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THE MARXIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN YUGOSLAVIA WITH A REVIEW OF ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE CHRISTIAN-MARXIST DIALOGUE

By Nikola Skledar


The title of this paper is formulated more precisely than had it been entitled, for example, "The contemporary Yugoslav Marxist philosophy of religion."1 The latter might suggest that there is a separate and specific Yugoslav Marxist philosophy of religion, which because of its characteristics and specificity, is essentially different from other Marxist elaborations of the problems of philosophy of religion in the world. However, as there is no such separation and specificity regarding European tendencies in the Marxist philosophy of religion, we have chosen the above title.

An even more adequate title would be "The Marxist Theory of Religion in Yugoslavia" since the theory of religion, following Marx's critique, includes not only philosophical but also humanistic-sociological aspects that cannot be separated from the whole and precisely differentiated. Neither can Marxist sociology be separated from social philosophy and its understanding of the essence and significance of society, the human being, and history without being reduced to a positivist, limited, descriptive or quantitative discipline.

The concept "theory of religion" is understood as a spiritual, mental perception (theoria) of the phenomenon of religion as a form of being related to the supernatural being (religio). The transcendent may also be studied as a metaphysical category, not only religiously and theologically (dogmatically), but also by means of an open, critical, and skeptical, that is, essentially, philosophical method.

The term "theory of religion" is also understood as a logically coherent system of assumptions about religion as a social and cultural phenomenon (the sociological approach). In this respect, i.e. as a logical system which explains religion as a structural part of a larger socio-cultural whole, every theory of religion must be sufficiently differentiated, which
means that it must determine the essence and specificity of religion as an expression of the spirit, as well as its relation to and fundamental difference from all other historico-cultural phenomena of the larger historico-social entity or structure to which religion belongs (its relationship to science, philosophy, ideology, etc.)

Due to this, there are amongst the authors of humanistic Marxist sociology of religion, some with very pronounced philosophical inclination whether or not they are aware of it. That is the reason why this attempt at synthetic survey of open, Marxist philosophy of religion in Yugoslavia includes not only philosophers of religion (Bosnjak, Kresic, Pavicevic) but also some sociologists of religion that are philosophically inspired (Cimic, Kersevan, Vrcan).

But before we state, or at least sketch, what is common to all of them and what is also fundamental in their understanding of the essence of the phenomenon of religion (regardless of their differences), we should, first of all, say something about philosophy of religion itself.

Philosophy of religion sheds light upon religion as a form of the human spirit which is a historical phenomenon and not only a mere delusion which should be tossed out in the name of truth. It is also a social phenomenon, whose sources, origin, meaning, and destiny need to be explored (like philosophical exploration of art). Philosophy is interested in religion per se, especially in the transcendent being. It is also interested in the possibility of a philosophical approach to that being as the axis of religion, which may be perceived by the mind and its antinomies (Kant). Philosophy of religion is an open, critical, rational search (including intuition) of religion, religious contents, and consciousness.

Marxist philosophy of religion, if it wishes to remain a philosophy, must always remain open, hypothetical, and questioning because otherwise there is a danger that it could turn into a type of traditional, dogmatic theology, regardless of its ostensibly contrary (atheistic) character.

As a special philosophical discipline, independent from theology and the church (or religious communities), philosophy of religion, as actually a philosophical conversation (but not "the last word") about religion and the divine being, is a recent approach. It resulted from the struggle for freedom of thought, against submission to dogmas and dogmatic thinking. Classical German idealism meant the establishment of free philosophical inquiry into religion, outside the confines of religious communities and theological concepts. Since then philosophy of religion has become a subject matter taught at universities.

As stated before, Marxist philosophy and theory of religion in Yugoslavia are not separated from the main streams of Marxist theory of religion in the world. Primarily they are related to the open Marxist currents in Italy, France, and Germany.
Dogmatic Marxist understandings of religion as a mere relic of mistakes and prejudices of a backward and unenlightened past which will automatically disappear with the political establishment of socialist social relations, did not include understanding religion as a specific human relationship to the world, conditioned by social, psychical, moral, and metaphysical factors. Dogmatic views are militant toward religion and wish to abolish these "remnants" by propaganda and even administrative means. There is, however, also an implicitly expressed undogmatic Marxist understanding which shows more realism and integrity in its approach.

The main characteristic of the contemporary open Marxist approach to religion is its questioning of the attitudes of dogmatic Marxism, which used to be affirmed as "truth" which may not be doubted or questioned. Contemporary Marxists oppose the thesis that the roots of religion are to be found in the onto-anthropological determination of human being, namely the understanding of religion as a mere social fact.

The question regarding the content of religion is also raised critically. Dogmatic Marxist thought considered the content of religion as a bunch of delusions, prejudices, and superstitious nonsense. Based mainly on Lenin's attitudes, this conception simplified the matter by assuming that this system of delusions and prejudices serves only the political interest of the people in power (which, indeed, may also be the case), that is, that religion is only a political fact. According to open Marxist thinking, however, religion and religiosity, regardless of theoretical and other differences which remain, are recognized as signs of the dignity of human relations in the world and as models of existence having their human and moral significance in the context of tolerance and pluralism.

Such theoretical and practical conceptions are not only typical of Bloch's "warm stream" of Marxism, of Italian Marxists, and of some streams in contemporary French Marxism but also correspond to the understanding and approach to religion among the majority of Yugoslav Marxist thinkers.

Italian Marxists (A. Gramsci, P. Togliatti) were among those who first opened themselves to religion and started to doubt some axiomatic attitudes of dogmatic Marxism towards religion. They questioned the governing and principal theses of Marxist orthodoxy about the origins of religion as the worldview (and ideology) of all social strata in Italy with influence on the total social-cultural system to which it belonged. However, they did not think that religious consciousness itself was, in its essence and structure, always and everywhere an obstacle to accepting a socialist orientation. Today, following their trail, many Marxists already deal with the question whether some components of religious consciousness may enable a progressive social engagement (the example of Christianity in Latin America being very inspirational).
The above mentioned non-dogmatic stream of French Marxism whose representatives were gathered around the review *Arguments* (for example Lefebvre and Axelos) does not consider Marxism to be a closed system in which everything is clear and which has ready-made answers to all essential questions about the world, history, and existence. They are aware of the fact that there are unanswered questions and that some questions will always remain unanswered, such as those about the beginning, meaning, and end, and that philosophy (or theology) cannot provide the final truth, but will always stand on the open horizon.

They are also aware that the human being and his/her existence in a new, humane world, if it ever is created, can never be freed from the constitutive anthropologic limits and contradictions. These will ever and again, be a motive for new search for answers to fundamental questions and about how to overcome the contradictions of existence.

Because of all this, they are alive, relevant and contemporary. For his interest in religion Roger Garaudy holds a special place among French Marxists. He went through various phases of spiritual transformation from dogmatic Marxism to Christianity and finally Islam. In his Marxist phase when he had already surpassed his dogmatic position, he was driven to better understanding of the humanistic essence of Marxism, surpassing naive and realistic comprehension by noticing some positive characteristics of Christianity. Garaudy claimed that Christian humanism first of all is a positive characteristic of Christianity, manifested in Christian treatment of subjectivity and radical affirmation of Christian love as a general human possibility. He points out that in real human life subjectivity is expressed in latent and subtle forms of consciousness and spiritual states, such as care, love, and the experience of transcendence. Christian love is the essential relationship of the human being toward God and other fellow humans. It is the transcendence of the individual in birth, the act of creating the human being. It is the immanent need of the human being as a spiritual being. And transcendence, although its absence is its essential dimension, cannot be reduced only to that, Garaudy warns as Bloch's follower. It is also that which is actualized in the human being, that which is creative and thereby expressed also in immanence.

The recent orientation of the open Marxists in Yugoslavia (during the last twenty or more years) is characterized by the attempts to surpass the dogmatic vulgar-Marxist conceptions which were dominant in the critique of religion up to that time. By this, we primarily think of dogmatic, sociologistic, positivist and enlightenment concepts of the emergence of religion, namely its origin and disappearance, that interpreted religion exclusively as the result of social and economic conditions (which implicitly included the surpassed supposition of the theory of reflection) in other words, saw its cause in ignorance and not in knowledge of the natural and social laws.
The atheist Marxist thought of that era was mainly based upon science as a theoretical assumption in the critique of religion. Practically, it usually simplified the matter by assuming that social preconditions of religion and religion itself, will automatically disappear with socialism, that is, with the realization of a just human society. However, to depend on science as a theoretic presupposition of religion, or its abolishment, is not adequate for the simple reason that science and religion are essentially two different forms of the human spirit. Although both science and religion, each in its own way, aim for truth and thus often get involved in conflicts in real life (although this is less the case nowadays because religion is becoming aware that it loses in such a conflict and that it is able to exist independently without a conflict with science), they are different ways, in regard to subject, content, and method of approach. Science is a rational sphere of spirit dealing with what is in the empirical realm and thus can be verified, while religion relates to its transcendent object which is essentially a non-rational relationship of believing. Science, therefore, cannot deal with the transcendent object and mystical contents of religion because it exceeds its possibilities having to remain within the limits of the experienceable by definition. Science, therefore, can neither affirm nor deny religion. For the same reason it is not true that science, since it penetrates and discovers the perfection of a creative mind, is able to confirm belief (in the sense of proving) and that scientific discoveries are, in a way, participation in the divine mind.

On the other hand, the attitude that the realization of socialist society will abolish religion is too simple and naive because religion has, as stated before, not only social, but also psychical, moral, and cognitive origins. Alienation experienced in the course of life, primarily fear of death, existential and metaphysical fear (that which people in regions of Hrvatsko Zagorje and Prigorje call in its most intensive form opstrah), feeling of dependence, understanding the limits of the human being when compared to the immense and infinite cosmos and the related yearning for infinity in the eschaton, for immortality—all these are a solid foundation for creating religion. Thus, religion has a strong source also in the anthropological determination of the human being, in his/her ontic and ontological structure, and in his/her understanding of this structure which is, at least in some of its aspects, regardless of historical changes, very resistant to change. Therefore religion's source is human mortality, human resistance to it, and the impotence overagainst the absolute.

Furthermore religion raises implicit and constitutive metaphysical questions which it answers in its own way, namely non-rationally, by believing. Such a solidly established religion cannot be destroyed overnight by any social system. It can only be reformed and transformed. Open minded Yugoslav Marxists are aware of the fact that religion and religiosity are mass phenomena in socialist society and they recognize a certain coexistence of religiosity, religious indifference, and atheism under contemporary socialist conditions.
They do not think that religion is a mere relic of class-exploiting relationships of the past, a relic which was kept only because of some laws of spiritual inertia according to which the spiritual superstructure always falls behind changes of the material basis. (Such a position would imply such radical revolutionary changes, such a definite abolishment of all alienating social structures and mechanisms, and the establishment of new ones, as would always, and with no mistake, find the best possible solutions for all social and individual problems.) In addition, the humanistic Marxists of Yugoslavia do not simplify the connection between religiosity and the coexisting social conditions in socialism by finding it only in the still inadequate functioning of the institutions of this system, in social inequalities, in still existing conflicts, exclusively, in other words, in sporadic and marginal circumstances.

Open minded Yugoslav Marxists, therefore, understand Marx's project of a future classless, just, and human society as a long historical process which is not straight and calm, but is a the complex dialectic of social and historical conditions and possibilities, human needs and interests, aspirations and expectations, with rises and falls, enthusiasms and disappointments. Remaining on Marx's trail in all these, they see the source and the space of religion as a possible human relation to life and the world. It is quite clear to them, that socialism is not mediated by abolishment (or transformation) of religion but vice versa. So, they approach the dialogue with Christians by understanding it first of all as the dialogue of human beings, as the mutual search of truth for the sake of better human coexistence. They approach it scientifically and universally, philosophically and socially engaged, with a sincere intention to promote this dialogue as much as possible in order to realize its meaning, that is, to establish more human possibilities of mutual living in our historical time, in these territories.

They believe that, although Marxism and Christianity are (generally speaking) two different, and very often opposed, theoretical systems and historical forces, they still have something in common, especially in understanding the human being, in his/her essence, being, creation, and humanity. Therefore they are not antagonistic, irreconcilable or disparate. On the contrary, their coexistence and dialogue is not only possible but inevitable. It is precisely, the dialogue (dialogos), understood originally as conversation, that puts together the speech of people about their different theoretical and practical interests, their vital problems and their solutions, all with the aim of living together.

In this purview, we shall deal more with similarities, with what is common to Christianity and Marxism as basis for dialogue, and less with differences and difficulties that remain. Dialogue (dialegomai), has as its supposition neither identity nor disparity, but the differences and contradictions that should be put into a dialectic relationship.

Therefore, authentic (Marxian) Marxism and Biblical Christianity, aware of their historicism, do not understand their worldview and social and historical universality as
something definite and static, but as asymptomatic—as a lighthouse on the open horizon of the future toward which one should always aim.

Christianity, which aims to be Biblical, offers its message to all people and nations, leaving it up to free will of each individual whether it should be accepted or not. It does not hope for general success and everybody's acceptance. It is the acceptance of a constantly renewed choice. Faith is a constant search that directs historic action, and God, as the "unimaginable secret," opens the human being to an "absolutely new future" (Rahner).

Marxism, which also wants to be authentic, sees the possibility of realizing its epochal project of a future disalienated human society in the achievement of human productive abilities.

Practice as primeval poiesis of purpose, as comprehended humanistic philosophical vision, as the concrete, permanent production of an authentic human world, a humane human being, of authentic human life, in short, makes it possible to overcome the old, inhuman world, and to realize her/his free, universal, active essence.

The conception of radically changing existing reality into essentially new human reality, the vision of fundamental and radical changes that would result in a meaningful world is, therefore, the only possibility, the essential chance facing humanity. It is up to the human beings whether they will accept this challenge.

Reality has not yet been made meaningful by the world revolution. It remains questionable whether it ever will be made meaningful. By this we do not deny the dynamic character of utopia. It is not the question of particular change in the world, making it better or not. It is the question of future history. The human being, as the being who lives in possibility, can realize her/his human world in her/himself. In other words, the human being can decide not to be fully human. If she/he so chooses, it is enough to stay in this still inhuman "now," in this time of crisis. We finally face a dilemma: either alienation and absurdity (taking into consideration that total destruction is also possible) or a meaningful free human existence in the future for which one has to fight.

Philosophy in this sense, as a critique of the existing world and as messenger and vision of a new one, is to be a herald of change—thought capable of leading and producing a really human world. It should go deep to the roots of the real problems, delusions and dilemmas of modern human being and society. It should discover their causes and essence. It should point to the real possibility of overcoming and transcending them. It should also, of course, analytically clarify the essential question: how can it become thinking for revolutionary practice and yet remain philosophy, a free personal choice and not something obligatory and given and therefore oppressive.

The representatives of this briefly sketched dialogue orientation believe that there is no absolute contradiction between these antithetic couples: Christian theism and Marxist atheism,
and Christian eschatology and Marxist relation to the future. Christians believe, to be sure, that, in *ultima linea*, they have the answer to all essential questions of the world and of life. Marxists believe that people should fight for the meaning of life. While Christians believe the human relationship with God is their liberation, Marxists believe this to be an illusion and a dream. Christians (Girardi, Veres) claim that even though the relation between the two positions in which one confirms what the other denies is contradictory, the above mentioned pairings are not contradictions, since they do not refer to the same God (god), or at least not to the same conception of that notion which is found in the Christian affirmation and the Marxist negation.

Commenting upon this, Marko Kersevan, a Slovenian Marxist, says that in this case Augustine's God who is above any name and thought, above every ideal and every value, the God of mystics Meister Eckhart, Angelus Silesius, John of the Cross, and Eastern mystics, the God of the Gospel who is love, the God of Karl Rahner as "inexpressible truth", the "living God" of Henri de Lubac, etc.--these have not much to do with the god who is the subject of Marxist analysis of religion as projection or alienation.

It is true that Marx's atheism is in a way a derived form of the rational atheistic tradition of the Enlightenment (Voltaire, Helvetius, Strauss, Feuerbach). But it is not traditional in the proper sense of the word. It is not the direct theoretical denial of God but an affirmation of human life and of a world without God. It is not anti-religious; it is non-religious.

For Marx, God was the hypostatized generic essence of the human being, the objectivity of the human aim for the immense, undefined absolute that anesthetized people in their creativity.

Negation of God's existence is not the essential and primary metaphysical, philosophical principle of Marx and Marxism. This principle is rather the existence of human being and her/his affirmation as producer, producing out of being (nature) into history. Original Marxism is the attempt to create the world and history without God, not against God. It is not anti-theistic but a-theistic. Marxist atheism is a logical consequence of Marxist humanism. It actually stems from humanism, and is, therefore, relativistic. Being such, it cannot be an absolute contrast to Christian belief (in God).

Giulio Girardi claims that the Christian God is not to be understood as a competitor of human being, but is historically manifested as love and service for people. The greatest doctrinal difference between Marxism and Christianity, in Girardi's opinion, is not the essential characteristic, or the fundamental thesis of Marxism, although Marxists have criticized religion and denied God. The fundamental thesis is giving priority to the human being and humanity. But Marxism related human struggle with the principle of axiological rivalry between the human being and God and between worldly (especially economic) and holy values.
Although, in Girardi's opinion, the application of this principle is incorrect, he finds some justification for it. Marx was more acquainted with Protestant Christianity and criticized the individualism of Lutheran religiosity. This, and some related Christian notions—running away from the world, despising the flesh, considering the earth as "the valley of tears"—caused the relation between the human and divine activity to be understood as alternatives. Thus, in the name of the human being, God was rejected.

But, Girardi claims, that such Christianity is not authentic, Biblical Christianity. The God of Bible is the God of love, friendship and kindness to human being. There is no rivalry between them.

Marxist analysis of religion should by all means take into consideration these new insights as a basis in dialogue with Christians. In that sense, especially those tendencies in the contemporary Christian theology that radically depart from traditional theology by understanding God as assured immanence should be taken into consideration. These tendencies divide the divine substance into human attributes claiming the right to transform theology into anthropology (J.A.T. Robinson), reducing God's existence into existence of the world in the essentiality of its appearance in which alone God is manifested.

In regard to the relationship between Christian eschatology and Marxist creative relation to the future there is also an attempt to show that there are no absolute contradictions. Christians expect and look forward to Christ's return to earth, his parousia at the end of world history, which opens them to the "absolute future" (Rahner), and provokes, rather than paralyzes, their historical action. Referring to the Gospel, the above mentioned theologians insist that the promised future is not a definite, static value, but is realized through history, and that therefore, active partnership and not only passive expectation should be a part of its creation.

Marxists, on the other hand, want to fight for a free human future by means of human historical action, by permanent disalienation and liberation of people from their dependence on "the realm of necessity." The future "realm of freedom" cannot, however, be achieved automatically by revolutionary political organization of society and technical domination over nature. It cannot be dogmatically anticipated or futurologically programmed and foreseen. The possibility of unpredictability must be accepted. The future can only be felt intuitively, hoped for actively.

Thus understood Marxism and Christianity or Christians and Marxists in their understanding of the future and of the human being essentially oriented towards that future and, because of it, oriented towards active, constantly meaningfully self-transcending present, do have a realistic basis and subject for dialogue and discussion. Differences remain. For Marxists the insecurity of the future, of the human being, and of the world, is immanent. For Christians the concealment of the future (of God and God's manifestations)
is transcendent. The differences, however, can even be mutually motivating because Christians can be directed by Marxists into the more realistic historical dimension of the human being and society, and Marxists can be led by Christians into some existential, emotional spheres and border situations—anxiety, fear, pain, death, and the so-called ultimate questions about the primordial, about meaning, and the eschaton. The human being and life cannot be reduced only to political and economic facts and dimensions. The significance and need for both Christians and Marxists to direct themselves radically towards humanity and personality was perhaps, in the simplest and most concise way expressed by the Vatical Council’s constitution "Gaudium et spes," "According to nearly the same belief of believers and nonbelievers, everything on earth should be organized for the human being as its center and pinnacle."

Marx has also seen the self-realization of human being as the possibility for each individual to realize himself/herself as a personal "generic being," that is, to realize in himself/herself everything that is given to him/her by the human, creative potential of the human race. Marx’s thought that "the root of man is man himself" means that he comprehended the human being not as the abstract human race. The human being for Marx was not an abstract being "squatting outside the world." The world of the human being is primarily a society in which he/she lives.

Marx’s essential question was: what is it what makes man a human being and directs him/her to unite with other people? His answer was that human action, self-productive work, praxis, is what is essentially human, the "generic essence" of human being.

By producing himself/herself, his/her human species, human being becomes more and more human, becomes universal, total being, that is, he/she gets nearer and nearer to it. The entirety of the human being is manifested in two different ways: individually and generically. Those two totalities are in mutual essential unity and mutuality.

For these reasons the human being and her/his humanity should be the basis and the aim of dialogue between Marxists and Christians. The possibility of dialogue and cooperation between Christians and Marxists in humanistic attempts to improve humanism of the man/woman and his/her world is seen in the fact that humanism (and not atheism) is of primary importance in Marxism.

There are still essential differences in the defining of humanism. For Marxists radical humanism is atheism that comprehends God as hypostatized human essence, as projection of human idealized characteristics, as the absolute which anesthetizes the human being and prevents him/her in his/her real engagement. God should therefore be abolished. For Christians, on the other hand, who think that Marxist atheistic humanism is closed because it locks the human being in time and space, uncertainty and mortality, radical humanism is open humanism that keeps a human being open to eternity because human being as an
incomplete and imperfect being can achieve completeness only by uniting with the absolute, by uniting lovingly with God. There are also undeniable mutual acknowledgements of the value of the human being, of what is great in her/him, of mutual agreement that human being is rational, has the will and consciousness for decision-making and choice as a free being, who attempts to fulfill the meaning of her/his life.

From the humanist point of view this should be applauded because human personality should never serve as a means to anything, neither for the state nor social groups, nor political parties and their programs, nor the Church, its doctrines and interests. They can never justify devaluation or destruction of human personality, in Machiavellian service of "more important aims."

The human personality is much richer, more fluid, dialectically more sensitive than any title, definition, ideology or system, and as such, cannot be reduced exclusively to them. After all, there is no conception of the world and the human being, no system of thought that would embrace the whole of human being without remnants, that would never have to be complemented by something else, and would thus without reserve be accepted by all people.

Finally, the issue is mutual openness towards general human values, brotherhood/sisterhood, liberty, peace, and engagement for that which is of concern to all nations and all countries.

Last but not least, when reflecting about the serious efforts of open minded Yugoslav Marxists to promote dialogue with Christians, one should stress, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, that they are not abandoning the Marxist critique of religion. Based on the ideas of Marx's philosophy, religion is understood as alienation which is caused by people's social and creative inability within the context of class and social structures.10

The point is therefore not the merger of Marxist thought with the Christian religion, but advocacy by open minded Marxists of the true democratization of society. The existence of religion is a fact that cannot be neglected or administratively solved, but, according to Marx, can be dealt with only by means of real, consistent, radical humanizing and democratizing of all conditions of human life--social, economic, legal, political, cultural, and spiritual.

In the context of Marx's thought, religion is understood also as a specific relationship to, and understanding of, the world, as a specific human praxis, a specific production (and alienation from the "total production" of the future) and not only as a mere reflection of economical and political situation projected to another world. This should exclude the a priori negative evaluation of religion in general and of concrete historical religious phenomena.11

Such a broad and nuanced Marxist (some would claim also post-Marxist) approach in Yugoslavia, although aware of the fact that religion has been transformed in relation to social changes and still respecting the ontological and anthropological determination of human
being, claims that human beings with some psychological structures can satisfy their need for transcending empirical reality entirely and meaningfully, not only philosophically and artistically but also religiously. Perhaps even in a future humane society a socially and spiritually transformed religion may contribute to the transformation, de-institutionalization and de-ideologization of the whole society.

Endnotes

1. The coinage "Marxist Philosophy of Religion" is, to say the least, very complex. It should be noted that some consider it a questionable term, since they perceive as a problem the notion of a Marxist (not Marx's) philosophy as individual, rather than given and obligatory in approach. Besides, within the Marxist philosophy or theory of religion one can discern various tendencies. One of them retains Marx's critique of religion as alienation. Another is based on a vulgarized Marxist critique of religion along the Engels-Lenin-Stalin line. A third leans on Marx's understanding of religion as a certain praxis-production, that is, an appropriation of the world, and even goes further by speaking about an onto-anthropo-psychical foundation and dimensions of religion, for which reason some authors call it a post-Marxist philosophy of religion.

2. Marx's critical theses and polemical quotations about religion in various contexts, do not yet constitute an integrated philosophical or sociological theory of religion. His special objections and analyses of religion as the inevitable fact of class (capitalist) society lacks a single differentiated definition of religion, that is of religious practice-production, as the established appropriation of the world in relation to other socio-cultural phenomena and forms of mind, namely, in this context, special ways of production (morality, politics, law, science, philosophy) of which he speaks only marginally in the "Grundrisse."

   S. Vrcan, Od krize religije do religije krize. [From the Crisi of Religion to the Religion of Crisis] (Zagreb: Skolska knjiga, 1986).


6. Compare E. Cimic, *Drama ateizacije*.


10. Marx criticizes religion as primarily a social, class fact, in its social, political roots and its function in an exploitative (capitalist) social relationship, as their expression, but also as a means of their preservation and reproduction. Therefore, religion *per se*, religious solutions to so called "ultimate questions" about border-line situations of human life and existence, about the foundation and meaning of everything, without the mediation of social and historical media, and about the onto-anthropo-psyhical givennes of human being as transcending being, in sum as a phenomenon relatively independent and resistant constitution to historical changes, was not sufficiently appreciated by Marx.

11. Speaking about a theoretical method (method of political economy) in "Grundrisse", Marx sketched the specification of religion as a special method of appropriating of the world which is different from the rational, theoretical, and scientific. So, he implicitly determined the significance of religion as active, productive (praxis, poiesis), against passive (reflection), although he did not work it out in detail when compared to other phenomena which he mentioned. Compare, K. Marx, *Temelji slobode* [The Foundations of Freedom, from Grundrisse] (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1974), p. 27.