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THE DYNAMICS OF YUGOSLAV RELIGIOUS POLICY:
SOME INSIGHTS FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY*

by Pedro Ramet

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In approaching the subject of religious policy, there are several questions with which one is confronted. First, should religious policy be treated as an autonomous issue area in isolation from other issue areas, or should it be interpreted with attention to a purported organic relationship with other issue areas, such as nationalities policy, educational policy, foreign policy, and so forth? Second, should policy in general, and religious policy in specific, be seen as the result of a factionalized environment or as the product of a system in which internal conflicts are of no policy importance? Third, should policy be seen as the product of clear objectives or as a complex outcome of sundry variables? Fourth, does the policy of a given organization, in this case the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), tend toward consistency or inconsistency over time and space? And fifth, is religious policy (in Yugoslavia) best viewed as an output of the system as a whole or in terms of the separate policymaking of the system's federal sub-units? In the following pages, I shall argue that Yugoslav religious policy is better understood in terms of the complex side of these alternatives and that, in this regard, it is a typical Yugoslav policy sphere. I shall also argue that organization theory can be useful to highlight some structural and behavioral facets of Yugoslav religious policy.

Organization theory is concerned, among other things, with elaborating the environment in which decisions are made and policies carried out. It assumes the necessity of some principle of hierarchy and of a division of labor, and a purposiveness in organizational behavior. Some of the insights gained from organization theory are, I
believe, helpful in understanding the dynamics of Yugoslav religious policy-making. At the same time, the evidence from the Yugoslav case is germane to an assessment of the relative applicability of alternate theories of organization.

Fred Luthans outlines four distinct approaches in organization theory. Classical bureaucratic theory, which may be associated with Max Weber, Peter M. Blau, and Robert Michels, presents a mechanical model of bureaucracy, in which the tendency to oligarchy is sometimes seen as irresistible. Behavioral theory, which may be associated with James G. March, Herbert A. Simon, and Philip Selznick, stresses the role of people, their perceptions and motivations, in organizational behavior and policy-making. Behavioral theory stresses organizational structure in both its formal and informal aspects. Systems theory stresses the input-output aspect of organizational behavior, as well as the interrelatedness and interdependence of elements in the whole. Systems theory is concerned, then, with identifying the "strategic" points in the system, the "nature of their mutual dependency," the processes which link the system together, and the goals of the system as a whole. And finally, contingency theory, which may be associated with Joan Woodward, William L. Zwerman, Paul L. Lawrence, and Jay W. Lorsch, urges that environmental factors such as, specifically, technology, may be more important than organizational structure and processes for organizational output. The findings of Lawrence and Lorsch may be summarized as follows:

1. If the environment is uncertain and heterogeneous, then the organization should be relatively unstructured. . . .
2. If the environment is stable and homogeneous, then a rigid organization structure is appropriate.
3. If the external environment is very diverse and the internal environment is highly differentiated, then there must be very elaborate integrating mechanisms in that organization structure.

While all of these theories have something to offer, the behavioral variant seems especially well suited to the Yugoslav case, and most of the citations from organization theory, in what follows, come from behavioralists.

The Institutional Setting

The regime's relations with religious bodies are conducted through two parallel structures. On the one hand, there are the republican Offices for Relations with Religious Communities, which are nominally subordinate to the Federal Office for Relations with Religious Communities, but which are, like almost everything in Yugoslavia, actually run by the respective republic governments. Alongside these offices are similar ones established under the rubric of the
Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) and its republic branches. These are separately staffed, but judging from their activity and from the frequency of mention in the press, it seems clear that the governmental offices play a more important role in the day-to-day management of Church-state relations.

In form, this has the appearance of hierarchical subordination. In practice, each republic has its own separate legislation regarding religion, which differs in particulars from republic to republic, and hence the guidelines, under which each republican Office for Relations with Religious Communities operates, differ.

While the party itself has, technically speaking, no formal apparatus for coordinating its religious policy, it exerts its influence indirectly through the aforementioned agencies and also through the press, which has often served as the vehicle for expressing party views on the subject of religion. And finally, the Marxist intellectual community, most especially sociologists concerned with religion, contribute to the understanding of religion in Yugoslavia and thus to defining the contours of religious policy in that country.

Add to this federalization the confessional heterogeneity in the country and one arrives at a strong expectation that religious policy will have distinct differences from one republic to the next. This expectation seems to be borne out by the evidence.

In Macedonia and Slovenia, Church-state relations are cordial, and in Macedonia one may even speak of a certain warmth in the relationship. Indeed, the regime was strongly supportive of the creation of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church in 1967, seeing in this ecclesiastical structure an instrument in its polemic with Bulgaria over the ethnicity of the Macedonians. In the Slovenian instance, although Catholic clergy there have occasionally spoken out on human rights issues and on the subject of "atheization" in the schools, on the whole Church-state relations are relatively uncomplicated.

The situations in these two republics are comparable in another respect, viz., the relative absence of factionalization on either side of the equation. The Macedonian political elite has every reason to support the Macedonian Orthodox Church, since both are wary of Bulgarian pretensions (Bulgaria asserts that Macedonians are merely Bulgarians), and there is no evidence of any division within the Macedonian political elite on the subject of religious policy. Similarly, the Macedonian Orthodox Church, finding its autocephaly repudiated by the Serbian Orthodox Church, looks to the republican government for support; none of the Macedonian clergy have been involved, thus, in politically controversial activities.

Factionalization is also absent, as mentioned, in Slovenia. The Slovenian party organization is dominated by "liberals" and it has
been years since there have been reports of any anti-Church directives in that republic. And while the same cannot be said of the Catholic Church—the only religious organization that counts for anything in Slovenia—its "progressive" wing, represented in Slovenia largely by Bishop Vekoslav Grmič, is of no particular significance. In Slovenia, as in Macedonia, thus, there are strong sources of impetus toward cooperation, and Church-state relations in these republics are organizationally simpler.

The Macedonian Orthodox Church is not the only religious organization in whose prosperity the LCY has had a vested interest. A flourishing Islamic community is important to the regime both because the regime has wanted to stimulate a Muslim ethnic consciousness among Bosnian Muslims and because of the importance which Yugoslavia places on its ties with the Arab world. In recent years, however, there have been repeated symptoms of rising Muslim assertiveness, including calls for a Muslim cultural society (which the regime will not allow), and demands for the redesignation of Bosnia as a "Muslim Republic," which is likewise unacceptable, since Muslims account for only roughly 40 percent of Bosnia's population. As a result of this new Muslim assertiveness, however, the Bosnian party's policy vis-a-vis the Islamic community has become tinged with ambivalence.

In fact, Church-state relations are generally more complex in Bosnia, as they are also in Croatia and Serbia. This is a result of the greater complexity of issues, the Serb-Croat rivalry in the former two republics (producing a generally higher level of tension in inter-ethnic and thus in interconfessional relations), and the greater degree of factionalization both within the political elites and within the respective religious bodies. The first two issues are inter-related, for it is the greater ethnic and confessional heterogeneity which, in part, accounts for the greater complexity of issues. The political elites here, unlike those in Slovenia and Macedonia, repeatedly return to the theme of "clerico-nationalism," warning the Churches to steer clear of nationalist causes. There are also specific features that distinguish one republic from the other: in Croatia, there is the traditional rivalry between the archbishops of Zagreb and Split, as well as the presence of theologically liberal clergy in the Christianity Today organization. In Bosnia, the Franciscan presence adds a complicating variable to the equation; and in Serbia, the institutional weakness of the Serbian Orthodox Church has meant that it has been less capable than the Catholic Church of mounting effective challenges to regime policies. And where factionalization is concerned, there have been tensions, in these republics, between theological liberals and theological conservatives in the Catholic Church, between Franciscans and diocesans again in the
Catholic Church, between lower clergy and hierarchy in the Serbian Orthodox Church, and between "liberals" (in different senses) and "conservatives" where the political elites are concerned.12

In the other federal units, finally, Church-state issues are less salient, even though the press has occasionally accused both Muslims and Orthodox in Kosovo of "meddling" in nationalism. Vojvodina is distinct in being the only federal unit with a large number of active Protestant churches. In Vojvodina, as in Montenegro, Church-state relations are distinctly low key.

Overall, thus, institutional decentralization and the federalization of policy-making have resulted in the emergence of discrete policy arenas. The distinct concerns and differences in factionalization assure that religious policy will vary from republic to republic.

Behavioral-organization theory tells us that decentralization, such as that found in Yugoslavia,

results in departmentalization and an increase in the bifurcation of interests among the sub-units in the organization. The maintenance needs of the subunits dictate a commitment to the subunit goals over and above their contribution to the total organization program.13

Bifurcation of interests is also reinforced by differences in the training and experience of administrators in different republics. Given local environmental differences, March and Simon inform us,

the struggle for internal control not only affects directly the content of decisions, but also causes greater elaboration of sub-unit ideologies. Each subunit seeks success by fitting its policy into the official doctrine of the large organization to legitimize its demands. Such a tactic increases the internalization of subgoals by participants within subunits.14

This tactic also obscures the differences between policies of the federal sub-units, since each sub-unit presents its own policy, of necessity, as consistent with the overall policy of the organization, in this case the LCY. The resulting pattern is reflected in Figure 7-1, which is a modified version of a model originally devised by Selznick.

**Religious Developments in Croatia and Bosnia**

The recent Church-state frictions in Yugoslavia are a case in point and bear out the relevance of organization theory. For within the federalized Yugoslav context, these frictions have been localized rather than a feature of nationwide developments. In fact, it is chiefly in Bosnia and Croatia that there have been prolonged polemics
FIGURE 1

- Delegation of authority
  - Amount of training in specialized competences
  - Bifurcation of interests
    - Internalization of subgoals by participants
      - Content of decisions
        - Internalization of organizational goals by participants
        - Operationality of organizational goals
over religious conditions and religious activity. Where Croatia is concerned, the party's nervousness in the early months following Tito's death was quickened by Archbishop Kuharic's outspoken demands for an expansion of ecclesiastical prerogatives (e.g., in terms of access to army recruits and to prisoners), and by 1981, the atmosphere in the regime's relationship with the Catholic Church was soured by mutual distrust, reciprocal polemics, and periodic "corrections" which served, inter alia, to sustain the polemics. When the theologically liberal Christianity Today publishing house ran afoul of certain bishops in 1981, the regime quickly endorsed the Christianity Today clergy—in a move that was interpreted on the Church's side as unwarranted interference and that probably was, if anything, embarrassing to the clergy of Christianity Today.

Yet despite repeated reports of petty harassments of Catholic clergy in Croatia,16 LCC policy in the sphere of religion remains the outcome of factional politics. In a striking example of this, Nenad Ivanković, longtime specialist on religious affairs for the Zagreb newspaper, Vjesnik, and spokesman for more moderate elements in the establishment, defended Popes Pius XII and John Paul II, in 1982, after their public disparagement by former Croatian Assembly President Jakov Blažević.17

The regime press sometimes charges individual priests with having Ustaše sympathies and with singing old Ustaše songs. It appears that these accusations are not always accurate. What they accomplish, however, is to foster the idea that ecclesiastical involvement in nationalism is apt to be fascistic. The liberal Croatian theologian, Fr. Tomislav Šagi-Bunić, recently replied to such equations in an extended discourse on The Catholic Church and the Croatian People. Rejecting any notion that the Church is entitled to identify itself with the Croatian nation, Šagi-Bunić proceeded to distinguish between "healthy nationalism" (or "patriotism") and "unhealthy nationalism," and defended the Catholic Church's "care" for the language, culture, history, and welfare of the Croatian community.18 While the book was well received in the regime press, Croatian nationalism remains a delicate sub-theme in relations between the party and the Catholic Church.

While the religious scene in Slovenia, Macedonia, and arguably Croatia too, has been unshaken by any dramatic new developments in the 1980s, the same cannot be said for Bosnia-Herzegovina, where two distinct events have dramatically heightened the religious self-awareness of Catholics and Muslims.

The first of these was the alleged appearance of the Madonna, on June 24, 1981, to six Herzegovinan children (for the first time) in the village of Medjugorje in the district of Čitluk. The regime
initially blamed Franciscan Father Jozo Zovko for concocting the miracle and put him in prison on a three-and-a-half year sentence, charging him with manipulating the believers in the interest of fomenting Croatian secessionism and anticommunism. The LC Bosnia-Herzegovina was worried that the steady stream of pilgrims to Medjugorje, which soon began to flow (at the rate of 6,000-10,000 per day), would stimulate Croatian nationalism and complicate interconfessional relations in the republic. Yet while the party was trying to debunk the alleged miracle, the Church itself remained cautious, appointing an investigatory commission to study the miracle and pass judgment on it.

Meanwhile, the children continue to report almost daily visitations by the Madonna, who, they say, has confided various "secrets" to them. Pilgrims and tourists continue to come to Medjugorje, including many from abroad, and some 25,000-26,000 people took part in third-anniversary masses in Medjugorje in June 1984. By then the authorities were starting to see the phenomenon in a new light and began to talk of developing hotels and other touristic facilities in the area in order to attract hard currency from foreign visitors. As of mid-1985, the chief frictions produced by the miracle seem to be intra-Church (between the diocesan Bishop of Mostar, who disputes the authenticity of the miracle, and the Franciscans, who benefit from it and endorse it), rather than between Church and regime.

In the case of the Muslims, on the other hand, it has been much harder to draw the line between what is religious and what is nationalist, and correspondingly harder to persuade the Muslim clergy to restrict themselves to "purely religious" functions. It is this complication, above all, that accounts for the sharp ambivalence in religious policy in Bosnia, where the Muslims are able to build mosques without any problem--there were 2,037 in Yugoslavia as a whole in 1976, and many more have been constructed since then--opened a new theological faculty in 1977, and launched a new theological journal, Islamska misao, in 1979. The regime has even allowed theological students to study in the Middle East. In essence, thus, the party has been broadly tolerant of Islam.

At the same time, the regime has shuddered at any hint of pan-Islam or Muslim nationalism. As Zagreb Professor Milan Kangrga put it in 1982,

the danger of Islam lies not in itself, as such, but rather in the tendencies contained within it, which do not shrink from openly and militantly advocating that Marx's science (which is European par excellence) be replaced by the Is-
And this was, in fact, the charge later levelled against a group of thirteen "Muslim nationalists" tried in Sarajevo in summer 1983. The leading defendants—Omer Mustafa Behmens and Alia Mustafa Izetbegovic—were given jail sentences of fifteen and fourteen years respectively, while most of the others received sentences of between five and ten years in duration. They were said to have made a visit "of an exclusively inimical character" to an unnamed Islamic country, to have propagated an "Islamic Declaration" which called for the "purification" of Bosnia, and to have begun organizing for the establishment of an "Islamistan" in Bosnia.24 The trial attracted a great deal of foreign attention, including in the Middle East, but did not have any particular consequences for the practice of Islam in Yugoslavia, except to stimulate Muslim self-awareness, at least temporarily.

**Basic vs. Routine Decisions**

Within the federalized, factionalized context of Yugoslav policy-making, religious policy must be attuned to diverse factors, including the need to maintain a good image in the West (the source of tourists and credits), the desirability of avoiding offense to Middle Eastern countries,25 the importance of maintaining the loyalty of Orthodox Macedonians in the face of Bulgarian claims, the fear that religious organizations may adopt the role of spokesmen of national communities, and so forth. At the same time, as I have indicated in the foregoing pages, the "rational actor model"26 is largely irrelevant to understanding religious policy in Yugoslavia. On the contrary, religious policy can be better interpreted as the variegated outcome of pre-established procedures and routines, conflicting interests and views, accidents of policy sequence, and strategies of "satisficing."27 Herbert A. Simon once put it this way:

> Discussions of administrative centralization and decentralization often bog down on the question: "Who really makes the decisions [in an organization]?"] Such a question is meaningless—a complex [policy] is like a great river, drawing from its many tributaries the innumerable component premises of which it is constituted.28

The formulation of religious policy in Yugoslavia is thus fully consonant with the expectations engendered by organization theory. Yet it is clear also that the LCY (or Tito personally) has intervened at different junctures, especially prior to 1980, to set forth certain fundamental principles. A recent instance involved the case of a Marija Car of Duga Resa who was expelled from the party in July 1983 because she allowed her newborn child to be baptized in church.
Although not a believer herself, she consented to the baptism at the insistence of her husband. She appealed her expulsion to the Commission for Statutory Problems of the LCY, thus bringing the central party apparatus into the dispute. The Statutory Commission upheld her expulsion, however, and took the occasion to reaffirm party policy of excluding all believers from membership.

Other similar interventions could be cited. One way to understand the relationship between these interventions on the part of the LCY and the more usual federalized policy-making context is in terms of the distinction between basic decisions and routine decisions. Basic decisions involve long-range commitments, broad questions of fundamental direction, and, in the Yugoslav context, any questions of cadres policy. Such decisions are broad in scope, infrequent, and taken at the highest level; they are apt to be taken under duress or pressure. Routine decisions, by contrast, have little impact of consequence on the organization but contribute to the formation of the policy environment. They are generally taken at lower levels of the organization, affect narrowly defined issues of a specific nature, and are apt to be reversible. Routine decisions lie exclusively within the domain of the federal units.

The Serbian Orthodox Church as Loyal Opposition

While the Catholic Church and the Islamic community are in many ways as strong as ever, the Serbian Orthodox Church seems to be experiencing a gradual decline. There are several tell-tale signs. First, secularization, as a natural process weaning believers from their faith, has hit the Serbian Church the hardest. A 1982 opinion poll, reported in Ilustrovana politika, found that while a third of youth in traditionally Catholic regions are religious, the proportion in traditionally Serbian Orthodox regions is about three percent, while a 1984 survey in the Niš area (in Serbia) found few real believers. Second, the Serbian Orthodox Church has the least favorable clergy/believer ratio of the three major denominations. For while there is one imam for every 1,250 Yugoslav Muslims and one Catholic priest for every 2,239 Catholics, there is only one Serbian Orthodox priest for every 5,714 believers. Third, the Serbian Orthodox Church is the least organized of the three major religious bodies when it comes to religious instruction. Fourth, the Serbian Orthodox Church has been by and large less successful than the other religious organizations in obtaining permits to build new churches. And finally, the authorities keep a tighter rein on Serbian Church publications, requiring that every religious publication in Serbia be submitted for approval fifteen days before it is to appear in public. This, of course, means that a daily or even a weekly publica-
tion—possible for the Catholic Church in Slovenia and in Croatia, where prior approval is not required—would make little sense for the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Seen in this light, it is not surprising that Pravoslavlje, the organ of the Belgrade Patriarchate, unlike its Catholic counterpart, Glas koncila, is a generally uncontroversial publication, content with commemorating the saints and discussing theological matters. Nor is it surprising, perhaps, that the current Serbian Patriarch, German, has taken pains to underline his loyalty to socialist Yugoslavia, observing at one point, "All of those who are opposed to a socialist Yugoslavia are also the opponents of the Serbian Church and are our enemies."36

Still, Pravoslavlje does occasionally speak out critically—usually in defense of Serbian national interests in the face of perceived threats in the "borderlands." When the Croatian nationalist euphoria reached a crescendo in 1970-71, the Serbian Orthodox Church was on hand to "defend" the Serbs from Croatian nationalism. When Kosovo, the ancient homeland of the Serbian people, exploded in Albanian-nationalist riots in 1981, Pravoslavlje issued an "Appeal for the Protection of the Serbian Inhabitants and their Shrines in Kosovo."37 And throughout the period since the secession of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in 1967, the Serbian hierarchy has interpreted its repudiation of Macedonian ecclesiastical autocephaly as a Serbian nationalist cause.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Serbian Orthodox Church felt it had a protector in Aleksandar Ranković, Yugoslavia's vice president and head of the security police.38 When he fell from power in 1966, the Serbian Church felt it had lost its protector—a fear that seemed confirmed when the Macedonian clergy began to press for autocephaly four months later. Since that time, the Serbian hierarchy has found it difficult to escape the feeling that the Serbian Orthodox Church has been singled out by the authorities for discriminatory treatment.39 The Church continues to complain of interminable delays in the granting of permission to build new church edifices in Belgrade and Split, of the failure of authorities to honor an agreement to return sacred artifacts from the Zagreb historical museum, and of "conduct of certain governmental organs toward the Church [which] is not always in accord with the constitution."40 In spring 1984, a Serbian priest even complained that "in other republics religious people can be members of the party and send their children to religious instruction while here it is not allowed."41 In other words, some Serbian clergy at any rate believe that the federalization of religious policy works against the Serbian Church.

Yet Serbian Church difficulties should not be exaggerated. The
Church has been able to open new churches both in Serbia and in other republics, for example at Tutnjevac in August 1981, at Nova Gradiška (in Croatia) in October 1982, and at Jasenovac (Croatia) in September 1984, and local authorities at Celje (Slovenia) granted permission in 1982 for the construction of a Serbian Orthodox Church to cater to the roughly 1,000 local Orthodox believers. In addition, the Serbian Orthodox Church laid the foundation stone for a new four-story theological faculty in Belgrade, in May 1984, which, when completed, will accommodate two hundred students. The ceremonies were officiated by Patriarch German and attended, inter alios, by various representatives of the Serbian government, the Serbian Academy of Sciences, and the University of Belgrade. Finally, the Serbian Orthodox Church has maintained a lively publishing activity, of which it is justifiably proud, capping this recently with the publication of the first official Orthodox Church translation of the New Testament into Serbo-Croatian. Hence, when the secular press reports that relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state are "generally good," this is, in fact, generally accurate. At the same time, there is much lingering distrust on both sides.

The Protestant Challenge

The authorities have become accustomed to the three traditional religions of Yugoslavia (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Islam), and vice versa. But the presence and proselytization of newer Protestant sects present a challenge to both—a challenge with which both the authorities and the traditional religious organizations find it difficult to deal.

The chief Protestant Churches in Yugoslavia are: the Reformed Christian Church, which caters largely to Hungarians in Vojvodina, with about 60,000 members; the Evangelical-Lutheran Churches, with 72,385 members (in 1976), many of them Vojvodinan Slovaks; the Pentecostal Church, with 5,000 members; the Seventh-Day Adventists, with 10,600 members; the Baptist Church, with 3,500 members; the Methodist Church, with 3,700 members; the Jehovah's Witnesses, with 10,000 adherents; and the Church of the Brethren, with adherents in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia.

Of these, the Pentecostals, the Baptists, the Seventh-Day Adventists, and the Jehovah's Witnesses have been the most active in proselytizing. In fact, the Jehovah's Witnesses publish their Kula stražara (Watchtower) publication in more than 32,000 copies: 14,000 copies in (Latinic) Croatian, 8,000 in (Cyrillic) Serbian, 10,000 in Slovenian, and an unspecified number in Macedonian. The Jehovah's Witnesses and the Adventists have been active in Serbia since at least the early 1970s, when they started to try to win converts from the
Orthodox Church. Mija Milačić, a district party official, reported at the time that these Churches were

insolently selling their publications through the mails. Baptist magazines are reaching some addresses on a COD basis. The Jehovah's Witnesses are distributing their literature in the villages of the Morava valley. The Seventh-Day Adventists sell their publications to Serbian Orthodox folk at the church in the monastery of Ravanica. Unpleasant scenes between the two groups frequently occur.47

Similar reports emerge periodically, and "smaller Protestant communities" have been accused, in particular, of disrupting Catholic and Orthodox church services and of proselytizing on the grounds of Catholic and Orthodox churches.48

On the whole, the authorities seem to prefer to ignore the Protestants. Intermittently, one may read passages, in the secular press, such as the following:

The Adventist sect is active in many of our cities. [Adventists] are very isolated and very dangerous. They are recognizable by the fact that they refuse to work or go to school on Saturdays or to carry weapons in the service. They pay money when they join the sect, and it is difficult to leave. They are dangerous because their children must also be members of the sect. They do not agree to any compromises, and they condemn every outside authority. They are exclusively against self-management and self-managing democracy.49

Because of their energetic proselytization, the Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses will probably remain anathema to the authorities in any of the federal units. Yet there have also been Protestant clergy who have achieved reputations for cooperativeness with the authorities, such as Dr. Juraj Struharik, Bishop of the Slovak Lutheran Church in Yugoslavia.50

Conclusion

The argument has come full circle. I began by stressing the limits to the commonality of religious policy in Yugoslavia, highlighting different religious conditions and legislation in the republics, and the very substantial autonomy enjoyed by the latter. Now it seems that there are also limits to heterogeneity. These limits can be seen in the Marija Car case, and likewise in the general distrust with which authorities in any republic view certain neo-Protestant groups especially.

There are other limits. Organization theory teaches that policy-making in an organizational setting is conditioned by individual
motivations, associational group loyalties (e.g., to Serbia, or Catholicism, or peasant farmers), and organizational structure, and that decision-making should be viewed as the process of "drawing conclusions from premises." The latter equation traces decisions to processes of information-processing in which premises derived from party affiliation, regional concerns, group loyalties, and personal development affect the way in which information is received, manipulated, and acted upon. Moreover, information-processing cannot be disassociated from organizational structure, and one is entitled to posit that structural commonalities will produce common policy proclivities and common decision-making dilemmas. Both organizational structure (which is very much the same from republic to republic) and basic premises set limits, therefore, on policy heterogeneity.

The essay began with five questions about religious policy in Yugoslavia. On every score, the question has been answered on the side of complexity. Religious policy in Yugoslavia is susceptible to the influence of considerations of policy in other realms, is worked out in a factionalized, federalized environment in which formally proclaimed "clear objectives" are often lost in a complex shuffle of intervening variables, and in part for these reasons is moderately heterogeneous across republics and across confessions. In approaching the subject matter, organization theory made sense of this complexity by differentiating between basic decisions and routine decisions, by linking decentralization to the reinforcement of the bifurcation of interests, and by stressing the importance of organizational structure, group loyalties, and operational premises in policy-making.

At the same time, this essay has provided a more particular vindication of the approach of James March and Herbert Simon, an approach referred to as behavioral organization theory. The importance of perception and group affiliation, which is borne out by the evidence, is nowhere stressed as much as in behavioral-organization theory, which, in general, seems better attuned, than other variants of organization theory, to the complexities of the Church-state dynamic in Yugoslavia.
NOTES

* I am grateful to Zachary Irwin and Robin Remington for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.


13 March and Simon, Organizations, p. 41.

14 Ibid., p. 42.

15 Derived from Ibid., p. 43.

16 See, for instance, Frankfurter Allgemeine (February 5, 1985).

17 Danas (July 13, 1982), pp. 9-10, and (July 20, 1982), pp. 13-14, 42.


19 Večernji list (August 18, 1981), as cited in Glas koncila (September 13, 1981).

20 See Fr. Tomislav Vlasić, OFM, Our Lady Queen of Peace, Queen of Apostles is Teaching us the Way to the Truth and Life at Medjugorje, Yugoslavia (Enfield, UK: Pika Print, 1984).


24 Komunist (August 5, 1983).

25 The Iranian news agency IRNA condemned the Sarajevo trial of "Muslim nationalists" in June 1983 and claimed that Yugoslavia's
Muslims were the objects of unfair discrimination.


28 Simon, Administrative Behavior, p. xii.


31 Ilustrovana politika (February 23, 1982), cited in Aktuelnosti Kršćanske Sadašnjosti, Informativni bilten (AKSA), March 5, 1982; and Duga (August 25, 1984), cited in AKSA (August 31, 1984).


33 Jedinstvo (Priština, January 18, 1973).

34 Interviews conducted by the author, Belgrade, July 1982. But see below for counterexamples.


37 Pravoslavlje (May 15, 1982). This appeal was also printed, by the patriarchate, as a separate pamphlet in 10,000 copies.


39 See, for example, Pravoslavlje (April 1, 1977), trans. in JPRS,


41Ibid. (April 1984), excerpted in AKSA (March 30, 1984).


45Politika (October 24, 1984).


48Ibid. (October 1, 1983), cited in AKSA (October 7, 1983).


50Vjesnik--Sedam dana (November 12, 1983), as cited in AKSA (November 15, 1983).


52Ibid., p. xii.