1985

Peace Initiatives in Eastern Europe: Conscientious Objectors in the USSR, Hungary and the GDR

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Recommended Citation

Klippenstein, Lawrence (1985) "Peace Initiatives in Eastern Europe: Conscientious Objectors in the USSR, Hungary and the GDR,"
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe. Vol. 5: Iss. 5, Article 2.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol5/iss5/2

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Official and non-official peace movements of all sorts have captured much media time and space in recent years. Serious intellectual attention and useful comment on these developments have not always kept pace. Still, as the arms race among an increasing number of nations escalates, and the fear of global nuclear war penetrates their populations ever more deeply, all initiatives for easing the threat of destruction will become potentially more significant, hence more worthy of careful analysis and consideration. The relative merits of the plethora of proposals for mediation and conflict resolution on all levels -- international, national, regional and even personal -- may then receive an appropriately-nuanced evaluation, with results distributed on a wide scale.  

The ever-more popular position of rejecting the use of military weapons altogether, i.e. conscientiously objecting to war, is a case in point. As it happens, resistance to military service for reasons of conscience constitutes a strategy of peace-making for tens of thousands of individuals in nearly two dozen countries
of the world today.\textsuperscript{2} The privilege of military exemption for reasons of conscience has, of course, been in existence for some groups in both European and other nations for centuries.\textsuperscript{3} For a growing number of governments however, the pressure to grant this right to major segments of their citizenry is something relatively new.

With their emphasis on collective rather than individual rights, Communist Party-led states have created their own socio-political contexts for those who refuse to support these regimes with arms. It would seem that in such centrally-controlled environments, with their low priority for human rights, by Western standards at least, there should be little or no room for any conscientious objectors at all. It turns out, however, that such is not necessarily the case. To see what is happening in fact is the aim of this report.

With the exception possibly of Albania, all of the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe must now deal with the issue of conscientious objection in one form or another. Present-day authorities of the Soviet Union itself openly acknowledge their anxieties about "pacifist influences" (meaning most often conscientious objection ), whereas in Hungary and the GDR, for example, it has become a question of open debate. Numerous cases are known about in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, with many more documented only in official "classified files."\textsuperscript{4} At least two of these governments, Hungary and the GDR, and possibly also Poland,\textsuperscript{5} already provide legal alternatives for certain categories of resisters to military service. In several
others of the nine, such types of service can at times be obtained in some form by persistent request. 6

No one country is typical of the situation as a whole. To focus on the USSR, Hungary, and the GDR is rather to illustrate the range or continuum of possibilities, as will be apparent, from the "very restricted" to the "relatively few." Conscientious objectors face greater obstacles in some countries than others, and the degree of flexibility does increase as one moves from the Soviet Union to Hungary and finally to the GDR. The other countries, again excepting Albania, can be assumed to exercise their policy prerogatives between the first and last of the three. 7

THE SOVIET UNION

When members of a Soviet Peace Council delegation were asked about conscientious objectors in their country, they expressed only stark disbelief that any man would refuse to fight for his native country. 8 They may indeed not have known (or cared to reveal) that in the USSR one can become acquainted with a number of individuals, certainly hundreds an perhaps several thousand a year, who insist that exemption from military service for reasons of conscience ought to be an accepted option. 9 What else, say these people, can the much-touted "freedom of conscience" clause in their Constitution really mean? 10

In practice all conscientious objectors in the Soviet Union face a serious personal conflict the moment they register their reservations about serving in the armed forces of the Motherland. The same Constitution which guarantees freedom of conscience also acclaims the defense of the country as the "sacred duty" of all
its citizens. According to the military statutes every able-bodied Soviet male between the ages of 18 and 27 must report for military duty. This means a term of active service from two to three years, depending on educational qualifications, and the service branch to which he is assigned. At least four articles of the RSFSR Criminal Code spell out the penal consequences for anyone who refuses to carry out these obligations. There is no legal provision for anyone seeking to opt out for reasons of conscience, religious or otherwise.

This situation contrasts sharply with the policies of the early Soviet period. Although himself a bitter opponent of all pacifists, Lenin agreed for pragmatic reasons to sign an exemption decree of the People's Council of Commissars when it was submitted to him in December, 1918. It came into effect on January 4, 1919, and permitted tens of thousands of persons from such religious groups ("sectarians") as the Russian Baptists, Evangelical Christians, Seventh Day Adventists, Tolstoyans and Mennonites to obtain a service exemption on grounds of conscience, or religious conviction.

In 1926, it would appear, this decree was revoked. Strong pressures forced all groups in the country to come forward with explicit statements of loyalty to the government. Most of the pacifist groups also yielded, officially at least. Those who disagreed with such support took their views "underground." The Mennonites mainly struggled to negotiate an alternative to serve in the Red Army. Tentative arrangements which were agreed to by the authorities also terminated when the Stalin Constitution of 1936
created a firm and permanent basis for universal military service requirements as they now stand.\textsuperscript{15}

At the time of the German invasion in 1941 Stalin directed special appeals for support to the Soviet people. As an expression of patriotism, and with an eye to possible improved church-state relations, the Russian Orthodox Church as well as such Protestant groups as the Baptists and Evangelical Christians, brought open pledges of aid to the war effort in return for the privilege of reorganization and reconstitution as legal church communities in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{16}

Persons of German background in the Soviet Union such as the Mennonites, were generally not recruited for military service since they were classed as "unreliable Fascists" and "enemies of the state." In most instances they were forced into work battalions of prison camps and other non-military installations. After the war their separated families could regroup but had to remain till the end of 1955 in restricted residence communities (kommandatur) of the Urals and north central Asia.\textsuperscript{17} Conscientious objection was hardly heard of publicly, though some cases are known.\textsuperscript{18}

Recruitment of Germans into the Soviet armed forces began almost immediately after the ending of "kommandatur" regulations. At first these new recruits were assigned only to non-combatant sectors of the forces. Soviet academics working on religious groups, more perhaps than the press during this period, helped to keep the public memory of "disloyal" conscientious objectors alive.\textsuperscript{19}

In the early 1970's samizdat sources began to mention
increased harassment and mistreatment meted out to young Christians serving in the army. The widely-publicized (in the West) death by violence of 20-year-old Ivan Vasilievich Moiseev, a member of the Slobodzeisk ECB church in Moldavia, and a truck driver in the Red Army who had refused to take the military oath, seemed to dramatize the option of conscientious objection as a stand of religious loyalty with respect to the bearing of arms in military service.20

Refusal to take the military oath is where many conscientious objectors, particularly those who belong to unregistered Reformed Baptist communities, begin their protest. They may not regard this as a rejection of service as such, and some do not object to carrying weapons while doing so.21 At other times they make the distinction more clearly. As one Christian recruit put it, "I am a believer, and from my purely religious conviction I cannot take the military oath, or bear arms. I do not refuse to serve in the ranks of the Soviet army, and am prepared to fulfill conscientiously all that my service demands. But with regards to the oath, as a religious believer I cannot alter my thoughts and conviction."22

Military authorities generally view the refusal to take the oath as a refusal to bear arms. The statutes in any case forbid the handing of weapons to anyone who will not take the oath. Court proceedings which normally follow a refusal will usually result in sentencing not simply for non-swear ing of the military oath (for which, incidentally there is no article in the Criminal Code) or "evasion of call-up to service." Charges will be laid on the basis of Article 249a, namely, attempting to evade the obligation of military service altogether. That is a serious crime indeed.23
Punishments under Article 249a typically include imprisonment for periods that can range from three to seven years in time of peace, and may lead to the death penalty in war-time. A sentence of three to four years, served in camps of ordinary regime, seems to be most common at the present time.24

Imprisonment is not automatic, however. Granting an alternative form of service, normally still under military auspices, can occur at the discretion of the local commanding office.25 Mennonite emigres describing their experiences in the Soviet Union prior to 1980 noted that young men in their communities not infrequently found themselves carrying on the trades of their civilian training while completing their service term. Construction battalions and chauffeur duties have become alternates for conscientious objectors.26

Granting alternative service privileges does not guarantee that the term of service will be free of troubles. Abuse and mistreatment may well continue as various forms of harassment are brought to bear upon a believer, especially if he continues to express his faith in visible ways.27 Cases of fatal brutality have been repeated since the case of Moiseev, and numerous instances involving other forms of violence are reported from time to time.28 In the Soviet press meanwhile, those who encourage or support conscientious objectors in any way are consistently charged with disloyalty toward the regime, and hostility toward the Soviet state.29

Anti-pacifist expression in the Soviet media has tended to focus most pointedly at those groups which advocate unconditional
refusal to carry arms. In the first instance these attacks are aimed at Jehovah's Witnesses, taking their directives from their North American headquarters in Brooklyn, New York, and perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent, the True and Free Seventh Day Adventists, led till a few years ago by V. A. Shchelkov. Both groups decline registration for their congregations, and in the Soviet Union, as well as Eastern Europe generally, they take a consistent objectors' stance with respect to military service.

Unregistered Pentecostalists, as well as some Jewish "refusniks" and Soviet Germans, have come under fire as well. For these groups, especially the latter two, emigration plans have sometimes tended to intersect with the service issue as such. In such cases conscientious objectors have taken the position, sometimes because they thought that military service would hinder their chances to leave the Soviet Union. In the past some would-be-emigrants have had their requests turned down because they were said to hold sensitive military information because they had been in active service, and so they could not get permission to emigrate. True Orthodox Christians sometimes resist service also, occasionally Muslims may as well. Members of registered congregations in the All Union Council, among them Baptists and Evangelical Christians, as well as Mennonites, sometimes ignore the official anti-pacifist teachings of the AUCECB, and take the conscientious objectors' stand. Mennonites meeting with representatives of the Council have in recent years continued to point to the question of military service as a "continuing concern." Emigres in Western Germany suggest that the merging of
latent feelings about pacifism in these groups is still a factor of influence for many Soviet conscientious objectors today.

Officially, the Russian Orthodox, Catholic and Lutheran churches of the Soviet Union, like the AUCECB, do not support the pacifist point of view. But here too, there are exceptions when it comes down to individuals. Such a one was Robertas Grigas, a young Lithuanian Catholic, who had to endure constant beatings and harassment for refusing to take the military oath. To the authorities he explained his actions as follows: "I refuse to take the oath to your Party and government because they are misguided institutions headed by misled men. I am a Catholic and therefore can only swear allegiance to God, the Eternal Truth made flesh in Christ, and to the Catholic faith. I will not carry out orders contrary to Truth and my Christian convictions." He was taken to Dzhikzak, where he was imprisoned with another conscientious objector, Lithuanian Baptist Oskaras Gumnas. That was in 1982. Two years later he completed his term of service in a labor battalion at the Badam Base in Kazakhstan. When Kolos Veliava (Battle Flag), a newspaper of the Central Asia Military District, published an article about how he had changed his views in the army, he wrote a letter of protest. At no point, said Grigas, had he changed his stand on the platform of freedom of conscience, or given up his religious beliefs. "Both the Constitution and the Helsinki Final Act demand respect for the dignity of person, and forbid ridiculing beliefs," he added. In his experience, he went on to say, these demands had been totally ignored, and their spirit grossly violated. What had been written about his "re-
education" in the labor battalion, he said, was nothing short of libel.40

Such is the sentiment of those who insist on a way other than bearing arms. There is little likelihood and/or evidence that state policies, the views of official religious groups or the probability that the "option" of conscientious objection will attract many more young men, can change dramatically in the immediate future. Beyond that, as far as the USSR is concerned, no one can tell.

HUNGARY

Hungarian conscientious objectors face a situation rather similar to, but also in some ways, quite different from that which prevails in the USSR. Article 70 of the Hungarian constitution also declares that the defense of the fatherland is "the sacred duty of all citizens" of Hungary. Paragraph 61 adds: Treason, breaking of the military oath, going over to the enemy, espionage and all injury to the military power of the state is, regarded as betrayal of the country and the cause of the working people, most severely punishable by law. Those who refuse military service can be sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from one to five years, though in practice seldom exceeding twice the period of military service. In time of war imprisonment could be for 10-15 years, and even the death penalty can be imposed.41

The term of military service, however, has been shrinking over the past twenty five years from a maximum of three years, as it was set in 1960 to two years from 1976 to 1981, when it was further lowered to eighteen months. Call-up is normally after a male is
over 18 years of age, but may not come till the age of 23, when many are already married. It is expected that military personnel will be available for help in dealing with natural disasters, e.g., flooding, harvesting, etc. with a view to helping the national economy as a whole.42

For certain small religious groups the Hungarian government already has been providing alternative service options. Since 1977 members of the Church of the Nazarenes, Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists have been able to take advantage of these arrangements if religious teachings forbid them to serve. The best-known and often the only mentioned arrangement of this sort serves the Nazarenes who have held to a doctrine of non-participation in war for many years.43 The latter two groups, the Witnesses and the Adventists have been added to the list of "recognized groups" only in recent years, perhaps with more informal agreements than those existing for the Nazarenes.44

For the Hungarian authorities the 1977 concessions might have laid the issue to rest for the present, if the Catholics of Hungary had not also become involved. As things now stand, it is the growing number of Catholic conscientious objectors which must concern, not only the state, but the Catholic hierarchy of Hungary as well.

The current context for the emergence of this latter-day pacifist thrust in the Hungarian Catholic Church evolved in the first instance from the work of small renewal-oriented groups known as "basic communities." In the first instance this pertains to the segment of these communities which has been led by the Piarist
priest, Father György Bulányi. Followers of Bulanyi accept his interpretation of Christianity as directly based on the Bible in a radical call to discipleship of Jesus Christ, carried out in humble service to the poor and needy, a simple life, and social concern for problems such as population decline, abortion, divorce and alcoholism. A belief in non-violence and peace are integral to the Bulanyist perspective of faith as well. 45

About a year or so before the 1977 alternative service arrangements, some of the Bulanyists also began to apply their peace position as a mandate to reject military service. In 1976 Károly Kiszely, generally seen as the first Hungarian Catholic to take a CO stand, refused to obey his call-up to military duty. 46 Kiszely simply informed the local military office that he could not bear arms because of his religious views, adding however, that he was quite willing to perform a non-violent form of service. As a result he was promptly imprisoned, judged by a court, and given a sentence of thirty-three months in jail. About a year later someone told him that he would be released since the government was preparing a new law for conscientious objectors. Only hours after receiving this welcome news, he was further informed that the law would not apply to Catholics, so that he would need to complete his term after all.

Since that time dozens of other Catholic young men have joined Kiszely in his position, and an equal number of them have been jailed if they did not change their minds. In the more recent case of Béla Simónyi, it was a term of sixteen months. 47 Simónyi explained his motivation for objecting as follows:
Two thirds of the people in our world are suffering from hunger and curable diseases, while those who could help give most of what they have to support the creation of weapons of destruction. I would like to devote my life to serve my neighbor, and to do so only in ways that will cause no harm. I want to emphasize that I am willing to serve my country in any conceivable manner, if it does not contradict the ideals I mention above. Serving in health institutions or other social activities would be examples. I want to live according to the teaching of our all-loving God, and render an oath in conformity with this teaching. I stress that I have no political motivations, and do not wish to influence others to follow my example. "But I tell you who hear me now; Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you. Bless those who curse you, and pray for those who use you spitefully. (Luke 6:27-28).

At the moment, there seem to be few prospects that the situation for Catholic conscientious objectors will change significantly. For their part, government authorities hold to the line that while, strictly speaking, military obligations do not apply to all Hungarian citizens, they do for all Catholics at least. Bulanyists may number only a few thousands, but Catholics comprise nearly two-thirds of the country's population. To open the option of alternative service to so many is a move the government chooses not to make.

That the whole matter is one of serious concern to the state is nonetheless clear. But by all appearances it is a problem which the Catholic hierarchy of Hungary has been asked to resolve within the church itself. Under the circumstances it is the issue of conscientious objection which has thus raised the simmering question of Bulanyist "dissent" to an open, albeit unsought, confrontation with the church and the state.

The "normalization" of church-state relations in 1976 left
the "basic communities" insecure, as the first pastoral letter of Cardinal Lászlo Lékai speaking for the winter bishops' conference in the same year, warned the small communities not to stray from the true church, and called them to obey the hierarchy while planning their own re-integration into the parish structure. In his discussions with Kathpress a year or more ago, the Cardinal spoke of the "Bulanyist case" as a "very difficult problem" for the hierarchy; the "false concept" of conscientious objection, he described as "particularly dangerous." He noted further that there would be no security in Hungary at all if all Catholics in Hungary should insist that their religious convictions did not allow them to take up arms in defense of the country.

In a course of direct action along similar lines church authorities in 1980 suspended a priest, Lászlo Kovács, for preaching a sermon supporting the Bulanyist pacifists while taking part in a pilgrimage. When Father András Gromon, a young chaplain from Pomaz near Budapest, criticized the Cardinal for this action he was suspended for six months also. In 1982 Cardinal Lékai ordered Father Bulanyi to discontinue his public preaching and conducting of the mass.

Meanwhile the number of conscientious objectors did not diminish much, if at all. In 1983 Miklós Marasztí and Lászlo Rajk published a pamphlet saying "at any one time, more than a hundred young Hungarians are serving heavy prison sentences for trying to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed freedom of conscience by refusing military service." As recently as this spring, Beszelő reported further arrests and sentences: József Ujvári of Tököl was
given thirty three months, a twenty-year old teacher, Gábor Tanos of Székesfehérvár received thirty-six months jail, a twenty-three year old engineer, János Dombi from Banya, is in for two years, and a term of unspecified length was given to a twenty-eight year forestry technician who had earlier served in the army for a year, but now wanted to serve without weapons.  

Objectors continue to speak for their position as a non-political approach, one that is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience, and one that stands in the spirit of the II Vatican Council which urged understanding for those who might wish to follow this route of faithfulness and service. Gyula Simonyi of Székesfehérvár has argued recently again that the government must change its laws to allow for a social service for those who cannot take up arms. "Loving our enemies" is something practical and important, says Simonyi, and conscientious objectors take it seriously in their lives. Objectors who resist military service for religious reasons do not deny that the army has a function in the defense of peace, nor do they insist that the force they apply must in all cases be wrong. There is a fundamental contradiction, argues Simonyi, between the constitutional declaration of freedom of conscience for Hungarians, and the obligation for all to render military service. The fact that theological students themselves serve in the army does not change the situation.  

Hungarian conscientious objectors do not stand entirely alone, however, and the fact that firmer action against them does not occur may be a hopeful sign. Western groups such as the Catholic
"Pax Christi" section of The Netherlands have been attempting to mediate in the struggle. Their contacts with the Hungarian episcopate lead them to state that there is a strong desire among church officials to find some "positive resolution" of the problem. The German Catholic Workers' Union supporting conscientious objection and social service and other peace groups have endorsed the "Pax Christi" appeal to the Hungarian authorities, especially the request to Cardinal Lékai to take up the case of the COs in a more supportive way. Bishop Czerháti promised at a press conference in Budapest recently that he would in the Bishops' Conference promote the idea of dialogue on the peace issue between representatives of "Pax Christi" and the Hungarian episcopacy. 56

The Vatican itself leaves the matter in the hands of the Hungarian episcopacy, urging, however, that the issue be resolved somehow. It has not taken an official position on the theological views of Father Bulányi till now. The State Secretary Imre Miklós, Chairman of the State Office for Church Affairs, stands squarely behind the Cardinal at this point, is indeed his mentor, many would say, with respect to what the official church position in Hungary ought or ought not to be in this whole affair. 57

Compromises have been offered both from the church side, and from Bulanyist supporters, but few persons see any that really seem to solve the dilemma. Small hopes do arise, to be sure. The official commission "Dignitatis humanae," appointed by the Cardinal to study the Bulanyist situation recently put forth affirming comments about the basis communities, noting their "positive contributions," and urging the Cardinal along with all bishops of
Hungary who are anxious for a unified church to "initiate an honorable dialogue with Father Bulanyi and the groups which he represents."\(^{58}\)

A door could be opening on the state side as well. Unconfirmed reports from Budapest indicate that the Council of Constitutional Rights in Hungary has been discussing the problem of conscientious objectors as recently as spring 1985. The secretariat of the President's Council of the Hungarian People's Republic intimated that it expects a presentation from the Catholic hierarchy on this matter. This suggests that Cardinal Lékai may need to bring the issue to the Bishops' Conference in the near future.\(^{59}\) But, as things stand, Hungarian conscientious objectors, like those in the USSR, can hardly hope for changes in the days ahead.

**EAST GERMANY**

This may be true in GDR (East Germany) as well. But here the struggle for recognition of conscientious objectors has gained a little more ground than it has in Hungary or the USSR. Leaders of the EKD, the Evangelical Church of Germany, now the largest in the country, have been much more supportive in the search for rights of conscience, and the authorities in turn have given more consideration to these demands.

The GDR had no form of military conscription during the first thirteen years of its history. The war-time Allies, who had hoped to crush the "military spirit of the German people" intended, in 1945, to create the new Germany as a nation of peace. For a time some even dreamed of a single neutralist state, with no more than a
tiny defense force (Home Guard), like that of Austria. 60

Subsequent developments took a different path, however. The Federal Republic of Germany passed a compulsory conscription law just ten years after the war ended, and in 1962, the GDR did as well. Its new statutes rendered all males between the ages of 18 and 50 liable for service in the Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army). For emergencies of defense that regulation was later extended to cover women of the same age, and also to include men up to the age of 60. The initial legislation mentioned only imprisonment as an "alternative" to serving in the armed forces of the GDR. 61

Significant segments of the East German public registered immediate disapproval of the move. Among young adults, that is those who had experienced the horrors of 1944 and 1945 as children, there was widespread detestation of violence and all forms of warfare. The oft-repeated official slogan that conscripts would be "defending the peace" frequently fell on deaf ears.

Some leaders of the Protestant EKD expressed deep disappointment about the government's seemingly total lack of respect for freedom of conscience and the rights of the individual. The EKD had in fact raised the issue of militarization as a harmful phenomenon, a decade or more before the promulgation of the military statutes in 1962. Its synods of 1948 (Eisenach), 1950 (Berlin-Weissensee), and Elbingrode (1952) could document with public declaration both their general reservations about militarization, and a readiness to stand behind young Germans who might decide to resist military service for reasons of conscience.
and religious grounds.\textsuperscript{62}

Quite in contrast to the cases of Hungary and the USSR, official church leaders helped shape the legal status of conscientious objectors in the GDR. Church-state conversations led in the spring of 1962 to a \textit{modus vivendi} in which the state agreed to end its attacks on all forms of pacifist thought,\textsuperscript{63} while also admitting a readiness to tolerate those who might wish to conscientiously object to military service as such. It did not, however, concede to the church's demand for a legal alternative to the taking of arms. Even its relatively generous treatment of conscientious objectors in the next few years could not alleviate the unrest and suspicion generated by the military service legislation as a whole.\textsuperscript{64}

In 1963 a conference of EKD leaders released "Ten Articles Concerning Peace and Service in the Church," in which the religious hierarchy took responsibility for providing legal protection for conscientious objectors, as well as spiritual guidance for those who did join the forces. The creation of non-combatant "construction units" (\textit{Baueinheiten}), ordered by the state on September 7, 1964, came by all appearances, as a direct response to this conference statement.\textsuperscript{65}

The Party newspaper, \textit{Neues Deutschland}, described the move, not as a compromise, of course, but as a "military necessity," since such building units integrated with the army would be a vital factor for building up the defense capacity of the nation. The need for broader "democratic legitimization" of the new state has been cited as another reason for the concession. The possibility
of facing a potential force of three to four thousand objectors, and the intense conflict with the EKD which that might have caused, may have been the strongest motivator of all.

Recruits for the Baueinheiten (known otherwise as Bausoldaten, i.e. construction soldiers) were given a distinctive uniform carrying the design of a spade as a shoulderblade (hence also the name, Spatensoldaten, i.e. soldiers of the spade). Their regular work excluded the carrying of arms, although remaining under military administration. Their eighteen-month term of service equalled that of regular soldiers. Building activity involved above all construction of military sites and installations. The men were usually stationed in small units of fifteen to twenty persons, although large-scale projects like that of building the new harbor at Mikran on the Island of Ruegen used larger groups as well.66

Neither the EKD church leaders nor the conscientious objectors felt that this arrangement really met their objectives and needs.67 The units were still fully controlled by the army, the construction of military sites seemed still involving them directly in military activity, and the required oath of commitment to service differed little in substance from that required of regular servicemen.68

Almost immediately some men protested the requirements of the Baueinheiten, both by appeals to authorities, and by non-participation. Others called for an open discussion of all ideas related to the search for a meaningful peace service, alternative to carrying of arms.

By the fall of 1964 the regional synod of Berlin-Brandenburg
had submitted a complaint that "the concerns of the conscientious objectors were not being met." A year later the Goerlitz provincial synod asked for "a form or alternative service which would not force anyone to participate in military building projects against his own conscience." In the spring of 1967 the provincial synod of Saxony registered its anxieties about students who had served in construction units facing discrimination in schools. This meant that leading career opportunities were being closed to those who refused to serve in the active forces of the country.

A civilian form of alternative service is what many church leaders as well as CO's really had in mind. The 1967 synod of Saxony had already heard the proposal of Bishop Jaenicke that the government ought to consider alternatives in the fields of health or disaster service. Beyond East Germany itself, the Conference of European Churches held in Nyborg in 1971 considered the same idea in various propositions on peace service presented there by Bishop Krusche. It resolved in the end to encourage churches of its member groups to be sympathetic to conscientious objectors, especially in cases of discrimination or even arrest. Beyond this, it seemed, little more could be done.

Proposals for a civilian peace service alternative were the substance of a seven-point program set forth in May, 1981, by the Dresden Initiative Group, "Sozialer Friedensdienst" (social service for peace). This formula affirmed a 24-month term of work, preceded by educational preparation on themes of demilitarization, disarmament, peaceful security and non-violent forms of conflict resolution. It suggested the extension of service to that of
medical aides, social work, disaster control and protection of the environment as worthy fields of service. Synods of the EKD regional churches gave these proposals sympathetic hearings, as the bishops continued to warn against increasing militarization in the GDR. 70

In September, 1981, Klaus Gysi, the GDR Secretary of State for Church Affairs, explained his government's total rejection of such a scheme. The constitutions of the GDR, he pointed out, required military service from all citizens of the nation, while the construction units catered to all those who did not wish to serve with arms. To make additional exceptions, he said, would undermine a fundamental principle. Moreover, the introduction of a so-called "civilian peace service" would imply that the National People's Army, which does nothing but "defend peace and socialism" is a "war service." Such an idea would be inadmissible, Gysi concluded. 71

This latest forthright encounter between church and state seems to leave the situation basically unchanged, and unimproved as far as the CO's are concerned. There is, however, some indication that in recent times the construction units are becoming less demanding in labor, and that duties of a civilian nature are now also qualifying for the involvement of such units. Defense Minister, Heinz Hoffmann, praised the Bausoldaten at his visit to the Mukran site in July 1984. It represented a form of recognition which the Party press has not publicized hitherto. Erich Honecker himself has claimed that there is no discrimination against these men, and some church circles appear to accept this view.

One serious dimension of the problem is nevertheless that body
of persons which rejects all forms of service, (Baueinheiten included) the Totalverweigerer, as they are called. This is a growing group, and the penalties for these men appear to be increasing also. All Jehovah's Witnesses objectors are probably included in this category, and possibly Seventh Day Adventists as well. Normally the "total resisters" suffer the consequences, which is a prison sentence of at least eighteen months (at one time only six to eight months). If they are recruited for the reserves, they spend that time in prison as well. In the building units refusals to swear the oath, or go to work, can bring sentences of twenty-six months in prison. It must be added here, however, that there are examples of lesser penalties, and, as during the early sixties, cases where no action is taken at all against those who refuse to serve. Hundreds of individuals, it seems have managed to escape a call altogether.

Annual statistics on the number of conscientious objectors in the GDR, whether in or outside of constructions units, are still difficult to obtain. One source places the early yearly number of Bausoldaten at 250, then rising to 500 in 1976, to a present level of about 1000 a year. This figure is estimated to be about half the number of all CO's in the country. For the years 1964-1976 about 1000 objectors who refused even to join the construction units were members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, again thought to be about 50 percent of the total number in this category for this period. This could mean as many as 3200 men may have served in units so far, and that about 2000 have been sentenced for being total resisters during these two decades. Another source offers
a quite different set of figures. Since 1964, it states, some 5000 males have refused regular induction. This does not even include the "total resisters," e.g. Jehovah's Witnesses, who, this source intimates, face "ever stiffer prison sentences ranging from three to ten years."\(^\text{76}\)

The Catholic Church of the GDR, numbering well over a million members, finds itself at the fringes of the problem. For the past generation it has sought to avoid confrontation or even negotiations with the government. Peace concerns seem to be rising here too, as a recent letter of the bishops makes quite clear. The letter was issued by the Berlin Bishops' Conference of the GDR on January 1, 1983. Pointing out that "the Church does not itself advocate pacifism, that is, in certain circumstances it considers the use of force to be permissible (the just war)," the bishops go on to express their understanding for "the qualms of conscience of many, especially young people, who are pulled back and forth between the legitimate right of a nation to defense capability and their insight into the hopelessness of a peace which relies on military superiority."\(^\text{77}\)

The statement goes on to say:

We welcome the fact that in the matter of military service, the rights of freedom of conscience is expressly recognized in the GDR's national legislation. We would like to express our respect for those who reject armed military service for religious reasons. Beyond this we ask, that there might be consideration and discussion of other feasible forms of military service.\(^\text{78}\)

Counsel is given to those who choose the way of conscientious objection and the letter goes on to "express concern (about) the extent to which
thinking in military categories is becoming more and more a part of the school curriculum and vocational training."

Young people in Catholic circles are obviously discussing the matter of conscientious objection as well. At a three day youth congress held in East Berlin in the spring 1985, it was reported that in the workshop on "Giving a Public Witness" participants discussed "the questions of involvement in society" and the "relationship of a peace service and military service." 79 Whether any of these questions will be taking a stand as conscientious objectors remains to be seen. 80

CONCLUSION

All three nations, the USSR, Hungary, and the GDR, stress their commitment to defend themselves, and to build up the armed forces to achieve this task. Governing authorities, and not the common citizenry have made this decision, one, that in fact, few nations of the world have chosen not to make.

All three countries give a little room to those who want to serve their country but not with weapons. Some give more room than others. Conscientious objectors press on to discover the outer limits of this space as they listen to dictates of their conscience on the matter. The churches of these countries do not speak with one voice on the issue. Some will support the pacifists and nurture their ideas, sometimes openly, sometimes otherwise. Others oppose it altogether. In the USSR objectors must take an illegal path, as must most of them in Hungary, trusting to the discretions of their systems to make individual exceptions to the rule. They must face the consequences of imprisonment and other harassments if no exception is made.

In the GDR there is an officially recognized channel of serving
without arms, not fully acceptable to resisters, but something significantly more than either the USSR or Hungary will grant at the present time. Significantly, too, its official church body will openly promote the cause of conscientious objectors, a move which their parallel religionist in the USSR and Hungary cannot, or will not yet dare to make.

Objectors to the chosen socialist ideological dictums, and the governing bodies of these nations continue to face dilemmas in the area of national service. For CO's they must be resolved, in most cases, with a price. There are few immediate prospects that the confrontations which follow for the great majority of them will soon cease.

What will happen if the demands for alternatives to military service spread and heighten? Can the "resisters" be bought off somehow, the church's protests laid to rest? Can compromises, be achieved which will settle the issue in these countries and other East European nations as well? Can governments learn to negotiate more flexibility than they have till now? These are some of the questions raised in this study. Whether the answers will be given, and how and when, observers of the struggle must wait and discover in the years ahead.
NOTES

1 A contribution to this end has already been made by a series of articles headed "Peace 2010", and published recently in Christian Science Monitor. Cf. issues of April 20-26, pp. 18-19; April 27-May 3, pp. 16-17; May 4-10, pp. 20-21; and July 6-12, 1985, pp. 20-21.


6 This seems to be the case, for instance, in Czechoslovakia where Seventh Day Adventists have been allowed to opt out of military service. Cf. Malcolm Haslett, op cit, p. 2.

7 Albania has declared itself to be the "first atheist state," effectively suppressing all forms of religious dissent. Information is strictly controlled. One can only assume that conscientious objectors would suffer more severely there even than in the USSR. The facts of the situation are unknown.

8 Catherine Perry, "Voices from Russia," Newspeace, April, 1982, p. 5.

9 Exact statistics for conscientious objectors in the Soviet Union are not available. This author has assembled references to
about 100 known cases in Eastern Europe, including one note on a
group of 160 Pentecostal CO's in the Rovno region alone. Cf. A

10 The article in the Constitution of the USSR is in fact
somewhat less straightforward than parallel articles in the other
Eastern European constitutions. Art. 124 begins thus: "In order
to insure to citizens freedom of conscience the Church in the USSR
is separated from the state." The others, including Albania, speak
of "guaranteeing" or "safeguarding" freedom of conscience for all
States. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute of War, Revolution

11 Cf. Article 3 in the section "On Military Service" in
Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Sovieta SSSR, Number 42, 18 October, 1967,
item 552, and a summary description of service requirements in
Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and
pp. 51-52. Amendments to the military service law were passed in
1977, but none affected the status of conscientious objectors.

12 The articles are: 80: "Evasion of Regular Call to Active
Military Service," 81: "Evasion of Call-Up by Mobilization," 198-
1: "Evasion of Training Courses or Musters and of Military
Registration by Persons Subject to Military Service," and 249a:
"Evasion of Military Service by Maiming or Any Other Method." It
must be proven in court that evasion was deliberate. Cf. Harold J.
pp. 155-156, 184, and 197.

13 On Lenin's views on pacifism cf. Michael Voslenisky, "The
Concept of Peace: What Can We Do? in International Lutheran
Contributions to Peace Ethics, ed. by E. Lorenz (Geneva: LWF Dept.
of Studies, 1984) pp. 70ff. Developments regarding exemption
provisions in the early years of the Soviet period have been set
forth in Lawrence Klippenstein, "Mennonite Pacifism and State
Service in Russia: A Case Study of Church-State Relations, 1789-
1936," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, USA, 1984, pp. 268-314. Cf also O. Antich,
"Sovietskoe zakonodatelstvo i otkaz ot Voinskoi služby po
religioznym ubezhdeniiam, "Religiya i Ateism v SSSR, June, 1980,
pp. 3-6.

14 For a recent comment on this decree, cf. "Lenin Cited in
Support of True and Free Adventist View," Religion in Communist
with an exchange between A. Sulatzzov, a Soviet journalist putting
down a Seventh Day Adventist CO in the journal Znamya truda of
Dzhambul, and the SDA leader, V. A. Shchelkov, upholding the decree
of Lenin as having continuing validity. The debate took place in
the late seventies.
The Constitution stated in Article 132: "Military service in the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honorable duty of the citizens of the USSR." In the Military Law of 1967 Article 3 reads: "All male citizens of the USSR, regardless of their race or nationality, their religious creed, education, place of residence or their social or proprietary position, are obliged to do military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR."


The situation is reflected in Walter Wedel, Nur zwanzig Kilometer (Wuppertal, R. Brockhaus Verlag, 1979), pp. 201-202 where one of the main characters mentions his conscience struggle with serving in the army during this period.

One of these was V. F. Krestianinov who accused Mennonite preachers of encouraging their young men not to serve in the army. Mennonity (Moscow; Politizdat, 1967), p. lll. Cf. also A. I. Klibanov, Religioznoe sektanstvo i sovremennost, (Moscow: Nauka, 1969).


Prisoners of Conscience, pp. 56-57 and "Young Christians Refuse the Soviet Military Oath," Evangelical Times, January, 1985, pp. l-2. The oath must be taken within a period of two months after recruits enter their new units. Only after taking the oath can a young soldier be tried by a military court. The situation facing a Christian young person who may object for reasons of conscience to the military has been recently set forth in, "Der Schmerz der Glaubigen Vaeter und Muetter, Wenn der Sohn beim Militaer Gequaelt Wird," Nachrichten von den Feldern der Verfolgung, X (January-February, 1985), pp. 4ff. This article also includes the text of the Soviet military oath, p. 5.


Berman, op. cit., p. 197.

This fact is based on a number of cases checked in samizdat sources published by Keston College, Glaube in der zweiten Welt, or Missionswerk Friedenstimme or published in publications such as


27 The issue received fresh public attention through the cases brought forth by the Council of Prisoners' Relatives in the USSR as early as 1975. Soldiers objecting to the oath or bearing of arms were now listed among those who were suffering for faith, and the punishments meted out to them were detailed. Sawatsky, Soviet Evangelicals, p. 120, and M. Bourdeaux, Hans Hebl and Eugene Voss, eds., Religious Liberty in the USSR: WCC and USSR: A Post Nairobi Documentation. (Keston: Keston College, 1967) pp. 87 ff. The Council was comprised of women from the Reformed Baptists and their Bulletin became a major source for the Christian prisoners' lists which have been widely published since that time.

28 Such was the case of Jurij Burda, an objector to the military oath, who died by violent means only five months after entering the army. "Der Schmerz der gläubigen Vater und Mutter," pp. 11-13. Cf. also "Soviet Union: Mysterious Deaths of Four Christians," Idea No. 4/84, April, 1984, p. 3, for other examples.


32 The March, 1984, issue of the new Chronicle of the Catholic Church in the Ukraine mentions 18 Jehovah's Witnesses of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, imprisoned for refusing to serve in the Soviet army. Note also the case of Pavel Schreider, a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to take the oath, and was placed in a construction battalion, then taken to court because he would not work on Saturdays. Cf. "Pavel Shreider: Conscientious Objection

33 Many Pentecostalist young men refuse the oath and bearing of arms. A brief comment on the current situation in the USSR is in O. Antich, "Obzor Polozhenia Piatidesiatnikov v SSSR za 1980-81," Radio Free Europe Research, PC 18/82, February 1, 1982, pp. 1-6. Officially Pentecostals gave up their pacifist stand in the late 1920's but unregistered Pentecostals follow an earlier tradition of non-resistance.


37 Such official AUCECB statements as that of Assistant General Secretary Mitskevich in Bratskii Vestnik, No. 3, 1971, pp. 66-71, and the more recent item, "Materialy plenuma VCEHB prochodivshevo 30 noyabriya-1 dekabriya, 1982 goda," Bratskii Vestnik, No. 1, 1983, p. 39 suggest that the question remains alive in top-level discussions.


43 Peter Brock, "The Nonresistance of the Hungarian Nazarenes


45 One of the sources for Bulanyist teachings is the samizdat journal Beszelo, which began to appear in Hungary in 1981. An excellent introduction, in English, to the pacifist thought of Bulanyi is in the translated document titled "Turning the Other Cheek", Religion in Communist lands, XI (Spring, 1983), pp. 95-105. The movement as a whole is analyzed more fully in Janos Wildmann, "Das Kirchenverstaendnis der Basisgruppen in Ungarn," unpublished thesis for the Theological Faculty of Luzerne, August, 1983.


48 A similar petition prepared by Gabor Csizmadia on February 24, 1982, was published in Beszelo, No. 3, dated 1982. A copy of a letter written by Father Mihaly Lipien, aged 27, in which he requested exemption from a military tax is discussed in Keston News Service, No. 214, 6 December, 1984, pp. 5-6.


50 "Kardinal Lekai: Fall Bulanyi ein Sehr Schwerwiegendes Problem," Kathpress April 3, 1984, p. 3/st. Several years earlier, in 1981, the Cardinal set out his main lines of criticism regarding Bulyanist thinking, in a sermon preached on September 6 at Esztergom. He specifically singled out pacifist notions as problematic, saying "The Church does not condemn the necessity of

51 Ibid., p. 11-12, and Kathpress, September 21, 1981.

52 "Religion," Radio Free Europe Research, Hungarian Situation Report/10, June 23, 1982, p. 16. The move, taken at the June 8-9, 1982, summer conference of the Bench of Bishops failed to silence Father Bulanyi who has continued to preach and celebrate the Mass as he had before. He has similarly refused to retract any of his ideas related to peace and conscientious objection to military service.

53 "Episcopal Viewpoint," The Tablet, January 1, 1983, p. 67. This number is confusing in some ways, because it does not indicate to which religious groups these people belong, or if they are all doing so on religious grounds.


60 Martin McCauley, The German Democratic Republic Since 1945


63 In its earliest phases of ideological development, the slogan of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) had been radically pacifist: No German may again take a weapon in his hand. Very soon, however, it began to denounce pacifism as a vehicle being used by imperialist forces to undermine the resistance of the masses to these powers. Peter Wensierski, "Zwischen Pazifismus und Militarismus," Deutschland Archiv XV (May, 1982), pp. 449-452 and Karl Wilhelm Fricke, "Die Pazifismus-kritik der SED," Deutschland Archiv XVII (October, 1981), pp. 1026-1029.

64 Eisenfeld, op. cit., p. 29.

65 Ibid., pp. 30-31.


68 Legahun, op. cit., p. 9, has the exact wording of the oath. It includes a pledge to "undergird the defensive readiness of the country," and to do faithful work in the Baueinheiten in order to "contribute to the People's National Army in assisting the Soviet and its allied forces to defend the state against all its enemies," to "obey all orders of the superiors faithfully," and to uphold the "honour of the Republic at all times."


Jehovah's Witnesses, presently an illegal religious community in the GDR, are thought to number about 28,000, and the Adventists, about 10,500. Luchterhandt and Bohren, op. cit., pp. 85-86.


Klemens Richter, "Kirchen und Wehrdienstverweigerung in der DDR," Deutschland Archiv, XII (January, 1979), p. 41; Klaus Ehring and Martin Dallwitz, Schwert zu Pflugscharen-Friedensbewegung in der DDR (Rohwolt: Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 1982), pp. 118-137; the latter on the broader development also.

Mocker and Mocker, op. cit., p. 12. Cf. also comments of John Thiessen, West Berlin, in a letter to the author, "Bausoldaten in the GDR." The comment includes a summary of remarks made by speakers at two events celebrating the 20th anniversary of the institution of construction units in 1964. The basic materials here are drawn from an address by Manfred Stolpe, entitled, "Wie dienen wir den Frieden am besten: mit oder ohne Waffen?"

Mushaben, op. cit., p. 127. Her sources suggest that these statistics would be several years old at best.


"Kardinal Meisner fordert von Katholischer Jugend in der DDR Eindeutiges Bekenntnis," Kathpress/Ausland, May 21, 1985, p. 4.