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Andrey Ivanov

Mennonite Brethren Biblical Seminary, Fresno, California

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THE MAKING OF A CONSPIRACY: RUSSIAN EVANGELICALS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR.

by Andrey Ivanov

Andrey Ivanov studies Church History and Theology at the Mennonite Brethren Biblical Seminary in Fresno, Ca. He also works as an Archival Assistant at the Center for Mennonite Brethren Studies.

On May 31, 2001, the Keston Institute News Service reported on a local law adopted by Belgorod Regional Duma aimed at restricting Protestant and all non-Orthodox activities in Belgorod. Intended to play “a preservatory role,” as formulated by Belgorod bishop Ioann, the new measures essentially prohibited any public gatherings of the non-Orthodox where minors were present, and thus engage in a religious activity without their parents’ consent. The regulations also sharply reduced foreign missionary activity and made it virtually impossible for believers without their own church building to rent atriums and other facilities. It also expressed concern about the proliferation of foreign faiths, and missionary activities spreading from the neighboring Ukraine.¹

Although the law has yet to be validated by the Constitutional Court, it exposed some of the discrepancies between the policy of the central government and its enforcement in the provinces. Some of the prevailing trends within local administrations’ public policies towards the non-Orthodox religious groups are often very negative ones. It was estimated that 30 out of 89 regional governments adopted restrictive religious laws after 1994.² This particular Belgorod law, as well

as the well-known 1997 act, aimed at better centralization of religious activities are far less menacing than policies exercised by other countries in the region. However, they do show a significant deviation from the extraordinary laissez-faire religious state policy of the years between 1991-1997. With the current “Counteracting Anti-Extremist Activities” legislation on the table in the Federation Council and the lack of conscientious objectors/civil service alternative it is clear that the current religious policy of the Russian Federation is aimed at consolidating the mechanisms of regulation of religious activities.

The underlying causes for these laws certainly are a subject of debate. Yet it would be wrong to assume that the law adopted by the popularly elected Duma would reflect nothing but the populist and nationally-protectionist biases seen in the general society. Whereas the central government usually gets the most blame for restraining freedoms, it is often the local ‘bosses’ who initiate and carry out these restrictions by popular demand. While large segments of today’s Russia’s population share some of these nationalistic sentiments, it is the central and not local government that often attempts to mediate or suppress the militant fervor of some groups. This is true in cases where Putin honored Pentecostal Union President V. Murza in 2001 as Russia’s distinguished minister of the year (the first time for a non-Orthodox) or took a stand against the growing anti-semitism. Nevertheless, the government must face criticism and responsibility for the actions of religious freedom violations in the provinces. This is especially relevant, given the long legacy of persecution that was instigated not by the local but the central government.

315 year presence in Russia requirement for organizations to register and enjoy full rights in Russia.
4Take, for example, draconian anti-public-gatherings laws in Lukashenko’s Belarus, or recent curbing of all non-Muslim activities in Central Asian states.
5Nizhni Novgorod is an exception, first region to develop alternative service program.
While most Christians in the West are aware of the persecution during the Communist regime, often little attention is given to the repression under the Tsars. It is true that the persecution in the 1860s, 70s, and 80s was far less fierce, and that the 1905 Manifesto gave a wide range of freedoms to the dissenters. Yet the onset of World War I resurrected some of the most reactionary conservative elements in the public and the government calling for a *revanche* against the religious minorities who grew and consolidated themselves between 1905 and 1914. World War one was a vivid example of the struggle that occurred not only in the political arena, but also among Evangelicals themselves on how to respond to a new political reality. Looking at the past, it may be easier to understand the responses and trends that Evangelicalism developed here in the last 90 years.

**WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF CONSPIRACY FEARS**

The start of the First World War brought hope that the Russian Imperial government would ease the left-right political hostilities, which characterized the period of four consecutive elected Dumas. The prompt victory over Austria-Hungary and the Germans would serve as a unifying idea for the conservatives and liberals alike. However, the advances of Russian troops in the fall of 1914 were short-lived. The year 1915 brought unexpected challenges for Russia and its participation in the First World War. It was a year that brought Austro-German troops east of the Vistula River and caused spontaneous Russian retreats from parts of Poland, Lithuania, Volhynia and Galicia. The year 1915 critically altered the military plans drawn by both the Central Powers and the *Entente Cordiale*. German hope for the *blitzkrieg* through Flanders and Champagne en route to Paris in 1914 resulted in a stalemate, and hopes for pursuing considerable advances in the east by Russian army were only partly realized in the strenuous victories in Galicia and East Prussia. Meanwhile, Germany and Austria took steps to regroup their position in order to abandon considerable advances in the West and concentrate on the Eastern front instead. This resulted in 140 divisions of infantry and cavalry being
stationed in the east and only 91 in the west by September of 1915. Stronger pressure from the reinforced Austro-German front led to surrender by the Russians in Galicia, Warsaw, Kowno, the Vistula valley and other strategic locations. The eastward flight of refugees blocking the army’s way created miserable conditions amidst the troops. The technological and humanitarian dimensions of the war crisis made the prospects of the noble retreat a la 1812 seem quite dim and the General Staff frantically sought for ways to face the public in explaining the perplexity of the situation.

The Russian retreat itself was characterized by growing deficiencies in ammunition, food, communication and transportation on the front. It became clear that the country had to brace for a longer war than was originally planned and expected. The German advances in 1915 exacerbated fears of the imminent defeat of the Entente, and prompted more policy makers to look inward to detect any impediments to the war effort. As the Kaiser’s soldiers marched into Warsaw, Lodz, Kowno and Lutzk, there were more calls for further revision not only of Russia’s military but also public policy. While modifications in military doctrine attempted to stimulate defenses from external enemy troops, the internal public policy turned to search for domestic forces that would be the most likely to commit sabotage. The internal attack against these subversive elements was thus deemed as important as external defense. Initiating and also inflating such fears, the press and the public (as well as some governmental) opinion searched for scapegoats in their midst. Reports of conspiracies moved beyond the realm of sheer rumors and were heralded everywhere – from the rural Siberian steppes to the court of the Tsar himself. In 1915 it was easy to find published remarks about Jewish conspiracy, a Catholic conspiracy, about suspicious airplanes landing in forests belonging to Russian

8Ibid., but also a good discussion of the retreat in Michael T. Florinsky, The End of the Russian Empire (New York: Collier Books, 1961) 194-205.
9Florinsky, 198-199.
German farmers, German-influenced Socialist propaganda in the army, as well as German plots in connection with the influences of Rasputin and the Tsarina on Nicholas II. Treason and lack of patriotism became a label, that was attached to revolutionaries, Social-Democrats, Germans, sectarians, pacifists, and to almost everything non-Orthodox and non-Great Russian.

As a result, several groups in society were questioned about their loyalty and patriotism toward the state. Among them were Jews, Catholics, Caucasian Muslims, and Russia’s ethnic Germans. The property liquidation measures of 2 February and 13 December 1915, for example, afflicted Russian Germans’ farms, while promising to re-distribute the land owners’ estates to the landless peasant soldiers on the front. The charge of pan-Germanism and social sabotage was also brought against Russian Evangelical sectarians: Baptists, Stundists/Evangelical Christians, Adventists, and some other groups. They were accused of a conspiracy to demolish the two pillars upon which the Empire rested: the Monarchy and the Orthodoxy. This essay will discuss a threefold conspiracy charge directed against the Evangelicals. First, the conspiracy pertained to the realm of external affairs: sectarians were simply the Kaiser’s tool to bring the Teutonic hordes, their faiths, and Kultur to Russian soil. Second, the conspiracy implicated the Evangelicals in internal political struggle: they were plotting together with socialists and anarchists to overthrow the Monarchy. Third, the conspiracy accused the Evangelicals of individualistic opportunism: they avoided military service and used the Bible to defend their pacifist beliefs.

The causes of these accusations must be addressed at the outset. The Russian reactionary forces blamed, among others, the religious dissenters because of the Evangelicals’ inability to create a solid position about political issues during the war. Their lack of organization and emphasis on individual (rather than

10While the press openly criticized Rasputin’s and the Tsarina’s powers, others wanted to take the initiative into their hands. In 1915, the Tsar’s trusted general, Alekseev was involved in planning a plot to kidnap ethnically German Alexandra, relieving the Tsar from the pro-German influences of his wife and Rasputin. K.P.Kramarz, Russkii Krizis (Paris: Rapid-Impremerie, 1925) 237-238.
corporate) political ethics put Evangelical sectarians on various spectrums of opinion about the war, the Tsar and post-1905 democracy. The ethnic Germans Vereins, sent their senators, bankers, and attorneys to convince the Emperor of their patriotism. Sectarians, on the other hand, had little economic or political influence and no political parties of their own. Sensitive to individualist interpretation of ethics and Scripture in general, Evangelicals had not developed a sense of denominational identity. Many decided to sustain relations with other dissenting and minority groups, not always because of ideology but because of their common plight. Among these groups were Jews, Socialists, Molokans, and Old Believers. Again, there was no common institution to give definition to their political attitudes, and there was no framework within which the Evangelicals could determine on which sides of the political spectrum they ought to be. Some chose one, others chose the other, often based on the functional sympathies of the classes they represented (which were mostly lower ones).

In short, the dissent never fully institutionalized itself before the war. Evangelicals were a diverse movement dating its origins back to 1860s. Some groups, like the Evangelical Christians, first founded ‘house churches’ back in 1860s, but the Evangelical Christian Union was only formed in 1909, and the Baptist Union, in 1880. They had no confessions of faith until the early 1900s. Though accused of ‘Western rationalism’ by the Orthodox, the Evangelicals shared many common traits with the so-called ‘irrational’ sects: Molokans, Tolstovites, and Malevantsy. Having maintained a marginality in society, Evangelicals found themselves at odds with the state that demanded organized affiliation and unanimous support of the war.

THE NATURE OF THE CONSPIRACIES

In January 1917, the Chief Chaplain of the Army and the Navy complained to Commander V. I. Romeiko-Gurko that the Evangelical soldiers likened the war between Germany and Russia to an ancient battle between the faithful Hebrews and the pagans in Palestine. They saw faithful Germans as Hebrews fighting pagan
Russians in the war, and “Wilhelm as their Tsar.” His conclusion was that none of these religious dissenters were loyal, and that their faith determined their political allegiance. The dissent itself, however, was considered a product of a German conspiracy to weaken Orthodoxy by promoting Protestant beliefs. This conspiracy was supposedly carried over through the German settlers who were invited by Catherine II to colonize the South Russian steppes. Right after the start of the war, the Bishop of Tavrida and Simferopol Dimitriy wrote to the governor of Tavrida in a special report of 4 October, 1914 that, “being nurtured by Russia, Germans, who were invited to develop agriculture, had thanked their new fatherland by planting Stundism and God-hated Baptism.” That statement, does in fact carry some truth, but not in a sense of deliberate ‘planting.’

Germanic settlers did play an important role in the origins of the two main branches of Evangelical movement in Russia – the Baptists and the Stundists (“Evangelical Christians”). The emergence of a new stream of Pietist and Evangelical renewal in the 1860s precipitated a religious ferment not only among isolated colonists but their Slavic neighbors as well. Johann Oncken, a Baptist preacher from Hamburg, arrived in Southern Russia in the 1860s, preaching not only among the German Baptist colonies of Novorossia, but also among Mennonites and Lutherans. He baptized and “ordained” Abraham Unger, a Mennonite from the village of Einlage (Kitchkass) near Alexandrovsk, who later

12“Oblagodetelstvovanny Rossiyyu nemtsy, priglashonnnye nasazhdat’ agrikulturу, otblagodarili svoye novoye otechestvo tem tol’ko, chto nasadili shtundu i bogomerzkyi baptizm.” From: Gosudarstvennyy Arkhiv Avtonomnnoy Respubliki Krym, Simferopol. [GAARK, State Archives of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Simferopol.] Fond No. 26, Opis 3, File 911. All references below are based on the microfilm copy at the Center for Mennonite Brethren Studies -Fresno Tavrida Collection.
split away from the mainline Mennonite Church, and formed a new church of Mennonite Brethren, together with Gerhard Wieler and several other separatists. Wieler and Unger baptized many Russian and Ukrainian converts and were instrumental in forming the Russian Baptist Union, of which Wieler was chairman until 1886.

Yet the new formed believer groups often were able to function on their own, as many German preachers went into exile or were threatened with imprisonment. In the Trans-Caucasus conversions occurred under the influence of German Baptist Martin Kalweit. However, many conversions also occurred among the Molokans – a dissenting Old Believers’ group, which emerged independently of the Western influence, but possessed profound similarities with the Evangelicals. Many ‘converts’ did not associate themselves with any union, and the population often christened them as “Stundists,” as their services originally only lasted for one hour (in German, eine Stunde), in a traditional German Protestant way. In the nation’s capital, St. Petersburg, Evangelical teachings spread also among some lower nobility, with the influences of British Lord Radstock, in the so-called Pashkov’s Circle.

Sectarians’ open friendship with the ‘Germans,’ often made it harder for the colonists to build their places of worship. In 1893, petitions of the Mennonites of Kotlyarevka, Memrik and New York to build their own prayer houses were rejected.

14Ibid.
16M.S. Karetnikova “Russkoje Bogoiskatel’stvo: Natsional’nyye Korni Yevangel’sko-Baptistskogo Dvizheniya,” Al’manakh Po Istorii Russkogo Baptizma (St.Petersburg: Bibliya Dla Vsekh, 1997) 66. In her article (pp.3-83), Karetnikova (Professor of History at St. Petersburg Christian University) conducts a thorough investigation of the non-Western roots of Russian Evangelicalism going back to the Middle Ages and Russian Renaissance of the 16th century. Hans-Christian Diedrich in his Siedler, Sektierer und Stundisten (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1985) 60-79 also discusses the question of Evangelical/Baptist roots in the medieval dissent and the role played by the German settlers.
based on their “fanaticism and desire to convert Orthodox people.”¹⁷ In 1896, a number of similar applications to the Kherson and Samara gubernia were turned down by the governors, who feared that the church buildings would attract curious peasants to learn of the “German faith.”¹⁸ Of course, none of these cases were ever considered without consulting first with the local bishops, who generally advised the governors not to give permission to the colonists.

‘The worshipers of the German Caesar!’

¹⁷ Correspondence between Ekaterinoslav governor and Dept of Religious Affairs, Sept-Nov 1893. TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 5, Delo 1026. CMBS Reel 3.
¹⁸ Ibid. Correspondence of Dept of Religious Affairs with Kherson and Samara governors.
The Pobedonostzev era of 1890s signaled the worst days of persecution for these new groups, but in the early 1900s, the persecution subsided to the point of granting complete freedom in 1905. But the pressures resumed in 1912 and 1913. In 1913, a 140-page report was submitted to the 4th State Duma featuring complaints about the Evangelicals in various gubernias, whose prayer houses were shut down and rights to worship curbed due to accusations of pan-Germanism, among other things.19 Already in 1902-1903 such a charge was addressed in General I. I. Filipenko’s correspondence with the Bishop of Simferopol and Tavrida. The general, stationed in Sevastopol, criticized some of the Orthodox priests’ imputation against sectarians. He found that apart from being called the “Anti-Christ,” the Stundists allegedly “are tools of Pan-Germanism…they worship their Caesar and are not loyal to the authorities.” On the other hand, Filipenko noted that some priests also “ridicule the Stundists’ honesty and loyalty, good way of living.” After spending some time among them, he was appalled at the made-up accusations of their “worship of Germanhood,” calling them “solid Great-Russians.”20

By the beginning of the World War, the Evangelicals turned from being labelled anti-Christ himself to being charged with collecting money for “German Wilhelm, the Anti-Christ.”21 According to a different report, it was actually Wilhelm who gave the sectarians money. In February 1915 the Ministry of Internal Affairs circulated a departmental report, Assessments of South-Russian Sectarianism,22 in which Bismarck was allegedly responsible for transferring a “billion[milliard] rubles” for the cause of Evangelical proselytism in Russia out of “political and statist motivations.”23 These motivations were formulated by German philosopher Hartmann that “in order to conquer the Russians, their spirit, i.e. Orthodoxy needs to be weakened.”24

19TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 311. Reel 16.
20I. I. Filipenko correspondence with the Bishop of Tavrida and Ministry of Internal Affairs. TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 5, Delo 1042. CMBS Reel 23.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
The local authorities often diligently endeavored to expose some of these secret money transfers. On 15 March 1915 the Ataman of the Terek Cossack District reported on local observations about the church of “Evangelical Christians” in the village of Ilarionovskoye. The preacher of the mostly-Russian congregation, Kasper Goebbel, was found preaching “thou shalt not kill” to his conscripted parishioners, encouraging them to “shoot up in the air,” lest they be “murderers.” In response to the parishioners’ request to pray for the Tsar, the pastor responded that the Tsar was a “Herod leading his people to slaughter.”25 The suspicions of the authorities only increased after they saw Kaspar Goebbel becoming rich within his first three years of preaching. Goebbel went from a poor peasant to possessing a 30,000-ruble estate. During August 1914, right before the war, he propagated with “special rigor,” while on the day of the proclamation of war, he gathered all his German friends in a secluded meeting in his home.26 All this gave the ataman enough reason to report Goebbel as a spy paid by German intelligence, and his preaching as indoctrinating propaganda.

For many public figures, the fight against the ‘indoctrination’ became essential to the war effort. Vostorgov’s speech titled “A Hostile Spiritual Avant-garde” drew many supporters, as he presented his logic as follows:

“We are being overridden by the German faith. The sectarian propagandists are demoralizing our spirit. History warns us that a cultural takeover usually precedes a military takeover. The Baptists and the Adventists originated in Lutheranism; they regularly receive financial aid and literature from Germany. It would be naïve to think that this help comes from German concern to save Russia. It is to destroy Russia. If German soldiers should appear in our streets today, we would fall upon them and put them behind prison walls. Yet the German faith has invaded us, and we do nothing. As we would war with German troops, so let us war with German ideas!”27

“The traitors of the Tsar and friends of the Teutons”28 carried a threat to cultural identity. The governor of Tavrida prompted the Military Governor-General of Novorossia Ebelov to close the prayer houses in strategic coastal cities on the Black Sea not only because of the Evangelicals’

26Ibid.
28Quoting 20 Feb 1915 patriotic proclamation in Kolokol. Blane 89.
ties to Germany, but also because of the new faith’s erosion “of Russian traits in converted persons…and their attainment of indifference to everything Russian.”

The Bishop of Simferopol argued that after one’s acceptance of Baptism, “high moral qualities of the Russian soul…are completely destroyed in the human being and make a person unrecognizable.”

The already–mentioned Assessments outlined three main centers where German cultural propaganda was printed and distributed by the Evangelical preachers in Russia: “1) International Tract Society in Hamburg; 2) I. F. Grote Publications in Petrogradl; 3) H. J. Braun Publications in Halbstadt colony, Tavrida gubernia.”

By the end of 1914, one of the avenues of propaganda – Halbstadt’s “Raduga Publications” was closed. Mennonite Brethren Heinrich J. Braun and president of Evangelical Christian Union Ivan Prokhanov managed this enterprise. Raduga Publications was shut down on 17 December, 1914 by order of the Odessa Military Governor-General, mainly on charges of pan-Germanism in both German and Russian Baptist literature that was published at Raduga. The former was simply linguistically unpatriotic and the latter was propagandist. Funded by local Germans, publishing this literature in Russian for German consumption did not make any sense, and thus was used to contaminate Russian minds with the ideas of “rotten Western German rationalistic sects.”

In January 1915, after a series of petitions by H. Braun, “Raduga” was allowed to re-open, as long as no Baptist or uncensored German books were to be published again. Braun and Prokhanov found themselves in a dilemma: it was unpatriotic to publish German books, but it was also anti-Orthodox (and thus, equally unpatriotic) to publish Russian Baptist ones. In June 1915, the Petrograd mayor wrote his conclusion to the Minister of Internal Affairs that, “inspired by their German Adventist and Stundo-Baptist preachers, these sects have such a strong influence from Germany, that they, but especially Baptists, are nothing but nurseries of Germanism in Russia.”

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2912 March 1915 Letter from Tavrida governor to Governor-General Ebelov, TsGIARF, Fond 1292, Opis 5, Delo 340. Reel 29.
30Report to Bishop Dimitriy of the priest of Maryanovka, Berdyansk uyezd Evthimiy Yevzhenko. GAARK, Fond 26, Opis 3, Delo 911.
31Zaklyuchenije.
33TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12.
On 3 August 1915, Minister of Internal Affairs Shcherbatov announced in that famous Duma session that “among...[the Baptists] along with those who are sincere believers, there are not a few undoubted tools of the German government.”\(^{34}\) Despite the protest on behalf of the Social-Democrats and especially Skobelev, the Baptist leaders continued to be exiled, and their hospitals and prayer houses sealed up. Later on, Father Stanislavsky of the Right party, stated in the Duma that the Stundists were simply “implanted” by the Germans forty years ago to initiate the destruction of Russia from within. He went on to allege that conscripted sectarians in the army “surrender at first opportunity,” and hope for Germany’s military victory so that their “true Evangelical faith, will flourish.”\(^{35}\) He then urged that a resolution be adopted to classify these sectarians (Stundists, Adventists and New Israelites) as subversive to the war effort, and to resume the persecutions of the Pobedonostzev era. Otherwise, he thought, the sectarians who viewed German culture as superior might themselves usher the defeat upon the Monarchy.

These accusations, however, prompted a series of responses from the Baptist-Evangelical leadership. Ivan S. Prokhanov wrote many petitions to the government calling for release of the imprisoned preachers and assuring Evangelicals’ support of the war effort. In one petition, he referred to the “heroic deeds” of his believers on the front, and presented an argument that while Jews or Tatar Muslims may openly profess their faith, Evangelical Christians “Russians by nature”\([russkiye po prirodye]\) are denied full freedom.\(^{36}\) Indeed, many believers joined the army and supported the war. After all, in Goebbel’s case, it was his own parishioners who reported the pastor’s unpatriotic behavior to the authorities. Prayers for the Emperor and collections of funds for the war needs were commonplace among the Evangelicals, while the official Evangelical publications from the war period carried hardly any anti-war literature.\(^{37}\) Prokhanov, Pavlov and many others, however, realized that their believers’ attitudes towards the war could not comply

\(^{34}\)John S. Curtiss, *Church and State in Russia; the Last Years of the Empire, 1900-1917* (New York:Octagon Books, 1965) 384.

\(^{35}\)Ibid., 385.

\(^{36}\)Letter from 29 August 1915. TsGIARF, Fond 821,Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12

\(^{37}\)Paul D. Steeves in pages 92-94 describes manifestations of Evangelical patriotism, such as opening of church-sponsored hospitals for the wounded, public prayers and services for the victory in Moscow and victory vigils near the Winter Palace in Petrograd organized by Prokhanov. Also, A. I. Klibanov *History of Religious Sectarianism in Russia (1860s-1917)*, trans. Ethel Dunn (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982) 332-333. Majority of patriotic manifestations, however, took place in large cities: Moscow, Petrograd, Ekaterinoslav, Odessa, Tiflis.
with the denominational position; because historically, there simply was none. Many Evangelical Christians functioned without a union for over fifty years, allowing each individual pastor and/or believer to interpret the war through the lenses of their own Bible reading. The Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod was amazed at the Stundist peasants’ theology of war when they refused to pray for the army, stating,

“One need not to pray for the Russian victory: for if we will pray about it, then the Germans will pray for their victory too, and then the war will continue without an end.”

Thus, Prokhanov and other Petersburg denominational leaders did not have many cards to play the note of the believers’ unanimous support for the war. Yet there was one argument that they sought to employ against the allegations of pan-Germanism. That ‘card’ was a British connection. In the winter of 1915-1916, Petrograd’s branch of the YMCA was suddenly shut down on charges of spying for Germany. While Novoye Vremya praised the decision, a very different reaction came from its patron – Senator Graf Pahlen, an Evangelical sympathizer, who openly stated that the organization was of Anglo-American, and not German character, and thus drew suspicion from many of the Lutherans. He accused the editor of Novoye Vremya of ignorance, and claimed that the decision had nothing to do with its pan-Germanist character. There was an undeniable support for the YMCA by Petrograd’s Baptists, but the society itself always carried a non-denominational character. Stating that the Association was founded in England - Russia’s ally, Graf Pahlen concluded that the decision to close down the YMCA was not well thought out. He then presented the Evangelicals as true patriots, who support the war, prayed for the Emperor, for the victory, and collected funds for the needs of the war and the needs of the wounded. Their “brethren in England” did the same.

In the confidential correspondence between the Supervisor of the Department of Religious Affairs and the Department of Police supervisor Klimovich it was surprising that the government was indeed aware of the British influences over the Baptists. Citing an Okhrana (Russia’s secret service) report, the letter spoke of two branches of missionaries responsible for

385 Feb 1915, Report of Chief Prosecutor of Holy Synod to the Minister of Internal Affairs about the Elizavetpol gubernia peasant sectarian attitudes to war. TsGIARF, Fond 1292, Opis 5, Delo 340. Reel 29.
39TsGIARF, Fond 821,Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12. Ivan Prokhanov to Petrograd’s gradonachalnik [mayor].
supporting the Evangelical-Baptist movement: the Germans and Anglo-Americans. It further stated:

“Under the influence of the Germans, the anti-state and anti-militarist tendencies are developed among the Evangelical Christians and the Baptists. The English organizations are trying to keep the sectarians loyal and in their publications call on Russian sectarians to be law-obedient.”

Despite this, the government still decided to deport Petrograd’s preacher R. Fetler - not as a German spy, but as an “agent of London, funded by England and Pioneer Mission of America.” He was allegedly plotting to “help England make of Russia an English colony.” In the eyes of the reaction-minded officials, the allies in the war against German troops were not necessarily the allies in the war against ‘German faith.’ Later in 1916 came also a call to refuse the American Baptist Mission Organization access to work among the prisoner-of-war camps in Russia. The ABMO was referred to as “one of the most dangerous sectarian promoters in Russia, funding many Evangelicals.” At its conference in America, the report claimed, the “German, British and Russian Baptists were seated next to each other.” An inter-national mélange of this sort was clearly a violation of the patriotic Union Sacré that sectarians needed to uphold. In that respect the Russian Evangelicals seemed similar (or related) to another group in Europe that shared the same degree of internationalist connections – the socialists. Indeed the Socialists of England, Russia, Germany, despite being torn by the warring nationalistic tendencies, still shared the same ideological persuasion and increasingly, toward the end of the war, were coming to hold very similar conclusions about the casus belli.

“The Socialists, the Anarchists, the Cosmopolitans”

In May of 1878, a student from St. Petersburg Technological institute, Ivan

40Okhrana Report. TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12
41Ibid.
42Steeves, 95. For a full account of Fetler’s life journey, see Oswald A. Blumit, Sentenced to Siberia (Wheaton, IL, 1943)
Basov, appeared in the Stundist villages in Kherson gubernia, spreading “revolutionary propaganda” with slogans like “Down with Aristocracy!” and “People, seek your rights!” In the correspondence between the Kherson governor and Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was found that Basov’s official excuse for going there was to study the “psychology” of the Stundist sects, but the Ministry also suggested a connection between Basov’s revolutionary activities at home and his desire to see the Stundists.44 Indeed, many saw the connection between a desire for a religious and a social liberation, and the government in the early years of Evangelicalism saw the two concepts equally attractive among the peasants. “Communism is the bait with which Stundists catch neophytes,” said a gubernial report to Novorossia Governor-General in 1867.45

In 1902-1903 correspondence of General I. I. Filipenko and Bishop of Tavrida, the allegations of sectarian socialist affiliation seemed absurd. In March 1903 he wrote,

>“Despite the accusations of socialism and disrespect for the authorities, the Stundists actually propagate very conservative political views. They do not share socialist views on property, and are actively involved in private enterprise. They urge their members to pray for the Tsar and the authorities and stamp out any form of liberalism.”46

The conservative elements in the government, however, saw the dissenters to be more loyal to their international connections than to the Monarchy. In early 1900s customs and censorship officials seized many books, tracts and devotional literature published in England and Germany.47 Evangelical preachers in exile before 1905 went to places like Switzerland or England, rallying for foreign pressure against the suppression of religious freedom. Even after 1905, the authorities looked at the international ‘cosmopolitan’ connections with suspicion. After all, it did look suspicious that sectarian leaders like Prokhanov or Mazaev, being of lower class, or even peasant background, enjoyed recognition and support from elite Protestant circles abroad. Some in the government were also afraid of those elites aiding sectarians visibly at home or dictating to them ideological principles. At the Baptist congress in Odessa in September of

44TsGIARF, Fond 1284, Opis 220, Delo 19.
45Quoted in Klibanov, 259.
46TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 5, Delo 1042. Reel 23.
47Central Committee for Foreign Censorship, 23 March 1906 detailed report on intercepted Adventist literature from Philadelphia and Hamburg. Tracts and books describing the “mark of the Beast” of all those who violated the Sabbath. TsGIARF, Fond 776, Opis 12, Delo 10. Reel 23.
1908, a prominent preacher from Pennsylvania declared, “We need to elevate the poor, so that they reach equality with the rich.”\(^{48}\) During the congress in 1909 one of the foreign visitors preached to the public a clearly ‘Marxist’ message: “from every one according to their abilities, to everyone according to their need.”\(^{49}\) These and some other incidents prompted the Ministry of Internal Affairs in November of 1911 to reject the president of the Baptist Alliance Rev. MacAlpine’s plans to visit churches in Russia. Despite the appeals to allow MacAlpine into Russia, including a letter from ambassador C. Guild and recommendation from Theodore Roosevelt (who was, then, editor of The Outlook Magazine), the Ministry was very reluctant to allow him operate among Russians, citing that the Baptist Alliance was “too socialist and cosmopolitan.” The same year the appeal to allow St. Petersburg Evangelical Christians to open a seminary was denied as well.\(^{50}\)

Socialism and the Evangelical movement alike sustained well-developed international ties and maintained a closely-knit network of public agitation. Both appealed to and found support among the mostly lower classes. Both envisioned (especially given the Evangelicals’ post-millennialism) the coming of the brotherhood-of-all-men, an egalitarian society, though they had differing opinions about the avenues through which a future paradise might arrive. Both groups endured many years of mistreatment and persecution, and both had their martyrs and their traitors. It is no surprise that the government proclaimed both groups equally destructive to the war effort. They threatened the very survival of Russian ‘genuine culture,’ as they tried to present their own alternative to the ideals of Tsar, Faith and Motherland. On 7 March 1915 the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent a secret circular to the heads of the police departments and gendarmerie, to increase the pressure on the sectarians and socialists alike. The circular stated that “close ties have been established between the destructive attempts of the revolutionaries and those who undermine the predominance of the Russian Orthodox Church.” Therefore, both groups possessed the same goal -- “to overthrow the Imperial regime.” The circular goes on to state that the Adventists “acquired the tendencies of anarchism,” Dukhobors exert “anti-

\(^{48}\)Baptist, 1908, No. 12; quoted in Golovashchenko, 154.
\(^{49}\)He was elaborating on the parable of Jesus about late-coming workers, underlining that principle as an eternal Gospel law, but not a political one. Baptist, 1909, No. 18; Golovashchenko, 155.
\(^{50}\)Correspondence between Rev. MacAlpine and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Oct-Nov 1911. TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Dielo 273. Reel 14.
militarism, socialism, cosmopolitism,” while the Stundists possessed “social-democratic tendencies.” The Baptists “not once proclaimed themselves as opponents of the current regime,” they aspired to a “social rebellion” and “inspire the workers to fight the Government.”51 In a different report, the Ministry of Interior claimed the dissenters’ wide use of revolutionary slogans in the church services. According to Prokhanov’s newspaper Utrennyaya Zvezda, the believers in Moscow instead of praying for the Tsar, prayed for the well-being of all Emperors and all armies, as well as for abatement of warfare.52 The secret service (Okhrana) reported tendencies of “antimilitarism, socialism and cosmopolitism”53 to the Ministry of Interior many times, but stated that such tendencies were more common among the capital’s Baptists than Evangelical Union members.

The conspiracy of Socialist-Evangelical common plot seemed reasonable to those who observed the Social Democrat defense of the sectarians in the political arena even before the war. Following the Duma report of shutting down various places of worship on 3 May 1913, a heated discussion followed. During the dispute, Social Democrats Petrovsky (Bolshevik fraction) and Skobelev (a Menshevik) attacked the policies of harassment adopted by both Orthodox missionaries and local police authorities. Interrupted during their speech by some of the more conservative members of the Duma such as Chkheidze and Purishkevich (the latter one was described by Petrovsky as a “clown”), they called for an immediate resolution to stop these police excesses. Their proposal was protested by the reports of Father Popov of Voronezh and Fr. Mitrotisky from Kiev, where Baptists and sectarians were referred to as “anti-church and anti-state.”54 Their ideas were considered revolutionary and subversive. Yet the arguments extended by Petrovsky and Skobelev included denunciation of religious fanaticism and religion alike. Proclaiming themselves atheists, they stated that sectarians’ plight interested them only because of their ideological motivations. They viewed sectarianism as a religious expression of the

51Golovashchenko, 157.
52Utrennyaya Zvezda, No. 8, Friday, 20 Febr 1915. CMBS-Fresno Reel 12.
53TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12.
54
TsGIARF, Ibid. Minutes of Duma meeting on 3 May 1913.
masses’ craving for revolution.\textsuperscript{55} The speech itself was published in the \textit{Utrennyaya Zvezda} and received mixed reviews from Prokhanov.

Among the left, there was a clear division of opinion about the Evangelicals. A. Q. Blane argues that at least until 1905, Lenin fully shared the view that the sectarians would be major assistants in building the proletarian state.\textsuperscript{56} Lenin’s colleague Bonch-Bruyevich defended this position even after the Revolution. There were, however, two major impediments to the recognition of sectarians as a leftist revolutionary movement. First, was the lack of revolutionary class conscience amidst their leadership. Indeed, Baptist functionaries like D. Mazaev, Pavlov, Balikhin, Zakharov, while from a poorer background, ended up becoming successful entrepreneurs. The Baptists and Stundists alike sought not to overthrow the regime but to improve their situation through communal and hard work. Their sober lifestyle together with a network of assisting ‘brotherly help,’ fostered their economic improvement. While the majority never reached a status of nobility or large scale land ownership, there were many examples of landless peasants becoming successful artisans, village teachers, and sharecroppers.\textsuperscript{57} There were also some nobles affiliated with Evangelicals and often facilitating avenues of financial and political assistance. Baron von Korf, Countess Lieven, Baron Nikolaii, Graf Pahlen were all members of the capital’s aristocracy interested in the Evangelicals’ cause. The second factor was the movement’s essential ties to the Russian-German landowners. The Stundists and the Baptists learned their techniques in land cultivation, and, often enjoyed not only hiring privileges, but also much better treatment from their bosses in industries owned by Russian Germans. They thus maintained strong contacts with their German brethren, who provided them with economic and religious patronage. Popular Russian writer Sholokhov, in his historical drama about the Russian revolution \textit{Tikhiy Don} (The Quiet Don), included a remark about the four hundred workers in the Martens factory in Millerovo. When asked about the revolutionary activity in that factory, one of the characters in the story responds that “these are not real proletarians because they are all well-to-do. Everyone has their own house, a wife, and all kinds of luxuries. And half

\textsuperscript{55}As a result, the Duma did not pass any of the resolutions proposed by Petrovsky and Skobelev, but ended instead with the adoption of unanimous congratulation telegram to His Imperial Majesty for the occasion of the Tsar’s May 6\textsuperscript{th} birthday.
\textsuperscript{56}Blane, 118-122.
\textsuperscript{57}A. I. Klibanov places an emphasis on the kulak tendencies among the rural Evangelicals, as well as their cooperation with the “bourgeois upper strata of Baptism.” pp260-266.
of them are Baptist. Their own boss – is their preacher, so, that one hand washes the other…”

Close co-operation between the dissenters and various ‘well-to-do’ brethren encouraged entrepreneurship and dissuaded them from open participation in revolutionary activity.

Being to a certain degree at odds with both the left and the right compelled Prokhanov, Mazaev and others to walk a thin line of appeasement to the ruling regime. It was dangerous to associate with the right-wing German landowners, who supported and aided Evangelicals on functional levels throughout the provinces. But it was even more dangerous to claim affinity with the left-wing Social Democrats, and their calls to halt the war. While some of the believers sympathized with the Socialists, others (especially the artisans or entrepreneurs) supported the right-wing cause and associated closely with German farmers. The leadership, found itself at a loss to discourage the associations, and to develop a consistent war ethic that could be effectively communicated to the parishioners. This was, frankly, an impossible task. As a result, much of the decision was left up to the individuals, where the Evangelical leadership only went half way to meet the war’s demands. They prayed for peace and for the Tsar, but they failed to pray for victory.

‘The Unpatriotic Malingers’

Much as in other European countries, World War I in Russia kicked off with a series of patriotic parades and demonstrations. While the victory was considered sure and imminent, the war itself was proclaimed holy. In the Second Great Patriotic War, as it was called,\(^60\) Russian soldiers marched in the parades with slogans and images of Mother Russia they swore to protect. The use of a portrait of an aged woman with tearful eyes full of compassion was more than just a sentimental gesture to the troops. The maternal imagery was to communicate to the soldiers whom they defended, for whose cause they fought. Failure to keep and protect was an abomination in society’s eyes, an abhorrent neglect of a man’s duty. Yet, even though the soldiers soon realized that they were not fighting for Mother Russia but for Father Nick and

\(^{58}\)Quoted in A. Reinmarus, and G. Friesen, *Mennonity* (Moscow: Bezbozhnik, 1930) 34.

\(^{59}\)A paraphrase from I. Vostorgov, “Yeshyo O Nemetskoy Vere, Otvet g. Fetleru,” *Pravoslavnyi Blagovestnik*, No. 12, 1914, pp 4-7; quoted in Steeves, 93.

\(^{60}\)Soviet historians later rejected the name, officially placing the title “Second Great Patriotic War” to WW II.
Uncle George, malingering and desertion were still viewed as immoral crimes in the military ranks.

They were signs of individual opportunism, and of self-preservation at the expense of others. Many Evangelicals were charged with these crimes. Reel 29 of the CMBS Collection contains several files about hundreds of Evangelical Union members, Baptists, Malevantsy, Tolstovtsy, Adventists who refused to take up arms or to accept the draft. Andrew Q. Blane states that by 1916 there were 837 sectarians who refused to be conscripted.\(^{61}\) Yet, this figure applies only to conscription. While in the army, hundreds more deserted or refused to shoot at the enemy. Many preached the peace message among the troops, “love your enemy” and “thou shalt not kill” commandments. Even the hospitals where the Evangelicals served the wounded were under suspicion: as early as December 1914, the General Staff prohibited the wounded from being sent to Petrograd’s Dom Evangeliya (“House of the Gospel” – Prokhanov’s church) hospital, because of the anti-militarist propaganda soldiers there received. In 1916 the hospital was simply closed down.\(^{62}\) In that year, Petrograd Evangelical churches were closed down too, as many soldiers attended the meetings where preachers allegedly described the war as “conducted by Satan, impeding the imminent coming of the Kingdom of Christ.”\(^{63}\) Thus, not only did they conspire with Germans to destroy Russian culture and with Socialists to overthrow the regime, but the Evangelicals now also viewed the war as threatening their beliefs, hoping for soon Christ’s return.

At the outset of war, the Baptists and the Evangelical Union believers reassured the government of their support of the war effort. Some even could pinpoint military obligations as formulated in their official theology. The 1906 Russian Baptist Confession of faith declared the believers to be “obligated” [obyazany] to perform “military duty.”\(^{64}\) Evangelical Christian Confession of Faith (developed by P. M. Friesen in 1903, later revised by Prokhanov) stated that

\(^{61}\)Blane, 95. Klibanov only lists 343, page 335. However, not all Evangelicals called themselves ‘Baptists’ or ‘Evangelical Christians,’ some avoiding to mention any denominational affiliation fearing that as a consequence, their ministers could be exiled. Considering also sectarians’ pacifism within the army ranks, it is very hard to give an adequate and final number of the Evangelical pacifists.

\(^{62}\)TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 331.

\(^{63}\)Ibid. August 11, 1916 report from Department of Religious Affairs.

“we consider military service to be a duty, but have fellowship with those who think otherwise.” Yet, in chapter XI of the Evangelical Christian Confession of Faith (“On the Freedom of the Christian and Freedom of Conscience”) believers were urged to pray to “uphold peace,” and “reject violence.” This certainly reflected some of the pacifist inclinations within the Evangelical community but also addressed the individual beliefs of each member. Throughout the year 1915, I. S. Prokhanov, kept up correspondence with the military and civil officials attempting to persuade them of the Evangelicals’ loyalty in service. When Novorossia Governor General Ebelov deported a number of ministers to Western Siberia (Tomsk region), Prokhanov appealed in February 1915 against the “bogus stories” (fantasticheskiye razskazy) of Evangelicals’ pacifism and pan-Germanism. He stated that the ministers should remain in South Russia to serve the parishioners whose sons went to war. Ebelov, in return, sent a list of sectarians who refused to fight or to be conscripted in Simferopol and Berdyansk uyezds, including a statement collected from one Evangelical, that “it is better to die from execution for treason, than at the slaughter [boynya].” In the summer of 1915, Prokhanov steered away the sealing of his own Petrograd congregations by providing a list of the Evangelicals who earned military honors at the front. Yet, he could not address the issue of propaganda of “antimilitarist ideas” that were becoming common by late 1915. By the end of 1916, the augmentation of war fatigue was also felt among the Evangelicals. In January 1917, Chief chaplain of the Military and Navy reported to the Commander V. I. Romeiko-Gurko:

“Thousands of them refuse to fight. They believe that they rather would go to jail than to fight, because ‘while we are in jail, your Orthodox soldiers die in the battles, but our life God saves for His miraculous purposes….’” Sectarians hope

65My priznayom voinskuyu povinnost’ kak obrok, no imeyem obshcheniye s tem kto inatche myslet v etom voprosye. Article XVI, Veroutcheniye Yevangel’skich Kristian (St. Petersburg: Raduga Publications, 1910) 40. Istoriya Yevangel’skich Kristian Baptistov v SSSR (Moscow, AUECB, 1989) 440-447 contains a description how P.M. Friesen compiled the original Ev. Christians’ Confession of Faith in 1903, how it was approved at the 1909 Ekaterinoslav and Odessa Evangelical Christian conferences, and later slightly revised (and published) by Prokhanov in 1910.
66Ibid. 26.
67TsGIARF, Fond 1292, Opis 5, Delo 340.
68Ibid., response of Governor-General Ebelov to Menkin.
69Ibid., Prokhanov’s letter.
70Golovashchenko, 161.
for the revolution, which according to them, is supposed to happen soon, stating that ‘we would sweep you away with the palms of revolution.’”\textsuperscript{71}

According to him, “the sectarians in the army are more dangerous than the ones who refuse to take up arms.”\textsuperscript{72} Because, it is in the army that they would conduct the propaganda, attempting to convert other disenchanted soldiers. Their subversive behavior proved to the Imperial military authorities that the Evangelicals were conspiring to preserve themselves while letting others fight for the Monarchy. Perhaps, the enemy’s victory could even be advantageous to them, they thought. The antimilitarist trends were not particularly strong in the cities. In Prokhanov’s correspondence with the authorities, evidence of popular support and enlistment was documented mostly in cities – Petrograd, Moscow, Odessa, Samara. The list of the sectarian malingerers within the army on Reel 29 contains no persons from a major city. Most were from rural areas, where local pressures against Evangelicals always tended to be stronger, and the central government’s reach weaker. It was there, that the dissenting peasants nurtured their understanding of the Gospel, based on the literal approach to many passages, including the Sermon on the Mount.

The leadership’s attempt to rally unanimous support of the war among believers was almost as vain as the attempts of the Imperial government to fight it victoriously. Many peasant believers were prepared to stand by their convictions – after all, they were much better adapted to persecution than their brethren in Petersburg. By the early 1920s, Prokhanov courted Bolshevik government (with limited success) for recognition of Conscientious Objector status for Evangelicals, as the pacifist beliefs constituted some of their values. Overall, the world war experience taught the Evangelical leadership about the dangers of political alignment, and contributed to their search for neutrality in relations with the state. It also attributed to future bitter relations between the sectarians and the militaristic Communist state, which may have appreciated Evangelical opposition to Tsarism on one hand, but wanted even greater loyalty, on the other. There was also bitterness between those originally loyal to the Tsar (who fled the country and formed émigré communities abroad) and new Prokhanov-style leadership seeking cooperation with the Soviets. Yet political non-alignment even now continues to play a

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 162-163
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid.
prominent role in shaping the framework of Evangelical-Baptist relations to the state, as these
groups grow and consolidate themselves in the countries of the post-Soviet world.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In a sense, the internal public policy toward the Evangelicals during World War I was the
1905 Manifesto put on trial. Liberties that were granted in 1905-1907 were now either suspended
or abolished. The pursuit of military victories prompted significant civil liberty restrictions. Yet,
this state of emergency led to policies that in no way relieved the country. These limitations of
rights and liberties as well as military losses in many ways caused a more rapid deterioration of
the institutions of Russian monarchism and overall order inside the country. The conspiracy
theories created to implicate the sectarians were neither provable nor successful. But they did
produce a sense of insecurity, among believers, after so blatant a shattering of their 1905
freedoms.

What followed in the 1920s were new freedoms, and significant improvements in their
plight, but the horrors of Stalinism eradicated any hopes for a peaceful coexistence of the
minority and the majority in Russia. It is no surprise that many Evangelicals today still view
most freedoms with suspicion, and that the majority of Baptist-Pentecostal emigrants left the
former Soviet Union after 1991. This was all despite the fact that precisely in 1991 the
Evangelicals were granted the most extensive civil and religious freedoms ever. Their experience
for the last 150 years, however, was unfortunately one of continuing bust-and-boom, emigration
and restrictions. Only time will tell how secure they can be in the new Russia (or new
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, etc.), a country leaping to bridge the gap between itself and
the West.