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RESISTING THE INEVITABLE: UNVERSAL AND PARTICULAR SALVATION IN THE THOUGHT OF ROBERT BARCLAY

HUGH S. PYPER

"Extra ecclesiam nullam salutem" [outside the church, there is no salvation] runs the well-known tag by which Catholic theologians traditionally defended the integrity of the visible church and the necessity of baptism into it for salvation. This seems a prima facie example of the restriction of salvation to a particular identifiable subset of humanity institutionally defined. It is something of a rhetorical coup, then, for Robert Barclay in his Apology for the True Christian Divinity to begin his best-known discussion of the universality of salvation by endorsing it:

Out of [the] church we do freely confess there can be no salvation; because under this church and its denomination are comprehended all, and as many, of whatsoever nation, kindred, tongue or people they be, though outwardly strangers, and remote from those who profess Christ and Christianity in words, and have the benefit of the Scriptures, as become obedient to the holy light and testimony of God in their hearts, so as to become sanctified by it, and cleansed from the evil of their ways. For this is the universal or catholic spirit, by which many are called from all the four corners of the earth, and shall sit down with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; by this the secret life and virtue of Jesus is conveyed into many that are afar off, even as by the blood that runs into the veins and arteries of the natural body, the life is conveyed from the head and the heart unto the extreme parts. (Apology Prop X § II)

Barclay turns this apparently exclusive statement on its head by redefining the church not as the visible company of baptised Christians but as the company of all those who respond to the secret work of God, whatever their outward profession. This is Barclay the universalist, so-called, much beloved of liberal Quakers—when they have heard of him.
In this paper, I want to examine the universalist aspect of Barclay’s thought a little more closely. The case I want to put forward is that Barclay’s universalism is at least as much driven by epistemological considerations as by soteriological ones and that one area where we may need to be wary in his or any other discussion of these issues is precisely the relationship between these two. It is his assessment of what truth is and the nature of human understanding of truth that drives him to this theological claim as much as an understanding of who Jesus is and how his life, death, and resurrection bring about salvation. It may be that Barclay’s theological conclusions may be rendered suspect if his epistemology is shown to be questionable. In particular, does this epistemological commitment to the universality of truth undermine the particularity of the revelation in Jesus, and furthermore, if this is universally available, why is it not universally acknowledged? The problems in this area, I shall argue, are reflected in the implications of Barclay’s way of using the metaphor of the body, something already manifest in the passage quoted above. Examining the causes and the consequences of these positions will lead us to reflect on Barclay’s continuing significance.

In discussing Barclay’s thought, however, one thing that must never be forgotten is that he is at heart an apologist, someone writing to defend his views and his community against their hostile critics. This fact has important consequences. There is a history of the writing of Christian apologies of which Barclay was well aware through his reading in the Church Fathers. In patristic studies, the title “Apologist” is reserved for a group of second-century Christian writers, most notably Justin Martyr, who offer defences of Christianity in the context of increasing persecution and intellectual attack on the church. In his book on these writers, Robert Grant offers a definition of apologetic literature:

Apologetic literature emerges from minority groups that are trying to come to terms with the larger culture in which they live. Apologists do not completely identify themselves with the broader society, but they are not advocates of confrontation or revolution. They address their contemporaries with persuasion, looking for links between the outside world and their own group and thus modifying the development of both. (R.M. Grant, The Greek Apologists of the Second Century, London: SCM Press [1988]: 9)
Apologetics arise from the need to defend the group against unjustified attacks and misrepresentations of their position. This is not usually a simple exercise in reasoned academic debate. Minority groups are often the victims of rumour and slander and quickly become cast in the role of scapegoats, especially when political unrest or natural disasters are threatening the stability of the wider group. The first Quakers did not lack opponents who sought to blame them for the political and spiritual unrest of their times.

According to Grant, there are identifiable techniques which apologists employ to defuse such prejudice. The apologist attempts to show that elements of his group’s position do in fact relate to the philosophical and cultural life of the wider society. More particularly, an apologist may try to prove that his approach is, in Grant’s words, “more ancient, more authentic and more expressive of common values” than the received philosophy of the dominant groups. We immediately think of the constant claim of early Quaker writers that they represent “Primitive Christianity Revived.” In addressing his fellow Christians, Barclay urges them to acknowledge that Quakerism is a purer manifestation of the original apostolic church than their own denominations. Far from opposing the most cherished beliefs of those who see him as an opponent, he is, he claims, seeking to reinvigorate them. In addressing fellow theologians, he seeks to show that his position is more coherent and defensible by their own standards of proof and logic than the alternatives.

Barclay himself was perfectly well aware of the perils of apologetic and controversial theology. The apologist is obliged to answer his opponents’ questions, not his own, in terms of their preferred language and categories. The questions that Barclay had to deal with were the questions that were already animating the ongoing debate between Catholic and Protestant theologians: the ground of truth and authority, how the salvation of the individual was to be achieved, and the extent of human cooperation in this process. Barclay entered a debate that was already raging and it was in that context that he had to engage with his opponents. That debate set the grounds on which Quakers were attacked and therefore determined the nature of their defence. It is another matter, however, whether these were the categories through which the distinctive concerns of Friends were best expressed.

Chief among these features on which Barclay is indebted to his opponents is the definition of truth itself. Barclay’s discussion of
universal and particular salvation is conditioned by his understanding of what constitutes true knowledge. It is no accident that the first proposition of his Apology is entitled “Concerning the Foundation of True Knowledge,” nor is it a coincidence that in this regard at least he starts from the same point as Calvin in his Institutes. The key point is that for Barclay true knowledge is equated with certainty, a certainty that confers infallibility on those who possess that knowledge. In a characteristically dry aside, Barclay remarks

For my part, I think the papists do wisely in pleading for infallibility; for certainly the true church never was nor can be without it: and the protestants do honestly in not claiming it; because they are sensible that they want it. (The Possibility and Necessity of Inward Revelation)

Barclay’s bold claim then is that the knowledge Friends possess supersedes all other dispensations precisely because of its certainty and infallibility. This identification of true knowledge with infallible certainty is not Barclay’s invention but a truism of scholastic theology and philosophy. If Barclay is to defend the truth of Quakerism to his contemporary theological opponents, then these are the criteria by which any claim to truth and authority will be measured.

In this, his work bears more than a passing resemblance to that of his great near contemporary Descartes. In a world where external authorities, in particular the church, were no longer able to command universal assent, Descartes turned to introspection to find the core of certainty in his own experience of doubt, from which he deduces all subsequent truth, including the existence of God. It would be surprising if Barclay were not influenced by the climate of Cartesian thought, given the fashionability of Descartes in the Parisian academic life of Barclay’s youth. The two were more closely linked indirectly in any case through their common correspondent, Princess Elizabeth of the Rhine, Barclay’s distant relative and dedicatee of some of Descartes’ works.

Descartes’ model of truth is geometry and in a sense his philosophy becomes a geometry of the soul, a tendency even more clear in the work of Spinoza. As with Euclidean geometry, it appeals to self-authenticating axioms, of which the famous “I think therefore I am” is the most quoted. This geometrical model of truth is intrinsically universal in scope. The sum of the angles of any triangle is 360 degrees. This truth is not historically or spatially conditioned: All tri-
angles everywhere throughout time have this property. This also means that the truth can be demonstrated from any triangle as no one triangle holds a special key to its nature.

In this geometry of the soul, there is a common factor that shapes the debates in which Barclay and the Calvinists, not to mention Descartes, were involved. That root is the thought of Augustine of Hippo, which is at the heart of the methodological turn to introspection as the route to truth in Western theology. In keeping with his own background in Neo-Platonism, Augustine sought the explanation of the multifarious confusion of experience in terms of underlying general spiritual realities. To find truth, one must get behind the fallen world of matter and appearance and seek it in the primal cause of the cosmos, the mind of God, the epitome of the spiritual. This is of course not directly accessible, but could be explored through analogy with the most spiritual, non-material phenomenon available, the human mind or spirit. Augustine, of course, only has privileged access to his own mind, but on the principle outlined above that any triangle demonstrates the Euclidean postulates on triangles, what is universally true of mind can be demonstrated from any human mind. Augustine’s seminal exposition of the trinity, for example, is based on his experiential account of the internal differentiation of the individual human subject. Universal truth, then, in spiritual matters can be anchored in the examination of the heart.

This form of argument underlies the following passage in the Apology, which deserves extensive quotation.

Observe the reason brought by [the Apostle John] ‘because the Spirit is truth’; of whose certainty and infallibility I have heretofore spoken. We then trust to and confide in this Spirit, because we know, and certainly believe, that it can only lead us aright, and never mislead us; and from this certain confidence it is that we affirm, that no revelation coming from it can ever contradict the Spirit’s testimony nor right reason: not as making this a more certain rule to ourselves, but as condescending to such, who not discerning the revelations of the Spirit, as they proceed purely from God, will try them by these mediums. Yet those that have their spiritual senses, and can savour the things of the Spirit, as it were in prima instantia, i.e. at the first blush, can discern them without, or before they apply them either to scripture and reason; just as a good astronomer can calculate an eclipse infallibly, by which he can conclude, if the order of nature
continue, and some strange and unnatural revolution intervene not, there will be an eclipse of the sun or moon such a day, and such an hour; yet can he not persuade an ignorant rustic of this, until he visibly sees it. So also a mathematician can infallibly know, by the rules of art, that the three angles of a right triangle are equal to two right angles; yea, can know them more certainly than any man by measure. And some geometrical demonstrations are by all acknowledged to be infallible, which can scarcely be discerned or proved by the senses; yet if a geometer be at the pains to certify some ignorant man concerning the certainty of his art, by condescending to measure it, and make it obvious to his senses, it will not thence follow, that that measuring is so certain as the demonstration itself, or that the demonstration would be uncertain without it. (Apology Prop II § XV)

Quite explicitly, Barclay makes geometrical demonstration his ideal form of truth. In order to establish that the Quaker claim to truth is better grounded than any appeal to tradition or scripture, Barclay takes the philosophical tradition of his day head on. This demands that he asserts a claim to universal truth, without regard to the question of human salvation or the empirical facts of human sinfulness. If what he says about the possibility of human knowledge of God is not universally true of every and any human being, then the claim to certainty which is his bulwark against his theological opponents will fall. What is universally true, of course, is an inner perception, not a historical account. Were salvation dependent on a historical account it would be both contingent and uncertain. So Barclay is methodologically obliged to discount historical knowledge as a road to salvation, with the happy effect that those beyond the reach of gospel preaching can be deemed open to salvation.

Yet Barclay cannot dismiss the history of Jesus lightly especially as another plank of his argument is that Quakerism represents the belief of the earliest church, an argument that itself depends for its force on the ultimately platonic idea that the nearer to the pure source something is, the truer it will be. How then can Barclay square this circle of universality and particularity? What difference does knowing and believing the history of Jesus actually make?

Barclay attempts to account for this by making a distinction between different sorts of knowledge that are appropriate to what is
merely incidental detail and to what is the true substance of Christian belief:

All men have not the material objects of faith propounded unto them; for some of the material objects of faith are merely accidental unto all men’s salvation: as to believe, that Abraham begat Isaac and Isaac, Jacob &c. Others though not accidental, yet are but integral parts and not essential of Christian Religion; such as the outward history of Christ &c. and so by this distinction divers of these arguments are answered, without more ado; especially the first two, where they spend much paper fighting with their own shadow telling us: that the heathens have no revelations shewing the birth, passion resurrection &c. of Jesus Christ. Which we do grant; for the belief of such things is only necessary to them, to whom they are propounded; and the scriptures alledged by them, prove no more. (Quakerism Confirmed p. 54-55)

Barclay’s favoured metaphor for the state of belief without this accidental or inessential knowledge may be slightly distasteful to modern sensibilities. He speaks in terms of disability or amputation. Just as a human being can live without an arm or a leg, so those who have an inner conviction of sin but no knowledge of Jesus can live spiritually but in a defective state. So he writes:

Even as the essence and being of a man consists in the unity of soul and body which is enough to denominate one a man, albeit he should want a leg or an arm, an eye and an ear, or have some other defect, or even should be destitute of some of the faculties of the mind, as of the memory &c that other men have; yet such a one would still and that truly be called a man, albeit not a compleat and entire man ... In like manner, this principle supposes the possibility of salvation both to those commonly called heathens, and to many among the dark and erroneous sects of Christianity, in that this essential part of Christianity is extended to them, albeit they want those integrals and comfortable parts which may in and with respect to the spiritual man be fitly compared to these defects, that those barbarous nations want, which we enjoy, as to the natural man. (Universal Love p. 226)

We can see here clear evidence of the inevitable tendency for this mode of argument to endorse a view of human beings which prioritises the mental over the physical. The prevailing model of Western
anthropology has been centred on the head, on mental activity and on the higher sense; the eye, the ear, and the activity of speech. The rest of the body tends to be relegated to a necessary but at times regrettable life-support system for the head. Descartes’ complete dualism, which posits the mind as something quite separate from and with the merest accidental link to the body is only the logical conclusion of this.

But this hardly deals with the problem of the particular significance of Jesus nor with the fact that the human race is divided both into those who have had access to the story of the gospel and those who have not, and between those who seem to live out that story and those who do not. Barclay’s aplomb in asserting the superiority of Quaker claims to truth seems inevitably to rule out any claim that would then give importance to the historical and contingent truths of Christianity. Can Barclay have it both ways?

He makes a valiant attempt in his letter to Adriaan Paets, a Dutch diplomat and amateur theologian, entitled “On the Possibility and Necessity of Inward Revelation.” Here he argues that the difference between contingent and eternal truth is not in formal characteristics but in the mode of communication. God can and does implant contingent truths in our minds, and by that act they become eternal truth. So, God could, and occasionally does, implant the truth of the historical account of Jesus’ life in people’s minds. To argue that he could not do this, Barclay contends, would be to derogate from both God’s dignity and ours: his in that this would seem to limit his powers and ours in that we should then be reduced to the level of brute beasts, solely dependent for knowledge on the evidence of our fallible and material senses. Barclay takes this idea further by positing the existence of supernatural senses, which are the channel of information to God from us.

In many respects, such an account might seem to add to, rather than solve, the problem of the contingent versus the eternal. If it is essentially a matter of the channel through which God chooses to communicate to us, are we not edging dangerously close to a Calvinist notion of some inscrutable decree of election? Why should some be granted this knowledge and not others? In any case, logical categories are being stretched beyond the breaking point by the notion of contingent truth becoming eternal. The fact that Barclay is pushed into such contortions may more fruitfully lead to the question
as to whether such categories and the system of assumptions within which they operate are really adequate to the task.

Throughout his writings, Barclay seems to contradict himself on the importance of external knowledge of the facts of Jesus’ story. At times, he speaks of this knowledge as an “integral” not an “essential” of faith, drawing again on the metaphor of the integral but not essential function of limbs within the human body. At other times he makes a stronger claim that this knowledge is necessary and that those who hear these facts and do not believe are sufficiently condemned by that fact. Those who have never been exposed to the gospel can be quite adequately saved by their inner knowledge of the operations of Christ. Those who do hear them and still do not register their truth are thereby excluded from salvation.

It is hard to avoid feeling that the retort of an apocryphal Inuit villager to a visiting missionary applies here. Having been given the good news of the gospel and the less good news that he would be damned if he did not believe it, the man asked in concern about the fate of his ancestors who had never had the privilege of hearing the missionary preach. On being told that because of their ignorance they would be judged according to their lights and might well be saved, the Inuit replied, “In that case, it was hardly kind of you to come and tell me.”

Barclay is walking a dangerous path in this debate. There are precipices on both sides and for good measure opponents on both sides throwing rocks. He cannot deny the experiential and scriptural evidence that some human beings show irredeemable obstinacy and that God himself can harden hearts. How then can the inner testimony be adequate? To counter this, he promulgates the concept of the “Day of Visitation”—a “day” of no defined duration—during which God works on any individual soul. Once the day is past, however, the same operation of the Spirit that offered salvation now turns to condemnation and, it would appear, irreversibly so. As Barclay graphically puts it, the same sun that melts wax will harden clay. This still does not explain how this metaphorical substitution comes to pass. Indeed, we are left with a restatement of the classic dilemma of election. Either all wax could turn to clay—so why doesn’t it?—or else only some wax could turn to clay—so in what does the difference consist?
Barclay’s answer here is “ill-disposition of the will,” which might be thought more of a recasting of the question than any answer. How and why a will becomes ill-disposed is not explained. Barclay does argue that not all receive the same measure of grace, which might account for this. The Virgin Mary, for instance, received more grace than Judas, he claims. Yet he also always insists that everyone receives sufficient grace for salvation and as we have seen, this universal claim is inalienable.

I would argue that here Barclay has fallen afoul of the Augustinian and indeed Cartesian emphasis of the essential identification of humanity in freedom with the operation of the individual will, which becomes a label for, rather than an explanation of, what freedom consists in. Much blood has been shed because of the tendency to an infinite reduction inherent in this line of thought in the context of an opposing and supervening divine will. If God’s will is irresistible, then how can the human being be capable of resisting it, ill-disposed or not. If it is not irresistible, then what price God’s sovereignty? Barclay opts to say that the explanation for this is that the irresistible Spirit operates in different measure:

For we do affirm that the efficacy is in a true sense insuperable as namely where the mind is well disposed: see RB his Thesis where he useth the word insuperably. But that the Spirit doth insuperably move, or irresistibly force the ill-disposed minds of all, in whom it operates, is false and contrary to scripture, which saith, that some resist the Spirit; yea and is contrary to the experience of all, who are acquainted with the Spirit’s workings; that know, that the Spirit many times worketh so gently that his operation may be resisted; therefore, saith the Apostle, Quench not the Spirit. (Quakerism Confirmed p. 53-4)

In principle the Spirit is irresistible but chooses not always to be so. Once again we go round the circle, because there seems to be no basis to that choice. Furthermore, if that choice is made, then how can we claim that everyone is equally open to the influence of the divine?

This has implications for Barclay’s christology as well, of course. The effective work of Christ is for Barclay his sanctification of the individual soul through the direct revelation of his presence, his suffering, and his resurrection. What then is the point of the historical
crucifixion and resurrection? Here Barclay resorts again to the metaphor of the body.

Christ’s outward sufferings at Jerusalem were necessary unto men’s salvation, notwithstanding his inward sufferings, that he might be a compleat saviour in all respects. For it behoved Christ not only to suffer in the members of his body but also in the head; so that it is a most foolish and unreasonable consequence to argue that because Christ suffered in the members, therefore he need not suffer in the head: whereas the sufferings of Christ in the members are but a small part, of what he suffered in the head, by being offered up once and for all: yet a part they are, as serving to make up the integral of his sufferings. (Quakerism Confirmed Proposition 13)

If Christ suffers in the members of the body, i.e. in the inferior and dispensable limbs our individual souls represent, then how much more fitting that he should suffer in the head, the person of Jesus Christ. The key issue then becomes explaining how the individual man Jesus is so constituted that he and only he is the head. Barclay quickly repudiates any charge that he is lessening Jesus’ unique status but has to resort to arguments that are more ingenious than lucid to account for this:

Christ in us, or the Seed, is not a third spiritual nature, distinct from that which was in the man Christ Jesus, that was crucified according to the flesh at Jerusalem. For the same that is *in us* was and is *in him* and as it is in him, it’s the fulness or spring of the same in us as the stream; nor is there any difference, but such as is betwixt the spring and the stream which are one in their nature and substance. (Quakerism Confirmed Proposition II)

Barclay is obviously trying hard to avoid a merely exemplarist account and also needs to equate the present source of Friends’ inspiration with that accorded to the primal church in order to present arguments over primacy of revelation. He has also to account for the presence of Christ “in us” within the manifestly wicked, which he does by distinguishing between indwelling and inbeing. Christ is in all humanity but dwells only where he is accepted. Yet this does not help us to understand why Christ in Jesus, if we must put it this way, becomes the source for Christ in us. What makes Jesus different?

Underlying this discussion is once again this troubling metaphor of the body where the crucial activity takes place in the head and...
where Jesus becomes head of the church in a physiological sense. But taking this metaphor further, surely the point of the head is that it is the site of the experience of sufferings of the body already and that the body gives life to the head quite as much as the other way round. Such an identification of the head with Jesus is especially troubling as it compounds both the mentalism of this anthropology and the oddity of Barclay’s account of the incarnation, which at once seem to demand too much and too little of the man Jesus.

There is here a particular case of a general failure in the Western church to take seriously two intimately related theological insights: the power and work of the Spirit and the inextricably communal and relational nature of the life of God and our life in God. The very universalism and generality of the model of truth as geometric certainty and the individuality of the inner quest for that truth belie the necessity of the carnal and the joy of interaction. The Cartesian—and Barclay—an individual is fundamentally a mental being. In anything essential before God, human beings are at once identical and yet alone. Not only the need, but even the possibility, for meaningful communication between them becomes a problem.

Yet the whole thrust of the biblical picture of human life is that the community is supremely important to the life of the individual. Human beings do not come together as self-sufficient individuals to become communities; they grow to be human individuals in their mutual interaction. Truth and salvation are not all-or-nothing possessions or qualities of individuals; they are continually striven for in the mutual upbuilding or sinful destructiveness of human interaction.

Almost despite his philosophical theology, Barclay was well aware of this other aspect. Although at times he speaks of communal worship as a concession to human weakness, at others he speaks in a new tone. It is no accident that the one passage from his Apology that most Quakers now recognise is his description of the effect on him of his early attendance at meeting.

For not a few have come to be convinced of the truth after this manner, of which I myself, in part, am a true witness, who not by strength of arguments or by a particular disposition of each doctrine and convincement of my understanding thereby, came to receive and bear witness to this truth, but by being secretly reached by this life: for when I came into the silent assemblies of God’s people, I felt a secret power among them which
touched my heart and as I gave way unto it, I found the evil weakening in me and the good raised up and so I became thus knit and united unto them, hungering more and more after the increase of this power and life whereby I might feel myself perfectly redeemed. (Apology Proposition XI §7)

This is a powerful account of an experience of individuality transformed and transfigured in the group which in itself becomes the ground of unity. In the light of this, Barclay’s metaphor of the body becomes more healthy when he says:

God reveals himself and draweth near to each individual, and so he is in the midst in general, whereby each not only takes part in the particular refreshment and strength which comes from the good in himself, but is a sharer in the whole body, having a joint fellowship and communion with all. (Apology Proposition XI §8)

Barclay here is expressing the essentially communal nature of worship, but also of the salvific process which may even have powerful physical manifestations in the groaning and trembling of the worshiper. But the main point to be made is this. The eloquent and moving language of this statement points to the importance of these communal experiences in Barclay’s religious life. Yet the theological and philosophical traditions with which he is engaged do not allow him to express them in his systematic writings. There he interprets the unity of the meeting in terms of the unity of a God who is the supreme Cartesian individual instead of working from the experience of the communal processes of salvation to inform his understanding of the communality of the triune God.

To be fair, no one else was doing anything much different in that climate of debate. The points at issue were very different. It was inevitable that this mismatch between Barclay’s theological presuppositions and the very experience he thought to defend should widen as those less theologically informed began to look on his apologetic work as a definitive statement until caricatures of Barclay as either a liberal humanist or a narrow evangelical were produced.

Whether we can do better is a moot point, but I should like to conclude by pointing to one major area of weakness that Barclay, it seems to me, shares with many theologians of his own day and ours. That is his deficient doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Barclay does use the name but partly as a result of his reaction against the Fathers and their
scholastic successors seems to me to make no consistent distinction between the operations of the Spirit and those of the Son. The lack of this “third term” leaves the dynamic of the relationship between God and Jesus one of individual man before individual God, son with father. God and Christ may be one, but there are huge problems in extending this to argue that God and Jesus are one. The inherent dualism of Barclay’s thought which ultimately pulls apart the divine and the human in the incarnation is merely reinforced by the attempt to mount such an argument. The constant mutual interplay of the spirit already at work in the world with the power of the son at work in the man Jesus, reconciling human beings to God and to each other through this dynamic interaction is lost. Barclay’s view of the human attempts to simplify us in the image of a unitary, spiritual God. The incarnation, on the other hand, calls us to recognise the diversity and complexity of God in his interactions with us, a diversity embraced in the community of the body, not purified in the solitariness of introspection. Our goal is to be caught up in the joyous upbuilding of personhood in love, which is the dynamic of the life of God. Salvation then becomes a process in which all are caught up. The dichotomy implied in the debate over universal and particular salvation may at this limit point become an artificial one.

But this is not to underestimate Barclay’s achievement. He will not let us forget the absolute and uncompromising scope of the call to transformation that such participation in the body of Christ entails. The criticisms implicit in this paper are a token of my frustration that the theological and philosophical language of his day meant that his works, for reason for which he can hardly be held solely accountable, belie at times the faithful, staunch, and various witness of his life. On that account, at least, we still have much to learn from him.