Traditionally epistemologists have taken doxastic states to come in three varieties—belief, disbelief, and suspension. Recently many epistemologists have taken our doxastic condition to be usefully represented by credences—quantified degrees of belief. Moreover, some have thought that this new credal picture is sufficient to account for everything we want to explain with the old traditional picture. Therefore, belief, disbelief, and suspension must map onto the new picture somehow. In this paper I challenge that possibility. Approaching the question from the angle of suspension, I argue that all possible credal accounts face serious challenges. They either (i) falsify central claims that uphold the credal picture itself or (ii) do not permit suspension in cases where it is permissible or (iii) rule out the possibility of plainly possible confidence comparisons.
del Rio, Andrew, "Suspending Belief in Credal Accounts" (2022). Faculty Publications - George Fox School of Theology. 435.
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: " del Rio, A. (2021). Suspending Belief in Credal Accounts. Noûs, 1–22." which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12438. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
Accepted for publication at Noûs.