}

We can see the influence of the passage from \textit{Deuteronomy} upon Philo’s shift. Rather than treating high spirit and desire as two horses under the direction of a single charioteer as in the general introduction to the horsemanship section of \textit{De agricultura}, he separates the horses from the chariot team and places each under the direction of a single rider. In \textit{Deuteronomy}, the horse and rider are both in the singular, signifying a horse and rider, not charioteer and chariot-team. Consequently, on the one hand, in order to provide continuity between his commentary here and the introductory passage, he expressly mentions again the two horses from the chariot team, high spirit and desire. On the other hand, in order to maintain the sense of the \textit{Deuteronomy} passage, he treats the two horses as separate, rather than yoked together as a team. Hence, he describes the foolish reasoning faculties as seated upon ‘each’ of the horses.

Philo further modifies the metaphor by shifting from treating high spirit and desire as two concrete parts of a tripartite soul as in the chariot metaphor, to presenting them as two examples of myriad passions. This too is a result of his reading of \textit{Deuteronomy}. The text mentions not only ‘a horse and rider’, but rather ‘a horse and rider \textit{and many people’}. Philo interprets ‘the many people’ to refer to other riders or reasoning faculties in addition to the two reasoning faculties riding high spirit and desire. However, rather than treating the other riders as also riding other instances of high spirit or desire, he instead takes each horse to be a different passion, each with its own rider. Philo erases any distinctions between a superior and inferior horse, as mentioned in his introductory section;\textsuperscript{65} all the enemy horses are equally bad. While this is certainly a significant move away from Plato’s chariot metaphor, it is not beyond the scope of Plato’s psychology. As discussed above, Plato had seen desire as composed of myriad distinct passions or desires. Hence, he could call it a many-headed beast in the \textit{Republic} or portray it as a bunch of desires in the belly clamouring for gratification in the \textit{Timaeus}. Nevertheless, as we will see in a moment, this erasure of the distinctions between the horses in fact signals the influence of a Stoic conception of the soul and passions. The juxtaposition of sage

\textsuperscript{64} Philo, \textit{Agr.} 78.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., \textit{Agr.} 73.
and fool, and the flattening of the two horses into the general category of horses, that is, the passions, all of which are more or less equally bad, move these Platonic ideas in the direction of Stoicism.

The Stoicizing direction of Philo’s transformation of the chariot metaphor becomes more apparent when we examine the details of another horseman/rider and horse variation – the Dan-biting-the-horse-heels allegory. On two occasions Philo relates the poetic prophecy in Gen. 49:17 about Dan, to the horseman/rider variation of the chariot metaphor.\(^\text{66}\) The Gen. text reads:

Let Dan become a serpent in the road (ὁδός), seated on the beaten track (τρίβος), biting the horse’s heel, and the horseman (ἱππεύς) shall fall backward (εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω), waiting for the salvation of the Lord.

As was his practice, Philo reads this text allegorically. He assigns each of the key terms a similar symbolic meaning, both in *Legum allegoriae* and in *De agricultura*. He identifies ‘the road’ in the first line of the Genesis poem with ‘the soul’ (ψυχή) and its ‘movements’ (κινήµατα), and ‘the beaten track’ with the well-trodden path of vice and passion.\(^\text{67}\) The serpent of Dan he likens to ‘endurance’ (καρτερία) or ‘temperance’ (σωφροσύνη). In *De agricultura*, he also compares the serpent of Dan to the brass serpent of Moses, which he says likewise symbolizes endurance and temperance.\(^\text{68}\) As such, for Philo, the serpent of Dan – temperance – opposes and cures another serpent, the serpent of the woman/Eve. This is the serpent from the garden that deceived Eve, which Philo understood to stand for pleasure.\(^\text{69}\)

Dan symbolizes the soul’s ‘judging faculty’ (κρίσις). This is ‘the faculty’ (δύναµις) in the soul that is able to distinguish among different types of existences that travel on the road or in the soul. In other words, it is able to distinguish between those movements of the soul that are lifeless, incomplete, diseased, enslaved, female, and sickly, in contrast to those that are living, whole, healthy, free, male,

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\(^{66}\) Ibid., 94-119; Philo, *Leg.* 2.94-102.

\(^{67}\) In Philo, *Agr.* 102-4. Philo identifies ‘the beaten track’ with life oriented toward indulgence in pleasure. The apparent difference is rather minor given the intimate connection for Philo between pleasure, passion, and vice.

\(^{68}\) Philo, *Agr.* 79-80, 95-8. We should note that Philo does discuss Moses’ brass serpent at length in the section immediately preceding the text under discussion. See Philo, *Leg.* 2.79-93.

\(^{69}\) Philo, *Agr.* 98-9, 106, 109; *Leg.* 2. 81, 84, 98, 106. For Platonic background, see Plato, *Leg.* 9.863b. Bréhier argues that the contest between the two serpents, especially in its form of two maidens at Sac. 20-36, is reminiscent of Xenophon’s fable of Hercules’ choice to follow the maidens, Virtue or Vice. In the fable, Vice offers every form of ease, luxury, and pleasure, but Virtue the path of labour (πόνος), and true happiness. É. Bréhier, *Philon d’Alexandrie* (1950), 265. Xen., *Mem.*, II 1.20-34.
and good.\textsuperscript{70} Philo then explains the significance of the symbols that follow in the remaining lines of the poem in \textit{Genesis}:

The passions are likened to a horse (τὰ πάθη δὲ ἵππω ὀπεικάσθη). For passion (τὸ πάθος), like a horse, is a four-legged (τετρασκελές) creature, impulsive (ὁρµητικὸς), full of wilfulness (αὐθάδεια), and naturally skittish (σκιρτητικὸς φύσει), but the principle of self-mastery (ὁ σωφροσύνης λόγος) loves to bite (δάκνω) and wound and destroy (ἀναιρεῖν) passion. When passion with its heel bitten has stumbled, ‘the horseman shall fall backwards (εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω)’. We must understand by the horseman (ἱππεύς) the mind (νοῦς) that is mounted on the passions, which falls off (ἀποπίπτω) the passions when they are brought to a reckoning (συλλογίζοµαι) and overthrown (πτερνίζω).\textsuperscript{71}

Having already established the symbolic identity of Dan, the serpent, the road, and the trodden path in the poem, Philo next explains the allegorical meaning of the horse and the horseman. Philo equates the horse with the passions.\textsuperscript{72} He describes it both in the plural (τὰ πάθη) and in the singular (τὸ πάθος); it is singular inasmuch as it refers to passion according to its genus, but plural when viewed in accordance with its several species. Philo adds that the passions, like a horse, are ‘four-footed’. This matches the classic Stoic classification of passion as a genus into four cardinal passions: fear, desire, pleasure, and grief. All the descriptive terms that follow, namely, that the horse is wilful, impulsive and skittish, correspond with Philo’s description of the horses in the chariot-metaphor above. In both cases the horse is described as ‘skittish’, and in a parallel description it is ‘unruly’ (τὸ ἄφηνιάζον).\textsuperscript{73}

Though we do not find an exact match for his description of the passion-horse as ‘wilful’ (αὐθάδεια) or ‘insolent’ (ὑπέραυχος) in the parallel text, it still fits Philo’s characterization of the chariot-horses as ‘stiff-necked’ (σκληραύχην) and deaf to the commands of the charioteer/ rider. Similarly, although he never describes the chariot-horses as ‘impulsive’ (ὁρµητικὸς), Philo clearly counts it as another synonym to his description of the horses as skittish (σκιρτητικὸς). In any case, the immoderate and unruly character of the passion-horse certainly fits a Stoic characterization of

\textsuperscript{70} Philo, \textit{Leg.} 2.97. Compare also Philo, \textit{Agr.} 95.

\textsuperscript{71} Philo, \textit{Leg.} 2.99.

\textsuperscript{72} Compare also Philo, \textit{Migr.} 62.

\textsuperscript{73} Philo, \textit{Migr.} 62.
passion, albeit not conclusively so inasmuch as the horse is still treated as separate from the mind and an alternative source of impulse.

Philo next identifies the horseman with the mind. Again he invokes the distinction between a horseman, who is skilled in ‘horsemanship’ (ἵππεύς), and ‘a rider’ (ἀναβάτης), who is not. He notes that since Moses called the rider ‘a horseman’, this type of mind is not ‘a passion-lover’ (φιλοπαθής) and does not wish to continue to ride the passion-horse. If such a soul correctly distinguishes by its judgment (Dan) the difference between what is beneficial and what is not, and so determines to be ‘a lover of temperance’ (σωφροσύνης ἐραστής), it will then employ the serpent of Dan, temperance, to bite the heel of the horse. The horseman then falls backwards from the passion-horse and awaits the salvation of the Lord. While Philo’s treatment of Dan retains the Platonic role of reason in overcoming the distinct agency of the horse, it ultimately leads to horselessness inasmuch as the horseman dismounts from the horse altogether.

Philo then puts into non-allegorical language his understanding of the significance for the soul of the rider falling backward (εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω) from the horse, and its subsequent overthrow (πτερνίζω). Here again we see the Stoicizing direction of Philo’s thought in this transformation of the chariot metaphor to the horseman/rider figure:

… if the mind, after starting out to do wrong (ὁρµήσας ὁ νοῦς ἀδικῆσαι), drops behind and falls backwards (πίπτω εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω), it will not do the wrong deed; and if, after moving toward an irrational passion (ἐπὶ πάθος κινηθεὶς ἄλογον), it does not follow it up (οὐ ἐπεκτρέχω), but stays behind (κατόπιν ἡνώ), it will reap the fairest reward, even freedom from passion (ἀπάθεια). This is why the prophet, understanding the falling backwards to be escape from the passions, adds the words, ‘waiting for the salvation of the Lord’, for he is indeed saved by God who falls away from the passions and comes short of realizing them in act (ὑστερίζων τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν) … This explains why Moses in the Song praised God, that ‘He cast horse and rider (ἵππος καὶ ἀναβάτης) into the sea’. He means that God cast to utter ruin and the bottomless

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74 Philo, Leg. 2.103-4.
75 Gen. 49.18 (LXX).
76 Ex. 15.1 (LXX).
abyss the four passions (τὰ τέσσαρα πάθη) and the wretched mind mounted on them (ὁ ἐπιστρεφόμενος αὐτοῖς ἀθλιὸς νοῦς) ... for if the soul be won by freedom from passion (ἐὰν ἀπάθεια κατάσχῃ τὴν ψυχήν), it will have perfect bliss (τελέως εὐδαιμονέω).77

According to Philo, the horseman – the mind that is oriented toward the acquisition of virtue – is riding passion because of its own initial impulse toward injustice. Hence, in the passage quoted above, the subject of the aorist active participle, ‘after starting out’ (ὁρᾶσας), is ‘the mind’ (νοῦς). This recalls the divergent explanation of the source/cause of passion between the Stoic and the Platonic/Aristotelian approaches to the passions outlined in the previous chapters, where the Stoics argued that the mind is the only source or cause of impulse and movement in the soul, but both Plato and Aristotle located the cause of the passions in other psychic powers ulterior to the mind. It differs from the Platonic explanation by location the origin of the movement toward doing a deed of injustice in the mind, which rather located it in the disobedience or rebellion of one of the horses, but also unlike Stoicism by still positing the existence of the horse or passion as an alternative to the mind. While this passage primarily signals a break from a Platonic approach to justice in the soul, when we couple this with his stress on the important role played by Dan, or ‘judgment’ (κρίσις), another Stoic technical term,78 in overcoming passion, it certainly points to Philo’s effort to introduce and integrate Stoic notions into the Platonic elements of his psychology by situating both within a larger narrative of the soul’s journey from fool to sage.

Philo next adds that even if the mind has already started to move the soul toward doing an unjust deed, the mind can still stop short of realizing the wrong act. Thus, one and same mind is responsible for both parts of the psychic movement, namely, setting the soul into motion and halting it. He uses a cluster of phrases to convey this later idea, including ‘to drop behind’ (ὑπέριζω), ‘to fall backwards’ (πίπτω εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω), ‘to not follow up’ (οὐ ἐπεκτρέχω), and ‘to fall off’ (ἀποπίπτω). All of these terms clearly reflect the biblical imagery in Gen. 49:17, but Philo’s point here follows from the logic of assigning responsibility to the mind for initiating an

77 Philo, Leg. 2.100-2.
78 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.111.
impulse: If the mind has the power to set an impulse into motion, it likewise has the power to bring it to a standstill.

As discussed above, Philo followed the Stoics in defining a passion as an immoderate and excessive impulse of the soul.\footnote{Philo, Spec. 4.79.} So, once the soul has launched into an inordinate motion, it will not be easy to quieten. Or, to return to Philo’s horseman/rider metaphor, if the passionate impulse is like a horse that is galloping uncontrollably, it requires the skill of horsemanship to slow it to a trot. Thus, Philo observes a few lines later that the horseman’s ‘work’ (ἐργον) is to ‘master’ (δαμάζω) and ‘bridle’ (ἐπιστόμιζω) his horse when it ‘is restive’ (ἀφηνιάζω). Philo then holds out the possibility that if the mind conquers the passion and ‘stays behind’ (κατόπιν μένω), which is to say, does not mount another passion/horse, it will reap as a reward the psychological states associated with the Stoic sage, namely, ‘apatheia’ or ‘freedom from passion’ (ἀπάθεια), freedom from soul sickness, and ‘perfect happiness’ (τελέως εὐδαιμονέω).\footnote{Philo, Leg. 2.100-2; Agr. 123.} Philo’s treatment of the horseman/rider metaphor with his strict contrast between the rider and horseman, his emphasis on the mind as the source of passion, and his moral ideal of apatheia, thus reflects a Stoicizing reinterpretation of the chariot metaphor into a three-stage journey of the soul from foolish rider, to horseman who has learned how to curb the passions, to a perfected sage that has quit passions altogether.

Transformation #2: The chariot metaphor and Philo’s journey of the soul

Philo integrated the chariot metaphor into a wider Platonic-inspired vision of the soul’s journey to wholeness and contemplation of the intelligibles,\footnote{C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 164-6; S. Sandmel, Philo (1979), 25, 84-8.} but one that is significantly modified by a Stoic outlook. The journey of the soul is one of the most pervasive themes in his corpus,\footnote{So likewise concludes Roskam. See G. Roskam, Path to Virtue (2005), 217.} and on a couple of occasions he relates this journey to the chariot metaphor.\footnote{Philo, Migr. 66-7; Leg. 3.114-59.} We will quote a passage from Philo’s De migratione Abrahami that nicely summarizes most of the important elements of his discussion, and supplement it with passages from Legum allegoriae where he discusses it in much greater detail:
‘Upon your breast and your belly (στήθος καὶ κοιλία) you shall go’ (Gen. 3:14), in the literal sense applies to the serpent (ὄφις), but is really a truly Divine oracle applying to every irrational (ἄλογος) and passion-loving (φιλοπαθής) man; for the breast (τὰ στέρνα) is the abode of fierce spirit (θυµός), and desire (ἐπιθυµία) dwells in the belly (κοιλία). The fool’s (ὁ ἄφρων) whole course through every moment of his journey depends on this pair, fierce spirit and desire; since he has got rid (ἀποβάλω) of mind (νοῦς), who is the charioteer (ἡνίοχος) and monitor (βραβεύς). The man of the opposite character (ὁ ἐναντίος τούτῳ) has excised (ἐκτέτηται) fierce spirit and desire, and chosen as his patron and controlling guide (κυβερνήτης) the Divine Word (λόγον θείον).

Even so Moses, best beloved of God, when offering the whole burnt sacrifices of the soul, will ‘wash out the belly (κοιλία)’ (Lev. 8:1), that is, will cleanse away desire in every shape (ὁλὸν τὸ ἐπιθυµίας εἶδος ἐκνίψεται), but ‘the breast (στήθυνιον) from the ram of consecration he will take away (ἀφαιρέω)’ (Lev. 8:29). This means, we may be sure, the warlike spirit (ὁ πολεµικὸς θυµός) in its completeness; and the object of taking it away is that the better portion of the soul, the rational part (τὸ λογικόν), that is left, may exercise its truly free and noble impulses (ὄρµαι) towards all things beautiful (πρὸς τὰ καλὰ πάντα), with nothing pulling against it (ἀντισπάω) any longer and dragging it in another direction (µεθέλκω).

In this passage, Philo sets into opposition two types of souls, in the strongest of terms. First he discusses ‘the fool’, then a man of ‘opposite character’, namely, Moses. The fool possesses fierce spirit and desire, but he has got rid of the mind. This recalls the metaphor discussed above of the horses removing the mind and taking over the chariot. Moses, on the other hand, exercises the rational part only; he has extirpated fierce anger and washed out every desire. For Philo, Moses functions as a sort of super-sage. It is as if the fool’s chariot comprises only the horses, without a charioteer, while Moses’ chariot has the charioteer, but no horses. The implications are clear: the fool is utterly irrational, since he has got rid of the mind, while the Moses-soul is utterly rational and free from all passion, since he has cut

84 Philo, Migr. 66-7.
off and cleansed anger and desire. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Philo describes
the fool as ‘an irrational and passion-loving man’, while he portrays Moses as a
passion-hater inasmuch as he has cut out and removed both passions.

Additionally, the two opposing types of soul follow different leaders. The fool
aimlessly goes wherever fierce anger and desire lead, since he has got rid of his
charioteer and monitor. There is no overarching direction or meaning to his life,
except for the fulfilment of the next desire, whatever it may be. In contrast, Moses is
led by the Divine Word, the source of all rationality in the cosmos, like a pilot of a
ship (κυβερνήτης). As such, his impulses are oriented only ‘toward beautiful things’
(πρὸς τὰ καλὰ πάντα). Consequently, the different characters of the souls’ impulses
also contrast, and are oriented in different directions – the fool toward the earth,
body, and pleasures of the body,85 the other toward heaven, the Divine Word, and
beautiful things (τὰ καλὰ)86. Since the fool is ruled by anger and desire, moreover,
his impulses as passions are by definition excessive and erratic. In contrast, Moses,
having removed both passions, exercises only impulses that are always noble and
free. Given that his impulses are under the guidance of the Divine Word, Philo’s
ascription of nobility to Moses’ impulses implies a certain moderation, orderliness,
and propriety in their movements.

The notion of treating entities of diverse character as different soul-types, in this
case the fool versus Moses, was not new. As noted earlier, Plato had already done
this in the Republic, where he sought to outline a five-part typology for individual
souls that mirrored the five kinds of city-states in the community – the aristocratic or
kingly, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical.87 Each of the five soul-
types reflects differing configurations of rule among Plato’s three parts of the soul.
The tyrannical soul, for instance, is dominated by the appetitive part, while the
kingly is properly ruled by the rational mind. While we might initially think that
Philo’s description of the fool and the Moses-soul corresponds to Plato’s highest and
lowest kinds of character, the tyrannical and the kingly, in fact the fit is poor. Unlike
Plato, Philo does not conceive of the fool and Moses-soul as consisting of all three
parts of the soul, but in alternative arrangements. Instead, he removes one or more
parts of the soul altogether for each of the soul-types. Whereas Plato’s tyrannical

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85 Ibid., 64-5.
86 Ibid., 64, 67, 70.
87 Plato, Resp. 8.544e-545c, 9.580b, 587c.
soul subordinates rational and spirited part to the appetitive, Philo removes the mind, leaving the spirited and appetitive parts to mindlessly direct the soul coordinately. Alternatively, while Plato arranged the parts of the kingly soul according to the ideal order of rational, then spirited, and finally appetitive, Philo’s Moses-soul comprises only the rational part. The spirited and appetitive parts have been cut off and washed away respectively. Additionally, the overall scheme for soul-types differs for each author. While Plato could certainly set the kingly and tyrannical soul-types in opposition to one another on occasion, his wider aim in the Republic was to show a progression from the kingly soul-type to the tyrannical, evenly distributed among the five classes. Philo, conversely, sets the fool and Moses-soul in sharp contrast to one another. He does put forward a third kind of soul-type that exists between those two, to which the chariot metaphor best corresponds, as we will see later. Nevertheless, the overall thrust of his discussion of soul-types differs from Plato’s. The emphasis in the text above and elsewhere is on the juxtaposition of the two, not, as in Plato, the progression from one end of the spectrum to the other.

Philo instead opted for a basic Stoic framework overlain with a body-soul dichotomy drawn from the Phaedo, wherein humankind is divided into ‘two classes’ (διττὸν εἶδος): the wise man who lives ‘by the divine spirit and reason’ (θείῳ πνεύματι λογισμῷ), and the fool, who lives by ‘blood’ (αἷµα), that is, ‘soul’ (ψυχή), with its irrational sense perception, impressions, and impulses, as well as the pleasure of the flesh, all of which are associated with the body and from which the wise soul withdraws as described in the Phaedo and discussed in greater detail above.88 The first resembles the ‘divine image’, but the second is ‘earthly’.89 As we have already noted in Philo’s text above, the Stoics had likewise juxtaposed two classes of souls, ‘the fool’ (ὁ φαυ̂λος) and the sage or ‘wise man’ (ὁ σοφός).90 They often expressed this juxtaposition in terms of the so-called ‘Stoic paradoxes’,91 vis-à-vis sayings like ‘only the sage possesses knowledge, everyone else is a fool’, or ‘only the sage is good, all others are evil’.92 These paradoxes underscore the basic

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88 Plato, Phd. 80d-81d; 82c-84b.
89 Philo, Her. 56-7.
90 Stob., Anth. II 7.11g.
91 For an exquisite example of Philo’s use of the Stoic paradoxes in his description of the sage, see Philo, Sobr. 56.
92 In fact, this Stoic paradox formed the basis of Philo’s Quod omnis probus liber sit, a book chock-full of the Stoic paradoxes. Roberts notes that ‘no single ancient source … offers a catalogue or count of all of the paradoxes’. Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum lists six: 1) virtue is the only good, 2) virtue is sufficient for happiness, 3) all vices and all virtuous actions are equal, 4) all fools are insane,
difference between the Stoic and Platonic mind-set in the Republic regarding the moral and spiritual life of the soul. Whereas Plato’s ideal for the kingly and tyrannical soul-type might approach the Stoic portrait of sage and fool in some ways, although with important differences, the Stoics posed a strict and absolute dichotomy between the two. Rather than present the distinction between the two kinds of soul as a gradual metamorphosis toward the kingly soul-type via philosophy, depending on their natural ability determined by their moral progress in a previous life, the Stoics instead positioned the sage and fool right next to one another in their ethical system. One is either a fool or a sage. Strictly speaking, there is no third option of one who is neither a fool nor a sage, or who is a mix of the two. Even when later Stoics such as Panaetius of Rhodes or Seneca did recognize a third soul-type, that is, ‘the one who is progressing’ (ὁ προκόπτων) toward perfect wisdom, this soul-type was still technically categorized among the vicious, even if they did recognize growth in virtue among the progressing souls. The Stoics were fond of pointing out that for a man submerged under the water, it makes no difference whether he is two inches or two miles below the surface, he is drowning in either case. Plato, by contrast, envisioned three intermediate stages between the kingly and tyrannical – the timocratic, oligarchic, and democratic soul-types – that not only represented genuine stages of evolution or devolution from the kingly to the tyrannical and vice versa, but also a mixing of the two. When we survey Philo’s soul-type scheme, we find that he too adopted the uncompromising Stoic bifurcation between fool and sage as his basic framework; his biblical patriarchs served as examples of the Stoic doctrine that a sage is ‘a law incarnate and made vocal’, but other biblical figures typified fools, and various types of progressing souls.

On one side of his scheme for the soul, Philo placed the fool. He employed a wide assortment of terms to describe those classed as fool, including, in order of

5) all fools are free, 6) and all fools are slaves. See E. Roberts, Philo, Paul, Stoic Paradox (2004), 14. Roberts adds that the paradox that the sage alone is king, though Stoic, was particularly prominent in Philo. See E. Roberts, Philo, Paul, Stoic Paradox (2004), 2.

94 Cic., Off. 1.46.
95 Sen., Lucil. 72.9-11. Bett points out that a greater attention devoted to moral progress was one of the features of the ‘later period of Stoicism’, which reflected its more practical orientation. See R. Bett, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (2006), 546. For further discussion and references, see also R. Sorabji, Ghandhi and the Stoics (2012), 116-7. Philo similarly reflects this growing emphasis. See C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 166.
97 S. Sandmel, Philo (1979), 48-9, 57.
importance to Philo: ‘bad man’ or ‘vicious man’ (ὁ φαύ̂λος), ‘fool’ (ὁ ἄφρων), ‘impious man’ (ὁ ἀσεβής), ‘unworthy one’ (ὁ ἄνάξιος), and ‘unrighteous man’ (ὁ ἄδικος). Rather than discuss the vicious soul in the abstract, although he was not averse to doing so at times, Philo instead often explicitly identified a constellation of biblical figures with the vicious soul, including Pharaoh, Esau, Cain, Laban, Balaam, Lamech, and Onan. Without necessarily denying their historicity, Philo associated these characters with what he called ‘temperaments’, ‘characteristics’, or ‘tendencies of the soul’ (ψυχῆς τρόπων). He did not equate each biblical character with the archetypal fool in every way; rather, he identified each with one or more aspects of a fool. By stressing certain elements in each fool’s character over others, Philo thus emphasized the overall confused, scattered, and variegated character of the bad man against the unified, stable, and consistent character of the sage. In other words, while what is true, beautiful, good, and pious is unified and coherent, as the Stoic doctrine of the oneness of the virtues had posited, that which is false, ugly, vicious, and impious is always ‘many and confused’ (πολλοὶ καὶ διαφέροντες) and focused on what is many, secondary, and created.

In the bullet-list below, we outline the ways in which Philo identified each of the biblical soul-types with various aspects of the fool soul-type, presented in order of relative importance to Philo. The variation in the characteristics among the fool

98 For an especially colourful description by Philo of the worthless man, see Philo, Abr. 20-1.
99 Philo, Leg. 3.13.
100 Philo, Sacr. 17; Congr. 59-61.
101 Philo, Det. 119.
102 Philo, Agr. 42.
103 Philo, Cher. 32-3.
104 Philo, Post. 75.
105 Ibid., 179-81.
106 Philo, Abr. 52, 88; Ebr. 144.
107 Philo, Abr. 17, 47-9, 52-4, 88, 147, 217-20; Gig. 60-7; Somn. 2.98; Spec. 4.114; Her. 81; Deus 112.
108 Philo, Migr. 153.
109 For further discussion of the unity or singleness of Stoic virtue, see R. Bett, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (2006), 533; M. Schofield, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (2003), 240, 247-8. For Philo, see Post. 129. Again, this Stoic approach to the unity of all virtue finds its inspiration in Socrates’ effort to show that virtue is a form of knowledge, and vice a form of ignorance, as argued in the Protagoras. See Plato, Prt. 324e-325a, 329c-d, 349b, 358c-360c. Philo likewise recognized virtue as single, of which the four cardinal virtues are species. He called it ‘generic virtue’ (ἡ γενικὴ ἀρετὴ) and allegorically identified it with the ‘tree of life’ (τὸ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς) and the river (in the singular) that flows from Eden at Gen. 2:9-10. See Philo, Leg. 1.59-65. Philo later identified ‘generic virtue’ with Abraham’s wife ‘Sarah’ after her name change from Sarai. See Philo, Cher. 5-8; Mut. 130, 148. Like the Stoics, Philo also asserted that to have one virtue is to have them all. Philo, Mos. 2.7.
110 Philo, Praem. 61; Spec. 1.327; Virt. 213.
soul-types themselves illustrates their ethical and psychological confusion. We will then amalgamate these facets into a single, composite depiction in order to illustrate the salient features of Philo’s fool soul-type:

- **Pharaoh**: Pharaoh served as the archetypal fool. Philo interpreted Pharaoh to mean ‘scatterer of noble things’ (ὁ σκεδαστής τῶν καλῶν) or simply ‘scattering’ (σκεδασμός or σκέδασις). Since Egypt represented the body, Philo, as the king of Egypt and foil to the archetypal sage Moses, symbolized body-oriented soul that scatters noble thoughts that relate to virtue and dissipates itself following the passions. Hence, Philo described him as ‘the lover of the body’ (φιλοσώματος), like Cain, ‘the lover of self’ (φιλωντος), ‘pleasure-loving’ (φιλήδονος), ‘the lover of passion’ (φιλοπαθής), and ‘proud’ (ὑπέραυχος), since he fancies himself to be a king. Additionally, as the biblical enemy to God’s people, one who said, ‘I know not the Lord’, Philo frequently depicted the Pharaoh-soul as the crowning example of ‘impiety’ (ἀσέβεια), that is both ‘atheistic’ (ἄθεος) and ‘hostile to God’ (ἀντίθεος). Pharaoh’s atheism takes the form of a rejection of the existence of God or Providence in favour of the worship or service of created things. On the surface, this description closely matches that of the Cain-soul below. The difference between the two, however – and it is only hinted at by Philo – is that ‘the atheism’ of the Pharaoh-soul takes the form of polytheism. Philo had already explicitly linked polytheism and atheism when he argued that polytheism ‘creates’ (κατασκευάζω) a type of atheism, since polytheists cease to honour God when they deify

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111 Philo, *Sacr.* 48, 69; *Somn.* 2.211; *Leg.* 3.12, 236, 243; *Her.* 60; *Det.* 95
114 Philo, *Abr.* 103.
115 Philo, *Cher.* 74; *Somn.* 2.219.
117 Philo, *Ebr.* 208-9; *Somn.* 2.277.
118 Philo, *Ebr.* 111; *Mos.* 1.88.
119 Ex. 5:2 (LXX). See Philo, *Ebr.* 19, 77; *Leg.* 3.12, 243; *Somn.* 2.182; *Mos.* 1.88.
120 Philo, *Mut.* 19; *Somn.* 2.182.
122 Philo, *Conf.* 88; *Congr.* 118; *Somn.* 2.183.
the mortal and created. Pharaoh’s atheism-as-polytheism consequently related to his status as the king of the literal Egypt, whose polytheism Philo singled out as embodying the greatest impiety among all the nations with its worship of idols and sacred beasts.

- **Esau:** Esau symbolized the foolish soul that is crafty in vice, because scripture described Esau as a great hunter. This sort of soul is ‘utterly senseless’ (πολλὴ ἀγνωσία or ἀφροσύνη), ‘irrational’ (ἄλογος), ‘rustic’ (ἀγροῖκος), and ‘untrained’ (ἀπαιδευσία) in relation to what is true and good. However, his ignorance and foolishness differs from stupidity or lack of mental prowess. As ‘a skilled hunter’, he could be quite inventive when practicing vice. Philo observed that Esau-souls take ‘folly’ (ἀνοια) as their counsellor and ‘make up’ their own truth about life and reality, a truth that is in fact ‘a myth’ and ‘fiction’. As a result, such souls become stiff-necked and disobedient to the guidance of right reason. Esau, as the symbolic father of a nation of vice, ultimately becomes the progenitor of Amelek or ‘passion’ through his son’s concubine Timna, since ‘the wicked man begets passion by his concubine.’

- **Cain:** Cain represented the vicious soul that is especially directed toward ‘self-love’ (φιλαυτος) and atheism, which Drummond argues Philo considered to be the ‘greatest evil, and the source of all evils’. As such, in contrast to Abel, who, as one who follows God, refers all that is best to God, the Cain-soul refers all things to itself. In contrast to the

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124 Ibid., 110; Philo, *Fug.* 114; *Praem.* 162; *Virt.* 212-4. At other times, Philo did not treat polytheism as a type of atheism. Rather, he distinguished the two as alternative species of impiety along with those who deny the incorporeal forms or potencies through which God created the world and those who forget God and ascribe to mind or senses the leadership and sovereignty of human affairs. Philo, *Spec.* 1.324-45. Nevertheless, all of these forms of impiety arrive at the same goal – the soul ignores the truly existent God and ascribes deity to some created thing. Philo, *Spec.* 1.344.

125 Philo, *Decal.* 76.

126 Philo, *Congr.* 175; *Ebr.* 9; *Migr.* 153; *Sacr.* 17; *Sobr.* 26; *Leg.* 3.2, 89.

127 *Gen.* 25:27 (LXX).

128 Philo, *Congr.* 61-2; *Fug.* 39, 42.

129 *Gen.* 36:12. Philo had argued that the ‘wicked man’ begets vice by his legitimate wife, but ‘passion’ by his concubine. He identified the soul as a whole, including the irrational parts, as the ‘legitimate wife’, and bodily nature as the ‘concubine’ and genesis of ‘passion’. Timna was the concubine of Esau’s son Eliphaz, who gave birth to Amelek. See Philo, *Congr.* 54, 59-60, 129.


132 Ibid., 51.
Pharaoh-soul’s polytheism-as-atheism, the Cain soul instead constructs a religious creed that excludes God or the gods altogether.\textsuperscript{133}

Philosophically, Philo linked the Cain-soul’s ‘impious and atheistic opinion’ with the Protagorean dictum that the human mind is the measure of all things.\textsuperscript{134} Since the secular world of pleasure, pain, and perpetual change is its only horizon, it consequently ends up experiencing the most painful of the four Stoic passions, ‘fear’ (φόβος) and ‘grief’ (λύπη). For such a life, evil is always either present, resulting in grief, or impending, giving rise to fear.\textsuperscript{135}

- **Laban**: Laban symbolized the vicious soul whose life is governed by sense perception and, by implication, agnosticism. His name means ‘variety of quality’ (ποιότης).\textsuperscript{136} As such, the Laban-soul focuses on ‘that which has quality’ (ὁ τῶν ποιοτήτων ἡρτημένος), rather than on ‘the nature that is without quality’ (τὴν ἄποιον φύσιν), namely, God.\textsuperscript{137} Outward objects of sense perception, whether things of the body or external to the body, serve as the highest good and chief end of life for the Laban-soul, while he ignores God or what benefits the soul or mind.\textsuperscript{138} Hence, Philo does not portray Laban as opposed to God so much as indifferent to Him. Inasmuch as Philo argued that the passions take their start from the experience of sense objects, he sometimes equated Laban with the passions themselves,\textsuperscript{139} though he elsewhere identified Amelek as the biblical symbol for ‘passion’.\textsuperscript{140}

- **Balaam**: Balaam represented sophistry, vanity, and illicit pathways toward religious knowledge found among fools. Sometimes, Philo referred to him as ‘a sophist’ (σοφιστής). This type of soul speaks eloquently about the life of virtue, but does not practice what it teaches.

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\textsuperscript{133} Philo, *Conf.* 122-8; *Post.* 51-3; *Sacr.* 2-3, 52; *Det.* 32, 48, 119. Compare also with Philo, *Leg.* 3.28-31. Ranocchia shows that Philo’s polemic against Cain’s impiety and atheism included a sharp rejection of the Epicurean doctrine of an autonomous God who does not interact with the world providentially or causally. Though this is not strict atheism, for Philo it effectively amounted to the same thing. G. Ranocchia, ‘Moses against the Egyptian’ (2008), 76-81.

\textsuperscript{134} Philo, *Post.* 35, 42.

\textsuperscript{135} Philo, *Det.* 119-20.

\textsuperscript{136} Philo, *Migr.* 28, 213.

\textsuperscript{137} Philo, *Cher.* 67; *Fug.* 8-9.

\textsuperscript{138} Philo, *Agr.* 42; *Ebr.* 46-50; *Leg.* 3.16, 20; *Det.* 4.

\textsuperscript{139} Philo, *Leg.* 3.19.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 186-7; Philo, *Migr.* 143; *Congr.* 55.
Instead, it gives itself over to the pursuit of pleasure and the rule of the passions. At other times, Balaam signified ‘vain people’ (μάταιον λαόν) that make their goal the vain pursuit of material gain. In either case, such a life is full of chaos and disturbance since it casts aside all virtue and lives instead in accordance with the unstable world of sense and body. Finally, Philo occasionally associated Balaam with the soul that deals in augury, prodigy, and divinization. Using all of these false paths to knowledge, it vainly tries to re-stamp God’s providence and defaces genuine heaven-sent prophecy in the process.

- **Lamech**: Lamech, a minor figure for Philo, signified the worthless man that deliberately chooses wicked ends with the hope that his evil plans will be executed easily. He illustrates the truism that the soul that strives for any one of the innumerable possible bad objectives always injures itself in the end.

- **Onan**: Another minor character for Philo, Onan symbolized the fool oriented to ‘self-love’ (φιλαυτία) and ‘the love of pleasure’ (φιληδονία). He represented those soul-types who pursue pleasure above all else.

When we examine Philo’s depictions of the vicious soul-types above, we find a wide variation in characteristics. The discordant and scattered quality of fools means that they wonder in numerous ‘pathless wilds’ (ἀνοδίαι), as opposed to adhering to the one, royal road of the sage. Hence, Pharaoh represents souls bent on polytheism, while Cain symbolizes the atheistic soul, Laban agnosticism, and Balaam superstition and magic. Similarly, while all soul-types are oriented downward to the endless variety of created, material things, each pursues different aspects of it. Hence, Philo identifies Pharaoh with the body, Laban with the senses or the passions in general, Onan with pleasure, and Balaam with the acquisition of that which is external to the body.

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141 Philo, *Post.* 86-7; *Det.* 71-74; Ishmael was also, on occasion, a type of the sophist for Philo, with a similar characterization as Balaam. See Philo, *Cher.* 8-10; *Sobr.* 9.


144 Ibid., 159.


146 Philo, *Det.* 50-1.

147 Philo, *Post.* 180-1; *Deus* 16-8.

At the same time, if we combine these characteristics into a single, composite portrait, we find that Philo’s fool answers to the contours of the classic depiction of the Stoic fool as morally vicious, godless, ignorant, unskilled in living, wretched, and sick, coupled with the strong body-soul dichotomy drawn from Plato’s *Phaedo*.\(^{149}\) Firstly, in all of the figures above, Philo followed the *Phaedo* in consistently describing the foolish mind of the bad soul as always oriented downward toward the body and earthly concerns, both of which are matters of indifference.\(^{150}\) This deviated from the Stoics, for whom all of existence is material and ‘earthly’. Philo uses a number of terms to describe the many forms of this orientation found among vicious souls. It may be ‘body-loving’ (φιλοσώματος), ‘passion-loving’ (φιλοσωμάτικος), ‘pleasure-loving’ (φιληδόνος), ‘full of wants’ (πολυδεής), \(^{152}\) ‘a money-lover’ (φιλάργυρος), \(^{153}\) or ‘a lover of honours’ (φιλόδοξος).\(^{154}\) Secondly, the fool lives a wicked life. We see this especially in his descriptions of Pharaoh, Cain, Lamech, and Onan. Throughout his corpus, Philo repeatedly connected the fool’s character to each of the four cardinal virtues, namely, foolishness, injustice, cowardice, and intemperance. Hence, he called the vicious soul ‘a hater of the good’ (μισόκαλος) and ‘an evil-lover’ (φιλοπόνηρος), though again each fool may practice one vice more than another.\(^{155}\) Thirdly, this, in turn, leads to various kinds of impiety in that the bad soul worships and exalts something in a shadowy created realm, and its own abilities, above the One who is truly real. As we can see in Pharaoh, Esau, Cain, and Balaam, this soul-type may worship many gods, explicitly reject the true God, practice superstition, or simply ignore God altogether. Hence, Philo called the fool ‘impious’ (ἀσεβής).\(^{156}\) Fourthly, Philo described the bad soul as ignorant. This characteristic is especially evident in the depictions of Esau and Balaam above. It can take many forms. The fool might look knowledgeable to the unwise, as in the case of the sophists; clever at devising

\(^{149}\) Diog. Laert., *Vit. phil.* 7.119; Stob., *Anth.* II 7.11g-i.
\(^{151}\) Philo, *Abr.* 103.
\(^{152}\) Philo, *Virt.* 9.
\(^{153}\) In Book 4 of the *Republic*, Plato had connected those souls that are led by the appetitive part with the merchant class of his city, both of which are later associated with the tyrannical soul in Book 9.
\(^{154}\) Philo, *Prob.* 21. This differs significantly from Plato, who associated the love of honour with the spirited part of the soul and with the soldier class in his ideal polis. The love of honour is not connected with Plato’s closest equivalent to the fool, his tyrannical soul.
\(^{155}\) Philo, *Abr.* 21.
\(^{156}\) Philo, *Post.* 34.
unjust strategies as in the case of Esau; accomplished in business as in the case of Balaam, or he might be quite uneducated. Whatever the case, as one who is ignorant, the fool’s ‘knowledge’ is in fact conjecture and opinion, insecure, and subject to shifting. Hence, Philo described the fool variously as ‘ignorant’ (ἀγνωστόν or ἀφροσύνη), ‘uneducated’ (ἀπαιδευτός), ‘unskilled’ (ἀνευτέχνης), and ‘irrational’ (ἄλογος). Finally, given its ignorance, orientation toward fleeting passions, especially pleasure, and the ever-changing world of sense, Philo characterized the fool’s soul as unstable, disordered, confused, and scattered.157 Consequently, every fool is by nature ‘a slave’ (δοῦλος),158 especially to pleasure, and his life is ‘wretched’ (κακοδαίμων, μοχθηρός),159 though according to external circumstance the fool might be a king or queen or a sage a slave.160

On the other side of his soul-type scheme, Philo opposed the sage to the fool. Contrary to the fool, whose depictions vary widely in detail, reflecting their fragmented and scattered existence, the virtues of Philo’s many sages coinhere as a single set of common attributes that is ‘essentially identical’ with the Stoic portrait of the sage.161 The Philonic sage is: metaphorically nobly born, rich, and king, free, glorious, harmonious, unbowed by circumstance, cosmopolite, the embodiment of virtue, a lover of solitude, though a lover of people, a follower of God or nature, and divine; the Philonic sage’s soul is a replica of heaven, contemplative, ordered, smooth, and consistent.162 Just as a diamond has many facets, so the sage’s many strengths are one, unified, and cohesive, even if we can distinguish many distinct features. Though Philo associated individual characteristics with each of his sage figures, these differences relate primarily to the pathway taken by each to attain perfection. Indeed, throughout his corpus Philo was fond of describing the path to full acquisition of wisdom in terms of the theme of ‘migration’ or ‘journey’ (μετανόια/ἀποικία). This was especially the case for the Abram/Abraham and Jacob/Israel figures, reflecting their many journey stories in Genesis. However, when we examine their descriptions after they have attained sagehood, we find that all the portrayals look remarkably uniform.

157 Philo, Abr. 83-4, 212; Congr. 58.
158 Philo, Leg. 3.89; Prob. 1.
159 Philo, Det. 119; Congr. 57.
160 Philo, Prob. 16-18.
162 Ibid., 815-21.
Philo utilized a variety of designations for the sage. These include, in descending order of importance, ‘the wise man’ (ὁ σοφός), ‘man of sound character’ (ὁ σπουδαῖος), ‘man of worth’ (ὁ ἀστεῖος), ‘perfect man’ (ὁ τέλειος), ‘worthy one’ (ὁ ἄξιος), ‘righteous man’ (ὁ δίκαιος), and ‘genuine philosopher’ (ὁ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἄνθρωπος). Among the Greek-speaking Stoics, Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic were cited as examples of a sage. Philo likewise cited Socrates as an example of a virtuous man and Diogenes the Cynic as an example of the freedom that a virtuous man possesses, but he preferred figures drawn from Torah as his standard models, including above all, Moses, Philo’s super-sage, then Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, a trichotomy of Platonic/Pythagorean inspiration, as well as minor figures such as the Levites, Caleb, and Enoch. Let us take a closer look at each of the biblical sage figures, beginning with the two that attained sagehood other than through progress – Moses, Philo’s favourite sage, and Isaac:

• Moses: Philo located Moses above all other sages as a sort of super-sage, though he could also model him on Plato’s philosopher-king, describing his education on the ideal curriculum outlined by Plato in the Republic. This is apparent first of all in the manner of Philo’s exegetical and apologetic project itself; namely, he expounds the Pentateuch only, the work of ‘Moses the great sage’, who is the prophetic vehicle of God’s revealed word’, who can as a ‘philosophos beat the famous Greek lawgivers’. Indeed, as Winston points out, ‘Moses would appear to transcend the virtually unattainable moral standard’ of

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163 Epic., Ench. 51.3 (Socrates); Diatr. 4.1.152 (Diogenes the Cynic); J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 40.
164 Philo, Prov. 2.21.
165 Philo, Prob. 98, 121-4.
166 Philo, Abr. 48-55; Det. 46. The Stoics acknowledged that their ideal Stoic sage was rare indeed. The Greek Stoics named Socrates, the legendary Heracles, and Diogenes the Cynic; the Roman Stoics added Cato the Younger. J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 39-41.
167 C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 165.
168 Philo, Plant. 62-4; Sacr. 119-27.
169 Philo, Mut. 123-4.
170 Ibid., 34-8.
172 Philo, Mos. 2.2. See also Mos. 1.148, 158, 334; Plato, Resp. 5.473c-d; L.H. Feldman, Philo’s Portrayal of Moses (2007), 282-7, 315, 363, 373, 375-6.
173 Philo, Mos. 1.23; Plato, Resp. 7.528e-530c. For further discussion and references, see L.H. Feldman, ‘Philo’s View of Moses’ Birth and Upbringing’ (2002) 261.
the Stoic sage.\textsuperscript{175} Arius Didymus, for instance, portrayed the Stoic sage as ‘particularly happy’ (εὐδαιμόνιον μάλιστα), ‘prosperous’ (εὐσεβής), ‘blessed’ (μακάριος), ‘fortunate’ (ὄλβιος), ‘pious’ (εὐσεβής), ‘loved by God’ (θεοφίλης), ‘meritorious’ (ἄξιωματικός), ‘kingly’ (βασιλικός), ‘fit for command’ (στρατηγικός), ‘political’ (πολιτικός), ‘good at managing the household’ (οἰκονομικός), and ‘making money’ (χρηματιστικός).\textsuperscript{176} Philo applied most of these standard descriptions of the Stoic sage to Moses.\textsuperscript{177} Like the Stoic sage, who has attained complete ‘freedom from all passions’ (ἀπάθεια),\textsuperscript{178} Moses comes to experience ‘perfect happiness’ (τελεως εὐδαιμόνης),\textsuperscript{179} since he has ‘cut off’ (ἐκτένω) and ‘washed away’ (πλύνω) the passions in their entirety so that only the ‘rational part’ (τὸ λογικὸν) remains,\textsuperscript{180} and destroyed ‘the wretched mind’ (ἄθλιος νοῦς) that rides upon the passions like horses.\textsuperscript{181} As a result, he must be truly ‘handsome’ (καλός), not only physically, but also since a sage possesses a perfect harmony of propositions and impulses in the mind.\textsuperscript{182} Moreover, like the Stoic sage, Philo described Moses as ‘blessed’ (μακάριος),\textsuperscript{183} ‘pious’ (εὐσεβής),\textsuperscript{184} ‘loved by God’ (θεοφίλης),\textsuperscript{185} and ‘meritorious’ (ἄξιωματικός).\textsuperscript{186} Though Philo never applied the terms ‘fit for command’ (στρατηγικός), ‘political’ (πολιτικός), ‘good at managing the household’ (οἰκονομικός), or ‘making money’ (χρηματιστικός) to Moses, he did attribute to him the ‘royal’ (βασίλειος), ‘legislative’ (νομοθετικός), and ‘priestly’ (ἱερώσυνος)
offices. While both explicitly recognized ‘the royal’ role for their sages, the Stoics could also described their sage as ‘a priest’ (ἱερεύς).\textsuperscript{188} Moreover, Philo’s ‘legislative’ role for Moses corresponds to the Stoics’ ‘political’ role, which included serving as magistrates, judges, and orators.\textsuperscript{189} Finally, though Philo never used the term ‘fortunate’ (δόλβιος), he did describe Moses as ‘prosperous’ (εὐτυχής). Just as the Stoics allowed for their sage to make money or become rich while pursuing public office if circumstances allowed,\textsuperscript{190} Philo likewise depicted Moses as someone who had been blessed with prosperity, though he too recognized it as a spurious good.\textsuperscript{191}

- Philo went still further, describing Moses as the greatest sage, who surpasses all other regular sages or philosophers, concluding his \textit{Life of Moses} in the same as Plato had in the \textit{Phaedo} with reference to Socrates,\textsuperscript{192} Unlike the other sages, Moses bides in the inner sanctuary, whereas the others remain in the outer court.\textsuperscript{193} Moses begins his course in training at the highest point of wisdom attained by Abraham.\textsuperscript{194} Philo counted Moses as the ‘holiest of all people yet born’\textsuperscript{195} and described him in the superlative as ‘the most holy Moses’ (ὁ ἱερώτατος Μωυσῆς),\textsuperscript{196} setting him above all other priests. This especially fit his role as the greatest prophet, which in turn formed the basis for placing the Jewish scriptures above those of any other religion. Similarly, Philo lionized Moses as the greatest of legislators, greater than the famed Greek legislators Solon and Lycurgus of Sparta. Moreover, Moses surpasses all the other sages in the biblical account, who are listed below.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{187} Philo, \textit{Agr.} 41-4, 50; \textit{Mos.} 2.2-7, 66.
\textsuperscript{188} Stob., \textit{Anth.} II 7.5b12.
\textsuperscript{189} Diog. Laert., \textit{Vit. phil.} 7.119, 121-3; Stob., \textit{Anth.} II 7.5b2, 11m, 11s.
\textsuperscript{190} Stob., \textit{Anth.} II 7.11m.
\textsuperscript{191} Philo, \textit{Mos.} 30-2.
\textsuperscript{192} Philo, \textit{Mos.} 2.292; Plato, \textit{Phd.} 118a.
\textsuperscript{194} Philo, \textit{Post.} 174.
\textsuperscript{195} Philo, \textit{Mos.} 2.192.
\textsuperscript{196} Philo, \textit{Det.} 135; \textit{Deus} 140.
\textsuperscript{197} Philo, \textit{Leg.} 3.131; see also Philo, \textit{Post.} 173; \textit{Sacr.} 5-10; \textit{Leg.} 2.87-93, 3.140, 144, 147.
• Yet Philo went even further, and portrayed Moses as one who ‘transcends’ even the ideal of the Stoic sage.  

Firstly, unlike the Stoics who were not at all ascetic, Philo described a demanding ascetic ideal for Moses. This is probably rooted in Philo’s Platonic body-soul dualism inspired by the *Phaedo* discussed above. Since he lives only for the soul and not for the body, Moses eschews both pleasure and prosperity. Though Moses only allowed to the body those pleasures appointed by nature, which was also true of the Stoic sage, he sometimes scorned even necessary pleasures in super-human fashion. In support of this, Philo refers to the biblical witness that Moses did not eat or drink for forty days. Instead he lived only on ‘the heavenly foods’ (οὐράνιοι αἱ τροφαι) of knowledge in its various forms. Here indeed, Moses ‘transcends’ the Stoic sage in Platonic manner in his disdain for anything bodily or external to the body, eschewing even necessary food and drink. Moreover, he is not merely ‘loved by God’ (θεοφιλής), but ‘most beloved of God’ (τελειότατος). He is loved to such a degree that the Existent One addresses to him alone the promise, ‘but as for you, stand here by Me’. Philo interprets this to mean that Moses’ transcendence is so great that the Existent One translated Moses into His own presence, even beyond the Platonic incorporeal realm of the ideas and genus. Philo connects his apatheiac ideal for the sage with the Pythagorean-Platonic noetic quest for the divine, but then ‘transcends’ that too. His description of Moses’ translation to the Existent One draws upon Plato’s vision in the *Phaedrus* of the erotic flight of the unembodied soul back to the gods where it can once again gaze directly upon the Ideas of Justice, Temperance, Knowledge and, above all, the

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199 Stob., *Anth.* II 7.11g.
201 Philo, *Leg.* 3.142, 161-2, 179; *Ex.* 34:28 (LXX).
202 Compare Plato, *Phd.* 64e, 65d, 67c-d, 68c-d, 80e, 82c.
203 Philo, *Ebr.* 94.
204 *Deut.* 5:31 (LXX).
205 Philo, *Sacr.* 8-10; *Leg.* 3.100-1.
206 I employ the adjective ‘apatheiac’ here rather than the more correct English term ‘apathetic’, to avoid the misleading connotations associated with ‘apathetic’.
Beautiful that are located beyond the heavens.\(^\text{207}\) However, whereas the consummate experience for gods and unembodied souls in the *Phaedrus* is to see the ideas, Moses goes *beyond* the realm of ideas to stand in the presence of the ineffable One Himself. As a result, just as the Existent One is not subject to addition or diminution in his fullness, immutability, perfection, and happiness,\(^\text{208}\) so also nothing can be ‘added’ (πρόσθεσιν) to Moses nor is there any more room for further spiritual advance.\(^\text{209}\) Since his mind is ‘more perfect’ (τελεώτερος) and ‘more thoroughly cleansed’ (κεκαθαρµένος νοῦς) than any other,\(^\text{210}\) the Existent One has made him ‘a sharer’ (µεταδίδωσιν) in the unchanging ‘repose’ or ‘rest’ (ἡρεµία) of his nature,\(^\text{211}\) with the result that Moses’ mind and judgment are firmly established, free from the possibility of the tumult of passion, experiencing only joy. As a result, Moses now lives in a supreme and perfect happiness’ (τῆς ἄκρας καὶ τελείας εὐδαιµονίας).\(^\text{212}\) Hence, as Winston observed, ‘the Mosiac mind is accordingly the closest possible approximation to the Divine Mind’.\(^\text{213}\)

- **Isaac:** Isaac symbolized the sage that attained perfection without progress, acquiring virtue by nature. While Isaac, whose name means ‘laughter’ (γέλως),\(^\text{214}\) could signify either ‘self-taught wisdom’ (ἡ αὐτοµαθὴ σοφία)\(^\text{215}\) or the *eupatheia* of ‘joy’ (χαρά) itself,\(^\text{216}\) he often symbolized those souls who have acquired virtue ‘by nature’ (ἐκ φύσεως) without the agency of another.\(^\text{217}\) Philo described the Isaac soul-type as ‘one who drew for himself from the well of knowledge, listening to no other, learning from no other, and without the aid of another’ (τὸν αὐτηκόου καὶ αὐτοµαθοῦς καὶ αὐτοµυγοῦ τῆς ἑπιστήµης ἄρωσάµενον) because God has ‘rained down’ from heaven the gifts of self-learning and

\(^{207}\) Plato, *Phdr.* 246d-247e, 250b-e.
\(^{208}\) Philo, *Abr.* 202; *Cher.* 86.
\(^{209}\) Philo, *Sacr.* 8-10;
\(^{210}\) Philo, *Leg.* 3.100.
\(^{211}\) Philo, *Gig.* 49; *Post.* 28-31; *Deus* 23-6; For God’s ‘rest’, see Philo, *Cher.* 86-90.
\(^{212}\) Philo, *Conf.* 31-2; *Somn.* 2.227-30, 2.235-7.
\(^{214}\) Philo, *Abr.* 201; *Mut.* 131, 157; *Plant.* 169; *Praem.* 31; *Leg.* 1.82; *Det.* 124.
\(^{215}\) Philo, *Det.* 30; *Deus* 4.
\(^{216}\) Philo, *Abr.* 201-2; *Cher.* 8, 106; *Mut.* 131; *Praem.* 31-2; *Leg.* 3.43; *Det.* 60, 123-4, 134.
\(^{217}\) Philo, *Abr.* 52; *Cher.* 8; *Somn.* 1.167; *Mos.* 1.76; *Det.* 46.
Now that this soul-type possesses the fullness of God’s gifts, it experiences joy.

Now we turn to biblical figures that attained sagehood through progress:

- **Abraham:** Abraham represented the sage that gained perfection ‘through instruction’ (ἐκ διδασκαλίας) or ‘by learning’ (μαθήματι).219 After pursuing wisdom as Abram through ‘the study first of nature’ (φυσιολογία) and then of ‘ethical philosophy’ (πρὸς τὴν ἱθηκὴν φύλοσοφίαν), he finally attained perfection and was renamed Abraham by God.220 Abraham thus acquired knowledge of the Creator and gained the virtue of ‘piety’ (εὐσέβεια) through study. As a sage,221 this soul-type now treads the royal road of wisdom without swerving either to the left or to the right,222 and finally attains perfection.223

- **Israel:** Based on Philo’s understanding of the etymology of Israel as ‘the one who sees God’ (ὁ θεὸν ὄρθων),224 derived from Gen. 32:31, Israel could represent the sage that has attained perfection through training or practice. After achieving victory in his struggle against the passions by means of training, Jacob became Israel,225 as a gift of God to His

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218 Philo, *Plant.* 168; *Sobr.* 65; *Sonn.* 1.168. In addition, the Isaac-soul is described as αὐτοδιδάκτος in Philo, *Congr.* 36; *Fug.* 167; *Migr.* 29; *Mut.* 88; *Post.* 78; *Sonn.* 1.160.

219 Philo, *Abr.* 52, 69; *Congr.* 35; *Mut.* 12; *Sonn.* 1.160, 167-8; *Mos.* 1.76.

220 Following the Stoics, Philo likewise divided philosophy into three parts: the physical (τὸ φυσικὸν), the logical (τὸ λογικὸν), and the ethical (τὸ θηκὸν). To illustrate, he often likened nature study to a field, with the logical serving as a fence or wall and the ethical the fruit produced by the field. See Philo, *Agr.* 14-6; *Ebr.* 202; *Mut.* 73-5; *Leg.* 1.57. For the Stoics’ use of this division, see Diog. Laert., *Vit. phil.* 7.40.

221 Philo, *Sonn.* 2.243-4; *Abr.* 175.

222 Philo, *Cher.* 10; *Gig.* 64; *Abr.* 81-3; *Mut.* 69-76; *Sacr.* 5; *Deus* 4.

223 Philo, *Her.* 46; *Abr.* 52, 83, 170, 275. Though clearly identified as a sage and perfect, Winston suggests that Abraham did not attain apatheia on the basis of *Det.* 46, where Philo acclaimed Isaac as the ‘only example of freedom of passion under the sun’. This patently is not Philo’s view elsewhere; his ‘super sage’ Moses has clearly attained apatheia at the least. Moreover, at *Abr.* 275, after praising the Abraham sage for his possession of the queen of the virtues, faith in the Existent One, he concludes by observing that ‘unwritten nature gave him the zeal to follow [nature] where wholesome and untainted impulse led him’. To speak of ‘wholesome and untainted impulses’ (ὀφιλέσιον καὶ ἀνόσος ὀρμή) is, in the Stoic account, another way of speaking of apatheiac impulses. With regard to *Det.* 46, Philo here may have in mind, rather, soul-types that are apatheiac from the beginning. Philo describes Isaac as sage by nature, not by progression as is the case with Jacob or Abraham. See D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 220.

224 Conf. 56, 147; *Plant.* 58-60; *Post.* 63; *Sonn.* 1. 129, 171, 2.173; *Leg.* 3.186; *Her.* 78. For further discussion, see E. Birnbaum, *The Place of Judaism in Philo’s Thought: Israel, Jews, and Proselytes* (1996), 61-127.

225 Philo, *Ebr.* 67-72, 82-3, 94; *Fug.* 88-9; *Plant.* 63-8; *Sacr.* 119-20, 129; *Sonn.* 2.34, 273. Philo also cited Levi as an example of those who attain to perfection by making progress in virtue. For example, while Reuben, ‘the man of natural gifts, is the first-born of Jacob, the Levi soul-type (ὁ εὐίτης τρόπος) is the first-born of Israel.
suppliants. By this Philo means that the Israel-soul, having cast off all the passions through ascetic training, is now able to intellectually apprehend the truth both that God exists and that He is the maker of all things by means of His powers. As a result, he accords God genuine devotion and honour. Israel’s apprehension of God or the Existent One falls short of direct vision. No one, not even the wise, is able to see ‘the essence’ (οὐσία) of ‘the Existent One’ Himself, since He is the invisible, inapprehensible ‘God of real being’ (ὁ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι θεός), who transcends all things, including His powers. Hence, when Philo says that the Existent One is ‘visible’ (τὸ ὄρατὸν εἶναι τὸ ὄν) to Israel, he understands scripture to be referring to each of the powers (God, Lord, Reason, etc.) that follow behind and attend to the Existent One. Paradoxically, the Israel-soul’s vision resides precisely in his ability ‘to comprehend that [the Existent One] is incomprehensible’ (καταλαβεῖν ἃτι ἀκατάληπτος) and ‘to see that he is incapable of being seen’ (ἰδεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀόρατος).

Finally, Philo identified three minor figures, all of whom had attained sagehood through progress, though he did not identify the specific pathway for each figure. Each, however, highlights key aspects of the sage that correspond with their narrative role in scripture:

- **Levites:** The Levites symbolized the sage’s pious worship and service to God. For Philo, the Levite represents ‘mind that has been perfectly cleansed and purified’ (ὁ τελεῖως ἐκκεκαθαρµένος νοῦς). It has renounced all that pertains to what is dear to the flesh and senses and all that belongs to the world. Instead, it devotes itself unhampered to the things of the noetic world and to the only Uncreate God and Cause of all things. It represents the sage’s habit of ‘service’ (θεραπεία) to God that is the special provenance of the wise, whose existence serves as a ransom.

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226 Philo, *Mut.* 81-2; *Praem.* 43-6; C. Termini, ‘Philo’s Thought within Middle Judaism’ (2009), 123.
227 Philo, *Plant.* 60.
228 Philo, *Post.* 14-21, 166-9; *Sacr.* 134.
for the fools. As such, this soul-type receives from God the great prizes of ‘peace’ (εἰρήνη) and ‘priesthood’ (ἱερωσύνη).

- **Caleb:** Caleb signified the perfect repentance (μετάνοια) of those sages who attained perfection via progress. Philo interpreted ‘Caleb’ to mean ‘all heart’. Though once a fool, this soul-type makes a complete conversion to the life of wisdom. As such, it does not waver or oscillate in its change, but rather converts entire soul to a supreme perfection.

- **Enoch:** Enoch occasionally symbolized the sage who ‘pleases’ (εὐαρεστέω) God. These souls have persevered in their repentance and have chosen an extreme ascetic life that finally dissolves the earthly element in them so that they have ‘become [like] unembodied minds’ (ἀσώµατοι διάνουσι κεφανότες), fixing their purpose on only pleasing God. As a result, God translates such souls from mortality to immortality and from progress to perfection.

When we examine Philo’s portraits of the sage soul-types above, we find that in contrast to the fool, whose common features overlay an underlying anarchy and plurality, the sage’s superficial differences coalesce in a set of features shared by all, centred on what Philo described as ‘knowledge of the monarchical principle’ (ἡ περὶ µοναρχίας ἐπιστήµη). The sage puts his trust in nothing created, which is by definition multiple, secondary, and at root, polytheistic. Instead, he trusts only in the One Cause, who is ‘the One, the Primal, the Uncreated and Maker of all’.

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230 Philo, Sacr. 119-20.
231 Philo, Ebr. 74.
232 See Philo, Virt. 180 for Philo’s connection between repentance and the soul’s progress.
233 Philo, Mut. 124.
234 Roskam treats Enoch as a member of the first triad that never reaches perfection, though he acknowledges that Enoch is ‘sometimes even presented as an example of a sage’. See G. Roskam, Path to Virtue (2005), 170.
235 Philo, Mut. 34-8.
236 Philo, Virt. 220; Termini suggests that this identification of God with a monarchical principle may have had for its model the Eastern monarchies. See C. Termini, ‘Philo’s Thought within Middle Judaism’ (2009), 98.
237 Philo, Virt. 213-8; Bonazzi attributes this turn toward philosophical monism to Eudorus, who exhibited a ‘Pythagoreanizing Platonism interested in Aristotle’. In Eudorus’ Neo-Pythagorean ‘doctrine of three principles’, the transcendent principle of ‘the One’, which is identified with God, is placed above the cosmological principles of Monad and Dyad, reversing Plato’s exaltation of the forms above the Demiurge. See M. Bonazzi, ‘Eudorus of Alexandria’ (2007), 367-71; M. Bonazzi, ‘Towards Transcendence’ (2008), 234-44. See also R.M. Berchman, From Philo to Origen (1984), 28-31. Philo does not offer so clear a formulation in his writings, though he comes close in his theory of the ‘Logos-cutter’ at Philo, Her. 133-229. See also E.R. Goodenough, Introduction to Philo (1940), 140-1; R. Radice, ‘Philo’s Theology and Theory of Creation’ (2009), 139. Philo, however, goes one step further and accounts God beyond even Eudorus’ ‘the One’. See Philo, Contempl. 2;
the soul establishes this virtue of faith, it gains with it all of the other virtues and characteristics that make up Philo’s sage. These characteristics, moreover, correspond to several of the basic contours of the Stoic sage as morally virtuous, godly, knowledgeable, skilled in living, happy, and healthy, but with a strong body-soul, material-immaterial Platonic overlay drawn especially from Plato’s *Phaedo*. Firstly, for all of the biblical figures above, Philo consistently described in Platonic manner the mind of the sagacious soul as oriented upward toward the incorporeal, noetic, and divine realm. The God-loving sage casts its vision away from the body and external objects and instead fixes its sights on the ordinances of virtue under the guidance of right reason. As a result, the sage is a person of ‘few wants’ (ὀλιγοδεής). Philo noted that the sage does have some wants because his body is mortal and requires certain basic necessities to live, such as food, water, and clothing. At the same time, because his soul desires immortality like the Enoch-soul above, he does not have countless needs like the fool, who is driven like Tantalus to satisfy his passionate desires. This strong ascetic impulse and quest for immortality reflected the *Phaedo*’s emphasis on despising the body and material and instead seeking rather the immaterial, noetic, and invisible, in opposition to the Stoic materialism, which vehemently rejected Platonic ideas or forms as nothing, in no way affirmed such strong asceticism, nor held out the possibility of immortality, even for the sage as noted above. Secondly, the sage lives an utterly virtuous life. The Abraham, Isaac, and Moses soul-types especially stress this aspect of sagehood. Philo thus called the sage ‘one who loves virtue’ (φιλάρετος), ‘loves goodness’ (φιλάγαθος), and ‘hates evil’ (μισοπόνηρος). Thirdly, in both the

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*Praem.* 40; D.T. Runia, ‘Rehabilitation of the Jackdaw’ (2007); Bréhier sees the combination of a transcendent, primordial ‘One’, metaphysical arithmetic, and ascetic ethics as a form of Neo-Pythagoreanism frequently found in the works of Philo. See E. Bréhier, *History of Philosophy* (1961), 171-2. Termini states that the oneness of God was an unalterable affirmation in all of ‘Middle Judaism’. At the same time, many Jews were prepared to see in the best of Greek philosophical teachings an opportunity for rapprochement, especially when both recognized one supreme principle upon which all depends. The *Letter of Aristeas* even went so far as to suggest that Zeus and the Jewish God are one and the same. *Aristeae* 16; C. Termini, ‘Philo’s Thought within Middle Judaism’ (2009), 97. In Philo we see this dual emphasis on the Jewish oneness of God and rapprochement with Greek philosophical principles.

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238 Galen, *Plac.* V 9.2; Cic., *Fin.* 3.75-6; Sen., *Lucil.* 75. Stob., *Anth.* II 7.5b8-5b12, 7.11g.
239 Compare to Plato, *Phd.* 65e, 66a, e, 67e-68a, 79d, 80d-81a.
242 Plato, *Phd.* 63c, e, 64d-67a; 82c-84b.
243 For further discussion of the deflation or rejection of Plato’s Forms, Ideas, or universals by the Stoics, see R. Sorabji, ‘Universals Transformed’(2006), 105-8.
244 Philo, *Mos.* 2.9.
Levitical and Abrahamic soul-types, Philo emphasized the godliness of the sage, describing this soul-type as ‘a God-lover’ (φιλόθεος)\textsuperscript{245} and ‘pious’ (εὐσέβεια). It is the only kind of soul that can offer legitimate ‘service’ (θεραπεία) as a priest to God. Philo’s sages, however, contrast sharply with the Stoic ideal of virtue as an achievement of one’s own, an idea that he associated with the foolish Cain-soul. Instead, his sages attain to virtue by divine aid in conjunction with their pious reliance on God.\textsuperscript{246} Fourthly, the sage possesses ‘knowledge’ (ἐπίστηµος) and ‘skill’ (τέχνη) in living.\textsuperscript{247} Philo hinted at this notion in his description of the Abraham-soul as one who ascends from knowledge of nature to knowledge of God through instruction and learning. He made it explicit in his descriptions of Israel as the one who sees the incomprehensible God and Moses as the soul-type that is stationed next to God. Finally, given the attributes outlined thus far, Philo characterized the sage’s disposition as ‘stable’ (βέβαιος) and at ‘peace’ (εἰρήνη). This answers especially to his description of the Caleb-soul as one who turns to God with its whole heart without wavering, and of Moses’ firm and undisturbed mind. As such, the sage lacks nothing in his embrace of God and virtue; instead he always aims at the right moral end and reaches it. Moreover, the impulses and actions of his soul are ‘perfect’ (τέλειος) and smooth, never erratic or immoderate. Consequently, every sage is ‘free’ (ἐλεύθερος)\textsuperscript{248} and his life ‘happy’ (εὐδαιµονία).

In general, Philo’s depiction as outlined above matches many of the contours of the Stoic ideal for both the fool and the sage, with the exception of the sage’s strong asceticism, his ascent to the Platonic noetic sphere, both of which are inspired especially by the \textit{Phaedo}, and his rejection of Stoic self-achievement of virtue. The view that the philosophic soul ascends from the material realm of shadows to the noetic realm of the forms in its quest to comprehend reality reflects the influence of Plato, dramatically set forth in the \textit{Phaedo}, but outlined in with more nuanced detail in his allegory of the cave in book seven of the \textit{Republic}. The Stoics, in contrast, were much more materialistic in their physics and empiricist in their epistemology.\textsuperscript{249} The Stoic sage possessed perfect knowledge and skill anchored in a

\textsuperscript{245} Philo, \textit{Her.} 82-3.
\textsuperscript{247} Philo, \textit{Agr.} 71. For Bréhier’s argument that Philo held to the Stoic doctrine of the indestructability of the knowledge of his sages, see É. Bréhier, \textit{Philon d’Alexandrie} (1950), 257-9.
\textsuperscript{248} Philo, \textit{Leg.} 3.89; \textit{Prob.} 1.
\textsuperscript{249} J. Annas, \textit{Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind} (1992), 86.
firm grasp of sensory impressions. The sage certainly did possess ‘notions’ (νόησις) or ‘general concepts’ (ἔννοια) about incorporeals that in a sense corresponded to Plato’s ideas, but these always remained rooted in the material and sensory experience itself. The ultimate reality that the Stoic sage grasped was material. This fundamentally contrasted with the Platonic notion that the intelligible realm of ideas and forms is what is most real, while the sensory and material is illusory and shadowy. In the Platonic system, the soul must take leave of the material to gain a conception of what is true, even if it takes its start from the material copy to begin its climb to the archetypes. To this, Philo added the fundamental religious conviction that even the sage cannot succeed in his quest without the God’s help. Consequently, while Philo’s depiction of the sage and fool structurally reflects the rigid dualism of the Stoic ethical system, he nevertheless simultaneously fused it with a Platonic conception of the ascending philosophic soul, and a Jewish piety that relied on God’s aid to attain to virtue and the vision of God.

We are now in a position to understand what Philo means in the passage from his De migratione Abrahami quoted above, where he says that the Moses-soul cuts out fierce spirit and desire, while the fool gets rid of the mind. In contrast to the fool, who ‘throws out’ (ἀποβάλων) the mind, the sage has chosen as his patron-guide the Divine Word. For Philo, the sage does not merely possess a mind while the fool rids himself of it. Rather, the Moses-sage possesses a mind that follows the Divine Word, the very archetype and guide of the sensible cosmos. By emphasizing the connection between the mind of the Moses-soul and the Divine Word, Philo thus stresses its rationality. Thus, the Moses-soul ‘cut out’ (ἐκτέτησαν) anger and desire, which are the irrational parts of the soul, with the result that only ‘the rational part’ (τὸ λογικόν) remains. He then further underscores the Moses-soul’s perfect rationality by observing that all of its impulses are ‘truly free’ and do not experience anything pulling in the opposite direction.

In contrast, in describing the fool as removing its mind, Philo is emphasizing the fool’s irrationality. Certainly, Philo explicitly calls the fool ‘irrational’ and ‘passion-loving’. However, the fool’s irrationality needs further definition. By lopping off the mind, is the soul now irrational in the sense that its impulses and actions oppose right reason and the Divine Word, and instead it wilfully follows the lead of its

250 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.51-4.
Platonic two horses, wrath (θυμός) and desire (ἐπιθυμία)? The fool’s removal of its charioteer and the mind does not mean that it is left mindless or non-rational, as if it had experienced a lobotomy! Instead, as we discussed previously in the section regarding Philo’s distinction between the horseman and rider, the foolish soul exchanges one sort of mind for another. Rather than having a mind that guides and directs the horses, as in the case of the horseman, it is passively carried wherever the careening horse takes it.

Philo’s meaning is made yet clearer, moreover, when we note that he went further and made the dichotomy between the two soul-types absolute and strict. Not only is the mind of the Moses-soul or the fool rational or irrational, but it is completely or absolutely so. Note Philo’s consistent use of totalizing language in De immigratione Abrahami 66-7:

- ‘…the whole course through every moment’ (ἀεὶ μηδένα διαλείπων χρόνον) of the fool’s journey is dependent on wrath (θυμός) and desire (ἐπιθυμία)
- Gen. 3:14 applies to ‘every irrational and passion-loving man’ (ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀλόγου καὶ φιλοπαθοῦς ἀνθρώπου)
- The fool completely removes the head [implicit]
- Moses ‘offers whole burnt sacrifices of the soul’ (τὰς ὅλοκαύτους τῆς ψυχῆς ἱερουργῇ)
- Moses cleanses away ‘every desire in every shape’ (ὅλον τὸ ἐπιθυμίας εἶδος ἐκνίψεται)
- Moses cuts away ‘the warlike spirit in its completeness’ (ἀφελεῖ… σύμπαντα τὸν πολεμικὸν θυμόν)
- ‘…nothing’ (μηδενός) pulls against the mind of the sage

As we have already noted, the dualist and opposing structure of Philo’s soul scheme already reflects a Stoic framework. To that we can add that Plato never envisioned his philosophical or kingly soul-type as removing the two horses. These irrational parts are permanent and distinct parts of the soul. Conversely, in the case of the tyrannical soul, the large desire-drone dominates the mind. Nevertheless, the rational
part of the soul remains, even if it is subservient to desire. Hence, for Plato, the
distinction between his soul-types is always a matter of degree.

As we can see from the observations above, however, Philo opposed the two
soul-types categorically. This dichotomizing language in turn helps us to elucidate
what Philo means when he describes the removal of the horses or of the charioteer.
These excessive, disorderly impulses, which Philo identifies with the two Platonic
horses of desire and wrath, are ultimately none other than impulses of the mind itself
responding to tugs and pulls of the pleasures of the belly that tempt and deceive it.
In other words, Philo is saying that the fool and the sage represent two orientations
of the mind, which initiate two contrary types of impulses in the soul. In the case of
the sage, his mental impulses are always orderly, moderate, and in accord with right
reason and nature, while in the case of the fool, his mental impulses are disorderly,
excessive, and opposed to right reason. In the context of Plato’s chariot metaphor,
the mental impulses in the fool are, by definition, the two horses, wrath and desire,
which Philo had also identified in the text leading up to Migr 66-7 as a single horse
of ‘passion’ (τὸ πάθος) or alternatively as the Stoic four cardinal passions of
pleasure, desire, grief, and fear (ἡδονή, ἐπιθυμία, λύπη, φόβος). Consequently, the
perfected Moses-soul has attained what Philo, in the parallel passage from Legum
allegoriae, calls apatheia, or ‘freedom from all passion’ (συνόλως ἀπάθειαν), whereas by contrast he calls the fool ‘passion-loving’ (φιλοπαθής).

Charioteering as metriopatheia: The case of Aaron, the progressing soul

Finally, in the parallel passage from Legum allegoriae, Philo offers an extended
discussion of the chariot metaphor in relation to the soul’s spiritual and moral
journey. In this case, however, he introduces a third soul-type – the Aaron-soul:

God assigned to the wise man a share of surpassing excellence, even the
power to cut out the passions (τὸ ἐκτέμινεν τὰ πάθη δύνασθαι). You
observe how the perfect man (ὁ τέλειος) always makes perfect freedom
from passion (τελεία ἀπάθεια) his study. But Aaron, the man who is
making gradual progress (ὁ προκόπτων), holding a lower position
(ὁ ἐντέρος ὄν) [than Moses], practices moderation (ἀσκέω

251 Philo, Migr. 62.
252 Ibid., 60.
253 Philo, Leg. 138-59.
φρονήματα), as I have said; for his power does not go so far
(ἀδυνατέω) as to enable him to cut out the breast and the high-spirited
element (ἐκτεμεῖν...τὸ στήθος καὶ τὸν θυμόν), but it brings to it, as
charioteer (ἡνίοχος), reason (λόγος) with the virtues attached to it ... 254

Earlier in the passage, Philo contrasts the Aaron-soul and Moses-soul in relation to
the first horse, anger:

Aaron, then, being inferior (δεύτερος) to Moses who cuts the breast
clean out (ἐκτένω τὸ στῆθος), that is the spirited part (ὁ θυμός), suffers
it not to be carried away by random impulses (οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτὸν ἀκρίτους
όρμαίς ἐκφέρεσθαι), for he is afraid that, if it be given the rein, it may
someday get unmanageable (ἀνασκιρτήσας), as a horse does, and
trample down all the soul. No, he curbs (θεραπεύω) and controls
(ἐπιστοίμω) it, first by reason (λόγος), that being driven by an excellent
(ἄριστος) charioteer, it may not get too restive (σφόδρα ἀφηνιάζω).255

In the same way, Philo later contrasts the Aaron-soul and Moses-soul in relation to
the other horse. Unlike Plato, however, who had identified the second horse with
desire alone, Philo equates it with either desire or pleasure. He argues that the love
of pleasure begets desire.256 So, in his view, the appetitive part of the soul is the
location of both passions. The appetitive part loves pleasure; it seeks it when it is
absent or enjoys it when it is present.257 With this in mind, Philo discusses the
Moses and Aaron-souls relative to the appetitive part of the soul:

In a corresponding manner we shall find Moses, the wise man, in his
perfection (ὁ σοφὸς τέλειος), scouring away and shaking off pleasures
(ἡδονὰς ἀπορρυπάντως καὶ ἀποσειόμενος), but the man of gradual
improvement not so treating pleasure in its entirety (ὁ δὲ προκόπτων οὐχ
ἀπασχόν), but welcoming simple and unavoidable (ἀνάγκη) pleasure,
while declining that which is excessive (περισσός) and over-elaborate
(περίεργος) in the way of delicacies.258

254 Ibid., 3.132; compare also Philo, Leg. 3.128.
255 Ibid., 3.128.
256 Ibid., 3.113.
257 Ibid., 3.138, 149.
258 Ibid., 140.
In these passages Philo typifies Aaron as ‘the one who is making moral progress’ (ὁ προκόπτων). This soul-type differs from both the sage and the fool above. On the one hand, the Aaron-soul is inferior to the Moses-soul. While the Moses-soul is ‘perfect’ (τέλειος), the Aaron-soul remains ‘imperfect’ (ἀτελής).259 The Moses-soul experiences Stoic apatheia, that is, the complete freedom from all passion, whereas the Aaron-soul merely practices the Peripatetic moderation of the passions, not their removal altogether.260 The Moses-soul possesses the power to cut out the breast, while the Aaron-soul does not. It can only curb and guide the high spirit and desire. So, while the Aaron-soul still experiences anger, though in moderation, the Moses-soul experiences no anger at all, only inner tranquillity.261 In a corresponding manner, later in the passage Philo observes that the sage ‘washes the entire belly’, namely, all the bodily pleasures. The sage even foregoes and rejects necessary food and drink, as for instance when Moses ate no bread and drank no water for forty days.262 The progressing soul, in contrast, merely ‘washes the innards and the feet, but not the whole belly’, that is to say, he avoids excessive and elaborate delicacies, but still welcomes the simple and unavoidable pleasures connected to necessary food and drink.263 As a consequence, Philo notes that the Moses-soul experiences virtue ‘apart from any toil’ (ἄπονος), while the Aaron-soul exerts much ‘toil’ (πόνος) in its efforts to charioteer the stiff-necked and restive horses of anger and desire.264

259 Ibid., 3.135.
260 Philo, Mut. 229. Philo elsewhere described those who have chosen a midway course between being completely good or completely bad in a manner in keeping with the description of progressing souls like Aaron. Philo described these souls as having made progress in their training so that they are now better than the untrained. Nevertheless, they are not yet perfect. Foreshadowing our discussion of the Aaron-soul, he described them as having not entirely ‘scoured and washed away their iniquity’ (μη παντελῶς ἐξερρύψαντο καὶ ἀπελούσαντο τὸ ἁδικεῖν), with the result that they are only in ‘a moderate and halfway degree purged’ (μετρίως … καὶ μέσως ἐξερρύψαντο). Hence, we see that while Philo positively integrated Peripatetic metriopatheia into his wider scheme of the spiritual progress of the soul, he simultaneously saw it as an inferior state to that of apatheia or the complete removal of all iniquity, which included all vice and passions. We will see this play out in his contrast between the Aaron-soul and Moses-soul. Knuuttila points out that the schematization of ‘metriopatheia’ for the progressing soul, but ‘apatheia’ for the perfected was quite common among the middle Platonists. See S. Knuuttila, Emotions (2004), 92-3, 102. See also J.M. Dillon, ‘Metriopatheia and Apatheia’ (1983), 510-8. Clement of Alexandria would take up Philo’s scheme, though he closely identified apatheia and agape love. See S. Knuuttila, Emotions (2004), 119-20, 127. This shift too was anticipated by Philo. See for instance, Philo, Deus 68-9.

261 Philo, Leg. 3.129.
262 Ex. 34:28 (LXX). See Philo, Leg. 3.140-2.
263 Lev. 1:9 (LXX). See also Philo, Leg. 3.140-1, 143, 155-9.
264 Philo, Leg. 3.135-7.
On the other hand, the Aaron-soul is superior to the other prototypical fool soul-types discussed above such as Pharaoh, Cain or Balaam. Whereas these fools are fixed upon their vicious existences, the Aaron-soul instead aims to make genuine moral improvement – hence Philo’s favourite term for this type of soul as ‘one making progress’ (ὁ προκόπτων). Whereas Philo described prototypical fools as passion-loving souls whose entire course depends on fierce spirit and desire, the progressing Aaron-soul rather ‘curbs’ (θεραπεύω), ‘controls’ (ἐπιστομίζω), and ‘trains’ (παιδεύω) both of these parts of the soul to be gentle. Unlike the fool, whose entire course is irrational, since it ‘has given its mind over to the inferior’ (ἐκδοθῆναι τῷ χείρονι) impulses of anger and desire, the progressing soul does not permit its anger to be ‘carried away by random impulses’ (ἀκρίτοις ὁραίαις ἐκφέρεσθαι), but curbs its ‘excessive impetuosity’ (ἡ ἐπὶ πλέον φορά). The distinction is curious since anger, as a Stoic passion, is by definition a random and excessive impulse. The key difference between the prototypical fool above and the Aaron-soul, then, lies in the degree of randomness and excessiveness that characterizes the passion. While the foolish soul gives itself over to unmitigated anger, the Aaron-soul, though still angry, moderates the soul’s motion and reduces its randomness when gripped by the passion. Additionally, the fool prefers ‘the ease’ (ῥᾳστώνη) of incontinence and bodily pleasure to the toil that necessarily follows those ‘profitable things’ (τὰ συμφέροντα) for the soul. Hence, the fool, as a lover of pleasure, ‘moves on the belly’, that is to say, it ever seeks after pleasures connected to bodily sense perception, especially those associated with eating, drinking, and sexual indulgence. The Aaron-soul in contrast prefers ‘the hardship’ (κακοπάθεια) of discipline and ‘toil for the sake of virtue’ (ὁ ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς πόνος) to the fool’s quest for pleasure. Thus, while the fool serves created things, the Aaron-soul has instead made a fundamental shift in its philosophical and religious orientation toward knowing and honouring God, which in turn purifies reason and begins the healing of the soul. As such, Philo argues that the Aaron-soul is a recipient of God’s favour, since the perverted mind of the fool cannot be the source of its own purification. Instead, the soul’s turning from vice to virtue, which

265 Ibid., 3.117, 128, 134.
266 Philo, Mut. 170-4.
267 Philo, Leg. 3.148-9, 155-9.
accounts for its transition from fool to progressing soul, comes from beyond the soul, from God.269

As was the case with the sage and the fool above, Philo treated numerous biblical figures in addition to Aaron as types of the progressing soul, including Seth, Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abram, and Jacob. Listed below are the soul-types that represent various types of the progressing soul, in order of their appearance in the biblical narrative:

- **Seth**: Seth represents those minds that make a beginning toward good disposition and virtue.270 He stands as the head of the race of souls that acknowledge that God is the author of everything, and loves virtue.271

- **Enos(h)**: Enos typifies ‘hope’ of ‘man’ in God, or human rationality.272 He represents those soul-types that are taking their first step on the journey toward virtue because of the expectation of good things from God, namely, happiness, the ability to see God, the culmination of perfect virtue, and to live in accordance with nature.273

- **Enoch**: Enoch generally symbolizes the gift of repentance when the soul begins to make ‘a change for the better’ (πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἡ μεταβολή). Such souls abandon the base and instead choose the excellent.274 Enoch could also symbolize those who acknowledge that everything comes from God and who thus seek to please God alone. As a result, God translates such souls from mortality to immortality and from progress to

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269 Ibid., 3. 125-7, 137.
271 Ibid., 42-3.
272 Philo often characterized ‘hope’ (ἐλπίς) in a manner that closely parallels the Stoic description of ‘wish’ (βούλησις). He characterized it as a kind of pursuit of something in the future at Philo, *Det.* 119-20; *Mut.* 160-1, 163; *Somn.* 2.142; ‘an expectation’ (προοδοκία) at *Det.* 120, 138, 140; *Post.* 26, *Mut.* 163; *Abr.* 8, 14; *Praem.* 160; oriented ‘toward the true excellence’ (ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν καλός) at *Post.* 26; *Abr.* 7, 9. He also treated it as a type of ‘propatheia’ at Philo, *Leg.* 86-7; *Mut.* 161, 163; *Praem.* 161; *QG* 1.76; M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 314-6. According to Seneca, Hecato treated hope as a type of desire, that when embraced, inevitably leads to fear. Instead of hope, Seneca commended foresight. See Sen., *Lucil.* 5.7-9; D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 217ff. Lévy sees Philo’s introduction of ‘hope’ as a novel transformation of Stoicism. See C. Lévy, ‘Philon et les Passions’ (2006), 30. Conversely, Philo’s approach is quite un-Platonic inasmuch as Plato associated ‘hope’ with the lower, mortal part of the soul and connected it to ‘fear’ and ‘confidence’, emotions oriented to pleasant or unpleasant future experiences. See S. Knuttila, *Emotions* (2004), 16ff.
273 Gen. 4:26; Philo, *Abr.* 7-14; *Plant.* 88; 11-4; *Det.* 138-40; *QG* 1.79; M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 314-6.
perfection. In this case, Philo associated Enoch not with progressing souls, but with the sage.275

• **Noah**: Noah represents those who are perfect in virtue relative to their generation, although not absolutely so.276 Such souls have made significant progress, but they fall short of the perfection of the sage.

• **Abram**: Philo interpreted Abram to mean ‘uplifted father’. As such, Abram represents ‘the virtue-loving soul’ who begins his search for the true God by first contemplating the harmonious order and beauty of nature.277 He then rises higher to pursue the philosophy of the heavens and the beings that dwell there. Finally, this soul-type mounts up yet higher through its love of knowledge to explore the divine nature itself.278 As a result, the Abram-soul finally attains perfection through teaching and study.

• **Jacob**: Jacob symbolizes the man of earnest effort,279 based on the etymology of the name of Jacob as ‘the supplanter’ (ὁ πτερνιστής) given in Gen. 27:36.280 He embodies the notion of ‘progress’ (προκοπή)281 by means of ‘toil’ (πόνος) against especially the passions,282 which is in keeping with the principle of ‘self-mastery’ (ὁ σωφροσύνης λόγος).283 When connected with his later identity as perfect Israel, he represents the soul that is perfected in virtue through ‘training’ or ‘discipline’ (ἐξ ἀσκήσεως).284 His training includes such practices as investigation, examination, reading, hearing, attention, self-mastery, indifference to those things that ought to be categorized as indifferent, living only on

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277 Philo, *Abr.* 60-1, 69, 78-80; *Cher.* 7; *Gig.* 62.
278 Philo, *Cher.* 4; *Gig.* 62-3; *Mut.* 66-8; *Sonn.* 1.60; *Leg.* 84.
279 ὁ ἀσκητὴς Ἰακώβ ἢ ὁ ἀσκητὴς. This was one of Philo’s favourite designations for Jacob. See for example, Philo, *Conf.* 80; *Ebr.* 82; *Fug.* 52; *Plant.* 90; *Post.* 59; *Sacr.* 5, 64; *Sonn.* 1.171, 2.19. Philo’s other favourite designation for Jacob is ‘the supplanter’ (ὁ πτερνιστής Ιακώβ). See for example, Philo, *Mut.* 81; *Sonn.* 1.171; *Leg.* 1.61, 2.89, 3.15, 3.93; *QG* 4.163.
280 Philo, *Leg.* 3.190-1; *Migr.* 201.
281 Philo, *Sacr.* 120; *Ebr.* 82; *Sobr.* 65; *Sonn.* 1.170.
283 Ibid., 2.99.
284 Philo, *Abr.* 52; *Agr.* 42; *Mut.* 81; *Sonn.* 1. 120-6, 169; *Mos.* 1.76.
what is necessary, low and mean, and eschewing luxury, pleasure, and popularity.\textsuperscript{285}

- **The nation of Israel:** Philo approached the nation of Israel from the perspective of their biblical lineage and from the story of the exodus. With regard to their ancestry, the people of Israel represent ‘the new race’ and ‘holy nation’ of souls that springs forth from Enos, Enoch and especially Noah. Their family tree terminates in sages such as Abraham, Isaac, and Moses.\textsuperscript{286} With regard to the exodus, the journey of the Israelites from Egypt to the Promised Land served as an example of the long and arduous journey from vice toward virtue. In contrast to the journey of Abram, which terminates in wisdom through learning (i.e. Abraham), the Israelites themselves never reach sagehood. Instead, Philo treated the nation of Israel as a symbol of the journey itself, that is, the progression of the soul.

- **Aaron:** Aaron symbolizes ‘an inferior’ (δεύτερος ὄν) stage in the progress of the soul to that of Moses. The Aaron-soul corresponds to the soul in which the rational part trains and curbs the lower parts, with the result that their ‘passions are moderated’ (µετριοπάθειαν). Philo elsewhere described Aaron as counted neither among those dead to the life of virtue, nor among those who live in supreme happiness. Rather, he ‘touches’ (ἐφάπτεται) both. Nevertheless, since he aspires to moral excellence and aims for the truth by ‘the deliberate choice of the good’ (ἡ ἑκούσιος αἵρεσις τἀγαθοῦ), he is making genuine improvement.\textsuperscript{287}

As we can see, Aaron comes at the end of a series of biblical figures that appear chronologically as the biblical narrative unfolds. Each figure highlights different aspects of this intermediate stage. Seth serves as a symbol of the inauguration of the life of virtue, Enos as a symbol of hope, Enoch of repentance, Noah of relative justice, Abram of progressing through learning, Jacob of progress through

\textsuperscript{285} See M. Sheridan, ‘Jacob and Israel’ (1995), 222-33, for further discussion of the key elements of the ‘spiritual struggle’ against the passions in Philo. Sheridan shows that Philo’s interpretation of Jacob’s name change was taken up by later Christian authors, including Clement of Alexandria, Origen, early Coptic monastic literature, fourth century Greek patristic writers and some Latin authors, including John Cassian.

\textsuperscript{286} Philo, *Abr.* 56-9.

\textsuperscript{287} Philo, *Post.* 78; *Somn.* 2.236-7; *Leg.* 3.45.
discipline, and the nation of Israel of the journey itself. In the same way, Aaron represents the moderation of the passions exercised by progressing souls.

These types also broadly correspond with specific moments in the soul’s progression toward virtue. In De agricultura, Philo sketched a scheme for the moral progress of the soul that leads from vice and ignorance toward perfection in virtue and the vision of God. He divided the soul’s progression into a series of stages:

- **The fool**: As discussed above, Philo portrayed the fool as morally vicious, godless, ignorant, unskilled in living, wretched, and sick.

- **The beginner** (ὁ ἀρχόμενος): Philo likened the beginner to ‘a suitor’ (μνηστήρ), who hopes to one day marry ‘discipline’ (παιδεία). Though such souls still lack knowledge, God has given them ‘a readiness to learn’ (ἐυμάθεια) so that they begin the journey toward virtue. Philo associated this sort of soul especially with hope for a better life.

- **The progressing one** (ὁ προκόπτων): Philo compared the one who is progressing to ‘the husbandman’ (γεωργός). Just as he cares for the trees to ensure their growth, so the progressing soul seeks to bring about the utmost development in the principles of prudence.

- **The recently perfected** (ὁ πρῶτον τέλειος): Philo likened these souls to a house whose plaster has just received the finishing touches, but has not yet become compact and ‘firmly settled’ (πῆξις). Such souls have reached completeness, but remain unpracticed and unaware of their perfection.

- **The sage**: As outlined above, Philo depicted the sage as morally virtuous, godly, knowledgeable, skilled in living, happy, and healthy.

This partition of the stages of the soul’s progress into fool, beginner, progressing soul, recently perfected, and sage, still fits under Philo’s overarching Stoic division.

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288 Philo, *Abr.* 54, 57-8; *Gig.* 64; *Post.* 100-2; *Deus* 3, 143-5, 159-62. For Abraham’s vision of God, see Philo, *Abr.* 79-80. For a description of Philo’s spiritual scheme using the patriarchs as types, see Philo, *Abr.* 48-9, 56-8; *Gig.* 60-4; *Sacr.* 1-10. On occasion he outlines a more general schematization of the spiritual life. See for example, Philo, *Gig.* 60-1.

289 Philo, *Agr.* 157-68. Philo sometimes used alternative metaphors to describe this theme. For instance, taking his start from the terminology and images in *Gen.* 6 (LXX), Philo divided souls into three classes: the earth-born (οἱ γῆς), heaven-born (οἱ οὐρανοῦ), and God-born (οἱ θεοῦ). This tripartite scheme answers to Philo’s philosophical division of souls into fools, those who are progressing, and sages.

290 Ibid., 158.

291 Ibid., 168.

292 Ibid., 158.

293 Ibid., 158, 160.

294 Ibid., 160-1, 165.
of all souls into fools and sages.\textsuperscript{295} The fool comprehends ‘pure’ fools such as the Pharaoh-soul above, the beginners, and those who are progressing, while the sage includes those who are newly perfected as well as the experienced and settled sage. Philo referred to the middle soul-type variously as ‘one who is making progress’ (προκοπή), one that is on the way to ‘betterment’ (βελτίωσις),\textsuperscript{296} ‘a practicer’ (ὁ ἀσκητής), or simply the soul-type that is ‘in the middle’ (ἡ μέση [ψυχή]).\textsuperscript{297} On the one hand, although Philo distinguished the beginner and progressing soul from one another, both were instances of souls that are making progress. As such, he distinguished them from the newly perfected soul and the sage as those who remain ‘imperfect’ (ἀτελής), while like the Aaron-soul above they also differ from the fool proper in that they have turned toward God.\textsuperscript{298} The beginner and progressing soul differ from one another, on the other hand, with regard to the degree of progress they have made toward virtue and perfection. The beginner is more ‘inexperienced’ (ἄπειρος) and ignorant than the progressing soul, who has practiced virtue and discipline for some time now.\textsuperscript{299} Nevertheless, both the beginner and progressing soul are still counted as fools, since both remain fundamentally ignorant, unskilled, and imperfect.

Philo’s distinction among varying degrees of progress within the fool soul-type was also of Stoic provenance,\textsuperscript{300} but with perhaps some important Peripatetic and religious influences as well.\textsuperscript{301} Although the Stoics posited a strict bifurcation of all humans into the two classes of fool or sage,\textsuperscript{302} they nevertheless differentiated those foolish souls that are making genuine progress toward virtue and sagehood from those that are not. They referred to this improving sort of fool as ‘one who is progressing’ (ὁ προκόπτων or qui proficit),\textsuperscript{303} and compared him to a drowning man that is swimming toward the water’s surface. Inasmuch as these souls remain below the water’s surface, they are still subject to the passions. As a consequence, they are

\textsuperscript{296} For examples in Philo of improvement as ‘betterment’, see Philo, \textit{Opif.} 128; \textit{Sacr.} 113; \textit{Mut.} 88; \textit{Post.} 174; \textit{Spec.} 1.260.
\textsuperscript{297} Philo, \textit{Mut.} 19, 30; \textit{Leg.} 3.144.
\textsuperscript{298} Philo, \textit{Abr.} 7, 15-6, 48.
\textsuperscript{299} Philo, \textit{Agr.} 160, 165.
\textsuperscript{302} Diog. Laert., \textit{Vit. phil.} 7.127; Plut., \textit{Quomodo} 75b-c.
\textsuperscript{303} Armin, \textit{SVF} (1903-5), 3.539-40; Epic., \textit{Diatr.} I 4.1, 9, 21. Sen., \textit{Lucil.} 75.8-10.
still in danger of drowning. Nevertheless, they have made genuine progress toward reaching the surface and attaining the life of virtue and wisdom. The actual passage from one state to the other must be ‘momentary and instantaneous’.

Philo’s division between newly perfected souls and the mature sage above also reflects a Stoic outlook. The Stoics had distinguished between those perfected souls that have only recently attained perfection and those who have been established as wise for some time, although they did not use different terms for them. They had argued that the newly perfected are often quite unaware of the fact that they have arrived at perfection. Because they have laid aside both passions and diseases of the mind, such souls are no longer in danger of slipping back, yet they lack the assurance that comes from proving their newfound perfection. The sage has not only attained perfection, but is also cognizant of the fact and remains firm and steady in his virtue through practice. Philo made the same fundamental distinctions between the recently perfected and the mature sage. Like the Stoics, Philo’s recently perfected are still unpracticed in virtue and ‘unconscious of their wisdom’ (διαλεληθότες εἶναι σοφοί).

Like later Stoics such as Panaetius and Seneca, Philo abandoned the Stoic paradox that all sins are equal and rather opted for admitting of degrees of moral progress toward perfection. Roskam argues that Philo’s outlook reflects a wider Peripatetic-Platonic trend that adopted the Stoic fool / progressing soul-sage framework, but revised it to allow for distinctions among faults and to accept the genuine diminution of one’s wickedness. By so doing, Middle Platonists transformed the framework into a genuine three-stage framework of fool – progressor – sage. In support of this conclusion, Roskam argues that Philo never mentions the typical Stoic paradoxes to illustrate the fundamental viciousness

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307 Sen., *Lucil.* 75.9.
310 Cic., *Off.* 1.46; Sen., *Lucil.* 72.9-11.
311 We find a similar three-phase scheme in Plutarch, Alcinous, and Apulius. See G. Roskam, *Path to Virtue* (2005), 144, 218, 220-390.
312 For an excellent schematic survey that details Philo’s three-part scheme, see G. Roskam, *Path to Virtue* (2005), 196. He draws up a simple table that shows how many of Philo’s biblical figures or soul-types fit into this three-part scheme at G. Roskam, *Path to Virtue* (2005), 154. My independent analysis below comes to the same basic conclusion.
of the progressor, 2) did not regard all faults as equal, and 3) did recognize the diminution of evil among progressing souls; that is to say, such souls are ‘good’ before they become ‘perfect’. The problem with Roskam’s analysis is that he overlooks the abandonment of the idea that all sins are equal and recognition of a qualitative change that comes from progress among at least some Stoics themselves. Seneca, for instance, argued that some souls advance so far that they are already in the harbour, though not yet on dry land like a sage, and as such, this type of progressing soul is not sick, though not yet well. He elsewhere argued that some progressing souls can reach a stage where they have escaped all diseases of the soul, but are yet still liable to experiencing passions, while still others have only laid aside only the greatest of the mind’s sicknesses and passions. All such descriptions reflected genuine distinctions in degrees of virtue or progress. While the shift to a trichotomous scheme of moral advancement would come to also characterize Middle Platonism, Philo in any case stands at the beginning of this transformation. This underscores just how much Philo’s moral psychology owes to the Stoic outlook.

Hence, in what may have been a novel move that bypassed the old debate between Peripatetic promotion of metriopatheia and Stoic apatheia, Philo made the two ideals complementary by overlaying both on his scheme of souls in various stages of progress toward virtue, as represented by figures in the biblical narrative. Beginning with Seth, Philo treated various members of his family tree as types of different degrees of moral advancement. In the De posteritate Caini, Philo schematized the biblical lineage into a series of three stages of improvement.

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313 G. Roskam, *Path to Virtue* (2005), 207-12. Again, while the insistence on these theses may reflect Platonic innovations, the scheme was still essentially adopted from the Stoics. The Platonic insistence on the equality of faults and the recognition of degrees of nearness to virtue, moreover, in many ways represents a development of concepts already present in orthodox Stoicism. B. Inwood and P. Donini, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (1999), 726-7. In this light, Roskam’s distinction between a Stoic and Middle Platonist scheme for the soul’s moral progress becomes increasingly fine.


each building on the previous one. The first advance begins with Seth, the second with Noah, and the third with Abraham, culminating with Moses, the man who is wise in all things. Conversely, in *De Abrahomo* and in *De praemiis et poenis*, Philo simplified this scheme into two stages, each of which comprised three soul-types. Enos, Enoch, and Noah made up the first triad and Abraham, Isaac and Jacob the second. The first triad symbolized progressing souls in the first stages of the soul’s journey toward virtue, and the second those in the latter stages. Although one might be tempted to try to make these schematizations fit Philo’s fivefold division into fool, beginner, progressing soul, recently perfect, and sage, no exact correspondence exists. At first sight, Philo’s division of the progression into two stages in *De Abrahomo* for instance might appear to correspond to his beginning-progressing soul distinction, but only Enos as a symbol of hope or Enoch as a type for repentance could be construed as a beginner, who has begun the path of rationality, but is not fully rational like the sage. Noah, who is also a member of the first set of soul-types, has made such progress that Moses called him perfect in his generation, though he is not absolutely good like the sages who would come later. As such, each of these biblical figures rather fit into the spectrum of souls at different stages of the journey from foolishness to perfection. As such, the lineage that extends from Seth to the nation of Israel and Moses represents the beginning of the race of soul-types that are truly reasonable.

Philo’s portrayal of the Aaron-soul as a symbol of the moderation of the passions in the progressing soul was particularly compatible with his use of the chariot metaphor. As noted in our discussion above, Plato’s ideal was not the eradication of anger, desire, or erotic love, but their subordination to and harmonization with reason. Hence, in his employment of the chariot metaphor, the charioteer manages first to constrain and then later to tame the black horse, but at no point does the charioteer remove either of the horses. In the same way, since the Aaron-soul is unable to cut out desire and anger entirely, he must settle for the more limited goal of ‘metriopatheia’ (μετριοπάθεια) or the taming of the horses/passions.

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320 Graver suggests that in Stoicism, these propatheia such as hope ‘might be useful to progressors as a warning to withhold assent from that impression and thus avoid emotion’. See M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθεια’ (1999), 319.
through training.\textsuperscript{323} This notion of metriopatheia reflects the Platonic and Peripatetic application of the ideal of the mean to the soul and to the passions.\textsuperscript{324} Against the Stoic notion of apatheia or the complete cutting off of all passions in the sage, the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions had argued that the aim of ethics was rather to exercise each passion in ‘an intermediate manner without excess or deficiency’ (τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως).\textsuperscript{325} For instance, the Middle-Platonist Alcinous argued that a virtuous soul might fear. If it fears everything, or in a manner that is beyond what is moderate, it becomes ‘a coward’ (δειλός). If it fears nothing, then it becomes ‘over-bold’ (θρασύς). The virtue of ‘courage’ (ἀνδρεία) is rather the moderate form of fear or confidence.\textsuperscript{326} Similarly, the soul can be angry at the right things and at the right time and in the right place, but it should not be hot-tempered and irascible, nor slavish and compliant. Rather than take sides in the philosophical dispute between Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, Philo instead incorporated both paradigms into his scheme of moral progression.\textsuperscript{327} The soul passes from Stoic fool to Peripatetic/Academic progressing soul to Stoic sage.

Among his various soul-types, Philo’s progressing soul thus most closely matched Plato’s description of the soul in both the \textit{Republic} and the \textit{Phaedrus}. In the passages quoted from \textit{Legum allegoriae} above, observe the characteristics of Philo’s description of the Aaron soul-type:

- The Aaron-soul practices moderation
- The Aaron-soul is powerless to cut out the breast [and belly]
- Reason serves as the charioteer and guide to the breast and spirited part
- The Aaron-soul does not allow the breast to be carried away by random impulses
- Reason curbs and controls the breast
- Reason does not allow the breast to get too restive
- Philo describes reason in the Aaron-soul as ‘excellent’ (ἄριστος)

\textsuperscript{323} Philo, \textit{Abr.} 255-61; See also Philo, \textit{Virt.} 195; \textit{Deus} 162.
\textsuperscript{325} Plut., \textit{Virt. mor.} 443c.
\textsuperscript{326} Albinus, \textit{Epit.} 30.5-6.
\textsuperscript{327} Dillon likewise concluded that Philo treated metriopatheia as a state proper to the progressing soul. See J.M. Dillon, \textit{The Middle Platonists} (1977), 151\textsuperscript{1}.
The Aaron-soul welcomes necessary pleasures, but declines excessive delicacies. Like Plato’s description of the chariot metaphor, Philo’s Aaron-soul possesses reason/charioteer and horses/breast and belly. This contrasts with Philo’s description of the Moses-soul, who has effectively removed the breast and belly entirely, leaving a chariot team without horses. Philo’s description of the Aaron-soul’s reason as ‘excellent’ likewise matches Plato’s consistently positive portrayal of the charioteer in the Phaedrus and Republic. It also matches Philo’s positive depiction of reason in the sage, but contrasts sharply with his characterization of the mind of the fool, which possesses a malfunctioning reason that is oriented toward what is bad. Similarly, like Plato’s charioteer, Philo described the role of reason in the soul as that of a charioteer and guide to the horses. Reason ceases that function in the sage, who no longer possesses any horses, while in the fool, reason fails to guide and direct, but rather is passively carried along. Although Philo ignored Plato’s nuanced treatment of the relation among charioteer/reason, white horse/spirited part and black horse/appetitive part, as noted above in our comparison of his depiction of the chariot metaphor with that of Plato, he nevertheless depicted reason in the Aaron-soul as aiming to moderate, control, and curb the horses, like Plato’s charioteer. This contrasts with Philo’s sage, who ‘cuts off’ both horses, and the fool, whose horses both run riot.

All in all, then, Philo’s depiction of the Aaron-soul is the one that most closely approached Plato’s description of the soul as manifest in the chariot metaphor. In the Aaron-soul, the charioteer is unable to cut off the horses, just as both horses are permanent elements in Plato’s depiction of the soul. In both, the mind is virtuous and guides the lower parts. Moreover, like Plato’s better soul-types, the charioteer in the Aaron-soul-type controls the horses. In both depictions, the soul only indulges in what is ‘necessary’ and ‘useful’ (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ χρήσιμον) for the nourishment of the body, and no more. Thus, Philo’s moral scheme advanced from Stoic fool to Platonic philosopher-king to Stoic sage.

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328 Philo, Leg. 3.141-44, 147, 157.
Conclusion

Philo made extensive use of Plato’s chariot metaphor and related horse similes. The winged chariot metaphor itself usually implied some version of Plato’s tripartite soul. In the metaphor, the charioteer corresponds to the mind, the white horse to the spirited part, and the black horse to the appetitive part. Philo adopted many of the basic contours of Plato’s myth in his own exposition of the soul, but also conflated it with elements drawn from the *Timaeus* and *Republic*.

Philo nevertheless diverged from Plato in several significant ways in his account of the charioteer myth. He removed references to the chariot wings, disconnected it from any discussion of erotic love, and emphasized the pride of the horses, all of which point toward Jewish modifications to the myth. Further, Philo associated the white horse with masculine soul characteristics, but the black with feminine, in contrast to Plato’s depiction of both as male. This corresponds to his idiosyncratic conception of femininity and maleness that permeates his work. Philo made both horses allies against the mind and identified them with ‘unruly impulses’, while Plato treated the white horse as an ally to the mind. Moreover, Philo emphasized the driver’s lack of skill as responsible for the destruction of the chariot team, not as in Plato, the insolence of the black horse. Philo’s occasional identification of the horses with the senses and, in the case of the related horse and rider images, of the horse’s four legs with the four Stoic cardinal passions, again all reflect a Stoicizing turn in his use of the metaphor, perhaps taking his cues from Posidonius.

Philo situated the chariot-metaphor within a wider Platonic narrative of the mind’s quest to ascend to the purely intellectual existence, but with a significantly modified Stoic outlook. He framed the entire journey as one between the two poles of the Stoic fool and the sage, via an intermediate ‘progressing’ stage. He then allegorically identified various biblical figures with various soul types or kinds of minds at different stages of the journey. Pharaoh, Esau, and Cain represented different kinds of fools, while Moses, Abraham, and Isaac corresponded to different kinds of sage souls, and Aaron to the progressing soul. This schematization in turn impacted Philo’s treatment of the chariot scheme. The passion-loving fool’s chariot has horses, but no driver; the apatheiac sage possesses only a charioteer, and no horses, but the progressing soul has both driver and horses, since he practices metriopatheia.
Hence, Philo creatively integrated Platonic metaphors, such as that of the charioteer, into a wider Stoic idea of apatheia by associating it with the psychological character of progressing souls. For Philo, the soul in its ideal form will look like the Stoic monistic account, even as he grafted the Stoic soul-progressing/soul-sage scheme within a wider Platonic narrative of the soul’s journey toward the vision of God.
Summary: Philo’s creative use of Stoic and Platonic philosophy in service of his exposition of Torah

Philo creatively synthesized a wide variety of opposing psychological elements current in his day in pursuit of his own religious philosophy. In the first chapter, we outlined how Philo closely followed the Stoics, especially Zeno, in identifying passion as a type of impulse that follows a wretched mind’s assent to a false judgment or opinion about what is good or evil and worthwhile pursuing or avoiding. In support, he could draw upon themes drawn from Stoic anthropology including their monistic psychology, first impulse, the theory of appropriation, and their division of impulse into the three classes of selection, passion, and eupatheia. Philo accommodated this Stoic approach to a wider Platonic body-soul dualism, drawn from the *Phaedo*, that located the source of the temptations in bodily pleasure, personified as the biblical serpent, with sense perception serving as the gateway, symbolized by the biblical Eve.

In chapter two, we showed that like the Stoics, Philo characterized the passions as irrational, excessive, unnatural, fluttering, and, as a consequence, blameworthy. Though the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions could likewise describe the passions as irrational, both traditions tended to treat their irrationality in terms of disobedience to and conflict with the mind. Philo constantly drew upon this Platonic theme in his own treatment of the passions’ irrationality, but sought to accommodate it to the Stoic notion of irrationality as a movement of a perverted mind against its own better judgment. Additionally, neither the Platonic nor Peripatetic traditions understood the passions to be necessarily excessive, aiming instead at their moderation. By contrast, Philo followed the Stoics in portraying all passions as excessive movements or activities of the soul. Finally, while neither Plato nor Aristotle considered the passions to be unnatural or inherently blameworthy, Philo joined the Stoics in treating the passions without exception as contrary to nature, harmful to the soul under all circumstances, and hence always deserving censure. Though Stoics such as Seneca could portray passions as vile in an effort to provide a remedy for the mind, Philo was unique in the degree to which he stressed their vileness and the first to explicitly describe them as ‘blameworthy’ (ἐπίληπτος) and ‘guilty’ (ὑπαίτιος) in the history of Greek thought. For this reason, like the Stoics,
Philo everywhere argued for the elimination of the passions from the soul, a proposal the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts considered impossible.

In chapter three we described how Philo could also make use of Plato’s tripartite division of the soul into rational, spirited, and appetitive parts. He could likewise relate Plato’s three parts to the four cardinal virtues. From Plato’s tripartism, Philo often picked up the themes of the passions pushing-pulling, disobeying, or deceiving the mind. Further, following the trend in Middle Platonism after Aristotle, as well as developments in Plato’s own more mature thought as reflected in the *Timaeus*, he likewise made a more fundamental bipartite division between rational and irrational parts of the soul. Finally, Philo was especially drawn to the body-soul anthropology of the *Phaedo*, with its theme of the immortality of the soul, though he deviated importantly from Plato by rejecting his doctrine of reincarnation. Philo also modified these Platonic ideas by normally treating the spirited part as an ally to the appetitive part rather than mind as in Plato and de-emphasizing the agent-like characteristics of the three parts in a more functionist direction. Both tendencies perhaps reflect an effort of Philo’s part to accommodate these Platonic elements to his preferred Stoic approach to the passions.

We also noted in each chapter that the biblical creation narrative about Adam, Eve, and the serpent played a significant role in the shape of Philo’s psychology. He coordinated both the Platonic tripartite and the Stoic eightfold division of the soul with his biblical typology of Adam-Eve-serpent. Adam corresponded to the mind/hegemon in both philosophies. Philo related Eve with sense perception or the Stoic seven lower parts of the soul, comprised of the five senses and the faculties of generation and speech, and with Plato’s bodyguards to the citadel of the mind. Philo could likewise relate the serpent, pleasure, to either the Stoic passions, Plato’s spirited and appetitive parts, or Plato’s deceptive and personified pleasure of the *Laws*. Pleasure represented the starting point either for the other three cardinal Stoic passions of desire, grief, and fear or as the Platonic personified temptress that utilizes the senses as a means to deceive the mind.

In the fourth chapter, we showed how Philo utilized images and terminology drawn from a conflated reading of the *Republic* and *Phaedrus* with supplemental interpretations drawn from the *Timaeus*. When utilizing the chariot metaphor, Philo

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1 Dillon likewise concludes that the Adam-Eve allegory is ‘basic’ to Philo. See J.M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (1977), 175.
followed Plato in treating the mind as charioteer and desire and wrath as horses. While Philo could also join Plato in treating the horse representing the spirited part in a better light, he normally opposed both horses to the charioteer, negatively depicting them as restive and violent, disobedient and rebellious. Additionally, Philo distinguished between the horses’ gender, while Plato did not, and Philo nowhere connected the charioting theme with erotic love represented by the chariot wings, which was so central to Plato’s *Phaedrus*.

Philo deviated from Plato in two important ways. First, Philo treated the theme rather elastically. He often coupled the theme with other, related analogies, interchanging the chariot metaphor with that of a pilot and boat, for instance. Second, at other times, Philo creatively extended the metaphor in new directions, usually in connection with a word or imagery found in the biblical text upon which he was commenting. Hence, the metaphor could morph into related images of herd and husbandman or rider and a single horse.

These transformations often reflected Stoicizing reinterpretations such as ‘four footed’ horses representing the four cardinal Stoic passions, the goal of the rider dismounting or falling off of the horse altogether and becoming horseless, which represented the ideal of the apatheiac perfection of a Stoic sage, or the portrayal of the chariot metaphor as an intermediate step in the process symbolized by Aaron. Philo thus encased his use of the chariot metaphor within a Platonic and Stoic vision of the soul’s intellectual and moral end, which he in turn related to the unfolding of the biblical narrative in Torah. He identified the soul’s intellectual and spiritual end with the Platonic quest to despise the body as a prison or corpse and leave behind the shadowy world of the senses and opinion and soar first to the incorporeal and intelligible realm of the forms and then beyond to a vision of the truly existent God Himself. At the same time, Philo matched the soul’s moral end with the ideal of the apatheiac Stoic sage.

Philo situated these themes within an allegorical reading of Moses. After describing a Platonic creation of the noetic archetypes of the soul and their subsequent copies in the sensible cosmos, he described the soul’s fall into the passions through serpent’s/pleasure’s *attack* on Adam/the mind through Eve/sense

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2 Philo, *Praem.* 30, 38-40. Malone argues that the conception of the realm of the forms as the home of only the Good and Beautiful, not of Ugliness or Evil, is a later development among the Church Fathers and Neoplatonists that is not found in Plato. J.C. Malone, *Psychology* (2009), 56-7, 61-2. In Philo, we already see this shift.
perception. He then used the biblical story that begins with Seth and Abel and culminates in Moses to describe the Stoic progression of the soul from fool to progressing soul to sage. Each figure in the biblical account symbolized different elements in the soul’s journey, depending on their role in the story and the meaning of their name. Cain and Pharaoh as key antagonists in the biblical narrative represented archetypal fools, while protagonists such as Abraham, Isaac, and Moses symbolized sages. Philo identified his depiction of the soul as a charioteer and two horses with the progressing soul that is passing from fool to sage. By so doing, he connected the Peripatetic-Academic ideal of metriopatheia with the aims of intermediate souls such as the Aaron soul-type.

Ultimately, Philo saw himself as an adherent of the sage Moses, not Plato, Aristotle, or Zeno. Moses, as the greatest sage, not only embodied wisdom in his own person, but also served as a divinely inspired historian and legislator, and ultimate source of the best of Greek philosophy. The lives of the patriarchs in Torah embody the life that accords with nature; its statutes serve as copies of the law of nature. Since Philo accepted the authority of Moses above all, his allegorical reading of the Law inspired, informed, and shaped his decisions regarding when, where, and how he might use elements drawn from Platonic and Stoic moral psychology or anthropology. The mythical, narrative, and legislative forms of the books of Moses, together with his exegetical and philosophical interpretive strategies, provided Philo with great flexibility in creatively relating his religious

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3 Ranocchia observes that Philo was the first in the Hellenic philosophical tradition to make pleasure, as a principle of evil, ‘an irrational agent, independent and external to man, that appeals to his pride and his basest instincts to induce him to sin and rebellion against God’. By so doing, he foreshadowed the Devil or Satan of the later Christian tradition. See G. Ranocchia, ‘Moses against the Egyptian’ (2008), 94. Bréhier points out that the diatribe against the seductions of pleasure as a foundation of evil also reflected the popular preaching of both Cynic and Stoic literature of, for instance, Musonius or Dion Chrysostom. É. Bréhier, *Philon d’Alexandrie* (1950), 261-8. Pohlenz, by contrast, argues that Philo’s pitting mind against sense perception, especially when serving as a pathway for the serpent pleasure, was essentially anti-Stoic. M. Pohlenz, *Philon von Alexandreia* (1942), 456-7. I rather think that Philo remains faithful to the Stoic suggestion that the mind is duped by the false goods of pleasure that come to it via the senses. Such an account could certainly fit within a Stoic account. We should not, however, overlook the Platonic background for the identification of pleasure as a source of deception for the soul. See Plato, *Leg.* 9.863b.


5 Philo, *Mos.* 1.1, 29.

6 Dillon argues that, like Antiochus, Philo saw Moses as the progenitor of a single philosophical tradition that descended from Pythagoras, through Plato and Aristotle and their followers, to the Stoics. As such, he felt free to draw on any part of that tradition when practicing exegesis upon the sacred text. See J.M. Dillon, ‘Philo and Hellenistic Platonism’ (2008), 226.


philosophy to that of the other schools. For Philo, the way of Moses transcended the sectarian disputes existent among the other philosophical schools, even as his philosophy shared many elements with them. Consequently, Philo’s free use of Platonic and Stoic philosophical elements strongly contrasted with, for instance, a partisan like Galen, who vigorously defended Plato’s tripartite psychology against Chrysippus’ monistic psychology in De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. His approach might initially appear to be more akin to that of a ‘semi-sceptical’ Platonist like Cicero, who in the Tusculanarum disputationum or De finibus likewise drew freely from competing philosophies, especially Stoicism. For instance, Philo could show a surprising indifference to basic philosophical questions at times: against the Stoics, he might pronounce the soul incorporeal, but then join them in identifying its essence as breath. Similarly, he showed little interest in definitively locating the mind in either the head, like Plato, or the heart, like Chrysippus. Nevertheless, Philo’s Mosaic dogmatism strongly distinguished his approach to philosophy from the scepticism of philosophers like Cicero. In the end, the philosophy of Moses represented a vision for life that transcended that of the other schools, even as it was able to comprehend within itself Platonic and Stoic elements.

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9 Philo, Mos. 1.24.
11 Philo, Somn. 1.30-4.
12 Philo, Sacr. 136; Spec. 1.213.
Outlook

Having come to the end of this study, one realizes that much work remains to be done. As in any research, this investigation was subject to limitations in scope and space. Philo’s theory of the passions must be understood in relation to the Hellenistic philosophical milieu of his day as well as to the antecedents that formed the background to the philosophical traditions he knew, especially his wide, first-hand knowledge of Plato. This methodological orientation toward the philosophical emphases in Philo’s writings finds support in his ubiquitous focus on the philosophical life, which was framed in terms of progressing toward the ideal of the sage. As a consequence, Philo often borrowed themes from Hellenistic anthropology and moral psychology and nearly always cast his allegorising exposition of the Torah in terms of Hellenistic virtue and vice, passions, and moral sickness.\(^1\) By focusing on the Greek side of Philo’s thought we have shown the central, organizing role in his philosophy of the monistic Stoic conception of the passions, the tripartite Platonic image, and the Platonic charioteer metaphor. However, henceforth further investigation is needed of the Jewish side of his thinking. Similarly, in moral psychology, having shown how the Stoic fool/progressing-soul/sage narrative provides the framework within which he placed his themes of Platonic ascent and soul types, there remains a need for inquiry into potential Jewish sources. The Stoic theory of the passions profoundly informed Philo’s conception and characterisation of the passions, but the fact that Philo was commenting on Moses, not Plato’s *Timaeus* or Aristotle’s *Categories*, reminds us that there was a Jewish and biblical side to his thought. In this regard, further research concerning the Jewish elements and sources of inspiration of his moral psychology is required. Areas touched upon in this study that serve as possible candidates for exploration include rabbinic discussions around desire,\(^2\) possible moral interpretations of biblical themes of journey or migration, and interpretations of biblical figures that Philo related to one or more of the passions, such as Enoch (hope) or Cain (grief). Similarly, although we have sought to pay attention to the literary context surrounding Philo’s comments upon the soul and its passions, acting upon Runia’s reminder that we

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\(^1\) D. Winston, ‘Philo and Rabbinic Literature’ (2009), 236-7.
\(^2\) For one such recent study, see H. Svebakken, *Philo’s Exposition* (2009).
must attend to the biblical problem and text with which he was wrestling could yield yet more insight, and enable us to ensure a proper interpretation of his meaning, if done systematically.\textsuperscript{3} We know that Philo related specific biblical texts or images to specific emotions, as with Cain and Enoch. Does he systematically do the same for all emotions? If so, how are these same texts utilized elsewhere? What problems are they related to?

Due to the limitations of space, moreover, several topics and themes initially identified in the preparation of this study merit further research, especially in relation to the relatively unexplored area of the structure of the passions and \textit{eupatheia} in Philo of Alexandria. To begin with, we focused on the conception of the passions in Philo. We probed its origin in the mind as an impulse, and its characteristics. The Stoics were also quite well-known for their penchant for their comprehensive system of classifying the passions using the metrics of moral valuation, time orientation, and change in the shape of the corporeal soul.\textsuperscript{4} Further research on Philo’s approach to classifying the passions, if at all, and what metrics he used, will further probe the depth of his adherence to and deviations from the Stoic theory of the passions. Further, though we did touch on Philo’s conception of \textit{eupatheia} as the obverse side of the emotions, much work remains to be done to understand the characteristics, classification, metrics, and symbols of the \textit{eupatheia} in Philo. The passions, moreover, were embedded by moral philosophers within a wider spectrum of spiritual and moral maladies, including sicknesses, infirmities, proclivities and aversions. Though Philo never explicitly used the technical Stoic terms for ‘proclivity’ (εὐεµπτωσία) or ‘aversion’ (προσκοπή), the notions of moral or spiritual ‘sickness’ (νόσηµα) and ‘infirmity’ (ἀρρώστηµα) permeate his writings, providing the broader context within which his discussion of the passions took place. Detailed analysis is still required to determine whether or not Philo consistently recognized and utilized the Stoic distinction between a ‘sickness’ and ‘infirmity’, whether or not he implicitly recognized and utilized Stoic proclivity and antipathy, and how this wider medical conception of moral weaknesses relates to the passions in his thought.

\textsuperscript{3} D.T. Runia, ‘Rehabilitation of the Jackdaw’ (2007), 489-95.

\textsuperscript{4} Armin, \textit{SYF} (1903-5), 3.94; Rabel argues that the Stoics distinguished the specific passions from one another on the basis of either the particular object in question or ‘a particular stage or quality of the motion of the soul’ that characterizes the passion. R.J. Rabel, ‘Stoic Generic and Specific Pathe’ (1977), 41-2. Nussbaum makes the same distinction. See M.C. Nussbaum, \textit{Therapy of Desire} (1994), 386-7.
Thirdly, we noted in this study the influence of the LXX biblical terminology and stories on the nuances of Philo’s conception of the emotions. Significant research around this topic remains to be done. A detailed comparison of the LXX’s emotional terminology and Philo’s own vocabulary could well yield further nuance and insight into the logic of his approach. Similarly, a close comparison of Philo’s treatment of these emotions in view of their usage in the LXX could reveal additional nuances in the contours of Philo’s own thought.

Fourthly, Philo and other ancient philosophical writers nearly always engaged in the analysis of the passions with a view toward their proper diagnosis and therapy. Hence, the ongoing controversies around the proper understanding of the soul and passions nearly always relate to the pressing matter of their therapy in practice, all with a view toward how one may live well. Using the metaphor of the physician, so popular among the Stoics, we might say that this study aimed at understanding Philo’s analysis of the soul and its passions so that one can make a proper diagnosis. The next step will be to explore in detail Philo’s understanding of the soul’s therapy in the light of his theory of the passions outlined in this study. While a proper understanding of his approach to the therapy of the passions is not possible until we have first established what a passion is, an analysis of Philo’s moral psychology remains incomplete until we have provided a full account of the therapy process.

Finally, further research is required to fully appreciate Philo’s conception of the emotions within the divine realm, as we limited our study to the emotional life of humankind. While Philo’s treatment of emotions in God shows some analogy with his understanding of emotions in his super-sage Moses, since the apatheiac sage comes to approximate the ‘likeness of God’ in his moral life, potential differences remain given the divergent ontological status of each. In this regard, close attention must be given especially to Philo’s hermeneutical principles. Citing the biblical principle that ‘God is not as a man’, drawn from Num. 23:19 of the LXX, Philo denied any correspondence between God and the created things. At the same time, Philo also cited a second, subordinate principle, drawn from Deuteronomy 1:31 and

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5 Philo explicitly cites the LXX version as his bible of choice. Such an extraordinary, inspired achievement made the LXX’s authors ‘not translators but heirophants and prophets’. See Philo, Mos. 2.40. He treated its translation as ‘both word-for-word and ‘sense-for-sense’. See A. Kamesar, ‘Biblical Interpretation in Philo’ (2009), 65-72.
8:5 of the LXX that ‘God is as a man’. For Philo, this second principle applies to those anthropomorphic references to God in the scriptures. He argued that they are not to be understood literally, but are to be used for pedagogical purposes among those who have not advanced morally. Philo’s approach is further complicated by his rather intricate conception of the divine order, with its numerous ‘powers’ and utterly transcendent God. Understanding Philo’s conception of the emotions in the divine realm will entail the additional hermeneutical task of sorting out whether or not Philo is speaking of transcendent God or one of the many powers. A productive case study to test Philo’s application of these two principles would be his handling of the biblical attribution of anger to God. One would expect that Philo would use the second principle to metaphorically ascribe anger to God, while ultimately denying it of God on the basis of the first. A more interesting case might be to examine Philo’s common attribution of joy to the divine, which would test the limits of his first principle. Given his distinction between passionate and eupatheiac emotions, one wonders how far Philo would go in literally ascribing joy to the divine. Does he ultimately apply joy only figuratively, as in the case of passions like anger? Does he apply it to one or some of the powers, but not to the transcendent One? The conclusions of such research would in turn have significance for his anthropology and, in particular, for his understanding of the biblical and Platonic spiritual goal of becoming ‘like God’. What exactly is the relation and character of the apatheia of the sage to that of the divine order? Is the sage to approximate the apatheia of the transcendent God or merely that of one of the powers, assuming there exists a difference among them?

To conclude, though we have restricted our reflections on remaining research to Philo studies, we should note that this study provides potential background for research on the emotions in Hellenistic philosophy, Pauline studies, Johannine Christology, and Patristics, especially in the case of Clement and Origen. Philo provides an important witness in the ongoing development of both Platonic/Peripatetic and Stoic philosophy regarding the soul and emotions. Philo’s use of Platonic tripartite language and the charioteer metaphor alongside an otherwise Stoic approach to the passions could well reflect developments within

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6 Philo, Sacr. 94, 101; Deus 53, 62, 69; Conf. 98; Migr. 113; Somn. 1.237; Decal. 32; QG 1.55a, 2.54.
7 Philo, Deus 53-4.
Stoicism by figures such as Panaetius of Rhodes or Posidonius in their debates with Academic and Peripatetic philosophers.

As a Hellenistic Jew, Philo also serves as an important witness to possible developments in late second temple Judaism and early Christianity. Scholars such as Troels Engberg-Pedersen have already shown that ancient Stoic ethics provides important insight into the interpretation of themes around body, spirit, emotions, cognition and participation in Paul's letters. Similarly, Philo provides another point of comparison, a unique Stoic approach to the passions, revised as it is by his Platonic and Jewish commitments, that could offer fresh light on Paul’s understanding of the passions. Further, Philo’s Stoic distinction between passions and *eupatheia* in the sage, in the divine powers, and perhaps even in God could help us better understand the account of Jesus’ emotions in relation to his humanity and divinity in the Gospel of John. Finally, this study provides important background to understand the passions in Clement and Origen, both as a source of influence and as a point of comparison for understanding their own unique developments, innovations, and deviations from Stoic and Platonic moral psychology within the Alexandrian context and as Christian theologians. A close examination of the character and structure of the soul and emotions in both authors in the light of Philo’s approach will in turn help us better understand their vision of the soul’s journey to God, the therapy of the passions, and their own ideals of apatheia.
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